State and Non-State Actors in Evacuations During the Conflict in Lebanon, July-
August 2006i
in: Khalid Koser and Susan Martin (eds) (2010)
The Migration-Displacement Nexus: Concepts, Cases and Responses, Berghahn Books.
Ray Jureidiniii
American University in Cairo
rayj@aucegypt.edu
Introduction
In this chapter I detail various actors involved with the humanitarian and evacuation
efforts during the Lebanese crisis. It is argued that assistance and protection of foreign
nationals in conflict zones varies considerably. The wealthier countries generally have the
willingness and capacity to evacuate their citizens but the situation for the often larger
number of foreign nationals from poorer countries is much more ad hoc and dependent
upon international assistance (in the form of donor support and intergovernmental
organizations), local government and NGO willingness and capacity to act. The chaos
that followed the Israeli invasion included foreign governments clambering to evacuate
their nationals, largely to the exclusion of others. Where foreign governments had no
capacity to do so for their citizens, local and international organizations, with external
funding, stepped in to assist.
For 33 days, from 12 July to 14 August 2006, the Israeli invasion against Hizbollah
forces in Lebanon left much of the country’s infrastructure destroyed: the airport, 109
bridges, 137 roads, 127 factories and a power station. “Housing, water facilities, schools,
medical facilities, numerous mosques and churches, TV and radio transmission stations,
historical, archaeological and cultural sites also suffered massive damage” (OHCHR,
2006: 3; see also UNEP, 2007). The conflict resulted in over 1,100 civilian deaths
(Human Rights Watch, 2007); many thousands were wounded and over 1 million
displaced. Around 180,000 managed to find refuge in Syria and another half a million
fled to the mountains where they were sheltered in schools and families who took them in
(Murphy, 2006). The Israeli invasion also created a crisis for foreigners and migrant
guest workers in the country. Reportedly, around 60 foreign civilians died and many
wounded (precise numbers of wounded are not available) including nationals from
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait,
Nigeria, Palestine, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Syria, Ukraine and the United States. 33 farm
workers, mostly Syrians were killed by Israeli air attacks, as they were loading a truck
with fruit in the Bekaa Valley (IRIN, 2006).
Drawing on reports from various countries, on 10 august 2006, a list of countries with
foreign nationals in Lebanon at that time was posted on the web. Although not exhaustive
and by no means reliable, it listed the following: Sri Lanka (80,000), Canada (50,000),
Philippines (30,000), Australia (25,000), US (25,000), UK (22,000), France (20,000),
Bangladesh (20,000), Egypt (15,000), India (12,000), Sweden (7,000), Denmark (4,100),
Nepal (4,000), Venezuela (4,000), Germany (2,600), Greece (2,500-5,000), Russia
(1,500), Romania (1,200), Armenia (1,200), Ukraine (1,200), Poland (329), Moldova
(240), Mexico (216 wishing to be evacuated), Bulgaria (207 wishing to be evacuated),
Iran (200), Ireland (161), Cyprus (102), Croatia (58), Slovakia (56), Peru (50),
Kazakhstan (31), Malaysia (1) (Wikipedia, 2006). To this should be added Italy, Ethiopia
(20,000) and Sudan, Ghana, Vietnam, Cameroon, Seychelles and Madagascar (numbers
unknown, but see numbers of evacuees below).
In total, some 70,000 foreign nationals were evacuated from Lebanon, mostly from
around the 16th July, 4 days after the war began. In all, 213 passenger and navy ships, 123
land convoys and 196 helicopters docked in or traveled through Lebanon during the
evacuation period. Despite the huge chaos of cars, buses, trucks and military vehicles
clambering over the damaged highways and bridges, the Israeli military indicated and
coordinated approved routes for evacuation convoys throughout the country (Human
Rights Watch, 2007: 246).
Lebanon is a party to six of the seven major international human rights instruments:
(CERD, ICESCR, ICCPR, CEDAW, CAT and CRC). However, it has not ratified the
2003 Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
their Families (MWC), nor it is a signatory to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, nor the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (OHCHR,
2006a).
What are the rights and obligations or responsibilities for protection and evacuation of
migrants, or non-nationals in a situation of conflict? The MWC does not specifically
mention migrants in crisis circumstances and thus it is a gap in the convention that
purports to be overwhelmingly comprehensive on migrant workers’ rights. International
humanitarian law does provide a general need for protection of civilians in times of war
and foreign nationals are protected as civilians in relation to military decisions that may
result in civilian casualties. The Fourth Geneva Convention,iii Article 35 also stipulates
that any person not involved in fighting during a conflict, including aliens in the territory
of a party to the conflict (Article 48),
who may desire to leave the territory at the outset of, or during a conflict, shall be
entitled to do so, unless their departure is contrary to the national interests of the
State. The applications of such persons to leave shall be decided in accordance
with regularly established procedures and the decision shall be taken as rapidly as
possible. Those persons permitted to leave may provide themselves with the
necessary funds for their journey and take with them a reasonable amount of their
effects and articles of personal use.
