Foreign policy of the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic in Central Asian region

Kuralay Maksut Tese de doutoramento Foreign policy of the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic in Central Asian region Departamento de Ciencia Política e da Administración Facultade de Ciencias Políticas e Sociais Santiago de Compostela 2014 Foreign policy of the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic in Central Asian region at the contemporary stage CONTENT ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 4 I. Research background and theoretical framework 5-21 II. Institutional analysis: Eurasia -two continents and one region A. Institutional changes in Central Asian countries 22-24 B. “Non Statehood” European Union and International relations 25-31 C. Similarities, peculiarities, converging issues and diverging policies 32-44 D. Slovak institutional and political reshapes 45-59 E. Czech Presidency in EU – Czech Government and Institutional Transition 60-67 III. The foreign policy of Czech Republic and Slovak Republic in Central Asia A. Implementation foreign policy of Czech Republic and Slovakia: perception of changes. 68-76 B. The strategy of the European Union in Central Asia 77-91 C. The objective conditions and prerequisites for the development of relations of Czech Republic and Slovak Republic with Central Asia countries 92-108 D. Czech approach 109-111 E. Slovak approach 112-115 IV. The policy analysis in the region A. Influence and conditionality of main actors in the region and beyond 116-233 B. The development of trade, economic, financial, technology transfer and cultural cooperation among Czech and Slovak Republics and Central Asia counties 234-279 V. CONCLUSIONS 280-288 VI. APPENDICES VII. BIBLIOGRAPHY AND DOCUMENTATION 1  La política exterior de la República Checa y Eslovaquia en la región de Asia Central Resumen La región de Asia Central postsoviética (antiguas repúblicas socialistas soviéticas que comparten fronteras con Afganistán), en particular, la llamada “Gran Asia Central” o “Eurasia Balcánica” tiene importancia geopolítica para los actores globales. La zona ha sido centro del pluralismo geopolítico y del multiculturalismo, origen de numerosos problemas étnicos y tensiones. Muchos expertos coinciden en señalar la importancia geoestratégica de Asia Central. Por esta razón, se subrayan dos factores fundamentales: en primer lugar, el descubrimiento de las reservas de hidrocarburos y en segundo lugar, su transformación en un importante centro de transporte que conecta Europa, China, Rusia, la región del Cáucaso, la región del Trans- Caspio y el Océano Índico. Como he señalado en la tesis, la formación institucional, la transformación para el apoyo de la economía y la democracia liberal es una tarea difícil para todos los países de la región. Por lo que respecta a la calidad institucional, ninguno de estos países han sido capaces de crear instituciones que se encuentren al mismo nivel que las organizaciones de los países altamente desarrollados. La revisión de la política de la UE en Asia Central y en particular, la dirección regional, es importante en términos de la identificación de las características, pues evalúa el funcionamiento de la acción exterior del conjunto de la UE. Al ser miembros de la Unión Europea, la república Checa y la república Eslovaca están promoviendo los intereses e ideas de la Unión Europea. Al mismo tiempo, complementan los programas y proyectos en diferentes países mediante la ayuda al desarrollo que la UE proporciona. Todo ello contribuye a garantizar la seguridad y la estabilidad a nivel global, así como a prevenir conflictos en los ámbitos regional y local, además de reducir la migración no deseada, proteger el medio ambiente, promover la democracia, el respeto de los derechos humanos y libertades fundamentales y, también fortalecer el estado de derecho. En esta tesis se presentan los roles de los actores de la región de Asia central, un análisis cuantitativo de los países, así como los datos de nivel de cooperación económica y los cambios institucionales en los países de la región. Con este trabajo se está tratando de componer una tarea aparentemente imposible: la creación de la Gran Asia Central en la región asiática, la UE como laboratorio avanzado del enfoque del capital político, económico, institucional, social, ambiental, cultural y humano, puesto que es una situación muy especial de unión la no condición de estado porque implica la colaboración entre países soberanos, independientes, libres. En este gran marco, las Repúblicas Checa y Eslovaca representan muy bien cómo conectar el pasado con el futuro, con la reverencia a Asia Central, en países que han sido desde hace mucho parte del llamado bloque de la URSS. Nadie podría imaginar que las Repúblicas Checa y Eslovaca serían dos pequeños laboratorios del Tratado de Roma de 1957, en el que los seis estados fundadores de la UE firmaron un tratado. ¿La UE podría convertirse en un posible ejemplo flexible y moderno para una futura agregación regional no solo en Europa y Asia, sino también en África, América latina y Asia del Pacífico? Los países de Asia central se centraron en los intereses de los principales actores mundiales y esta región, hasta cierto punto, se puede considerar como la “clave” para el futuro geopolítico y para la estabilidad de todo el continente de Euroasia. Esta tesis presenta la visión de la situación en Asia central, el análisis de los riesgos y desafíos a los que se enfrentan los países de la región, describe las posibles vías de desarrollo de la cooperación entre las República Checa y República Eslovaca en el contexto de los problemas internos y las influencias externas. PALABRAS CLAVE: actores internacionales, la importancia geoestratégica, seguridad regional, formación institucional, recursos naturales. 2  Foreign policy of the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic in Central Asian region Summary Post-Soviet Central Asian region (former Soviet Socialist Republics, sharing borders with Afghanistan) in particular, so called “Great Central Asia” or “Eurasian Balkans” according to a superficial Eurasian continent geopolitical importance to global actors. The region has been the center of geopolitical pluralism and multiculturalism, which itself engender the ethnic problems and tension. Many experts are concordant with idea that geo-strategic clarity of Central Asia today has been underscored by two principal factors: first, the discovery of hydrocarbon reserves and second, it has become a major transportation hub connecting Europe, China, Russia, the Caucasus region, the Trans-Caspian region and the Indian Ocean. We may see how it is indicated in dissertation that the institutional formation and transformation for support of economy and liberal democracy is challenging task for all countries of region. As for institutional quality none of these countries were capable of building institutions which are at the same level as highly developed countries’ institutions. Review of EU policy on a particular Central Asia, the regional direction is important in terms of identifying the characteristics and evaluates the functioning of the overall EU's external action. Being members of European Union the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic are promoting the interests and ideas of European Union, as well as complementing programs and projects in different countries by providing development assistance, which contributes to ensure security and stability at the global level as well as conflict prevention at the regional and local levels, reduce unwanted migration, the environment, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and strengthening rule of law.. External actors began to participate more directly in cooperation and support of regional structures due to recognition of their interest in the prospering and stable Central Asia. In this thesis are presented the roles of actors in Central Asian region, a quantitative analysis of country – level data, the data of economic cooperation, and institutional changes in countries of region. This dissertation as is trying to compose an apparently impossibly task: Great Central Asian region building up; EU most advanced laboratory of political, economic, institutional, social, environmental and cultural and human capital approach because it is very special condition of non statehood union, that means partnership between sovereign, independent, free countries; in this large frame the case of Czech and Slovak Republics very well interpreter how to connect the past to the future with reverence to Central Asia, for countries which has been for a long part of past century into so called USSR bloc. It is now time in the contemporary history, in international relations theories, in transnational and regional cooperation experiences, on the way all over the world to make clear the starting point of this dissertation, only EU could become a credible, fusible, flexible example and modern for future regional aggregation not only in Europe and Asia but also in Africa, Latin America and Asia Pacific quagmire. In the last process of EU enlargement still undergoing with the last membership of Croatia and ongoing negations with Balkan countries, Central and Eastern Europe had assume a great role and in bridging problems and incapability, cultural and ideological barriers historical reason of conflicts, ethnical and language tensions, as nobody could have imagine as signing the founding the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Czech and Slovak republics in this sense are two small laboratories what we have said page after page in this dissertation. Central Asian countries focused on the interests of the major global players; region to some extent can be considered as the ‘key’ to the geopolitical future and stability of the entire Asian continent. This dissertation presents the vision of the situation in Central Asia, the analysis of the risks and challenges faced by countries in the region, and described possible ways of development of cooperation between Czech and Slovak republics in the context of internal problems and external influences. KEYWORDS: international actors, geopolitical importance, regional security, intuitional changes, natural recourses. 3 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to express my profound appreciation to all, for providing an opportunity to accomplish this project. I would like to express deep feelings of gratitude to my professor and thesis supervisor Anton Trabada Losada for his valuable guidance at different stages of this research project. I am also grateful to professor Zhuldyz Tulibaeva and professor Tomohiko Uyama, head of the UN Mission in Afghanistan UNAMA Ján Kubiš, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Slovak Republic to the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, Professor Dušan Podhorsky, a leading expert of the Agency of the Slovak Foreign Policy Ivo Samson. I would like to thank my parents and friends, who helped me a lot in finishing project within the limited time. 4  Chapter I Research background and theoretical framework The purpose of this thesis is twofold, first is to demonstrate approach of institutional aspects in Czech Republic and Slovak Republic before joining EU and contemporary reshapes, to provide an analysis of gradual transformations and institutional changes which are taking place in Central Asian region after the collapse of Former Soviet Union, second - theoretical problem analyzed in this research is policy capacities of main actors in region. In particular by Haldén’s theoretical approach of “non-statehood” of EU, this thesis will attempt to propose the analysis of conceptual framework of different actors’ relations, thus by Losada’s relevance of actors’ role, connected with assessment of institutional factors, we can consider Czech and Slovak Republics as ‘small laboratories’ that have mediation and integration role of differences not only in politics and economics for Central Asian regional but also being example for building up by adopting of the EU non statehood to this very different part of Eurasia. The background of this project has emphasized on the role of institutions. As Losada in his La Politica del Mar, has identified, “the importance of institutions for analysis of politics and its outcomes of an intentional action developed under external restrictions, therefore have a subjective component: are intentioned and depend on the perceptions and preferences of affected individuals, who in turn act as a function of their perception of reality, the definition of its opinion interests and values and its own regulations 5 convictions about what is beneficial, good and right and due”, therefore the institutions have influence and effect on rule of law, property rights, honest and transparent government, freedom of press, open markets. The thesis statement is about influence of operative and credible institutions to meet a large degree of consent, such innovations and development should necessarily be rooted in and grows mainly out of political traditional processes in order to fulfill their tasks at national and international levels. These expectations are probably more linked to the aspect of concrete programs and agreements that would finally give a boost to the industrial development, the economic growth and the social market economy advancements, in this case the examples of Czech and Slovak Republics for Central Asia are becoming more important. Research problem under investigation shows acknowledgment according to Gritcenko that complete change of the structure of political institutions is not possible in short period of time; especially it concerns the role of institutional factors in transitional processes of Central Asia. It is essential for post-socialist countries the further successful institutional development, formation of regulations, procedures, and institutional changes (Gritcenko, 2005). The research and studies of EU policy in Central Asia have a scientific and serious practical interest. Central Asian is at the center of the Eurasian continent, with no ocean and continuity divide since ever, is unquestionably substantial, economic and optional geopolitical crossroads. Its conceptualization has been modified in various ways: in this context and frame we could better summarize the region ideal as a “Greater Central Asia”, a term that includes the five Central Asian countries, Afghanistan, and Xinjiang region of China (where Kazakh and Uighur people live in autonomous province quite well integrated in Mainland China). 6 Central Asia is a priority for Russian Federation’s foreign policy, security and economy due to geographical proximity of the states and closer bilateral and multilateral political, military, economic and cultural ties with the countries of the region. Nevertheless, at the same time Russia is still ranking very low in economic performances, trade, foreign investments inflows and outflows with basic industrial production then a situation non- sustainable in long run. The development of cooperation after the cold war (reunification of Germany) led to intensifying the EU policy and strengthening its presence in the region after the terroristic attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, which has updated the question of harmonization of interests and goals of the Russian Federation with the European Union, growing power worldwide, in Central Asia. The region has become one of the top priorities on the agenda at meetings of senior officials and management of the different actors, but the real strategic change is represented by the EU 28 becoming the first world industrial, economic, technologic and welfare country-Union ranking power before US and China. In recent decades, the global market of carbons reformatted and changed priorities in Central Asia, from “oil and gas” row materials, almost unique asset of balance of payment it is become urgent for Russia to trade and promote investment both national interpreters and national investors for production in for the domestic market in this moment totally importing all the goods. In other terms this means to follow economic policy of import substitution. Along with this increased interest also the significance of the region as a whole become more competitive. United States at the beforehand opportunity since 2001, hastened to gain a foothold in the region, but in the following years the two questionable wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have weakened the US options and capabilities, also because two wars has been concluded without any political and military value added, they sought only to perpetuate and consolidate their positions. Second major factor that played great role in the growth of interest in Central Asia has 7 become a global financial crisis, deeply affected US since 2008 and EU since 2010. Being two major transatlantic power buyer of great part of the regional energy resources in order to ensure its own energy security, they discover themselves fatally “dependent” from Central Asia and Middle East. EU countries in recent years apparently had become dependent on Russian supplies, with the contradiction of their vital interest but in fact developing very quickly important alternative energy already known as in the case solar and wind and some other based on hydrogen turbines mainly covered by military and technological, total confidentiality. So we assisting to paradoxes: while flooding literature as been engaged in studies on the “dependence” both of US and specifically of EU due to binging agreement of Russia and some Eurasian countries, the great jump has been done of some EU countries post on nuclear hydrogen energies. In the last ten years enormous quantity of funds as been officially under covered devoted to these alternative energies sources where now we assist and ready to experimental stratospheric jets and use in car industry for the first in the history, of the fuel cell batteries. Both these development represent the next frontier of the science vigor technology and energy challenging needs by the mean highly developed economies. All these events will not under mind the present dependency for the really reason that the interrelations between producing countries and financial markets of buying companies are a kind of twine destiny “sisters”. I mean that these great innovation, a real revolution affecting all energy consuming sectors (from industrial and electromechanically sectors; aerospace; car and automotive; all ICT system development and artificial achievements connected to super computer; transportation and logistics; ‘cold and hot’ agro industrial chain, finally the costly oil and gas pipelines, constructing and maintenance quite high costs, all these factors are bringing us closer to crucial choices not on the real question when the alternative energies will be available, “soft landing” on the proper countries, specifically ones 8 which dependent on oil and gas due to before mentioned dependence of these oil and gas supply). When we are talking of “soft landing” we are in fact opening a “Pandora box”, as world economic and industrial reality is showing the quite astonishing diverging perspectives. Why for the EU the coexistence of traditional energy producing supplies - and we talk of oil and gas, might cohabitated in the long run, for Asia first of all, also the Americas and Africa, the alternative energies we come later and then we will not assist to a crushing of the past energy and the rushing introductions of the alternative ones. 1 The main reason is related of costs of new energies and cheap availability of traditional one. Could these situations let us sleep calm nights without caring of these main changes of industrial and economic organization doing on in the world? No. There are three reasons, suggesting the main world power to be foresighted and govern the problem, and start dealing with problem since now: A. The collapse of price of oil and gas could provoke geopolitical catastrophic conflicts; B. The impact on the financial system of crushing of the traditional prices of oil and gas, could not be absorb provoking a currencies volatility and main stoking exchange, erratic trends to the point that we could assists to a systemic, dangerous and not governed outcomes. C. In the long run, the oil producing countries that today mainly under developed or in the declining grow and development performances will be obliged by the internal and external factors and pressures to start investment on their domestic industrial and trade developments. Paradoxically we could say that new energy 1 Emerging Strategic Technologies: Geopolitical Implications by N.R.F. Al- Rodhan, St Antony College, Oxford University 9  alternatives are more convincing way in almost all traditional producing countries also in the militaristic Russia and countries which still not aware of time out of the next 20-30 years. Now we come back to previous evolution of national and international policies are facing a challenges before mentioned, the important part of these programs are related to human capital, higher education, sound financial banking systems, environment, agro industrial re launching and regional cooperation, not in the form on what we have seen failing around the world but following the few successful experiences, the most relevant of them, the one of the open “non statehood” European Union 2. Are we come after specific, political, geopolitical crucial point? The adoption by the Heads of States and EU Governments in June 2007 “Strategy, a new partnership”, the EC Regional Strategy for Central Asia 2007-2013 and Central Asia Indicative Program 2011 – 2013 in relations with the countries of Central Asia, marked the transition region into the category of important foreign policy priorities of the EU and made even more urgent adjustment of Russian Central Asian policy, taking into account the European factor. Analysis of EU regional policy is also important for understanding the evolution and foreign policy, the dynamics of interstate relations in Central Asia. Review of EU policy on a particular Central Asia, the regional direction is important in terms of identifying the characteristics and evaluates the functioning of the overall EU's external action. The EU developed regional programs in accordance with the priorities of the Strategy: Among the programs are the Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE)3 which helps to control and realize the potential energy originating from Central Asia’s 2 Stability without Statehood. Lessons from Europe’s History before the Sovereign State by P.Halden, Uppsala University, Sweden. 