Although originally specific to nationals of one of the warring parties who wish to leave
the country under occupation, the general terminology employed in the Convention
would also make sense in applying it to non-national civilians residing in a country under
conflict.
Following from the above, Article 36 stipulates that departures “shall be carried out in
satisfactory conditions as regards safety, hygiene, sanitation and food.” Importantly,
however, from the point of exit, the responsibility for the costs of repatriation are to be
met by the country of destination (in the case the destination is not the country of origin,
but a neutral country) or by the country of origin. This is to ensure that the right to leave
the territory can be realized despite lack of financial resources. Although there is no
provision for the cost of travel to the frontier, it is assumed that the authorities of the host
country would facilitate their departure if such costs were an obstacle to their flight
(ICRC, 2005).
Perhaps more indirectly, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963) conceives
consular functions to include helping and assisting their nationals (Article 5e) as well as
“protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals,
both individuals and bodies corporate, within the limits permitted by international law”
(Article 5a). It may be assumed that this applies regardless of conditions of peace or
conflict in the host country. Finally, the United Nations Security Council, Resolution
1296 (para.8) also emphasizes the need for “safe and unimpeded access of humanitarian
personnel to civilians in armed conflicts” (UNSC, 2000).
In large part, most of the above principles were complied with during the Lebanese crisis.
The extent to which the actions of the various states did so out of moral or civic
responsibility or out of legal obligation may be worthy of research and discussion
elsewhere. There was little immediate evidence of direct intervention by the Lebanese
governmentiv other than a role in coordinating and facilitating the assistance of local and
international NGOs and international aid agencies. A somewhat late appeal for
humanitarian aid in late July by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA) followed a consultative process within the Inter-Agency Standing
Committee (IASC) with the assistance of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. A
regional Task Force was established to liaise with the Israeli authorities.
The Lebanese Government did establish a Higher Relief Council as the main
coordinating body to coordinate crisis activities.
Cooperation was also fostered with the considerable Lebanese NGO and civil
society presence (over 6,000 organizations) to deliver health, food and nutrition,
water and sanitation, logistics, protection, shelter, and common services
[particularly for the hundreds of thousands of internally displaced]... In addition to
the response inside Lebanon, the Government of Syria and the Syrian Arab Red
Crescent Society (SARC) [took] a lead role in registering, accommodating and
assisting the most vulnerable of the people displaced there from Lebanon.
(OCHA, 2006)
UNHCR sent emergency mobile teams to the main transit routes between Syria and
Lebanon. The World Health Organization (WHO), the Swiss Cooperation, World Vision
and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) provided various health care facilities and supplies,
assisting hospitals, throughout the main affected areas of the country and continued after
the war with those returning or attempting to return to their homes (WHO, 2006).
While the figures show a large number of foreign nationals being evacuated from
Lebanon, it is not clear how many were dual nationals, how many were visiting, on
holidays, or how many could have been classified as “migrants”. In addition, it is not
clear whether the many foreign skilled professionals, including business investors,
entrepreneurs, managers of transnational corporations, embassy personnel, UN
institutions, international NGO staff and the like, may be categorized as migrants or
migrant workers in Lebanon. It is important, however, to get a sense of the differences in
scale of various country operations that were mobilized to evacuate their nationals.
Foreign Government Actions on Behalf of Expatriates in Lebanon
The developed nations, particularly those with close ties to Israel and sophisticated
resources that could be activated quickly in the region, acted relatively promptly
(although there were critics from many countries who thought they should have moved
more quickly). However, each country had set its objective to rescue its own citizens
from the conflict in the first instance. Just as sovereign nation states have a right to
determine who enters their country, so it was that there were significant differentiations
based upon nationality in the evacuation processes from Lebanon. The examples show
how they rallied to assist their expatriates in Lebanon, with varying levels of military
sophistication.
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) “Operation Ramp”, led by the Australian
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, took over 5,000 Australian nationals as well as
1,350 other “approved foreign nationals” from the ports of Tyre and Beirut. In all,
Australia charted 17 ships, 22 Australian aircraft and over 470 buses. Within 24 hours of
the first notice being given to the service members, an advance party had departed
Australia. The remaining forces departed in the following 24 hours (McDonald, 2006). A
Hercules air carrier based in Cyprus, for example, transported Australian citizens “from
Larnaca to regional transport hubs and between Mersin and Ankara in Turkey. Capable of
transporting 130 evacuees each flight, the Hercules made its first flight from Cyprus to
Turkey on July 23” (Airforce, 2006). Initial evacuations prioritized families with children
and the handicapped who boarded a British warship already in the port of Beirut (AAP,
2006).
The French sea and air mission “Operation Baliste” employed armed forces to evacuate
French nationals as well as conveying humanitarian aid and engineering personnel as
reinforcements for their contingent in UNIFIL (including prefabricated steel Bailey
bridges immediately the war ceased). Around 14,500 people were evacuated from
Lebanon, including 11,300 French; two thirds using military means (Ministère de la
Défense, 2006). Two amphibious operation ships and two frigates provided hospital
facilities, combat and transport helicopters and landing craft. The French prioritized those
who were allowed to board flights and ships. First preferences were given to those who
were only French nationals; second, French who were visiting or on holidays in Lebanon;
third, Lebanese residents with dual Lebanese and French passports. Around one third of
French evacuees were nationals of other countries which are unknown, but included
European and United States citizens (Wikipedia, 2006).
With around 12,000 of its nationals in Lebanon, the Indian navy initiated “Operation
Sukoon”, meaning “peace and tranquillity” in Hindi, “relief” or “succour” in Urdu (Indian
Navy, 2006) sending 4 naval vessels that contained around 115 tons of aid from both the
Indian and Cyprus governments: medical supplies, clothing and blankets, antiseptics,
food, baby milk powder and canned goods (Srivatsan, 2007). Some evacuees went to
Cyprus and some direct to India through the Suez Canal. Overall, around 2,280 were
evacuated - over 1,800 Indian nationals (although some were without valid documents),
379 Sri Lankans, 69 Nepalese and 5 Lebanese (ibid). It was argued that most evacuees
were middle class expatriates, compared with the mostly unskilled migrant workers who
were unwilling or unable to leave and leave their jobs in Lebanon (Wikipedia, 2006).
The British “Operation Highbrow” committed approximately 2,500 personnel (including
ship personnel) that evacuated approximately 4,500 individuals, using Cyprus as a drop-
off point. They mobilized 6 Royal Navy vessels, a naval air squadron (including
helicopters); a royal Air force squadron, including Chinook helicopters and 4 RAF air
transport carriers; the army provided a “Spearhead Land Element” (around 800 personnel
in total) which included an “Infantry Battalion Tactical HQ and Infantry Company
Group” along with “Military Operational Reconnaissance and Liaison Teams” who flew
into Beirut on 17th July (Defence News, 2006). This was partly in direct support for Dr
Javier Solana, the European Union’s foreign policy commissioner and for the protection
and assistance of the British ambassador and embassy staff. British operations ceased on
27th July. Less than half of those evacuated were UK citizens (2,000) and the rest (2,500)
were made up of some 50 other nationalities (ibid).
The Canadian “Operation Lion” (CF, 2008) evacuated around 14,000 Canadians between
19th July and 15th August from Beirut and Tyre, to Cyprus and Turkey from where they
boarded flights to Canada. With an Emergency Operations Center in Ottawa, thousands
of phone calls and emails per day were made to those who were registered with the
embassy in Beirut. From the outset of the crisis, the number of registrations quadrupled to
40,000. The government established an interdepartmental taskforce, chartered aircraft and
ships (seven) and deployed over 350 officials to Beirut to assist with the evacuations. The
first airlift of 261 evacuees from Cyprus was taken by the Prime Minister, Stephen
Harper, in his aircraft and the rest were placed with Skylink and Air Canada flights
(Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, nd). The size and the cost ($85 million)
of the Canadian evacuations created considerable controversy for some time afterwards,
particularly when, by mid-September, half had already returned to Lebanon. Questions
were raised regarding the government footing the bill for non-resident and non-taxpaying
Canadian citizens abroad - and because an exception was made in this case to the normal
requirement that evacuees reimburse the government (CTV, 2006).
The United States, in “Operation Strengthen Hope” established Joint Task Force
Lebanon and evacuated around 15,000 of its estimated 25,000 citizens in Lebanon at the
time (U.S. Navy, 2006). A cruise ship the Orient Queen was leased to ferry evacuees to
Cyprus and from there charter flights were arranged to multiple U.S. destinations (CNN
2006). The cruise ship was guarded in the Mediterranean by two U.S. navy destroyers.