3 The INOGATE Program supports energy policy cooperation between the European Union and the INOGATE Partner Countries. http://www.inogate.org/ 10 natural resources. The INOGATE deals with the areas of oil and gas, electricity, energy efficiency and renewable energy. This particular program provides a number of services, including practicability and technical studies, legal and institutional support, as well as technical assistance. Also INOGATE is supporting medium-sized investments in the interstate infrastructure. As the famous “Silk Way” Route went through Central Asia and provided the essential development of trade in the whole region, building roads and rail within and between the countries become a priority, to assist in this process was formed the Traceca (Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia program) which covered several transport and trade services and expertise. The projects were aiming to promote the integration and trade of the Europe-Caucasus-Asia international transport corridor and determine problematic issues in the region’s transport systems. In order to improve the regional cooperation to facilitate development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) were developed various programs for example the Central Asia Invest regional program, to stimulate the development of SMEs by means of capacity-building projects, specifically its helps develop local BIOs—Business Intermediary Organizations to support SMEs. BIOs are organized groups of commerce, trade, professional and industrial associations, bodies of regulation and agencies supporting investment, trade and commercial activities also sector-based agencies. There are programs initiated by the EU promoting regional stability, helping prevent criminal activities of drug production, trade and trafficking. To promote the anti-drug activities and improve border management currently are working two programs: 1) BOMCA - The Border Management in Central Asia program which helps to increase security in the Central Asian region, also assisting towards the contribution of legitimate trade and transit, and minimize any kind of the illicit trafficking; 2) CADAP 11 – The Central Asia Drug Action Program focus on identifying actions to address particular problems associated with illicit drug issues. In the field of disaster preparedness, during several years, the European Union is fulfilling a program DIPECHO, which covers all five Central Asian countries. The EU institutions provide the programs not only in the scope of economic cooperation but also in the educational field, one of it is: The Central Asian Research and Education Network (CAREN) and The Millennium Development Goal (MDG) for universal primary education is planned to be achieved by 2015. In Central Asian, the EU is developing a high-capacity research and education network which will provide high-speed internet for universities and research centers, also parallel to development of primary education. According to the environmental situation in Central Asia, in particular, climate change, natural disasters, desertification, and deforestation are a persistent threat. The Central Asia Environment program for protection of natural resources and is divided up into two important parts. The first part focuses on water resources and run until 2012. The second part is under development and run until 2013. All of these initiatives require close consultations and exchange between Central Asia and Afghanistan 4 and software interaction. Being members of European Union the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic are promoting the interests and ideas of European Union, as well as complementing programs and projects in different countries by providing development assistance, which contributes to ensure security and stability at the global level as well as conflict prevention at the regional and local levels, reduce unwanted migration, the environment, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 4 In mid-October 2013 Czech Republic will withdraw its troops from the province of Logar, after which retain a military presence on two military bases - in Kabul and Bagram military base. In 2014, the Special Forces will return from Afghanistan .During ISAF special operations in Afghanistan were killed 5 Czech soldiers. 12 freedoms and strengthening rule of law. 5 The EU policy in Central Asia is also the research area of institutes and think tanks in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is the only country in Central Asian region, which had upgraded program of cooperation and partnership between Kazakhstan and EU, well known as State Program ‘Path to Europe – 2009-2011’, Astana 20086. In general, researchers are full of factual information, especially regarding the interaction of the EU and Kazakhstan, and contain a detailed analysis of the formation of a common legal framework for relations between the EU and the countries of Central Asia and the dynamics of bilateral trade and economic ties. However, in the EU's external relations are poorly presented the peculiarities of the Central Asian countries, the evolution of the structure of interests and objectives of the EU in the region. Remains obscure formation of foreign policy strategy of the EU in Central Asia, the degree of self-consistency of the regional policy of EU countries and their common policy within the EU, the contradictions that arose between the EU countries in the elaboration of a joint Central Asian policy, due to the events and conflicts in the region and along all are bordering Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and the Caucasus still burning terrorism in Chechnya and Dagestan. Consideration of the main directions of cooperation between the EU and countries of the region sometimes is descriptive, in particular, no analysis of the problems that arose during implementation of aid programs in the region – the main instrument of EU policy in Central Asia, and evaluate their effectiveness. 5 Zahraniční rozvojová spolupráce, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 2013. EÚ a rozvojová pomoc, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, 2013. 6 State Program “Path to Europe” 2009-2011. Государственная программа “Путь в Европу” на 2009-2011. http://www.mfa.kz/ru/#!/informatsiya_o_kazahstane/gosudarstvennaya_programma_put_v_evropu_na_2009-2011_godyi/ 13 Scope: The issues of Foreign Policy of Slovak Republic and Czech Republic in Central Asia take place only in the sphere of diplomatic relations, it should be noted that these parties are not well informed about each other. Moreover, in the research literature all aspects of the development of relations of these countries are poorly covered. Thus, in this thesis are provided analysis with data, indexes, long and short term trends, weighted and international accepted criteria measurement social factors and outcomes to show the relations between countries. The objectives of the thesis are: 1. To focus and to analyze at institutional changes in Central Asian region and also to examine the development of relations between Central Asian states and Slovakia and Czech Republic through an analysis of policy dialogue and its outcome. 2. To analyze the process of convergence in the EU's foreign and security policy and the evolution of geographical priorities, and their total foreign activity in the period after the collapse of Soviet Union and find a place in Central Asia in the external interests of the EU, in particular in the interests of the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic. 3. To demonstrate the ratio of regional and country aspects of actors’ policies in Central Asia 4. To analyze the relevance of actors and factors that may affect the cooperation between EU and Central Asian countries within an appropriate and brand new approach to a great regional dimension. Interests are central to study of international relations. To understand relations among countries we must take into account their interests, just as analysis of foreign policies (Frieden, 1999). 14 It was mentioned by Mahoney and Thelen: “Institutional stability is a function not simply of positive feedback but of active, ongoing political mobilization, and institutions are vulnerable to change not just in moments of crisis but on a more ongoing basis. Features of the context and the properties of the institutions themselves hold the key to understanding the processes through which such change can be accomplished” (Mahoney, Thelen, 2010), the transition of some region can be explained by institutional changes as well as connections of these changes to interest of actors presented in particular region. Institutional analysis has become a central focus in comparative politics. Fueled by a wave of institutional change in developing and post communists worlds, scholars from diverse research traditions have studied how institutional design, electoral system, and other formal institutional arrangements affect political and economic outcomes. (Carey, 2000, Helmke, Levitsky, 2004) A new formats and actors are contributing for global partnerships as a form of collaboration and cooperation at different levels for implementation of international agreed goals and mechanisms. (UN development agenda, 2013). Having in mind all abovementioned references hereby is a model of questions: are there presented the relevance of actors in region, the institutional transition of particular countries, the interests of countries in region, geopolitical context and its relevance to the role of actors, is transitional stage has impact on institutional changes, what are major security issues in region, are natural resources becomes the main aspect of establishing cooperation. There were conducted few interviews as a part of field work. This model is proposed conceptual framework: 15 FIGURE 1: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK Institutions Interests Actors Central Asia Transition Geopolitical Security issues context Natural resources The theoretical significance of the research lies in the fact that this work has direct relevance for the Eastern European study. The practical importance of the work is that the results of research may be included in the lectures and seminars on Political Sciences, Area Studies and Cultural Studies. With regard to the methods used to elaborate this work, thesis compounds theoretical and methodological and concrete empirical research used in the work of domestic and foreign researcher’s monographic, comparative, typological analysis, different procedures of generalization and interpretation of empirical data. While analyzing political and socio-economic issues not only structural but also functional features are analyzed. The analysis of objective indicators (cooperation level, the various elements of institutional structure), is combined with the study of subjective (aspiration, political activity, etc.) indicators. The project is based on an analysis of different sources: official 16 documents, which include documents of diplomatic correspondence (notes, memoranda, and letters to heads of states) and the leading statesmen on foreign policy issues and international relations. To conduct the study was involved a wide range of sources, which are based on: (Founding treaties of the European Communities and the European Union, and other basic documents of the EU; - Documentary publication of the European Union institutions: the European Council, the European Commission, European Parliament; - Documents of the governing bodies of the EU and Central Asia; - Official publications, speeches, interviews and statements by officials of EU institutions, government bodies of the EU and Central Asia; - Bilateral agreements on cooperation between the EU, the EU, on the one hand, and the Central Asian countries - the other; - Documents of international organizations: the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and others; - Statistical materials Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat) and international organizations; - Materials of European, Central Asian and Russian press. In order to effectively conduct the research investigation both quantitative and qualitative approaches have been used, as well as data from Czech statistic offices and Slovak agencies due to difficulties of usage of Central Asian countries statistics, some of these countries have closed data system according to regimes ruling in these states. The statements of thesis: As it is indicated in thesis the general situation in Central Asian region might be explained by four statements: 1. The institutional building up in region by adapting models 2. The rivalry of main actors in Central Asia 17  3. Future importance of a strategic evolution of present and future of energy perspective 4. The relevance of conceptuality in national politics’ changes necessary for development of region The theoretical framework Theoretical foundation for the research Institutional and actors analysis have rich and diverse perspectives, the study of relationships between countries is particular for each region. Rational choice of theoretical approach is begun on analysis of institutions, policies, relations, and strategic choices of actors. In this thesis to develop a theoretical grounding of this research have been applied the key studies, therefore the following subsection brief review of research stream and pertinent studies. According to Al-Rodhan and Losada’s establishment of institutional framework in political traditional processes in Central Asian region have to change with purpose to address the current issues but also to be integrated in global political system. Professor Losada’s roles of actors explain perfectly the contemporary situation in Central Asia. As for relevance of influences of actors in Central Asia this thesis attempts to demonstrate the roles of global actors in region. Each actor has its own interests and thesis reveals tendency that these interests do not consider the interests of Central Asian countries. 18 The model of EU integration as an untraditional theoretical approach of “non- statehood” by Haldén, emphasizing the positive results widely not forecast by the same most outstanding research centers and International Affairs think tank, gives now to the EU an extraordinary capability to make work in full efficiency the “laboratory” of wide regional cooperation start in 1957. Three aspects of such phenomena could be considered as relevant: of course the partial transfer of sovereignty to sub-national or-transnational and regional, economic and political integration bodies; but more importantly the voluntary retreat of the State from the management of the economy and other traditional attributions; finally, the effectiveness of its action and powers to cope with the global problems and to solve them. By Dominese problem of sovereignty erosion thesis analysis reveals that Central Asia region has no systematic attempt to modernize its institutions, due to consequences of collapse of majority institutions after 1990s. Also that this region is under transition, as it is well known that well being of population determined by developed institutions, countries' policies and other factors that affect the performance of particular economies. From productivity in turn, depends on development of country: the level of income, business, budget, return on investment and potential growth. By Helmke and Levitsky’s post communist Eurasia’s institutions are dealing with clientelism, clan-based relations which are coexist with new institutions building up. The policy cooperation has a great importance for the countries in order to secure the global recovery after crisis and downsize the risks as well as to create new conditions for sustainable growth. (Lipsky, 2011) 19 This thesis draws insights on importance of institutions, relevance of actors and Central Asian regional situation, it organized in five chapters, each chapter has various sections. The first five sections are devoted to the definition and understanding of institutions in Czech Republic and Slovak Republic and in Central Asia. First chapter provides the theoretical framework of the thesis. Second chapter explores the meaning of “non- statehood”, similarities, and peculiarities as well as political reshapes, identifies the difference between institutions, showing that this region is a special case. The third discusses issues concerning foreign policy of Czech Republic and Slovak Republic, how the EU strategy was formed and contemporary situation. Forth chapter provides policy analysis in region, examines differences, influences of actors and their relevance, the instruments applied for reaching their goals in region. Finally the fifth concludes the thesis. Three of the five Central Asian countries have significant reserves of energy resources. Kazakhstan has most large oil resources among the top ten countries in the world, and the largest gas reserves - among the top fifteen. Turkmenistan has large untapped gas reserves; Uzbekistan is also a major gas producer. Russia is highly dependent on gas supplies from Central Asia. (Satbayev, 2014) The increasing importance of actors in the global economy is evident, and when the new actors have influence in development collaboration programs, this context present challenges and opportunities for EU. (Grimm, 2009) The international cooperation is different by nature if its context. Research of development cooperation is a challenging task, the development problematic do not explain dynamics of development cooperation. In the Annual Report 2012 the IMF has clearly stated that the first economic-financial power in the world is the EU, then comes 20 the US, then China and the followers Japan, India, Brazil and all the emerging countries. As result of the very focused policies of the EU to be “avant-garde” in the age of the migration from the old growth and development theories to landing on the new sophisticated topping innovative and technological stage (Dominese, 2013) By Satbayev, Krupnov,Kaukenov, Limin in this thesis are presented relations between actors in region, the geopolitical approach of China, Russia, USA, and Turkey. And, by Evseenko, Panovkin, significance of situation in Afghanistan for its neighbors and other countries. By concluding theoretical approach of thesis prevails current institutional transformation in Central Asian Region, also dynamic changes in institutions in Czech Republic and Slovak Republic; using comparative case study design, the analysis shows the formation of institutions in Central Asia is very distinctive as it took place in Czech and Slovak Republics. But there are similarities in terms of changing process of transition of centrally planned socialist economics. The process of economic transition of ex-socialist countries as Czech and Slovak Republics towards market economy may serve as example of relative success of transformation process. In studying of Central Asian region within the context of its geopolitical importance, institutional changes, relevance of actors and their interest in natural resources and transport capacities of region bring new challenges and scenarios not only in this region itself but also restructuring diplomacies, regional and international cooperation building up, enhancement of actors’ influences, their relevance in globalization and multipolarity. 21  Chapter II INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS - EURASIA: TWO CONTINENTS AND ONE REGION Post-Soviet Central Asian region (former Soviet Socialist Republics, sharing borders with Afghanistan) in particular, so called the “Eurasian Balkans” according to a superficial Eurasian continent geopolitical importance to global actors. The region has been the center of geopolitical pluralism and multiculturalism, which itself engender the ethnic problems and tension. According to some experts Uzbekistan was considered important country, being least vulnerable to the influence of Russian government, over the last decade the resource-rich Kazakhstan has also emerged as one of the leading nations among the Central Asian states. Many experts are concordant with idea that geo-strategic clarity of Central Asia today has been underscored by two principal factors: first, the discovery of hydrocarbon reserves and second, it has become a major transportation hub connecting Europe, China, Russia, the Caucasus region, the Trans- Caspian region and the Indian Ocean. Tajikistan (having in mind also that second ethnic majority in Afghanistan are Tajik people), Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (the forth ethnic majority in Afghanistan are Uzbek people) have borders with Afghanistan, with Iran in west and Pakistan to the east and south, hence the geo-strategic significance of Afghanistan is strategic environment in Central Asia. With the control of Afghanistan comes the control of the land routes between the Indian sub-continent and resource-rich Central Asia, as well as of a 22 potential corridor to Iran and the Middle East. Therefore, stability in Afghanistan, and in neighboring Pakistan, became a geo-strategic imperative. Meanwhile, Central Asia has never been a unified region and is undergoing a stormy transitional process with a various range of ethnicities and fragmented societies throughout the whole area. These ethnic 7, social divisions and lack of strong political constituent bring together the political and economic challenges. One of the challenging imbalances existing in Central Asian countries is the Soviet-era unified energy system8, in the republics and the southern part of Kazakhstan was created a single integrated water-energy complex. This imbalance provokes conflict of interests in region because Uzbekistan from the beginning strongly against the constructions of the Rogun hydropower plant in Tajikistan9 and Kambar-Ata-1 HPP in Kyrgyzstan10. Kyrgyzstan over the past eight years has gone through two revolutions, and some analysts have expressed serious doubts about the prospects of its statehood. Just a decade and a half ago ended the civil war in Tajikistan, which nearly brought to complete collapse of the state; and the situation in the ‘opposition’ regions such as Badakhshan11, remains turbulent. Both republics are members of the CSTO 12, but 7 In the 90's and in 2010 in the south of Kyrgyzstan took place ethnic conflicts between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz people, hundreds of people were killed and injured. 8 Unified Energy System of Central Asia (CA UES) is a unit of power systems, connected by lines 220 and 500 kV, running parallel with the UES of Russia through a network of Kazakhstan. The unit includes the southern part of Kazakhstan UPS, power system of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. Central Asian energy ‘ring’ is a system of almost all energy hubs of the former republics of the USSR. It consisted of 83 plants of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. 9 More information is on appendices Table 1 10 Uzbekistan regularly closes borders with Tajikistan, limits the supply of gas and electricity. It also adversely affects the development of the Central Asian region, both economically and politically, because it remains fragmented, politically unstable and poorly predictable as it depends on the will of authoritarian leaders. 