Claimed to be one of the largest evacuations in military history, it was not without some
initial controversy. As evacuees boarded, they were advised of a standard practice of
charging individuals for their repatriation. It was unclear what the US government was
charging - whether normal commercial fees, or $300 per person. While no-one was
prevented from boarding aircraft or ships because they did not have the cash or a cheque,
there was an expectation that they would be billed for reimbursement later. Following
outrage in Washington, on 18th July, the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced
that the charges would be waived (CNN 2006a).
Because of their proximity to Lebanon in the Mediterranean, the other countries that were
able to mobilize their own naval vessels were Greece, Italy and Turkey. Greece used a
fleet of ferries almost immediately and evacuated between 2,500-5,000 people to Cyprus
and Piraeus. They included not only Greek nationals but also citizens of the European
Union, U.S.A. and “other Western nationals” (Wikipedia, 2006a: 3). On July 17th an
Italian destroyer evacuated 350 Italians to Cyprus and then to Rome with Alitalia airlines.
And, rather late, on 24th July, a Turkish navy ship, escorted by two gunboats, repatriated
some 1,200 Turkish nationals.
Although it is likely to be an exaggeration, the Egyptian government estimated the
number of Egyptian nationals working and living in Lebanon at around 300,000, mainly
working in various services sectors (notably petrol stations) (Egyptian Information
Service, 2006). The Egyptian embassies in Beirut and Damascus had already established
a hotline and a “crises-management group”. Although only 5,000 were registered, the
two embassies coordinated the evacuation of around 14,000 back to Egypt. Some 500
Egyptians managed to return by car through Syria, Jordan and the Aqaba Gulf (ibid).
With routes agreed to by the Israelis, the Foreign Ministry sent many military aircraft on
an almost daily basis, using an old disused runway that had not been damaged. These
brought aid, including medicines (they established a temporary hospital in the south) as
well as milk, rice and oil and returned to Egypt with both Egyptian and Lebanese
evacuees. Navy frigates also shipped many tons of drinking water from Alexandria
(Ibrahim, 2006). One civilian ship arriving for evacuations was hit during the missile
exchanges between Israel and Hizbollah off the coast of Lebanon and had to make its
way straight to Syria (Spiegel Online, 2006). Between 3,000 and 4,000 Egyptians
avoided the $1000 fine for Lebanese immigration law violations, thanks to their
embassy’s negotiations (Ibrahim, 2006).
Other foreign nationals had their governments arrange buses to Syria and then flights on
to their respective countries. With an estimation of around 80,000 Armenians in Lebanon,
mostly Lebanese citizens, around 1,000 went by bus to Aleppo in northern Syria and then
airlifted to Yerevan. The Foreign Ministry spokesman for Armenia noted that most were
living in largely untargeted Christian areas in Beirut, and concluded: “I wouldn’t say
there is widespread desire [to escape to Armenia] at the moment” (Armenia News, 2006).
Almost 1000 Brazilians were bussed to Adana, in Turkey where they were provided with
evacuation aircraft from Brazil (one being a famous former presidential Boeing 707)
(Wikipedia, 2006a). By the 21st July, almost all of the 7,000 Swedish nationals in
Lebanon were transported by boat to Cyprus. Some 5,000 were evacuated almost
immediately because of an organised sms mobile phone messaging system that enabled
them to gather in a hotel and leave in an orderly manner to a Malaysian ship waiting for
them (Farrell, 2006, Whittaker, 2006). Finally, cooperation between Russia and the
Commonwealth of Independent States, enabled around 1,400 Russians, 1,100 Romanians,
400 Ukrainians and 150 Moldovians to reach Damascus by bus and airlifted from there to
their respective countries (Wikipedia, 2006a).
In the aftermath, the Canadian government made it clear:
The issue of available resources also highlights the need for greater coordination
between Canada and its international allies, including the United Kingdom, the
United States, Australia, and France. The attempt by many countries to
unilaterally secure the necessary transport resources for evacuating their nationals
created a situation of competition amongst countries for available resources,
whether this competition was intended or not. Countries with greater military
resources than Canada were able to begin the evacuation of those in greatest need
at an earlier time than Canada. There was also a subsequent event where a vessel
chartered by Canada for evacuation from the port of Tyre left at half capacity. To
improve effectiveness and efficiency, Canada should work with officials
bilaterally and through the G8 and NATO to devise strategies to ensure that in
future cases of mass evacuation, Canada and its allies cooperate to the maximum
extent possible to secure and evacuate their respective nationals. (Canadian
Senate Report, 2007)
The competitive situation referred to by the Canadians was evidenced when a ship
chartered by the Australians was found to have been double-booked. The Canadians
came to the rescue and took 100 of the 300 Australians scheduled to leave to southern
Turkey on the 19th July (AAP, 2006).
In the panic for safety, governments with serious evacuation plans and registries with the
names and contacts of their nationals in Lebanon were better able to manage their
protection and eventual evacuation. Diplomatic relations with the invading forces also
enabled safe passage of the various means of transport used. The Canadian call for better
coordination and cooperation between its “allies” could be developed further in a more
universalistic humanitarian sense of protecting and assisting any foreign national in need
of evacuation in such crisis conditions. In the Lebanese case, neutral countries were used
as transitional drop-off points (such as Cyprus and Turkey). This means that those
countries with the means for mass evacuations need not be so xenophobic in allowing any
other nationals to board whatever transportation they have garnered without fear of
breaching their sovereignty rights of entry restrictions to their own borders. Of course this
begs the issue of the willingness and facilities of neutral countries to allow mass entry to
their territories while others do not. The question is whether discriminatory policies in
such crisis circumstances are morally appropriate.
International Agencies, NGOs and ‘Third Country’ Nationals
At least 6 Sri Lankan domestic workers were killed along with the families who
employed them. For example, on July 13, the first day of massive air strikes, Israeli
warplanes destroyed the home of Shaikh `Adil Muhammad Akash, an Iranian-educated
Shi`a cleric believed to have a religious affiliation with Hezbollah, killing him, his wife,
and his 10 children aged between two months and 18 years, and their Sri Lankan maid
(HRW, 2007:10). At least two Filipina domestic workers died while trying to escape
from the high rise apartment buildings where they worked, when their employers refused
to allow them to leave (Uy, 2006; Docena, 2006; Snyder, 2006).
As many as 10,000 people arrived at the Syrian border each day including tourists from
the Gulf States and many poor Palestinians. While only around 1000 Palestinians were
allowed entry to Syria, paying a nominal entrance fee, some 200 were stranded for weeks
in no-man’s land at the border, unable to enter, when the Syrians inexplicably required
approval from the PLO (Murphy, 2006). With around 400,000 Palestinians still
languishing in refugee camps around Lebanon (constituting around 10 per cent of the
population), many thousands were trapped in the south where most of the Israeli
bombardments were focussed (along with the southern Shia suburbs of Beirut). UNRWA,
the United Nations agency responsible for Palestinian refugees attempted to assist by
trying to supply water, electricity and food, particularly in Ein El Helwa, the largest camp
in the south.
Although there are no reliable figures (or official records) of the migrant population in
Lebanon, estimations suggest that, prior to the conflict, there were over 160,000 female
migrant domestic workers as the largest single occupational group of foreign nationals
(100,000 Sri Lankans, 30,000 Filipinas, 30,000 Ethiopians as well as an unknown
number of Indians, Bangladeshis, Nepalese, Ghanaians and Nigerians) (Jureidini, 2005).
The key to understanding the plight of these particular guest workers is their lack of
access to information and social services, partly because of language problems and partly
because they are secreted in homes and apartment buildings, which were targeted in
Southern Lebanon and in the heart of the Shia suburbs of Beirut. Under a sponsorship
system (kefala), Lebanese employers withhold the passports of migrant domestic workers
as insurance from absconding and losing their payment to the agencies. While many
employers delivered their employees to their respective embassies for safety and
repatriation, many also refused to let them leave. Many simply ran away stating that they
were escaping from abusive employers and left without papers or money. Others chose to
stay because they did not want to lose their income, because they had not been paid or
because they did not consider their situation back home to be any better (Murphy, 2006).
Reports indicated around 5 or 6 women died and others injured while attempting to
escape from high-rise apartment buildings.
The governments of Sri Lanka, Philippines and Ethiopia had neither the financial means,
nor organisational capacity to arrange for evacuations of their citizens. They relied
heavily on the collaboration of the Catholic NGO, Caritas Lebanon Migrant Center
(Caritas), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to pay for and arrange
relief, accommodation, transportation and repatriation.
Caritas had some years before established a close relationship with General Security, the
forces responsible for all foreigners in the country under the Ministry of Interior. The
relationship began from a rather controversial agreement at the time to help fund a new
detention centre which was to be located under a highway Passover, right next to the
buildings of General Security in Adliyeh. However, the arrangement did allow Caritas to
operate a health and medical office in the detention center itself and thus was also able to
monitor more closely the treatment of those in detention. The detention centre was
designed specifically for foreigners who had visa violations for one reason or another.