11 Badakhshan – high mountain area in the Pamir (Tajikistan), historically served as a place for different cultures. Since the second half of the XIX century, a divided section of the Pamir territory between England and Russia. Geographical line of division was chosen the Pyanj River. Territory on the right bank retreated to Afghanistan, which was part of within the interests of Britain, and the left bank was given Russian part of the Emirate of Bukhara. In Badakhshan are present the separatist tendencies, the local population never called themselves as part of Tajik ethnic group, they are against official Dushanbe and President I.Rakhmon, in 2012 between local militia and Tajik military forces a violent conflict took place, the number of causalities is unknown. Nowadays part of Badakhsan is in Tajikistan, other part is in 23 whether it will intervene in another conflict is not clear. During the “second” Kyrgyz revolution in 2010, for example, CSTO refused to interfere. At once security and economic issues are the two most relevant compounds of the Central Asian countries’ engagement with the global actors. For that matter, there are elements of both competition and cooperation among the states. Their historical legacies, geo-strategic locations, and as well as all their perceived national interests are influence the political choices of Central Asian nations. The weaknesses of the new independent states in Central Asia pave the way for outside powers to interfere in their internal affairs. Afghanistan. In combat operations in the north-eastern Afghan province of Badakhshan are participating militants from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (http://www.afghanistan.ru/doc/64993.html) 12 The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), was founded on May, 1992, fundamental objective of the Organization – is to continue and strengthen close and comprehensive relations in the foreign policy, military, military- technical spheres, coordination and joint efforts in combating international terrorism and other security threats. 24  Section A Institutional changes in Central Asian countries Contemporary processes in the political sphere of Central Asia have actualized the approach of institutional aspects of the study of political issues, since at the level of political institutions have formed and changed the political norms, values, stereotypes, ideas, behavior, changes of which lead to vast consequences. The study of political institutions has a paramount place in political theory aspects, as well as comparative politics and public policy. “Institutional change will determine how society evolves over time, and thus, is a key to understanding the historical change. Institutions are developed formal (laws, constitutions) and informal (contracts and voluntary codes of conduct) restrictions, as well as factors of coercion, structuring their interaction. Together they form the incentive structure of politics, society and economy”. (North, 1990). But also the dangers and risk for humanity coming from the next decade of exponential technology and innovative introduction worldwide. We must establish a truly global framework for dealing with these issues now. By the time it is politically expedient to address these issues, it will be too late. Not acting now is akin to implicit acceptance of the end of the human race as we know it. 25  (Al-Rodhan, 2011) According to Levi “as formal agreements between groups of people, whose behavior is governed by the application of clearly defined rules and decision-making authority and supported by a single person or group of persons having formal authority determines political institutions” (Levi, 1990) In general the experience the transformation of post-socialist countries is interesting and instructive, but also in their specific case institution and political leadership failed short facing the challenge of their programs. Its comprehensive analysis and general conclusions are still ahead. The collapse of the FSU 13 was widely welcomed by many countries as a sign that democracy had achieved a “victory”. In the context of post- socialist transformation, when radical change of the society foundations takes place, it becomes especially important the ratio of institutional sustainability of society, institutional, social, economic and financial dynamics. “The institutions are important for political analysis and its outcomes of an intentional action developed under external restrictions, therefore have a subjective component: are intentioned and depend on the perceptions and preferences of affected individuals, who in turn act as a function of their perception of reality, the definition of its opinion interests and values and its own regulations convictions about what is beneficial, good and right and due”. (Losada, 2000) Historical approach puts institutional stability on the existence of power. Ruling groups differ desire to adapt - to meet the political institutions their needs in the first place - the need to maintain their power and to strengthen it. 13 Former Soviet Union (FSU) 26  “Complete change of the structure of political institutions is not possible. Especially it concerns the role of institutional factors in transitional processes. If we look at the history of the market transforming economies of the former Soviet Union countries, we can see that from theoretically point of view at that time were not presented institutional approaches at all. Prevailed at the beginning of the transformation process, and especially the neo-classical monetarist methodology oriented to market self-regulation and market mechanisms imposed by the West and the International Monetary Fund, was untenable. This methodology is unable to provide theoretical tools for understanding what is happening in society and the economy within the transformational terms. In our countries, economies are transitional and unbalanced”. (Gritcenko, 2005) In order to understand what is happening and to develop a more or less adequate analysis, it should be connected the assessment of institutional factors. As many researchers note, ability to change under the influence of activities or groups of agents have only a few variables characteristics of institutions pertaining to a particular historical period. From economic standpoint the political institutions are defined as some point of equilibrium in substantial change of which no one is interested because it is fraught with firstly by uncertainties over the long term changes, and secondly, by the reluctance expend funds already spent on training institutional agents within existing institutions. The high costs factor put by supporters of the economic approach to the first place for explaining the causes of institutional stability. (DiMaggio and Powell, 1990) Political institutions play a primary role in society, notably in times of crisis, accompanied by military and economic conflicts, increasing violence in society, polarization of public opinion, even leads to social cleavages. (Weaver and Stares, 27 2001) Social upheavals forced to rely on help and protection from the state as the most important in modern society political institution that has, moreover, legitimate monopoly on force and explicit intervention force priority. Because the state is the leading political institute of modern society, it is a priority research for representatives of institutionalism approach in political science. TABLE 1: KEY SOCIECONOMIC INDICATORS IN CENTRAL ASIA Source: UN Data 2012 Life Human Poverty GDP per Education Health Average expectancy development Index % capita Index care wage Index % from GDP Countries Year Year Year Year Year Year Year 2011 2012 2012 2011 2011 2011 2011 Kazakhstan 67.4 0.754/Rank 69 0.002 12 603 0.83/Rank 3.9 630 USD USD 35 Kyrgyzstan 68.0 0.622/Rank 0.019 2 238 0.72/Rank 6.5 160 USD 125 USD 77 Tajikistan 67.8 0.622/Rank 0.068 1 935 0.70/Rank 5.8 85 USD 125 USD 84 Turkmenistan 65.2 0.698/Rank N/A 6 785 0.74/Rank 2.7 300 USD 102 USD 67 Uzbekistan 68.6 0.654/Rank 0.008 3 039 0.71/Rank 5.4 240 USD 114 USD 80 Institutional weakness of the CIS, the lack of capacity and willingness of the leaders of the new states to invest significant resources in building integration led to skepticism of many experts examining the processes of post-communist transformation. Violation of institutional order and the change of the individual subsystems lead to institutional failure and institutional system crash. The collapse of the USSR may serve as an example of institutional catastrophe and new states formation with a fundamentally different social systems, rules and regulations of public life, as well as values and priorities. Thus wise, implemented changes have a long-term impact on consequent political, economic and social development. According to UN Development Program hereby provided some main indicators of development of society in Central Asia 28 countries. The last two decades of independence these numbers had been changed radically. The peculiarity post-Soviet perception of international relations theory is that political science should pass deideolization phase. Rejection of Marxist-Leninist paradigm for many years monopolized interpretation of the mutual relations between states was not coupled with the emergence of a large number of schools and new theoretical concepts. At the same time, the absence of the Soviet period, alternative concepts in political science began to take precedence empirical studies. This circumstance could not affect currently expressed in the weak interest of experts in international relations theorizing. Post-Soviet region was then a unique region with this matter that there has the highest degree of intensity change geospatial alliances and foreign policy goal setting reformatting of states. (Shemielov, 2013) TABLE 2: KEY SOCIECONOMIC INDICATORS IN CENTRAL ASIA Source: UN Data 1991 Life Human Poverty GDP per Educatio Health care Average expec development Index % capita n Index % from wage tancy Index GDP Countries Year Year Years Year Year Year 1990 Year 1990 1990 1980-1990 1991 1990 1991 USSR Kazakhstan 68.34 Gini 350 USD Kyrgyzstan 68.30 USSR coefficient – USSR USSR USSR (exchang Tajikistan 69.29 0.920 / Rank 26 40.11 3766 0,900/ 3.5 e rate Turkmenistan 66.22 USD Rank 24 USD to Uzbekistan 69.17 Ruble 1,784) Essential for the further successful institutional development of post-socialist countries which are engaged in market transformation is the introduction in the basic institutions of institutional dynamics, i.e. formation of rules, regulations, procedures, institutional 29 change, and preparedness of subjects. Institutional dynamics should be one of the basic components of countries' development strategies. The main phases of post-communist transformation in these countries proceeded at different rates, but they have several features in common and it is determined by the desire of the former Soviet elites become a new ruling class of society based on a market economy. These elites have experience of the CPSU, with all its disadvantages: inability to work with the masses, fear of transparency in decision-making, bureaucracy and authoritarianism. As their priorities proclaimed democratic values: the division of powers, the equality of all before the law, respect of human rights. However, the opacity of government institutions, ineffective political parties that emerged after the collapse of the FSU in the post-Soviet space, not allowed bring new ideas and approaches to solving arising issues during reforms. In most post-Soviet countries underwent privatization of basic production assets, resulting in an influential stratum of large owners. Formation of a new social order was accompanied by the appearance of a new politics of post-Soviet states problems and controversies which have acquired sustainable features and began to exert a moderating impact on future development. One of issues was practically everywhere the concentration of power and property in the hands of small groups (clans) of national elites. While government and business have been tightly bound to each other, and interests of top officials and owners of leading companies and enterprises are closely interlaced. (Ryabov, 2005) Socio-economic relations and political regimes that were formed in the 90s of the twentieth century in most post-Soviet states differed clearly defined by the inequality in the distribution of power and property, lack of public control over the activities of the authorities. 30  In the first decade of post-communist transformation and the formation of regional oligarchic systems made in the context of social passivity of the population. After collapse of Soviet Union heads of all the former Soviet republics gained power with independence. In fact, the presidency grew out of the republican Communist Party structures for which these institutions has become an important tool with which it was possible to concentrate power in their own hands. Therefore most of the newly formed states’ presidents have received tremendous formal and informal power, which was legitimized by national elections. Thus originated the phenomenon of forms of power, which allows the holder to prevent a collective response by the regime elites and thereby effectively manage them. (Hale, 2005) The lack of institutional structure and the monopolization of power by restricted circle of local elites in most post-Soviet countries have gained the “family” nature, which led to a narrowing of its social base. Weak public administrations which are often connected with ruling groups, could not establish operating structure of institutes of the power. It led to those small and medium-sized enterprises, people engaged in shuttle trade business and small country farms appeared in the power of the corrupted and exploiter management system. 31  Section B An “untraditional” theoretic approach to EU as a “Non Statehood Union” One of the missing point looking at the EU from outside it for sure the lack of understanding the really nature of the institutional building and of the governance of the great result achieved with the Treaty of Rome in 1957 by the founder countries. Abandoning the traditional concept of “state sovereignty” and progressively transforming the Union into the “de facto” first word power had been a really long itinerary, large part of which done in silent and soft effective policies by the Commission, the Member Countries and lately by the European Parliament. The final stage had been the Germany reunification and the introduction of the Euro, events that pushed the global role, economic and financial power of the European Union to be tested successfully in the most dangerous structural crises occurred to the US starting the 2007, Europe starting 2010 and now Asia and the emerging countries in different ways and contamination. The positive exit from the tunnel, widely not forecast by the same most outstanding research centres and International Affairs think tank, gives now to the EU an extraordinary capability to make work in full efficiency the “laboratory” of wide regional cooperation start in 1957. By the way this model of integration has a large applicability in many other areas of the world and could become a guideline for future aggregations and unions, where sovereignty, identities, national languages, different speed and 32  flexible integration timing will avoid the growing of a new traditional power but of the main power on the example of the Roman Empire, of the West Holy Empire, of the first 50 years of the US existence and - if we really force a bit the concept of “non statehood” - of the ten centuries of the Republic of Venice great power, an example of early stage of representative, free market and internationally assertive actor in the modern political institutions history. Since the Congress of Vienna in 1814 anything has grown up to a new stage of the previous examples of “non statehood” until the EU starting up in 1957. (Haldén, 2011) The concept of sovereignty erosion or – sovereignty progressive inefficacy - became familiar to the politicians and to the scholars, although, until the 1980s’, such concepts were still reflecting theoretical rather than actual approaches. With the reunification of the two Germany, European Union start to develop even more a concept of “non statehood” governance that achieved an even more emphasis during the recent worldwide financial and economic crisis. More precisely, the diminution of state sovereignty was such to produce actual and alternative concrete solutions for the management of human communities which is, of course, the primary state function. (Dominese, 2013)14 It is quite indicative the main scientific analyses of “Stability without Statehood” by Peter Haldén,15 from the Uppsala University in Sweden, an in depth investigation on the need of stronger national players to guarantee development, growth, stability, peace in the future global governance. 14 Erosion of sovereignty and “non statehood” in global governance by G. Dominese Chairman TSN Venice-Rome and Faculty at UIBE University Beijing, 2013 15 Stability without Statehood. Lessons from Europe’s History before the Sovereign State by P.Haldén, Uppsala University, Sweden, 2011 33  Those targets cannot be achieved if not reshaping the “national sovereignty” giving more and more room to the notion of a “non Statehood” kind of institutional building. (Haldén, 2011) Three aspects of such phenomena could be considered as relevant: of course the partial transfer of sovereignty to sub-national or-transnational and regional, economic and political integration bodies; but more importantly the voluntary retreat of the State from the management of the economy and other traditional attributions; finally, the effectiveness of its action and powers to cope with the global problems and to solve them. On these aspects, a reading of wide impact and interrelations is the paper on “Non Statehood Europe and Global Governance” by Giorgio Dominese, university professor in Rome since last 2013, at present visiting professor at UIBE University in Beijing, who published his final researches in this field in the Journal Transition Studies Review and in the Journal of Global Policy and Governance, together with other papers presented in main international seminars and conferences by the Author. (Dominese, 2013) This dissertation is quoting the main passages with his permission. “The example of the world financial and economic crisis erupting in 2008 and certainly still ongoing, showed to the world Governments that even the largest and most powerful countries, like the US, needed the cooperation of the International Community to cool down international financial markets and to re- launch the economy. But EU demonstrated to be capable to exit from the financial disaster without abandoning the foundation on the “non statehood”, keeping to acceptable level welfare policies, social lower inequalities and great push in human capital, new technologies and diffused innovation to lead now all the excellence sectors of industrial, aerospace, agro-industrial, trade, alternative 34  energies, environment and effective security. The horrible conflicts of the past had left the immunity of Europe from the conflict temptation in resolving international crises, if not when affecting vital interest on the human right and freedom of citizens just outside the border of the EU, as it had been with the Balkan war and the North Africa military interventions, all events followed by the enlargement of the European Union or the inclusion of emerging countries among the associated members both of the Union and in different forms of the Euro” end of quotation. Also small Cyprus, that can be considered a micro-parcel in world economy, might affect the global economic system. But even there – wrote the Author - the European Central Bank had imposed in 2013 the cleaning up of the banking system from money laundry, grafting, income from high corruption and international forbidden trafficking and smuggling, disregarding the pressures from Russia to save the money deposits and money located in Nicosia. “The problem of sovereignty erosion thus became an actual challenge for the International Community in the globalization era and requires an urgent review of the rules and governance traditionally guiding the International Community. In the “non statehood” Europe the strategic answer to the emergency of the financial crisis, that could have destroyed the Euro and imploded the EU, had been to introduce “de facto” a different speeds governance power in the crucial decisions by Ecofin in Brussels and ECB in Frankfurt, where euro-scepticists have found inspiration to insinuate the growing of a hegemonic Germany, France and Netherland playing alone. In fact, the notion on “Union of States” and not “State of States”, not a “Federation“ of States but really a “commonwealth” of sovereign countries, is a concept not even understood in some EU member countries and certainly not abroad, if not among specialists of 35  history, constitutional law, international affairs and politologists”, wrote Giorgio Dominese. In the Introduction to International Relations, Theories and Approaches, by Jackson & Sørensen16, the evolution of the states’ sovereignty and the crucial passage of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, with the introduction of the “commonwealth” of the fragmented European order, after the thirty year war, it's well pictured. “Non statehood” was again finding its legitimacy and valuable European perspective, finally capable to decide and act as a political, financial, economic and geopolitical protagonist with very distinct “non statehood” architecture, nearly perfectly suited to the forthcoming global needs in the 30 to 50 years ahead. (Jackson, Sørensen, 2012) “Banking defaults, subprime collapse in US, Eurozone risking to blow up due to the unsustainable burden of public debts of many Member countries, mainly determined by modest leaderships, wide ranging corruption and unacceptable costs of the political systems in several countries, together with the stratospheric costs of the controversial wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, have given the courage to tell at many levels, also officially, some revealing confidential details and very crucial genetic political and structural distinctions that characterize Europe of the current 28 member states and the nearby countries aspiring to become members. The title sounds clear: the European Union is proud not to be “statehood” and to represent the most efficient and politically advanced laboratory of global governance. In the Annual Report 2012 the IMF has clearly stated that the first economic-financial power in the world is the EU, then comes the US, then China and the followers Japan, India, Brazil and all the emerging countries. This is the result of the very focused policies of the EU to be “avant- 16 Jackson RH, Sørensen G. Introduction to International Relations. Theories and Approaches. Oxford University Press, 2012 36  garde” in the age of the migration from the old growth and development theories to landing on the new sophisticated topping innovative and technological stage”, continues the Author. The result had been to offer the European economies and societies all the best options allowing the optimal strategies and investments for global competitiveness as well as for welfare, social achievements and environmental standards but also in security, in the capability to transform the great advancement into applied and still in progress technologies related to the future deterrence and reliable defense system, where Europe and USA could compete in a fair way to the common strategies in the NATO transatlantic alliance but also to the specificities and alternative options in the European regional and global strategic scenarios. There are four very interesting text books by Nayef R.F. Al-Rodhan17, Scholar at the St. Antony’s College Oxford University, published in the last two years by Palgrave Macmillan: The Politics of Emerging Strategic Technologies; The Politics of Emerging Strategic Technologies: Implications for Geopolitics, Human Enhancement and Human Destiny; Meta-Geopolitics of Outer Space: An Analysis of Space Power, Security and Governance. Being the Author mainly a philosopher, neuroscientist and well appreciated geo-strategic he was very effective to representing, in an evolutionary approach, the growth and development, the technological and innovation changes, the institutional, strategic and political implications of the world 2030-2050. (Al-Rodhan, 2011) In fact – observed Giorgio Dominese -, leaving the master books by Jean Bodin18 “On Sovereignty” and by Thomas Hobbes “Leviathan” with their own 17 Al-Rodhan NRF The Politics of Emerging Strategic Technologies. Implications for Geopolitics, Human Enhancement and Human Destiny. Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 18 Bodin J, On Sovereignty, (1992), Cambridge University Press, UK 37  sharp, and quite frankly, obsolete an even dark doctrine of the state, without entering into the theoretical debate over sovereignty and the constitutional frame of the expression of a nation-state, the European Union starts to appreciate its “status” of real “non statehood”, of commonwealth of sovereign states deciding a devolution of the governance on main issues to a “Union” quite technocratic but capable to give life to a new architecture of the transnational relations and entities leading the world affairs. (Bodin, 1992) Today is the appropriate moment to quote some of the most important books on these issues, otherwise I would feel a bit exposed to questioning and dogmatic wondering on my paper when in fact already these concepts belong to the intellectual heritage of our third millennium and not only to my personal opinions and preferences. I admit, we are talking of very sensible issues of the classic public policy, doctrine of the state, constitutional law and traditional democracy. Even so they are already carved in marble and I really doubt they could be changed anymore. In his researches and papers, Giorgio Dominese is not using diplomatic tuning in giving the names to the main forces that attempted to destroy Euro to dismantle European Union. (Dominese, 2013) “That’s why European Union did not implode due to the Eurozone crisis; was not torn down by the financial and covert political destabilization strategies promoted by main speculative groups and so called “strong powers”; did not follow the fatal destiny to look for a refuge in a traditional Constitutional Chart; and was not worried by those deploring a “lack of democracy”, whenever the debate is open on reforming democracy and liberal institutional heritage as well. More than this, we heard the People’s Party Congress in Beijing discussing what’s next after the end of socialism and its Chairman quoting only one time the word “socialism”, as a “work in progress” to review an 38 obsolete ideological pattern already incapable to reading the contemporary society and the global governance conditionality”. A great difference from the tuning in Moscow. It will take many decades before reaching stable and shared convergences on the best way to govern the world but for sure we will not see the United Nations to interpret the fundamental goals and principles for which it had been founded. G-20 was sounding a first signal of the insufficiencies and the lack of the credibility accumulated by the UN. Now it must be clear that the world is considering, without any open polemics but simply as definitive assumption, as unacceptable the decision making procedures of the Security Council and the instrumental use of the veto power by the Jalta conference of the five winners powers of a war ended almost seventy years ago. The lessons on the mistakes of the past and the consequences worldwide had been learnt but can’t be used still as an argument to discriminate the voting system in the Security Council. We are getting close to a showdown on this issue and the main European and Asian protagonists will be quite firm in pushing for revision and reshaping of the Glass Palace, where the lack of effectiveness and transparency appears as the sign of obsolescence and fatal destiny. Of course, I believe the mistake to change without having an alternative or integrative solution agreed upon, robust and widely accepted, will never be made but the front of the countries in favor of a “change and reform” is made up of nearly three quarters of the almost 200 member countries of the UN. Russia is almost unique case of looking back leadership, where the attempt is to re-establish the former Soviet Union better than to become a fast growing economic and political system. The situation of the border countries are not promising anything good, starting from Ukraine and the maneuvers on the way to annex Crimea even with an external aggression, on the base of ethnic principles and purely propaganda issues, against all the international laws and the signed treaties by Russia itself. When the domestic 39 economic and social situation in Russia is really collapsing, the external enemies are the way to hide the total failure of the last ten years of Kremlin policies of growth and welfare in the Country. “Stability without Statehood” by Peter Haldén, from the Uppsala University in Sweden, is disturbing quite a lot the widespread understanding that we need stronger national players to guarantee development, growth, stability and peace in the future global governance. With an accurate political and philosophical examination of the major authors dealing with this subject, the eminent Scholar of Uppsala is reviewing the last two thousand years of history and the main examples of the “non statehood” great powers - from the Roman Empire to the Holy Roman Empire, the first 50 years of the American foundation and finally to the European Union - Haldén doesn’t fear to disturb the sleep of the contemporary constitutionalists and main state sovereignty “clerics” and tackle the issue directly: given the Fiction of the State as the Good, Natural and the Beautiful, we have to consider the revision of a very weak and abused concept on which we trusted and fought wars over and the rather modest governance of the world for almost 300 years. “It is time to propose again something having to do with the too much neglected Heritage of Republicanism, evading the spectrum of the “state-system of states” and investigating more carefully the Union of States without a “Statehood”, in the century dominated by the global governance anxiety and the regional approaches need. In fact, this issue cannot find any constructive and viable answers if we don’t accept the need to reshape, and in some cases abandon, intellectual political theories and praxis tailored for the world of the last several centuries but not for sure having the appropriate architecture to host the new 40  incumbent needs of the society, the economy, the citizenship, the welfare, the openness and the integration indispensable to govern the “one world”. (Haldén, 2011) Let’s read the rigorous assumption from which Haldén starts his analysis: “I have argued that it is necessary to circumvent the dominant position of the state in contemporary political thinking. The precise theoretical problem is the idea that the state is the best possible form of political organization and indeed the only possible one. A consequence of this mode of thinking, dominant in political, legal and historical thinking since the mid- 1700s, is that all entities in world politics can be reduced to points along a spectrum ranging from “state” to “system of states.” I have not analyzed the European Union (EU) through the analytical lens of the state and implicitly or explicitly compared it to ideal- typical or existing states – a procedure that tends to reproduce the state as a normative ideal, propagated since 1576. Instead I have constructed an analytical framework based on classical and early modern republican political theory and modern systems theory. In this interpretation, republican political theory has two aspects, one systems-theoretical which posits a political ontology that transcends the distinction between domestic and international, and one normative- political which provides a security analysis utterly different from the Hobbesian tradition. Both aspects allowed me to create an ideal type of rule, the compound republic. Consequently I compared the EU with two other variants of this ideal type, the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation (HRE) between 1648 and 1763 and the United States of America (USA) between 1776 and 1865”. (Haldén, 2011) Without any doubt, much of the architecture of a tangible, operative and credible global governance remains to be ‘‘invented’’, and, to be meaningful and meet a large degree of consent, such innovations should necessarily be rooted in and 41 grow mainly out of political traditional processes and institutions at national and international levels. As we said, it is certainly not the model of the United Nations that can show the way out of the night of the years in which we are assisting to the failure of the spirit of aims and scope of the global governance “ante litteram” announced in the Charter of San Francisco in 1945. Proposing the question really never focused, after the second world war, of the reform and innovative redefinition of the democracy and the liberal principles on which it is based, on the one hand, and of the courageous revision of a great number of the crucial pillars of the doctrine and practice of the socialism heritage, on the other, we will serve the truth, the credibility and the coherence to the history and the humanity”, we can read in. The political science, the international affairs, the public policy and the main economic-financial strategies of the present and the future decades would benefit of our guidelines and safe tracks to move further the global governance from theory to practice. As conflicts are part of history and will remain a factor of risk and instability in the future, a “non statehood” configuration of the alliances and multilateral initiatives seems appropriate. The so called soft power, that every time the really need comes is showing to be so mighty and capable to enforce peace, had lost the sense of weakness and insufficiency shown in the past. In fact Europe and the collective military alliance into NATO - again with an approach quite similar to the “non statehood” basic concept of the “union of states” rather than the “state of states” or “federation” alliance – have shown already twice in the last 20 years the “dura lex sed lex” in the Balkans and in North Africa. And the high tensions in these weeks in the Near East are announcing a possible “storm” again, even if everything will be done to avoid it. (Haldén, 2011) 42 I understand that expectations are probably more linked to the aspect of concrete programs and agreements that would finally give a boost to the industrial development, the economic growth and the social market economy advancements in the great Euro- Asiatic role and potentiality. But we have seen in the last 20 years that the lack of a clear political understanding, even if the German reunification had given so many reasons and opportunities for change and new course on both sides of the former blocks, that the successful “non statehood” in EurAsia and the growing role of main global actor of China have propelled the international relations and the global governance to a real process of convergence and interrelations. “It's not utopian – going back to Dominese scientific works -to imagine that we have to open a special track of negotiations for new adhesions to the European Union, even if you are observing how difficult and challenging the enlargement to the Eastern and Southeastern countries is, even if this remains a top priority of the EU. And now, after Croatia becoming member, also Serbia had started the adhesion long run “acquis communautaire”. Even Turkey is proposing a deadline not to be overlooked for the membership in the Union by 2023. But in the case of Russia, it should be a much bigger effort to be done to assume the function of promoter and propeller of a new world order, in which the global governance is not any more wild, esoteric and abstract as still it is. Any millenarism, heritage, tradition, culture and religious faith could justify the failure of Europe and Russia in joining more concretely in this common endeavor, where USA, China, Brazil, India, some parts of Africa, Southeast Asia, Japan, South East and Central Asia, the same Middle East as the full Euro- Mediterranean region are investing more and more for the long term, in view of the great changes already ongoing and announced almost every day and before our eyes. The example of China, jumping after thirty years of deep reforms and 43 still difficult passages, to the top five great powers is in this sense an encouraging factor of confidence, credibility and a contemporary successful story”. 44  Section C Similarities, peculiarities, converging issues and diverging policies During the years of market transformation of the former socialist countries have substantially changed its appearance. During this period, are created and started to function the formal institutions of a market economy - commercial banks, commodity and stock markets, currency exchange, qualitatively new tax arrangements, the rules of antitrust regulation, etc. However, costs of market reforms have been significantly higher than expected by the initiators. In countries fell sharply average real income of the population and at the same time increased the inequality in their distribution. Similarities in Central Asia and Central Eastern European experience are seen in tendency to manipulate the democratic institutions and procedures in insufficiently developed civil society. The result of manipulation is generated outcome, which is different than the proclaimed goal, but providing significant dividends to investors – manipulators; one example is the Slovak “mečiarism” 19, the basis of which is the operation of democratic institutions and procedures in the interests of the ruling elite 19 From Slovak Prime Minister who name is Vladimir Mečiar (served three times as Prime Minister from 1990-1991, 1992-1994, and 1994-1998). Leader of People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (L‘S-HZDS), Mečiar has been criticized for autocratic style of administration and manipulation of privatization process in Slovakia. 45 that seeks to establish an authoritarian regime. Elsewhere in the region manipulative management model of political process is less developed, it finds expression at the level of institutional design - for example, the crisis of a bicameral parliamentary system in the Czech Republic in 1992-1996, or the crisis of government in 2009 during the Czech presidency of the EU. According to Hungarian researcher D. Marcos, “in all post-communist states observed deformation ideological issues, and the logic of the left-right spectrum is broken. In Eastern Europe during the post-communist period, people vote, in fact, for the same party under different signboards.” The institutions in Slovakia are not capable to prompt economic development. According to analytical research in the sphere of institutions’ quality by UniCredit Bank Slovakia in 2012, on the political scene of Slovakia are visible results of corruption connected to the politics of ruling elites. Hereby are provided results of research in Eastern European countries, which share the same historical background due to their socialism heritage, when in these countries had not existed market compatible institutions and liberal economy. Despite significant differences between countries, in addition to many general features, and traced the similarity transformation models that allows evaluating the effects of various institutional choices and policy decisions and their impact on the subsequent development. If taking in account the data of institutional quality from world-known think-tanks as World Economic Forum (WEF), Heritage Foundation and Transparency International (TI), it becomes clear that many post-soviet bloc countries share similar indices: 46 TABLE 3: IMPORTANT GLOBAL INDECES IN CENTRAL ASIA Countries / Czech Slovakia Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Data Republic 2011 Diversion of Rank Rank Rank 97 Rank 120 Rank 69 N/A N/A public funds 102 113 2013 Judicial Rank 74/ Rank Rank 111/ Rank 135/ Rank 72/ N/A N/A Independence Score 3.7 116/ Score 2.7 Score 1.9 Score 3.7 Score 2.7 2013 Economic Rank 29 Rank 42 Rank 68 Rank 89 Rank 131 Rank 169 Rank 162 freedom Index Global Rank 46 Rank 78 Rank 50 Rank 121 N/A N/A N/A Competitiveness Index 2013-2014 Corruption Rank 57/ Rank 61/ Rank 140/ Rank 150/ Rank 154/ Rank 168/ Rank 168/ Perception Index Score 48 Score 47 Score 26 Score 24 Score 22 Score 17 Score 17 2013 (TI) Pillars/Institutions 86 119 55 133 N/A N/A N/A by WEF 2013 2010 KOF Zurich 85.08 83.55 67.65 63.43 N/A N/A N/A Economic Globalization index 2010 KOF Zurich 86.9 85.44 69.76 65.77 64.11 39.02 43.61 Political Globalization index Source: KOF Index of Globalization As it is obvious from these indicators of institutional quality none of these countries were capable of building institutions which are at the same level as highly developed countries’ institutions. Therefore, we may see that the institutional formation and transformation for support of economy and liberal democracy is challenging task. In the Central Asia countries ordinary people practically cannot achieve justice if they do not have influential patrons or do not resort to corruption. Numerous political, institutional and economic negative events, in particular in the economic recession which has begun after declaration of independence, substantially explains why regional 47 cooperation of the new states in Central Asia was weak despite numerous assurances of the leadership of the countries. National elites and political groups of influence tried to protect reducing assets, by limiting the external competition and aspiring to take the maximum income in short terms. The leaders who have came to power from the ruling elite of the Soviet era, also created, to some extent, political structure in which they and their governments kept almost exclusive power over society. External partners began to participate more directly in cooperation and support of regional structures due to recognition of their interest in the prospering and stable Central Asia. Growing understanding of common interests in the sphere of safety and SCO role in the solution of these questions created base for bigger trust and cooperation in other areas, in particular, in the sphere of economic cooperation as the important factor promoting effective regional development, safety and stability. Nevertheless, obstacles to further economic reforms, regional cooperation and integration continue to exist in the person of fully centralized presidential institution, the interests of influential representatives of business connected with the government, and also in average and the lowest level of public administration and security services. In long-term prospect there is a risk of emergence of a vicious circle in which the weak government, limited possibilities of institutes and the insufficient accountability of the authorities lead to indignation and the performances of the people suppressed by the governments of the countries. The similar cycle restrains anything, and plunges the region into political and economic chaos, undermines bases of institutes of society, regional cooperation on key economic problems. Governance problems, especially corruption leads to inability to manage efficiently and predictably of all institutions and the economic relations between the countries. 48 It also leads to decrease in resources of the country, falling of volumes of direct investments, except for extracting sectors of economy, increase a social inequality, stop reforms and lead to growth of discontent of the population. Governmental crisis in 2005 and 2010 and power crash in Kyrgyzstan and violence in 2005 in Andizhan - Uzbekistan20, also in 2011 in the western Kazakhstan became a striking example of similar consequences21. All these events are a warning signal for the Central Asian governments. How they interpret them and as will react, will define the future of the region and situation in the sphere of human development and safety in the region. Some scenarios of succession of events are generally possible. First option heads of the states for achievement of short-term stability will limit more and more political and economic freedoms that most likely, will lead to high probability long term instability. The second scenario is characterized to gradual strengthening of institutes, linearization as well as political and economic spheres and it should result political and economic stability. Expansion of regional cooperation could strengthen hopes of political success considerably. However, such approach demands reforms in institutional spheres, the courageous management ready to perform reforms. The neighbor states of Central Asia and the international community could support such option of the region development. When it comes to the political, economic and institutional realities of Central Asia according to many experts, it is possible to expect only limited regional cooperation in the short and mid-term. Most likely scenario of cooperation is between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The leaders of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, regardless of internal instability also may choose the preferred path of regional cooperation and integration. 20 All official data were closed, but according to local people of Andizhan approximately 2500 people were killed by government forces. 21 The employees’ protests of subsidiaries of the state “KazMunaiGas” Oil and Gas Company (subsidiaries are - “Karazhanbasmunay” and “UMG”) in Mangistau region in western Kazakhstan. The most known mass oil strike in 2011, punctuated in major riots in Zhanaozen on December 16 with 15 dead, dozens injured and arrested. 49  Section D Slovak institutional and political reshapes Nowadays, Slovakia formally involved in developing the EU’s policies and showing a general support for intensifying the degree of its integration as well as its further enlargement. After withdrawing all obstacles that continue to hold up placing Slovakia on an equal ground with other EU member states, it will become truly equable in the course of framing the EU policies. Slovakia sustains the EU institutional reforms, and has also supported further EU enlargement, particularly to the countries of the Western Balkans i.e. Croatia and Serbia. 