A collaborative emergency action had been experienced following the tsunami in
December 2004 that required the Sri Lankan embassy to deal with many hundreds of Sri
Lankans, particularly those who were illegal residents who had been granted an amnesty
by General Security to leave the country without penalty, but on condition that they leave
the country and not return for at least 5 years (AFP, 2006). Without their passports, they
arrived at the embassy which had to issue emergency travel documents which had to be
checked and signed by General Security before they could leave. Caritas not only assisted
in the procurement of exit visas, but also provided funds for accommodation, food and
airfares. Following this experience, Caritas had established a “Special Operation
Emergency” response program
Only two days following the Israeli invasion, the officer in charge of the detention centre
offered to release all inmates – around 500 – immediately. An amnesty was declared for
all illegal migrant workers on condition they leave the country and not return for at least
five years. However, Caritas could not deal with so many at such short notice so gave
priority to women domestic workers (around 200) from the Philippines, Sri Lanka and
Ethiopia, as they were deemed most vulnerable. Within two hours, the detainees were
given release papers. It was assumed that Egyptians and others would be able to garner
their own resources. Caritas secured a dormitory from a Catholic order in the mountains,
and all the children were sent home to accommodate the migrants. In conjunction with
the Syrian operations of Caritas Austria, a convent on the coast of Syria was also made
available for those who travelled north.
When these arrangements were made, IOM approached Caritas to offer the required
transportation. The IOM received around 11 million euros from the European Union,
earmarked initially for the evacuation of 10,000 migrants from developing countries, in
part as a security issue. Facilitating the repatriation directly to their home countries would
ensure that they did not seek safety in Europe. In addition, they raised $1 million from the
United States government, $2 million from Belgium, $600,000 from Australia and
$300,000 from a Qatar charity (personal communication, 28 August, 2006). Under IOM
auspices, more than 13,000 ‘Third Country’ Nationals were evacuated. The EU
delegation in Lebanon wanted Caritas to submit a proposal for the evacuation, but the
head office in Brussels decided to commission IOM with the funds they had allocated.
The first 3 buses to Damascus left Beirut on 20 July carrying 112 Sri Lankans. Over the
next 4 weeks convoys travelled almost daily either to Damascus through the eastern
Masna border. The European Union, the IOM and others were in contact with the Israeli
military to coordinate safe passage of these convoys. From the 22-24 July inclusive, as
well as the 4th and 12th August no buses left Beirut most probably because of safety
warnings. When the Masna border was bombed by an Israeli raid, buses were redirected
north and went to Tartous on the Sryian coast, before further transportation to Damascus
where the charter flights took them to their respective countries. One bus, carrying 78
Columbians on the 14th August went a little further north to Latakia, although there is no
record of them having been airlifted from Syria home before the 22nd August. A tri-
lingual booklet (in Sinhalese, Amharic and Tagalog) was produced by the Ministry of
Justice and Caritas Lebanon that cautioned domestic workers against possible traffickers.
These were distributed at the borders as they left Lebanon..
In all, there were 300 buses arranged by the IOM that carried 12, 078 passengers from
Lebanon to Syria. The countries of origin were the following: Sri Lanka, 4752;
Philippines, 3762; Ethiopia, 2396; Bangladesh, 762; Iraq, 154; Ghana, 91; Columbia, 78;
Vietnam, 77; Nepal, 24; Cameroon, 10; Seychelles, 4; and Madagascar, 4. Of course
many others took buses, cars and taxis (who were charging up to $500 for the journey) to
Syria independently. It is estimated that at least 20,000 migrant workers (not including
Lebanese nationals) were able and willing to leave the country by land (interview,
Caritas). On arrival in Damascus, they were given 48 hour visas, housed and placed on
charter flights to their respective countries (IOM, 2006: 27).
Over 85 flights, arranged by IOM (two departed from Latakia carrying Sri Lankans)
repatriated 13,318 people (90.6% females) (IOM, 2006a). The carriers included Sri
Lankan Airways, Sudan Airways (to Sri Lanka), Starjet Air (to Sri Lanka), Qatar
Airways (to Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Philippines), Etihad Airways (to Bangladesh,
Philippines), MEA (to Ethiopia, Ghana, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Bangladesh, Cameroon),
Orient-Thai Airways (to Philippines), Egyptair (to Ethiopia), Emirates (to Bangladesh)
and Kuwait Airways (to Bangladesh, Philippines). The Sri Lankan government offered to
provide free airlifts from Damascus to Colombo for its nationals, however it was not
clear how many flights to Sri Lanka were paid for by the Sri Lankan government and
how many from the EU funds through the IOM. The IOM did offer to reimburse the fuel
costs of those flights that were paid for by the Sri Lankans.