22 Prime Minister R.Fico also expressed his support for intentions of Turkey to join EU. Besides, Fico also accentuated that Turkey could not be ineligible only due to its Islam religion. 23 24 Energy security belongs to notable Slovak policy initiatives inside the EU. Czech and Slovak Republics are initiated the establishment of the European Nuclear Energy Forum. During the 1 st forum in Bratislava (capital of Slovakia) on November 2007 participants discussed the prospects for European Union legislative and regulatory framework to simplify administration and permits granting for the construction of new 22 Slovakia has not officially recognized the independence of Kosovo. 23 Fico spoke about Turkey’s prospects for EU membership in front of the parliamentary Committee for European affairs on December 11, 2006 (Source: CTK, December 11, 2006) 24 Dzurinda’s coalition government between 2002 and 2006 placed particular policy limits on integration in the spheres of direct taxation, social policy and defense. However, such positions were not unique to Slovakia among EU member states and they certainly did bring new policy impulse to the intra-EU debate. 50 nuclear energy sources. Fico accentuated Slovakia’s interest by stating that “the government is keen to carry on constructing nuclear power plants”. 25 Slovakia is determined to overturn the consequences of its pledge to close down the Jaslovské Bohunice nuclear power plant. The Slovak Strategy on energy security26 adopted on September 2007 states that additive to completing two blocks in Mochovce, it a intends to build a new nuclear power plant on the area of the Jaslovské Bohunice plant due to its closure in 2010 emphasized Slovakia’s importer of electricity position. In 2007 Slovakia joined the group of EU member states for involving the nuclear energy among the “clean” (free from CO2 emissions) energy sources. Slovakia’s focus on nuclear energy issues from the country’s sense of vulnerability as negative consequences of the Jaslovské Bohunice plant closure; aside from policy priorities holding back from the treaty Slovakia’s policy standpoints have largely been driven by fears of the future instead of opportunities brought about by the membership in the EU. Such nature of the countries’ priorities in the EU is closely connected to Slovakia’s underdeveloped EU policymaking process. The Slovak government was politically and technically in charge for the adoption of policy preferences in the EU. Nevertheless, research and interview with political and administrative actors of Slovakia’s EU membership revealed several issues for the development of Slovakia’s positions within the EU.27 Slovakia’s policymaking inside the EU has only little to do with traditional foreign policy implicated with the viability of the state. Instead of country’s success in EU is linked to the capacity of domestic politics to deploy EU in dissolving domestic problems. In Slovak various ministries, though, their use of functioning methods and 25 For more details http: //ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/forum/Bratislava_prague/2007_11_26/index_en.htm 26 The text is available at http://www.economy.gov.sk/index/go.php?id=3167 27 Bilcik V.-Vilagi, A. pp.203-240, Bratislava, 2007 51 coordination of EU affairs vary widely. It is evident that the engagement of domestic ministries in EU agenda of foreign affairs, economic and social policy is more profound, than in the case of transport policy. In Brussels the Slovak Permanent Representation to the EU often plays a significant role in working out Slovakia’s position, so far, it cannot replace a domestic ministry by reason of it has no efficiency to generate documents of strategic significance. Another factor that influences Slovak limited activities in EU is not highly qualified human resources. Slovakia’s central administration employs three times less workers in EU departments than central administrations of Hungary and Czech Republic. Notably more experienced and older members of state administration are less able to argue Slovakia’s case in English and French languages during the sections of EU working groups. With relatively low salaries in many departments are able to keep their employees for a few years when they leave for the well paid positions in private sector. The restrained domestic administrative capacity has its external dimension in Brussels. The country is using its administrative quotas in the EU only up to about 60-70 percent and not in the full range.28 Slovakia is not strong at filling mid-management positions in European Commission, only Poland and Czech Republic are lagging behind Slovakia. Limited number of young people applies for internship in EU institutions; as a result it limits the long-term development of high quality human resources. Slovak government for years suffered from limited connections between EU political community and domestic politics. According to that many representatives were quite new to EU institutions; Slovak politicians were a source of more “shame” in Brussels. 29 Also Slovak private sector does not have an adequate institutional basis establish at the EU level. 28 The Speech of Maros Sefcovic, 2008 29 Interview with a Slovak diplomat seasoned in EU affairs, Brussels, January 16, 2007. 52 Aside the Government, the Slovak National Council could play significant role in EU affaires. In some interview in National Council was mentioned that parliaments’ employees concerned on examining the accordance of Slovakia’s EU positions with the positions of the other EU member states (Bilcik, 2007).30 Since Slovak parliament does have a potential legal space for offering to the formulation of the country’s EU policy, it lacks the administrative capacity and expertise to control the executive in EU affairs regularly or to affect the contents of Slovak positions in EU. The fulfillment of Slovak strong parliamentary role in EU policymaking has been limited to intensive exchange of information whose flow in one-way: from initiating and deciding government to the parliament that acknowledges. In recent years Slovakia is running out of its strategic goals vis-á-vis the EU at a time when policy preferences determined by the skills and ability of diplomats and state administrators rather than upon conceptual analysis. Politicians are not interested in the EU beyond the nature of the existing integration or the drawing of EU structural funds in Slovakia. The Government Office does not represent a leader for the formulation and coordination of Slovak policy strategies in the EU. Slovakia’s accession to the EU and NATO in 2004 prepared goals in the country’s foreign policy, and it was soon no longer in lacking standing as EU recipient or NATO requirements. Membership in these organizations has a potentially important relevance for Slovakia’s individual relations with both insiders and outsiders to these organizations. Slovakia’s decision to side with the United States during the Iraq war was welcomed by some EU member states while the countries opposed to the military solution in Iraq saw it as undermining the opportunity of the Union (Valašek).31 Although Slovakia sided with the U.S. during the war in Iraq, it has, e.g. consistently 30 Bilcik V.-Vilagi, A. Bratislava, 2007 31 Valašek, T. p.65, 2004 53 sustained the signing and ratification of the Kyoto protocol. On conflict in Syria and the possible consequences of military intervention, Slovak President I. Gašparovič expressed support to diplomatic solution, also emphasized the role of the UN as crucial in ensuring access of civilians to humanitarian aid, to penalize the perpetrators of crimes against humanity and start negotiations on stable post conflict arrangements within the Geneva Initiative 2.0. There are plenty of opportunities for possible tensions or at times conflicts between such a set of external goals on the one hand and institutional constraints posed by EU membership on the other hand. Slovak foreign policy positioned before a double challenge: how best to utilize the EU framework for the pursuit of its new goals better. The evidence for determining the ability to live up to either challenge for Slovakia’s international conduct is few and very recent. However, there are at least some indicators of Slovak foreign policy attitudes inside the EU. Slovak diplomacy introduced its own strategies in relation to Russia, Ukraine, the Western Balkans, the Middle East and North Africa. At the same time one can criticize these documents for vagueness and often very general contents without a specific set of Slovak goal, there are also some indications of future Slovak foreign policy priorities. The conclusions demonstrate that Slovakia is still very much in search of its own foreign policy goals and instruments even if in the frame of European regulatory prescriptions. Slovakia is also acquiring to play the game of EU politics. Therefore, rather than fond of fast integration or re-shaping of the Union, wants to adapt to existing structures well. Once the country does internalize the EU modes of policymaking better, its current rigid positions on EU security designs and matters may become more flexible. Slovakia’s and conversely the EU’s biggest task for a successful formulation 54 and pursuit of foreign policy seems to stem from the complete number of actors, interests and variables in Europe’s internal and external agendas. Some statements by few Slovak diplomats that “once in the EU we shall not need our foreign policy as we shall have EU foreign policy” proved incorrect even before EU accession. Slovakia as an EU observer had to take a clear position on the Iraq war since the EU remained internally divided. As well as, Slovakia has an opportunity to express its stances on the institutional design of EU foreign policy. In brief, the EU is both a heterogeneous and an evolving foreign policy player with limited capabilities. Moreover, since the latest enlargement the EU has also become a diverse geopolitical entity. This fact has inferences notable with respect to new eastern neighborhood of the Union and plea new opportunities for offering to EU external relations. Slovak leading official foreign policy priorities have spotlighted on the countries of the Western Balkans and the EU’s eastern neighborhood. Slovak diplomacy has been devoted to engage these countries with its own experience in regulating post-communist transition and EU and NATO integration. Slovakia introduced its own Official Development Assistance Program (Slovak ODA). Yet, foreign policy has remained in the shadow of other policy areas. Specifically, the foreign diplomacy is distinctly more multi-tasked and disseminate in its daily agenda than prior to EU membership. The diplomatic corps resemble more an operational service rather than a policymaking body. Slovak diplomacy requires reform like other parts of public administration. Intellectually, Slovakia is more progressively discovering Ukraine and the Western Balkans as significant points of foreign activities. 55 For this reason, the planning and the execution of foreign policy action are in their early stages. External policymaking is primarily about events driven reaction rather than about agenda setting initiatives. Especially, when Slovakia will be Chair of EU Council in the second half of 2016, as Presidential State Slovakia will negotiate the new European legislation and top political issues. Its main role inside the EU Council will be to seek compromises between Member States in European policies. Outwardly, they will represent Slovakia in relation to other European institutions like the European Commission or the European Parliament. It will be the first Slovak presidency; preparations began in 2012, and are among the priorities of the Government. Launched by Government the resolution No. 392/2012 established the basic assumptions of the Presidency and current priorities. Since approved by a number of other important documents it offers a comprehensive overview32. 32 http://www.mzv.sk/sk/europske_zalezitosti/predsednictvo_v_rade_eu-slovenske_predsednictvo_v_rade_eu 56 1.1. Evolution of Slovakia relations to the EU membership The history of relations between Slovak Republic and European Union start after signing so-called Association agreements on October 1993, as well as Association Agreement Slovak Republic with the EU subsequently ratified by Slovak Parliament in the same year. Slovak National Council ratified it on December 1993. The Association Agreement entered into force on February 1995 after ratification by Parliaments of all member countries. On June 1995 Enrollment in EU lodged on by Slovakia's former Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar at EU summit in Cannes. Application complemented the Memorandum of Government that permitted Slovakia to join in 2000. The European Council asked the Commission to make its report on Slovakia's application for membership in order to evaluate Slovakia's progress towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria. The European Commission had serious reservations against Slovakia instability associated with institutions and shortcomings in the functioning of democracy. The European Council on the basis of evaluation did not recommended in Luxembourg in December 1997 to start accession negotiations with Slovakia. The summit on intensive negotiations lead to membership of the Union of the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Cyprus, Slovenia and Estonia. Slovakia was dropped from the first wave of enlargement. Relations between the EU and the countries remained outside the gates of the first round were treated by individual Accession Partnerships. They focused specifically on those areas of the Copenhagen criteria, which lagged behind the country. 57 In 1998 was held parliamentary elections in Slovakia, which results entail a change in style of governance and overall conditions of the political scene in Slovakia. Foreign countries highly appreciated the parliamentary elections. The tour of Slovak Prime Minister Mikulaš Dzurinda led to the heart of the EU - in Brussels and then to Vienna (Austria at that time held the Presidency). A clear priority of the Slovak government was integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. In 1998, Parliament adopted a resolution on Slovakia's candidacy for EU accession. In it, the Parliament recommended a flexible approach to Slovakia and European Commission (EC) proposed a new report on Slovakia, as the situation in the country after the elections visibly changed. Slovakia met the Copenhagen criteria and it was reason for invitation to negotiations on accession to the summit in Helsinki 1999, Slovakia along with the other candidate countries was open to accession negotiations at the meeting of the Conference on Accession at February 2000. Slovakia as a reference date of adoption and implementation of the acquis communautaire elected first January 2004, which was generally a reference date of entry into the Union. At the summit in Nice in December 2000 confirmed the important document for enlargement strategy that the European Commission - so-called Road map. Based on its schedule of priorities defined at EU discussions of candidate countries during the next three presidencies in EU (Sweden, Belgium and Spain) Slovakia, along with other candidate countries concluded its accession negotiations at the Copenhagen summit. Slovakia fulfilled the prerequisites for admission into the Union on 1 May 2004. The European Commission recommended ten accession countries. The European Parliament overwhelmingly approved their entry on April 2003. Council of EU Foreign Ministers approved the admission of new members on April 2003. Thanks to the Treaty of 58 Accession signed on 16th April 2003 in Athens by President Rudolf Schuster, Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda, Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan and Chief Negotiator for accession to EU Jan Figel. In Slovakia was held EU accession referendum. The question that Slovak citizen’s answer was: “Do you agree that the Slovak Republic became a member of the European Union” Referendums attended a majority of eligible voters where 52.15% participated in the referendum and 92.46% of them expressed approval of accession to the EU. Slovak Republic in May 2004 along with nine other countries joined the European Union. 59  Section E Czech Presidency in EU – Czech Government and Institutional Transition In 2009 Czech Republic’s six months at helm of EU Council was under the three E’s priorities – the Economy, Energy and the European Union in the world. As it is known, Czech Republic had to face during its presidency the Russian-Ukrainian “gas war”, the global economic crisis, the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, and the resignation of its government. The Czech Presidency accomplished to attain several positive outcomes in three priority areas. Regarding the legislation, due to collaboration with the EU member states and institutions, principally with the European Parliament, made certain effective realization of dialogue on more than 80 explicit procedures. Along with the other areas took place a number of remarkable accomplishments as adoption of conclusions on banking capital in order to uphold credit for business and households, rejection of the protectionist tendencies, was achieved an Agreement on common concept for dealing with impaired means, supplementing the Strategy for supporting the financial sector approved in October 2008. Considering investments, adoption of European Economic Recovery Plan was a significant issue. The Plan contributes for funding to increase EU’s energy security; 3.98 billion EUR out of 5 billion EUR will be invested in energy infrastructure (energy interconnectors, gas storages) also offshore wind parks and carbon capture and storage. 60 In the age of financial crisis the EU rotating presidency has made one more thing clear – the European Union needs an effective structure, greater integration and a higher quality overseas mission. Czech government made great efforts to overcome gas crisis, but the chances of achieving political success were low because there were strong players in the game. Moreover, the Czech term showed that small EU countries are not ready for daunting tasks of coordination and leadership that should be solved in a crisis of such scale. Due to institutional weakness domestically, the government felt apart right in the middle of the term in office of the Council. Presiding country has not taken a leadership role in addressing the problem of gas supplies. The same applies to its position during the military operations in the Gaza Strip. The efforts of the Czech Republic in this direction were so vague that went completely unnoticed. However, the influence of Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek weakened for a long time from the very beginning he was ineffective at the head of the European Union. President Vaclav Klaus has never made a secret of his principal dislike of the Maastricht Treaty and to the very idea European integration. Nevertheless as an attempt to “save face” on May 6, 2009 Czech Senate approved the Lisbon Treaty destroying one of the last barriers to its ratification. In recent years the queries to the EU and hence to its chairmanship country have been grown. In addition to constant issues on the agenda (energy policy, environmental protection, economic growth, modernization of national economies in Europe), which are continuously being developed and it is impossible to ignore, every country, occupying the post of chairman, takes the lead on a global scale: whether it is a war in Georgia or the financial crisis. Sufficient human resources are not less important than the prestige and influence on the world stage. Just in this sense, small countries have less to offer. In this matter Czech Republic is in similar position as Slovakia with its shortage of highly qualified human resources. 61 It would be incorrect to accuse for these problems one only the Czech Republic, which is at least trying to create some momentum. The most convincing was the establishment of a new “Eastern Partnership” on EU summit in Prague in May, 2009. The EU has made new, confident agreements with six countries, each of which is central to the stability of Eastern Europe, as well as for fundamental personal interests of the EU in terms of energy security. EU Eastern Partnership might produce constructive ideas on reforming the geo-strategy especially in regard to the complex relations between Russia and the EU. Czech Presidency has affected other Eastern European countries. Central and Eastern Europe has shown itself unable to advance their interests both within the EU and in its relations with Russia. The Czech Republic, like many other new EU members such Slovakia and Poland, suffers from the inability to form on its internal political arena European policy. Since joining the European Union in 2004, there is still lack of policymaking in European political scale. According to Eurobarometer surveys in the Czech Republic the number of people with a pessimistic view of the future more than in other European countries. Only 39% of Czechs believe that the worst of the economic crisis is came to end. Recently, in the Czech Republic, there have been a number of political scandals, one of them took place in June 2013, it was the largest scandal in the last 25 years involving Prime Minister Petr Necas. Well-known Czech political analyst J.Pehe said that Czech President M.Zeman is representative of the outgoing post-Communist era. Zeman and Klaus share similar political preferences, but there are 2 main differences: first, Zeman is more pro-European, he better understands the foreign priorities of country. 62 Second, he has a reputation of the president who is close to common people of Czech Republic. 63 1.1.1. Evolution of Czech Republic relations to the EU membership In December 1990, Czechoslovakia began talks with the EC concerning the conclusion of association agreements. Period from 1992 to 1996 After the breakup of Czechoslovakia EC suspended the ratification process Czech diplomats led by Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec trying to catch up with delays. In 1993 both parties signed an “Association between the Czech Republic and the EC and Member States” entered into force on 1 February 1995. Until then, relationships were under Interim Agreement. At Copenhagen meeting in June 1993 the European Council decided that the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union. It was also stated that the entry occurs when a country is able to accept all responsibilities associated with membership, meet the economic and political conditions and sufficient administrative and judicial capacity to take over the acquis. At Essen meeting in December 1994 European Council invited the Commission to undertake a detailed analysis of the impact of Eastern enlargement and policy of the European Union and its development. The internal report was submitted to the European Council meeting in Madrid in December 1995. The Council asked the Commission as soon as possible after the end of IGC had developed opinions on individual applications for membership and began to process summary document on the course of expansion. In January 1996 the Czech Republic application provided by Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus's to join the European Union. 