Up to two thousand Sri Lankan women camped around their embassy in the foothills of
Beirut (although many feared to go there because it is near a major Lebanese military
post that came under Israeli air attack). Initially, there was some reluctance of the Sri
Lankans to cooperate with Caritas as there were assumptions that it may not be
appropriate to house them in a Catholic convent in either Lebanon or Syria. Caritas
contracted two bus companies and paid for a number of the buses to Damascus through
the eastern Masna border, as well as many who were transported to Tartus and
accommodated there. Caritas staff also assisted at the borders with the paperwork for
General Security. The Caritas shelter in Damascus was also used by the IOM for housing
other nationals they were transporting. But there was overcrowding. Shelters that would
normally accommodate 300 were now required to house 1000 people.
What became clear was that because of the previous crisis experience with the tsunami,
the Sri Lankans and Caritas knew more precisely what needed to be done. The entry of
the IOM was as a novice to the particular Lebanese nuances and the entry of this large
organization created considerable tension, with some locals feeling as though they were
being marginalized. People at the embassy, in the buses and in the shelters needed to be
fed, and the IOM, it seems, was not particularly equipped to deal with these needs. There
was also a controversy over IOM staff who had rented Porsche Cayennes to travel around
the country, until complaints by the European Union delegation were made.
The crisis created dire circumstances for Lebanese families, many of whom lost their
incomes. As a result, around one quarter of the domestic workers who were taken by their
employers to their respective embassies came from areas that were not affected by the
conflict. If their contracts with the workers were about to expire, they took advantage of
the evacuations to avoid paying for their transport home. Others, who were not so
unfortunate, took advantage of the situation also. One interviewee argued: “they could
have at least paid them some of the money to help them when they return home.”
The Hariri Foundation, with a center in the south, received scores of migrant workers and
sent them on to Caritas as well as the Philippines embassy. They also provided normal
commercial tickets for a number of migrant domestic workers – including 12 employees
from the Hariri household – in order that they not have to wait for several days in a
shelter before leaving Damascus.
Noone expected the war to last as long as it did. Some families left for Syria leaving their
Sri Lankan or Filipina maid in the house, telling her they would return, but didn’t. Others
simply left to Syria, leaving the maid behind on the assumption she would not be allowed
to accompany them.
The figures show that while there was an extraordinary exodus from the country, the
battered roadways clogged with those fearful for their lives. Yet, most migrant workers at
the same time not only chose to stay, but preferred to stay. The motivations for remaining
and weathering the crisis were numerous. Some felt they had less to return to: “Of course
I am scared, but leaving is a luxury. Going back to Sri Lanka is a greater risk for our
lives. The war here is much better than dying from hunger at home” (AFP, 2006). Others
needed to maintain the remittances to their families at home: “What will I do in the
Philippines? I cannot leave. I am the only breadwinner for my mother, two young
children and two nieces” (ibid). Still others remained loyal and kept working as usual as
though it was just a phase they had to endure and for which so many Lebanese families
were grateful (see Attalah, 2006).
The Philippines Department of Labor and Employment had already insisted on a new
minimum set of conditions for contracts of migrant domestic workers to reduce the
demand for Filipina workers and improve their conditions, particularly in the Middle
East. However, the Sri Lankan government was, by contrast, reluctant to encourage their
nationals to return home, even in the face of the Lebanese crisis. On 25th July, 2006,
while evacuations were well underway, the Sri Lankan Labour Relations Minister,
Athauda Seneviratne made a public statement that the government was not encouraging
Sri Lankans to leave Lebanon and they were concerned that their families were placing
pressure on them to return home:
I don’t think a large number of people want to come back. They are used to
(conflict). The problem is that people here telephone them and ask them to return.
If these people don’t call, they will not return… I want to make sure that we send
another 400,000 workers to the Middle East this year. (Peiris, 2006)
Some of the Lebanese placement agencies played a role also. Many employers called the
agencies to either advise that their maids had fled, or to help them get to their embassy
(Shalhoub, 2006).
The plight of migrant workers from developing countries was a tenuous one compared
with those whose embassies and governments could make direct contact and make
evacuation provisions from the port of Beirut. The vulnerability of developing country
nationals was exacerbated by the long transportation overland to Syria and eventually
Damascus, either from the northern or eastern borders of Lebanon. While migrant
workers were killed by accident (mistaking commercial trucks for military vehicles) or as
“collateral damage” along with Lebanese civilians in civilian areas of the South and
Beirut, does not diminish the lack of care of the military attacks on the country that
resulted in so many civilian casualties. If it were not for the immediate funds provided by
the European Commission and the capacity of Caritas Liban along with the IOM, it may
be assumed that many more migrants would have been in direct danger. The
instrumentalist motivations of the European Commission to provide funds to fend off the
possibility of developing country nationals from seeking refuge in Europe may not be as
important as the resulting humanitarian aid that took many thousands to safety.