64 1.1.1. Period from 1996 to 2004 In July 1997 the European Commission published Agenda 2000 material, which subscribed to the idea of “bigger and stronger Union”, and published opinions on the readiness of all candidate countries. The Commission also determined that the Board report regularly on progress made by each of the candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe amounted to prepare for membership. Commission recommended starting membership negotiations with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus. In December 1997 at the Luxembourg summit the European Council instructed the Commission processing of regular reports on progress in preparing for membership made by the individual applicant countries. On the recommendation of the Commission the European Council at its meeting in Luxembourg in 1997 of the official invitation of the 11 candidate countries for EU accession. The Czech Republic took over the invitation of President Vaclav Havel, accompanied by Foreign Minister Jaroslav Sedivy. Luxembourg summit decided that in spring 1998 convened bilateral intergovernmental conference, which would open accession negotiations with six countries: Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia (the so-called Luxembourg group). March 1998 the process of expansion was then launched in Brussels, by Foreign Ministers of EU15 and 11 candidate countries, including the Czech Republic. The legal framework had been formulated in the Accession Partnership. The Czech Republic submitted in Brussels 1998 National program preparation for the EU membership, which was published successively in 1999, 2000 and 2001. In April 1998 began the first part of the Brussels talks on accession to the EU - the so- called “screening”, e.g. the analytical comparison of the candidate countries legislation with European law. After preliminary technical meetings it began in November 1998 65 negotiations on the accession to the EU at the ministerial level. For the purpose of screening the acquis was divided according to areas of into 31 chapters before starting negotiations on each chapter the EC always proposed a joint negotiating position of the Union, approved and presented by the Council Presidency. Opinions on all 31 chapters also develop all the candidate states that the negotiations represented the main negotiator and his team. The process of preparing for membership was continuously monitored by the European Commission, which annually since 1998 issued regular progress reports on candidate countries prepare for EU membership. The first evaluation report of 1998 the Commission was very critical, especially in the areas of state administration and judiciary. The government tried to accelerate the process of legislative transposition of EU law. Second Commission report 1999 positively identified the adoption of the government's economic strategy document joining the European Union, a joint evaluation of economic policy priorities, a significant shift in the liberalization of capital movements and the adoption of basic rules for the promotion of regional policy. Nevertheless, the overall outturn Accession Partnership identified as unsatisfactory, including a highly critical assessment of the situation of Roma population. Commission Report of 2000 was evaluated much better than the two previous sign, was positively evaluated primarily accelerated the adoption of legislation. From 7 - 11 December 2000, EU summit held in Nice, which dealt with the expansion eastwards and the overall reform of the institutions. According to the results had to enter into the EU having 11 votes in the Council and 20 members in the EP. Czech Republic and Hungary states are approximately the same size as Belgium, Portugal and Greece, but they got fewer seats in the EU Council and European Parliament. 66 Report on the 2001 Czech Republic was significantly positively evaluated, especially in a functioning market economy. Constant problem was the situation of gypsy population and the reform of state administration. In 2002, again was addressed the issue of so- called Benes Decrees. Based on the analysis, the Commission issued a report that the decrees of the acquis in terms pose no obstacle to the accession of the Republic. The last evaluation report released in 2003; this report had been called the Comprehensive monitoring report on the preparations of the Czech Republic for membership. The studies the Commission had proposed to extend the Union by ten countries proposed in Laeken. Pre-accession process with the ten candidate states, including the Czech Republic was terminated by the European Council in December 2002 in Copenhagen. Here, the finalization of the negotiating chapters, including the transitional period, which provided the new member-states a longer period for the successful settlement of all obligations arising from EU membership. The European Council decided in accordance with the Commission's adoption of 10 new Member States with effect from 2004 (History of the accession to the EU). 67  Chapter III Section A The foreign policy of Czech Republic and Slovakia: perception of changes Foreign policy requires that the particular state has set its interest in the international community, formed by the states and other international actors, and this focus taken place. States with its foreign policy committed to a certain idea, which the international community advocates and receives support for its existence and its operations. The conceptual content of foreign policy can be expressed either in concepts or ideas. While the concepts are explicitly formulated and defended in the political debate ideas remain hidden and may be re-rationalized concepts. Czech policy The key to the foreign policy of the country's foreign policy interests of its content and the way which this interest formulates and advocates. From this perspective, currently Czech Foreign Policy distinguish two periods, the first (entry into the EU in 2004), this content existed, albeit in incomplete form, the second (after 2004) has disappeared. Objective: Return to the West Czech Republic was created in 1993 as a state with clear foreign policy interests, which follows the same concern, formulated the Czechoslovak federation - it is a return to Europe or return to the West. ‘Aimlessness in the West’ 68 Returning to the West meets the Czech main foreign policy goal that united the greater part of the political elite and mobilized society. Since then, the Czech foreign policy strays in aimlessness, there are not synthesized various ideas into the political content which would have the internal and external support and what could be consistently carried out. Public interest in foreign policy, at best scenario, and not only there, is replaced by the wider public interest or even completely privatized economic interest groups or ideological approach. Similar process takes place in Slovak foreign policy; the ideas of promoting successful foreign policy are not synchronized at the particular level. This does not mean that the Czech foreign policy completely failed to set targets. For example government's concept of Czech foreign policy from 2011 defines the following priorities:  Strengthen the security of the Czech Republic, analyze threats and to act against them;  Promote economic and trade interests abroad, including energy security;  Strengthen the positive image and perception of the Czech Republic abroad;  Develop good relations with neighboring countries and strengthen regional cooperation;  Support operational and economically and politically strong European Union;  Maintain and strengthen the transatlantic link ;  Promote respect for human rights and democracy in the world (with resources Transformation and development cooperation);  Strengthen European integration of Eastern and Southeastern Europe. In some of these areas may log in Czech as well as some partial successes. However, there is lack of specific requirements for these priorities into coherent objectives and their subsequent implementation. Czech Republic is closely following developments in the CIS countries and within their means will endeavor to contribute to the peaceful resolution of conflicts on the territory of some of them. Czech Republic continues the tradition of economic relations with each country, but only with Kazakhstan is becomes more realistic the trade relations, 69 rather than with other Central Asian countries due to their closed market and corruption issues. 70 2.1. The power and the instruments Military and economic resources of the state cannot be expected to have significant changes, although budgetary savings may further restrict military sources of power. More open is the development of institutional and ideological sources of power. Institutional sources will depend on the internal transformation of EU and NATO eventually to the establishment of new structures in this area and the ability Czech retain and expand existing membership or to join the new initiatives. The approaches, which only cling to the already achieved, locks or maintain institutional positions. Even the preservation of institutional positions gained entry into the EU requires a proactive attitude to European integration, including integration into the euro zone. Ideological resources can be strengthened with a new story that Czech society needs for inner renewal and which will attract even beyond its borders. Foreign policy requires a different mix of instruments. Efforts should concentrate in multilateral action (EU, NATO, the UN and other organizations) and supranational (EU), which is not reducing the prevailing bilateral instruments. Purely bilateral policy should be limited to neighbors and the Visegrad states, because Czech has neither the power nor the analytical assumptions for supra-regional or even global impact on the bilateral level. In all other cases, the bilateralism serve only as a service objectives multilateral or supranational. For example, it makes no sense to attempt their own bilateral policy towards global powers (USA, Russia, and China) for the reason that such a policy does not match the Czech possibilities. This does not give up any action on these powers. On the contrary, the only effective way of action is offered through the Czech and supranational multilateral diplomacy within the respective institutions. It should also be far more intensive use of indirect instruments of foreign policy operations, primarily companies or their organizations and non-governmental organizations. Partnerships 71 with companies and organizations are offered as the main implementation tool of economic diplomacy. Space for cooperation with non-governmental organizations opens especially in areas of action development, humanitarian and human rights. In all these areas, the Czech foreign policy partner has experience with non-governmental sector, which can be made and that can be expanded. Deepening concerns (in particular human rights) should be part of the new story of Czech foreign operations. A number of internal and external reasons, not always suitable Czech state realizes such a policy. While the internal reasons for concern unconvincing results of domestic human rights policies, external stem from objective necessity of cooperation with countries with different ideas about human rights and democratic debate. This does not mean that the state should give up this issue. In some cases, however, it could take place, for example, through a publicly - supported foundation that would build on its work conceptually based on a political task, on the other hand, was independent enough to fairly reflect the human rights pro Czech Republic is largely focused on international cooperation. This is not only due to the fact that the smaller European nations, but also open economy, a high share of exports and services in GDP, and a lack of resources. The international environment in which the Czech Republic pursues its foreign policy is the result of the interaction of a number of factors - sovereign states, groupings of states with different degrees of integration in international organizations , but also non-state actors (from NGOs to interest groups , including organized crime groups and terrorist organizations) . The role, importance and influence of each factor vary, often in a very short period of time. After the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the bipolar world and due to changes in the security environment, vigorously promoting globalization, liberalization of the world economy, the growing interdependence of states and the rapid development of science and technology significantly increases the importance of 72 multilateral cooperation within international organizations and integration groupings. In the face of new threats posed by certain illegal, especially terrorist organizations, we are rapidly growing importance of international mechanisms aimed at countering such dangerous phenomena and problems of Czech allies and partners. 73 2.1.1. Slovak diplomacy Slovak Foreign Policy of this “generation” should above all be “smart”, it aims to increase interoperability with foreign partners, consolidate and deepen position in those areas where more than a decade involved - particularly in support of transformation and integration processes in neighboring States and EU regions. Complex Foreign Relations of 21 century require increased attention on issues of the economy, particularly the strengthening of energy and food security, given political, security and economic parameters in the interests of Slovakia's support pragmatic and effective European cooperation, including the importance of deepening integration and communitarian elements within the EU. The test of maturity, professional, organizational and diplomatic skills will undoubtedly preparation, and especially successful management of EU Presidency issues facing Slovakia in the second half of 2016 Presidency in the EU chapter, but not the goal of foreign policy in the next decade. Given that this is a cross-sectional, sector project opens the way to improve the implementation of the European, but also global policies of sectors level. Competencies of Ministry of Foreign Affairs is indeed responsible for conducting foreign policy, but highlighting a comprehensive, cross-sectional characteristics of international relations (economic issues, trade, environment, defense and security, finance) and fusion of European and national policies is a significant opportunity for profiling the external dimension of the work of other central government bodies. It is good that Slovakia is looking well beyond the Union and examines the areas in which it can offer the experience, capacity or resources. The UN is committed to security sector reform, which is crucial in terms of stability and sustainable development in the post-crisis period, supporting humanitarian and development activities in East Africa (Kenya, South Sudan). There are very successful Slovak diplomats of high rank are working in Afghanistan and 74 Central Asia (Jan Kubis and Miroslav Jenca and others), promoting the international cooperation also in preventing diplomacy. Slovak diplomacy has seen intense global phenomena. Climate change is happening and it is irrelevant to argue about whether this is the result of human activities or natural environmental cycle. It is therefore necessary to pay them more attention than before, helping to set development goals after 2015 and to define the objectives of sustainable development. Already on the ground that one of the priorities of the Slovak Presidency of the EU (2016) is the issue of water as a strategic raw material. In these areas, Slovakia can find software “Slovak diplomacy 3.0”33 - diplomacy and foreign policy of the state that is confident and established in the geopolitical environment. At the same time has the human resources that are possibly greater than the financial and interest to extend the scope of its activities thanks to the fact that many of the issues it does not print the burden of history. To intensify cooperation with Central Asian countries in the EU will fully exploit the potential of partnership agreements and cooperation programs of the European Commission and EU Member States, cooperation mechanisms such as the “Baku Initiative”34 and political dialogue, using various tools of Common Foreign and security policy. It will also expand cooperation with the United Nations, in particular the Economic Commission UN, OSCE and the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, NATO, international financial institutions and other regional organizations and forums. EU Special Representative, embassies of EU Member States and European Commission delegations should seek to strengthen cooperation with the OSCE. 33 Establishment of multi-year program of Slovak diplomacy - www.mfa.sk 34 The “Baku Initiative” was started on the occasion of the Energy Ministerial Conference held in Baku on 13 November 2004 with the participation of the European Commission and the Black Sea and the Caspian Littoral States and their neighbors, such as Azerbaijan, Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Iran (observer), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russian Federation (observer), Romania, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 75 Furthermore, the EU, together with the countries of Central Asia, should seek new forms of cooperation, such as a regular bilateral dialogue on human rights and NGOs. 76  Section B The strategy of the European Union in Central Asia Evolution of the mechanism of external activities and external relations of the EU During the postwar Soviet-American confrontation of European integration plans were put into practice only in the sphere of economics. The development of a common trade policy of the Common Market was originally identified the global nature of the external activities of the European Economic Community (EEC). Creating an extensive system of assistance to third countries (food, humanitarian, technical, financial, through the representation of trade preferences) in the framework of the so-called development policy has stimulated the development of relations of the EEC with developing countries. Forming in 1970 the mechanism of European Political Cooperation (EPC) has contributed to greater coordination of foreign policies of the EEC countries. The constant expansion of the EEC intensified its political and economic importance to the third countries required registration of new members of the traditional ties with individual countries and regions around the world. In existing during the “Cold War” system of external relations EEC became the main priorities of West European countries, which were not included in the Community, the developed European countries and former colonies of the member states (countries of the Southern Mediterranean and the countries of the ACP - African, Caribbean and Pacific). Mainly 77 from the periphery of interests were removed EEC countries in Latin America and Asia. The relations with the socialist bloc were in its early stage. The end of the “cold war” led to a drastic change at different levels of world political systems and required adaptation to the EEC's new strategic environment. Getting rid of the Soviet military threat and, consequently, the need for strict adherence to Atlantic solidarity, the appeal of traditional EEC partners to expand co-operation opportunities in the “discovered” the socialist countries gave rise to the political and academic circles of Western Europe's hopes for a speedy transformation of the EEC in the central element of the future architecture of “Wider Europe” and the overcoming of its subordinate, dependent on the U.S. political status. The then Former European Commission President Jacques Delors in his speeches repeatedly called on the European political circles to accept the challenge of history and, realizing the “global responsibility” of Community, to share the political and military burden of keeping the new world order35 (J.Delors, 1992). It should be noted that the initial formation of a new regional policy has acquired a special significance the Soviet factor. The adoption of the 1988 joint declaration of the EEC and CMEA paved the way for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Community and the Soviet Union and the signing in December 1989, bilateral trade and economic agreements. A constructive policy towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the German question, on security issues in Europe and the world had turned the Soviet Union in the international political partner of Western European states. Instead, the Soviet leadership hoped for a massive economic support ongoing domestic reform and development of the format of relations with the EU, such as that which was proposed at that time the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In 35 Available on: J.Delors speech at a conference in Luxembourg on May 28, 1990: Delor J. Le Nouveau concept européen. Paris, 1992. pp. 233-249 78 December 1990, at a summit in Rome, the EEC approved the allocation of the Soviet Union a package of food aid amounting to 750 million ECU, of which 250 million ECU at no charge, and to develop a technical assistance program with a budget of 400 to 1991 mil ECU (after the collapse of the Soviet Union it was called “TASIS” - Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States). In early October 1991 the Ministers of Economy and Finance of the European Economic Community agreed to grant the Soviet Union ECU 1250 million as a loan to pay for imports of products and medications. The collapse of the Soviet Union that resulted in a deterioration of political and economic situation in the newly independent states, Western European countries were clearly aware of the nature and size of the possible threats to the security of the former Soviet Union were extremely interested in the establishment and consolidation in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), especially in its European part of Russia, headed by the pro-Western democratic regimes, but the stabilization republics of the world's business community and were not inclined to use the same tools as in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe or the Mediterranean. The question of the possible accession of CIS countries was not considered. Volumes allocated technical and other assistance were significantly lower. Developed the legal framework of contractual relations did not contain trade and other preferences. Prepared for accession countries in Central and Eastern Europe acted as a filter against the destabilizing effects on the European Union from the CIS and at the same time, together with the countries of the fourth wave of expansion, taking into account the factor of attraction for further promotion of the EU's eastern border. The task of ensuring close and stable relations between the neighboring CIS countries and candidate countries became an integral part of the strategy of the EU enlargement (European Commission, Agenda 2000). Significant for the EU policy began to promote 79 the full participation of Russia and the future border of the CIS countries in the Pan- European economic and political institutions, support for sub-regional organizations in the outlying areas for the EU to the Black, Baltic and Barents seas, cross-border cooperation of the EU and candidate countries of the CIS, political, diplomatic resolution of support “frozen” conflicts in the Caucasus. In 1999 the European Council adopted two strategies that contained a common vision of goals, tools and areas of EU cooperation with Russia and Ukraine. In anticipation of the final entry of the candidate countries the EU had taken steps to develop tools of “East” policy. In May 2001, at the EU - Russia in Moscow was approved by the idea of creating a common European economic space. In May 2003, the parties had agreed to form four integrated space as a “common economic space, common space of freedom, security and cooperation in the space of external security and space research and education, including cultural aspects” (Diplomatic Herald, p. 10). In May 2005, in Moscow, had been approved “road map”. The overall objective of the new EU initiative was to build relations with countries that had “all the advantages offered by the EU, except for the integration of our institutions of power” (R.Prodi). Thus, in the period since the establishment of the European Communities and their subsequent transformation into European Union common foreign activities of EEC / EU had undergone a significant evolution. After a long phase of the joint policy primarily in the areas of trade and assistance to third countries of central focus in the 1990s - early 2000s becomes a strengthening of cooperation among the EU's foreign and security policy. Providing expansion of the common interests and activities of foreign instruments and political rapprochement of the European Union revealed its limits, thus set the overall direction of evolution of a system of external relations. Since the early 80 1990s, the EU took a strategic focus on strengthening its influence in neighboring regions and countries. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the preparation of large- scale EU enlargement to the east in the strategy of “inner circle” were gradually included all the CIS countries, except the former Soviet republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The broad, resource-intensive, aimed at long-term agenda of the EU in its international environment complicate the identification of common interests and goals of the EU Member States in respect of five new independent states, the principles of their integration into the EU's external relations. Optimistic sentiments have strengthened after the signing in November 1990, the so- called Transatlantic Declaration, which formally means the recognition by the United States a united EEC as its global political partner. The desire to control the growing economic and political potential of a united Germany and acted as one of the factors supporting ideas other Western European countries to strengthen international political role of the EEC. Efforts had been made to integrate the EEC countries into the areas of foreign and security policy: the first step was inclusion in the EEA Regulations for European cooperation in foreign policy, mainly codified existing practice of foreign policy cooperation among the EU in the EPU. Attempts to significantly deepen the integration continued during the Intergovernmental Conference of 1990-1991, initiated by the leadership of Germany and France with a view to establishing the EEC political union. The discussions revealed significant contradictions on key issues of the future mechanism. The compromise was fixed in the Maastricht Treaty, which entered through the structure of the three “pillars” were held the dividing line between supranational interests of socio-economic and inter – “Common Foreign and Security Policy” and “Cooperation in the field of justice and internal affairs” the areas of competence. The 81 agreement widely stated goal of the Common Foreign and Security Policy: “the protection of common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union”, “strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways”, “to preserve peace and strengthen international security”, “promotion of international Cooperation”, “develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Single European Act, 163). Separately, noted that the Common Foreign and Security Policy “includes issues relating to the security of the Union, including the formation of the final light of a common defense policy, which could be transformed over time into a common defense”. In the Maastricht Treaty, a wide range of areas, “mutual interest”, was including the “politics of the asylum”, “immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries' struggle against the “unauthorized migration”, “drug abuse”, “international crime”, “terrorism” (Single European Act, 169-170). The results of the practical implementation of the mechanism of a common external policy, made in the first years after the entry into force in November 1993 Maastricht Treaty, were twofold. Might be assessed as positive the apparent trend towards the intensification of external political cooperation between EU countries in various organs of the Council, the beginning of the use of joint action. Most of the sequence of actions the EU was to make the inclusion in the 1994 ENP Secretariat of the General Secretariat of the Council. At the same time revealed significant difficulties, questioned the “general” nature of the common foreign and security policy. According to observers, the main obstacle was the lack of willingness on the part of national governments to conduct a coherent common foreign policy within the EU. This was manifested in the implementation of unilateral government action without prior consultation and coordination of positions in the EU, and in their intransigence on this or any other international issue, restraining the production of common EU policy. 82 Along with the consensus method of decision-making in the Council and the lack of a mechanism of sanctions against the “offenders” have been identified other weaknesses functioning foreign policy. The provisions of the Maastricht Treaty did not provide for granting the status of the European Union subject of international law, which is extremely complicated process of entry into force of EU agreements with third countries: if the agreement covered the issues of the second or third “pillars”, required the passage of national ratification procedures in all EU countries. Regular rotation of the Presidency of the Council of the country has become one of the sources of the problem of “institutional memory” - the inconsistency of EU policy in certain areas, taking into account different set of priorities for each country. The mechanism of the three pillars that united representatives of the three States which were in charge as heads of the Council was not sufficient to solve it. Separation of a common foreign policy as self-reliance pillar within the European Union has led to inter-institutional and contradictions in the EU. During the 1990s the issue of distribution of powers between the outer main structural units of the European Commission remained valid. In the spring of 1993 was established the Directorate General for External Political Relations of the EU, which together with the general supervision over the implementation of a common foreign and security policy, was settled to regulate relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, other European countries, Mongolia and the former Soviet republics. As a result, responsibility for external relations the EU has been distributed among the various General Directorates, the competence of which covered only the external aspects of EU activity, which could not cause division within the European Commission (Bretherton p.39-40) The greatest problems arose between the Council and the European Commission. Much of the Board members preferred the Commission to consider more as a technical body 83 that executes decisions of national governments in foreign policy. On the other hand, the European Commission, endowed with the exclusive right to propose a socio- economic sphere, serving as chief negotiator on behalf of the EU at the conclusion of agreements, with its wide network of offices in many countries and international organizations, sought to increase their influence on EU foreign policy. Involvement of the European Commission in an advisory and consultative body to the Council of Ministers, Political Committee, working groups of the Council, the Secretariat of the Council did not meet the views of the European bureaucrats own role. Tensions between the two institutions projected for many areas, up to the weak coordination between the embassies of the EU and European Commission Delegations in third countries. Finally, the lack of common tools in the arsenal of military-political cooperation between the European Union narrowed the possibilities. Despite efforts on the expansion of Western European countries, increasing its operational capacity, agreed cooperation framework of Western European countries and NATO, the mechanism of interaction between the EU and Western European countries has not been fleshed out, and the EU countries to refrain from prescribed by the Maastricht Treaty rights refer to the Western Europeans countries to develop and implement the decisions and actions which have defense implications (Danilov p.171-173). Many of the weaknesses of the common foreign and security policy is visibly manifested themselves during the repeated attempts of the EU to resolve the crisis in the Balkans, acknowledged as the failure of the largest European political cooperation mechanism. 84  Generally, the degree of cooperation of EU countries has increased significantly, which allowed the researchers to talk about the current “intensive intergovernmental networks” cooperation (Boer den M.Wallence p.503). At the same time because of the significant differences in the structure and traditions of the functioning of national judicial systems and security agencies process of convergence on many issues delayed. The text of the European Convention on Police Office (Europol) mentioned in the Maastricht Treaty, along with extra protocol was finalized in June 1996. The need for national ratification procedures were further delaying the start of full operation of the new agency. Revision of the major shortcomings and problems of functioning of the second and third “pillars” had become one of the main themes of the next Intergovernmental Conference of EU countries that took place in Turin in March 1996 was the Amsterdam Treaty, signed at the end of October 2, 1997 upheld the “tricycle” or “three-point” structure of the European Union. Changes made to the mechanism of a common foreign policy testified about the preservation among national governments cautious approach to its development, based on the strengthening of intergovernmental cooperation. The post of EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy was established, which is at the same time the Secretary General of the Council, with the function of facilitating the preparation, adoption and implementation of the conduct of political dialogue with third countries, as well as representational powers. In his work he had to rely on a special section of the Policy Planning and Early Warning System, established within the General Secretariat of the Council. The contract was secured by the Council of the appointment of special representatives of the EU. List of tools added to “common strategies” adopted by the European Council framework documents in areas where member states have important common interests (Amsterdam Treaty). Established principle of qualified majority with the approval of the Council common 85 positions and actions based on common strategies, complemented by a reservation of the right member of the Board to require a unanimous decision on important matters of national policy (Amsterdam Treaty). More significant was the introduction of the position of “constructive abstention”, in which the presences of abstentions among the Council members do not interfere with the decision. In comparison with the Maastricht Treaty provisions on the common EU defense policy as an element of the second “support” were more detailed. There was a clearly defined scope of “defense aspects of the common foreign and security policy”: “The tasks of humanitarian, rescue and peacekeeping issues, as well as the problem of striking forces acting to resolve crises and restore peace” (Amsterdam Treaty). The contract provides that the definition of principles and guidelines of foreign policy and security policy and European Council decisions on joint action by the Board subject to the defense. Immigration policy and asylum policies fully incorporated into the founding treaties Communities, thus becoming the first “pillar” of the EU. Changes in the mechanisms of the EU second and third “pillars” have been made after the Amsterdam Treaty. Franco-British Declaration, signed at St Male in December 1998 paved the way for the formation of a new structural element of the common foreign and security policy - the European Security and Defense Policy, which meant the failure to consider the Western European countries as a military instrument of the European Union. Construction of the European Security and Defense Policy in the establishment of permanent political and military authorities, as well as plans for the accumulation of a large autonomous military and civilian capabilities to the EU in 2003 and found repercussion in the contract signed by the EU in Nice in February 2001. At the special EU summit in Tampere in October 1999, important decisions were taken in the field of internal affairs and justice, among whom figured the intention to create a 86 common asylum regime, and joint operational agency to fight organized crime. Under the Lisbon Treaty, EU sign a December 13, 2007 assumed the formal elimination of “three-point” structure of the EU and the unification of decision-making process. However, that did not affect the sphere of common foreign and security policy: the provisions of the contract, despite some innovations, retained typical Amsterdam and Nice treaties primary progressive course of cooperation. Thus, in the framework of EU cooperation in the field of foreign and security policy was similar to the principle of enhanced cooperation rather than integration. National governments retained a high degree of autonomy in making and implementing decisions. Duality of results and the low efficiency of foreign attempts defined the place of military integration in the EU's European security architecture. Despite the significant increase in its value, a crucial role in ensuring the military security of the majority of EU countries continues to NATO, after the “cold war” to initiate the expansion of the organization and the range of problems in the area of crisis management and peacekeeping outside the territory of its members. Functions were expanded of Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, transformed in 1995 into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. However, the cumulative impact of the EU countries into NATO and the OSCE has provided great opportunities to achieve common interests of the European Union, and coordinate policies in international organizations and forums has been spelled out in the Maastricht Treaty as one of the areas of common foreign and security policy. The integration factor severely affected the evolution of the system of geographical priorities of the EU. The regional policy crystallized as worsening political situation in many countries of your nearest and frustration results of the 1990-1991 Intergovernmental Conference on political union. Management of 87  the European Commission since the beginning of 1992 speaks of the fallacy of spray attention and funds the Community and in the future clearly and consistently advocated the adoption of the call, at “the threshold” of the organization (Delors, 1992). An important step in reaching an agreement has been approved by the European Council in Lisbon in June 1992 report of the Foreign Ministers of the EEC areas of common foreign and security policy after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty: among the factors determining the existence of common external interests and the need for joint action, had been transferred to the geographical proximity of the region or the country36. Isolation of the summit in Essen in December 1994 as one of the four priority areas for the whole of the EU to ensure peace and stability on the European continent and adjacent regions of the evidence conclusively established in the EU consensus 37. Self-restraint did not mean self-isolation and did not prevent the activation of policies in other areas. This is due to not only the new strategic situation, and Intra-integration dynamics, and stable trends in the global economy. Overall, the EU's external activities focus on the predominant use of coordination mechanisms, approaches, economic resources and political leverage in its immediate international environment. Strategy priority to develop relations with its neighbors meant, above all, strengthening cooperation with countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Begun in June 1990, negotiations on the content, timing mechanisms and creating a unified European Economic Area (EEA) concluded with the signing in May of 1992 the first version of the agreement. 36 Counseil Européen de Lisbonne (26-27 juin 1992): Conclusions de la Presidence. Available on: http://eurparl.europa.eu/summits/lisbon 37 Counseil Européen d’Essen (9-10 december 1994): Conclusion de la Presidence. Available on: http://eurparl.europa.eu/summits/essl_fr 88 Against the backdrop of a clear understanding of goals and means to enhance policy toward the countries of the European Free Trade Association within the EEC grew discussion about developing a strategy for states lying on the perimeter of the eastern and southern borders of the EU. From both sides the EEC was under pressure towards the deepening of ties. In the eastern part of the European continent liberated from the “iron” Soviet custody in Central and Eastern Europe as a result of the “velvet revolutions” of 1989-1990 on the path of liberal economic and political reforms whose success is inextricably linked with the early “return to Europe” after the entry into the European Economic Union. Also, some countries on the southern flank (Morocco and Turkey in 1987, Cyprus and Malta in 1990) have applied for membership. By this they are also pushing for the last decade, increased economic dependence on the EEC. The process of developing an adequate response was complicated by the rapidly deteriorating political situation in many states. Internal systemic crisis in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe undermined the fragile political stability. Gloomy outlook could become a situation of Yugoslavia, during the “cold war” was part of the Mediterranean partners, EEC: a federation is steadily moving to the collapse and civil war, increasing tensions in the neighboring states of the EC and Central and Eastern Europe. In the Southern Mediterranean countries with the partial liberalization of the observed internal destabilization associated with opposition to the secular government and Islamic opposition. Multifactor instability in neighboring regions has stimulated massive legal and illegal migration and infiltration of criminal and terrorist groups in the countries of the European community, has threatened military security of Western European countries, the interests of European investors, the reliability of energy supplies from North Africa and the USSR, the environmental situation in Europe. Comparative analysis of policy in two areas indicates the presence of a hierarchy of priorities. Relations with Central and Eastern European countries were normalized in 89 1988-1990 in June 1988 adopted a joint declaration of the EEC and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) of mutual recognition agreements on trade and economic cooperation launched a technical assistance program “Phare”. In December 1991 started the signing of association agreements ("Europe Agreements"), which included items such as political dialogue, the introduction of free trade in industrial goods, easing restrictions on movement of persons, services and capital. (Commission Européenne. P.13-23). Decisive in shaping the "east" policy has been voiced by the EU at the European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993 a proposal for Central and Eastern European countries join the EU as soon as they meet the established criteria. According to the staff of the Centre of West European Studies, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, the spread of the integration processes in these countries was chosen as “the only effective way to counter destabilizing trends in Europe and the strengthening of European security”. An additional mechanism was approved by the French initiative is the development and signing of the Stability Pact in Europe, designed to ensure the inviolability of borders and address the issue of minority rights in Central and Eastern Europe. Pre-Accession Strategy was approved by the European Council in Essen in 1994. In December 1997, decided to open formal negotiations with six countries. In October 2002, were identified deadlines join the main group of candidate countries in May 2004 completed the process of accession of ten countries, including the three Baltic countries. In January 2007, became full EU members Bulgaria and Romania. Planning the most ambitious in the history of European expansion has included the painful process of the harmonization of intergovernmental conferences in the future institutional structure and financing of the EU. 90 Activation of integration processes within the UES in the second half of the 1980s fueled rampant in the member states of mood. Began the integration boom has been the most fruitful in the socio-economic sphere. Single European Act in 1986 opened the way for the formation of the Common Internal Market. Approved in February 1992 in Maastricht “Treaty on European Union” outlined a phased implementation of the Economic and Monetary Union member countries. The implementation of the tasks contributed to the further convergence of interests of the EU and over supranational instruments of domestic and foreign policy. In particular, the overall environmental policy of the EU was institutionalized and strengthened, including cooperation with third countries and international organizations through the mechanism of trans- European networks established by the Maastricht Treaty, enhanced external component of total activity in the field of transport, energy and telecommunications, providing a legal basis for joint policy development (Single European Act). The distance of the present Transatlantic relations of that time and nowadays is very well remarked in the start up of negotiations of US for TAFTA (A Transatlantic Free Trade Area) and including also investments between two sides of ocean. EU has grown up and US comparatively had lost some positions. 