Conclusion
The civil and moral responsibility of governments to protect their citizens in foreign
countries is tempered by their abilities to do so, particularly in crisis conflict
circumstances. There are no international provisions to care for all people whose safety is
threatened, other than UN institutions for example, like the UNHCR but which is only
mandated in regard to “proven” refugees. As Koser (2008) points out, there is no
international law or other humanitarian provisions, or even guiding principles that
specifically address the circumstances of displaced migrants in, or who are obliged to
flee, a host country in crisis.
In the absence of international protection, countries like the Philippines, Sri Lanka and
Indonesia, who encourage labour emigration and benefit from the billions of remittances
each year, should perhaps make crisis plans for their citizens in countries that are at risk.
Conflict and other forms of crises often come without warning. Yet some countries may
be conflict-prone or politically unstable, or exist in hostile regions. It does not require
much foresight for sending country governments to undertake precautionary plans to
cater for their citizens abroad. For example, not only should their embassies be properly
resourced, but also agreements could be made with their wealthier allied countries to
protect and evacuate their nationals if required. The ignominy of the kind of
discrimination that occurred in Lebanon, as we have seen, is not commensurate with a
truly universal humanitarian response.
The relief and evacuation arrangements during the Lebanese crisis were largely ad hoc
and largely left to most citizens’ and foreigners’ own resources in their flight from
danger. Despite the fact that more Lebanese and those of Lebanese descent live outside
the country, Lebanon has not ratified the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights
of All Migrant Workers and their Families that would presumably have created a
consciousness of the rights and needs of migrants in the country, particularly in times of
crisis. They saw, for example, that their own citizens with a second nationality from a
developed country were promptly honoured with their protection. However, it behoves all
embassies of foreign nationals in countries under risk of conflict or invasion to have
evacuation plans in hand at all times – many do, but not all. In this Lebanese case, for
those citizens of countries that did not have the means to intervene on their behalf, the
sophistication of the IOM and the Caritas organization as well as the charity of the Syrian
population and government meant being able to move many thousands to safety. Other
circumstances may not be so fortunate.
Given the discrepancies between countries in their means and abilities to mobilize
emergency evacuation procedures, there is a dire need for the development of
international humanitarian law to address and make clear the rights of migrants who are
inadvertently placed at risk due to war or other crises in a host country. One of the main
lessons to be learned from the Lebanon case is that not only migrant rights need to be
addressed, not only obligations on the part of the host government and other parties to the
conflict, but also on all governments to come to the aid of non-nationals. It is obvious that
such obligations require international agreements that are best ratified under United
Nations conventions.
The gap in the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and their Families to cater for the protection and evacuation of migrant workers from
crisis or conflict conditions in host countries is a major flaw that needs to be rectified.
However, this convention to date has been rather weak in the number of migrant
receiving countries that have ratified it. Given also that other human rights conventions,
such as the Geneva Conventions, have no provisions for migrant workers, or non-
nationals who are not nationals of the warring parties, there would seem to be
justification for a UN convention that specifically addresses the rights and requirements
of migrant workers (and/or non-nationals generally) in host countries under all crisis
circumstances. As noted, it was only in the Canadian Senate that some reflection was
given to the competitive chaos in the clamber of countries to rescue their own nationals in
Lebanon and called for more cooperation. Perhaps a new convention that took the spirit
of the 1951 Refugee Convention and applied it to migrant workers required to flee a host
country in conditions of crisis, might oblige all nations to allow entry of any nationality
to their rescue ships, aeroplanes and other means of transportation used for evacuations.
Whether and to what extent states will be willing to help nationals other than their own,
regardless of nationality, gender, age, religion or socio-economic status, remains to be
seen.
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i
The focus of this paper will be on Lebanon alone.
ii
My thanks to Marise Habib for her assistance as well as Mr Farouque Mohsen, then Sri Lankan
Ambassador in Lebanon, Najla Cahda of Caritas Lebanon, representative of the European Union delegation
in Lebanon, the International Organization for Migration in Lebanon and many others who gave of their
time during hectic schedules. Thanks also to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies, Geneva, for permission to use material from my short publication on the topic “Guest Workers in
the Lebanese Crisis” in the World Disasters Report, 2007. All errors and omissions are, however, the
responsibility of the author.
iii
Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949. At
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/geneva07.htm
iv
Such as it was at the time, with Hezbollah members and their allies boycotting the Parliament during
negotiations for certain veto rights.