91  Section C The objective conditions and prerequisites for development of relations of Czech Republic and Slovak Republic with Central Asia countries This chapter focuses on the theoretical approaches for better understanding of history, political systems and processes underlying a comparative politics concept. The conditions and prerequisites for the development of relations of the Czech Republic and Slovakia with Central Asia countries have a common ground in the form of shared political past of these countries. Formation of the geopolitical region of Eastern Europe as a relatively isolated fragment on the political map of Europe has been relatively recent and is a logical consequence of the restructuring of the post-socialist Eastern part of the European continent. Joining a number of Eastern European countries into the Euro-Atlantic structures have led Czech Republic and Slovakia being dropped out of the general trends in the development of the European system at the beginning, later on took a similar transitionary position, as well as the gradual crystallization of the autonomous regional dynamics in Central Asia, in its structure and began to be considered by external actors. This has contributed to the establishment of separate formats of policies concerning these countries, which is not strengthened internal consolidation in this geopolitical 92 space, but gave it some external signs of integrity, or at least common sense of their geopolitical situation. “The uniqueness of EU’s political system in its diversity; outline between Eastern and Western Europe is much more difficult. The EU concept of more cultural and historical dimension can have its influence in EU politics. In this matter, there is also a presence of ambiguity that characteristic for EU as political system which more like a state, and unlike international organization, this can bring to a broad range of policy areas, the same ambiguity can be found in EU institutional decision-making process. And not every country is reflected as source of decision-making agent. (Lelieveldt, 2011)” To clarify these issues, it is necessary to consider the evolution of the geopolitical region of Eastern Europe over the past two decades, and its specific results at contemporary stage. It must be admitted that for a long time in the current upheavals in Eastern Europe were not important for European politics. In the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, these countries were remained rather reserved and somewhat peripheral field of the European Affairs. External impulses of its structuring were minimal and were limited mainly to prevent overflow beyond the dominant centrifugal tendencies in it to destabilization and fragmentation. Almost constrained, these tendencies in fully proved in the 90s, having led not only to increase of turbulence and instability, but also to accumulation in it considerable conflict potential. This refers also to Russian – Ukrainian gas conflict which affected energy shortage mainly in Slovakia, due to its dependence of supplies38. As a consequence, none of the conflict lines are has become the foundation for building a new system of relationships in Eastern Europe. The 38 Slovakia and Bulgaria depend on gas imports up to 90%. 93 cumulative effect of tension on all existing lines of conflict resulted in the impossibility of constructing a system on the basis of cooperative projects. The situation was aggravated by the fact that practically none of the major players there did not aim to overcome the escalating conflict, seeking rather to use them for more political points than neutralize them as a potential threat of safety for all Eastern Europe39. The Czech Government as EU presiding country in 2009 has not taken a leadership role in addressing the problem. It is important to note that the economic interdependence inherited from Soviet period is very strong and none of the countries yet overcome it completely. The economic interdependence still is provoking the conflict issues in Central Asia as well. Also it is possibly to add to it the tactics of use by local elite of the conflicts of one level for damping of the conflicts at other levels; it is possible to receive rather exact picture of a political landscape of Eastern Europe and deepening its political failures. In the monograph of Russian specialist S.Zhiznin “Energy Diplomacy”, along with the main characteristic of the tendency of European integration in the energy sector, is an 39 In 2012 Putin was solving the problems with Turkish partners. Putin held a ceremony to start the construction of the “South Stream”, construction begin in 2014. Italy currently chairing the European Union, support the pipeline project “South Stream”, previously, the EU Energy Commissioner Guenther Oettinger called to suspend construction of the pipeline need to until it will not correspond to the norms the European Union. He pointed out that in order to build a pipeline, Russia must recognize the rules of the Third Energy Package. According to the document, the owners of pipelines in the EU cannot be gas companies. On the eve of Putin's visit to Istanbul in December 2012 observers conclude that Russian-Turkish relations are far from ideal. Differences, in particular, were outlined against the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline39, the agreement on the construction of which was signed in 2009. Russia believes that the EU's attempts to freeze the construction associated with the desire to “punish” Russia for Crimea accession. South Stream – is a gas pipeline, whose task is to transport gas to bypass Ukraine, with which Russia has seriously deteriorated relations. It planned to build a gas pipeline through Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia and Italy. Construction of the “South Stream” launched December 7, 2012 near Anapa. Commissioning of the first line is scheduled for the end of 2015. Total capacity of both pipelines will exceed 60 billion cubic meters of gas per year. Putin solves problems with Turkish partners 12.03.2012 / Sergei Kulikov Source - Nezavisimaya Gazeta permanent article address - http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1354511040 94 attempt to determine the place of the Caspian region in the external EU energy strategy40. The work of B.Potshveriya (Institute of Oriental Studies) on the establishment of relations in Central Asia and Turkey in the first half of the 1990s substantiates the thesis of the important role played by EU policy and the leading EU countries to strengthen the position of Ankara in the region 41 (Potshveriya, 2001). While analyzing different points of view of Russian researchers, some of them treat certain aspects of the Central Asian policy of the EU as a “forcing away” Russia out of the region, a number of experts in the analysis of international cooperation in Central Asia are emphasizing based on the thesis that the presence of a consolidated policy of the EU countries, as well as their interests in terms of economic and political expansion to gain control over energy resources of Central Asia 42 (Belokrinitsky, Sklyarov, 1996). Kazakhstan in Central Asia has a role as the largest, relatively self-sufficient state with a close relationship with all members of the space and is able to set the vector of the political process in its regional environment, although not directly determining it. It is well known that in last decade about 30% of oil extracted in Kazakhstan are the share of European companies, and more than 43% of the Kazakhstan oil export go to EU countries (generally to Italy, the Netherlands and Austria, Slovakia) (Strokov A., 43 Panamonov V.) . The main items of Czech imports from Kazakhstan in 2011 include 40 Zhiznin C. Energy Diplomacy, 1999 41 B. Potshveriya Turkey is between Europe and Asia. Results of Europeanization at the end of the twentieth century, 2001 42 Belokrinitsky V. Sklyarov, L., The current situation in Central Asia and Caucasus: A view from Iran, 1996 43 Strokov A., Panamonov V., Import of the Kazakhstani hydrocarbons – The steady basis of cooperation of the European Union and Kazakhstan http://www.easttime.ru/analytics/kazakhstan/import-kazakhstanskikh- uglevodorodov-ustoichivaya-osnova-sotrudnichestva-evrope 95 crude oil (83%, Kazakhstan is third largest supplier of oil to the Czech Republic after Russia and Azerbaijan)44. This is largely explained by the peculiarities of the situation in the coming years on the basic structural level of the European system, which is reduced mainly to the interaction of the leading centers of power, and, in the this region directly. But as introduced at the beginning of this dissertation “non-statehood” Europe has its peculiarities in the capability of flexible governance of different speeds. Firstly, the transformation of Eastern Europe into completion ground for power centers occurred in the context of conservation and somewhat deepening the geopolitical intermediate position in this region. Secondly, competition for influence in this area was conducted not directly and openly, but implicitly in mediated forms. Problematic issues related to this field have not been the subject of systematic negotiations within the current institutional and bilateral interaction formats. Moreover, there was no attempt to develop a systematic compromise on these issues. What was happening around Eastern Europe in 2005-2008 is rather a chain of mutual asymmetric response of European actors to the unilateral actions of each other, generating a kind of “spiral of tension”, which, however, could not find an open recognition in political rhetoric of the parties. Thirdly, the competition was of uneven and selective. It concerned some of the most painful aspects of the situation in Eastern Europe, namely military-political and energy sectors. The attention was focused on building a strategic presence in this region, while the strengthening of the EU presence did not cause any concerns. However, at this particular period in the shadow of the Russian-American confrontation was the prerequisites of competition between the EU and Russia in Eastern Europe45, which 44 Economic and trade relations of the Czech Republic – Kazakhstan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czech Republic 45 Russia and the USA declared the beginning of "reset" of the relations in 2009. Then at a meeting in Geneva US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton presented to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov the 96 although is less intensity and resonance, but as it turned out, has a more substantial structural importance for the political formation of the region. It must be admitted that this competition did not occurred as a result of a deliberate strategy of the parties, but rather was a by-product of the implementation of their policies in different directions as a lack of coordination between them. And fourthly, the competitive policy in regard to Eastern Europe did not affect the underlying sources of conflict of the region. It is rather, the controversy at the US- Russia and some EU-Russia “were imposed” on formed in it at different levels the complex of conflicts, but it did not change much, so did not lead to the desired stabilization, if not in the former Yugoslavia with the progressive enlargements of EU and NATO to the now independent republics. 46 However, it is impossible to ignore the fact that, due to peripetias of the specified period finding a compromise formula of the leading actors’ interaction in Eastern Europe became an indispensable condition to the formation of cooperative bases of new system of relations on the continent, including the construction of new security architecture in Europe. Of course, without overcoming the existing conflict issues in this region but developing acceptable modus operandi for all actors in the continental system it is not possible. Structuring values that acquired EU policy upgrading Eastern Europe over the years must be recognized, despite all criticism towards EU policy formats in this region. symbolical button which ministers pressed together. It has not passed also several months as a drowning in the relations between the countries was braked again. The question of antimissile safety in Europe became a new stumbling block. Russia insists on the participation in created by the USA and NATO to EUROABM system, demanding guarantees that this system won't be directed against it. The USA refuses to give such guarantees and don't intend to connect the ABM system with the country which is not the member of NATO. In 2009 Barack Obama made concessions, having agreed to revise plans of placement of interceptor missiles in Poland and radar in the Czech Republic. However the new program of creation of the ABM also displeased Moscow. 46 Case of Crimea can be mentioned. 97 Brussels anyway managed (what Moscow could not) to create the convergent political framework uniting all six countries of Eastern Europe, despite separation of their purposes and approaches in the relations with EU. Summarizing the presented analysis, it should be emphasized that, while remaining the most amorphous, least regulated region, Eastern Europe, however, performs a constructive function, stimulating the major actors to the search for the optimal options and the best interaction principles in this region. The strategic value to the maintenance of security and stability in the Europe, widely belonged to the eastern part, is so high that it cannot yet be defined as concluded (could be defined as work in progress). However, the factors that may produce the further continuation of the current unstable issues and might encourage its members to radical changes in the status quo are not observed. Eastern Europe represents a region with complex multi-level contradictions, which does not fit into any externally suggested - either in the U.S. project of enhancing democracy, or more binding EU regulatory convergence, neither in the Russian project of post-Soviet reintegration. Finding an acceptable balance in this region requires complex interrelated solutions, the implementation of which is necessarily connected with the advancement of existing policy approaches, as well as the revision of a number of positions as achieved by the major actors, and on the part of the Eastern European countries. Based on this, we may say that in the European geopolitical configuration the Eastern Europe acts as an intermediate region, which amorphous states creating a field of competition for influence and relationships existing configuration, but does not determining it. In Eurozone attractive plays in this case a well perceived “second adhesion” quite diffused attitude in the countries not yet sitting in the European Central Bank in Frankfurt. 98 Complexity and insecurity as well as regional and external rivalry, is taking place in Central Asian region. The majority of experts of Central Asian policies in Czech and Slovak Republics are unanimously emphasizing the interest of other countries in region. In particular, Russia, USA and China are showing more and more interest on the potential energy and strategic position of Central Asia. 99 3.1. The criteria of issues of foreign policies of Czech and Slovak Republics: Central Asia as a problem or opportunity The following chapter is organized in three sections. The first section is description of principal issues of foreign policy of Czech Republic in Central Asian countries. The second section will describe the foreign relations policy of Slovak Republic in region; the third section will focus on foreign policy line of Central Asian countries, as well as the main diverse of the Czech and Slovak Republics foreign policy with the Republic of Kazakhstan – as one the most supporters and endeavors to strengthen the development of cooperation with the European Union member states – but also with the other countries of the region. With the adoption of the EU Strategy for Central Asia, there was the necessity for the better agreed values and interests. The Strategy took into account the specificities of the countries in region and developed individual approaches to each of them, without leaving aside the regional cooperation. Thus Kazakhstan is presented in Central Asia as political, energy and food supplier of stability of the entire region. From the perspective of the European Union, on the basis of the approved EU document “EU strategic partner - Central Asia” and in particular the Republic of Kazakhstan (30. 06. 2008) and response of the Kazakhstan governmental by presenting the state program “Path to Europe”, Kazakhstan is the largest importer of EU. In 1997 Kazakhstan government adopted a strategy “Kazakhstan – 2030” which provided a long-term scheduled, key objectives and priorities for the economic development of the country, which was then refined by the Strategic Plan in 2010. Comparing economy from 2000 to 2008 (it two years before the 100 strategic signature of the plan) shows that the volume of GDP increased at twice and effective social policies has been fulfilled. The supplies of Russian and Central Asian gas delivered to Western Europe and transiting through Slovakia had been on the basis of long-term contracts, in November 2008, with validity until 2028 and with a capacity of supplying 6.5 billion cubic meters of gas a year. Physical volume deliveries in 2011 reached 5.9 billion m3 47 (in 2010 to 5 billion m3), the physical volumes of transit reached 53.78 billion m3 (in 2010 to 43,350 billion m3). In the first half of 2012 the volume of supply and transit of gas reached 1.68 respectively 27.97 billion cubic meters48. The tendency to diverge the natural resources, strengthen industrial engagement, leadership, competitive frameworks, innovative technologies launched well known the EU Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program49. Abovementioned projects such as ICT systems 50, research and innovation industrial capacities and business perspectives (including SMEs), alternative energy opportunities are maximizing the impact of the international cooperation actions. One of focus areas of innovative technologies in Czech and Slovak Republics are research and application of hydrogen technologies and hydrogen fuel cells in the Czech Republic there is a project funded by EU Operational Infrastructure Fund 51 and the state 47 Trade and economic cooperation with the Czech Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/encyklopedie_statu/evropa/rusko/ekonomika/obchodni_a_ekonomicka_spoluprace _s_cr.html 48 Trade and Economic Cooperation of the Slovak Republic and the Russian Federation; official statistics of Embassy of RF in SR. http://rusemb.sk/svk/Rusko-slovenske-vztahy/spravka/ 49 Horizon 2020 is EU Research and Innovation Program, with €80 billion fund for 2014 to 2020. 50 Global ICT marketplace was estimated to be worth app. USD 3.7 trillion in 2008, and by 2011 exceeded four trillion USD, even in spite of the global economic slowdown. ‘Global ICT Spending Tops $3.5 Trillion’ (2008), JCN Newswires, 20 May, ttp://www.japancorp.net/Article.Asp?Art_ID=18281 51 Among the various EU-funded projects now runs in nine European cities less than thirty experimental buses. 101 budget of the Czech Republic, launched in Institute of Chemical Technology in Prague, where will be built in Neratovice 52 hydrogen refueling station. Particularly, in Czech project – buses will be powered by an electric motor and power supplying it with hydrogen fuel cells. Expected range will be between 400 to 500 kilometers on one fill- up. Given that it is a bus for urban public transport, it is more than enough. Hydrogen source for unique yet classic way bus will be in production from fossil fuels. There are some plans to expand the production and implementation in Bratislava (capital of Slovakia). Hydrogen is derived from the electrochemical production of sodium hydroxide and chlorine. This technology is based on the basis Neratovice called mercury, amalgam electrolysis. There is mission platform: Supporting the development of hydrogen technologies and introduction of the hydrogen economy in the Czech and Slovak Republics. The most important business platform: 1) Coordination of activities of entities hydrogen economy among themselves and in relation to programs and resources both domestic and foreign. 2) Support and promote the common interests of its members with the aim of creating an enabling environment for the development of the hydrogen economy. 3) Association with the EU Platform, partner of similar institutions abroad. 4) Providing expertise in the departments and agencies of state and local governments in areas related to the development of the hydrogen industry. The European Commission has proposed investment of € 22 billion Innovation Package for Medicine, Fuel Cells and Hydrogen, Bio-based Industries, Clear Sky, Electronic Components and Systems for European Leadership53. Generally the rates of Czech and Slovak Republic in KOF Rankings are high, which shows the perspectives of future growth of region. Following graphs are representing the numbers: 52 In Neratovice (Central Bohemian Region of Czech Republic) was launched project with hydrogen fuel cells also in Honda car model as experimental project. www.ujv.cz 53 Horizon 2020 – Public-Private Partnership Joint Technology Initiatives 2013, www.ec.europa.eu/programms 102 TABLE 4: POLITICAL GLOBALIZATION Sources: KOF Index of Globalization Political Globalization 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Italy 98,21 97,98 Spain 97,19 96,68 96,54 95,93 Sweden 94,87 94,73 Egypt, Arab Rep. 94,37 94,16 94,14 94,13 Netherlands 93,74 93,63 Turkey 93,59 93,24 92,66 92,21 United States 92,21 92,17 Hungary 92,06 91,88 91,29 91,03 Nigeria 90,95 90,82 Ireland 90,53 90,22 90,03 89,72 Korea, Rep. 89,6 89,6 South Africa 89,47 87,78 87,65 87,1 Czech Republic 86,9 86,88 Croatia 86,53 86,49 86,27 86,07 Philippines 86,07 85,85 Slovak Republic 85,57 85,44 84,99 84,63 Ghana 84,34 84,28 Kenya 83,94 83,4 83,28 83,18 New Zealand 82,65 82,43 Ecuador 82,34 81,36 80,68 80,36 Cyprus 79,28 79,05 Bolivia 78,13 78 77,29 77,16 Cote d'Ivoire 76,68 76,61 Mali 76,38 75,82 75,33 75,15 Qatar 75,12 74,31 Albania 73,86 73,77 73,77 73,66 Togo 73,54 73,5 Jamaica 73,32 72,89 72,28 72,27 Honduras 72,26 72,26 Serbia 71,97 71,75 71,28 70,87 Fiji 69,86 69,78 Moldova 69,76 69,72 69,58 68,44 Rwanda 68,27 67,78 Sierra Leone 67,48 66,4 66,36 66,1 Gambia, The 65,91 65,77 Yemen, Rep. 65,53 65,5 64,84 64,69 Cuba 64,49 64,11 Guinea-Bissau 64,1 63 62,82 62,8 Saudi Arabia 62,4 62,05 Kuwait 61,69 61,31 61,24 60,79 Cambodia 60,73 60,67 Azerbaijan 58,92 58,84 58,76 58,72 Latvia 58,08 58,02 Iraq 57,99 56,38 55,7 54,82 Lesotho 54,81 54,75 Malta 54,15 54,03 53,79 52,13 Georgia 50,9 50,8 Armenia 50,36 50,35 50 49,78 Angola 48,82 48,59 Haiti 48,26 47,89 47,89 47,78 Guyana 46,94 45,91 Papua New Guinea 45,47 45,32 45,31 45,03 Uzbekistan 43,61 42,28 Seychelles 42,13 39,58 39,09 39,06 Turkmenistan 39,02 38,64 Swaziland 38,02 37,51 36,14 35,48 Antigua and Barbuda 34,9 34,09 Monaco 33,84 33,5 33,34 33,12 Sao Tome and Principe 32,97 31,81 Somalia 31,48 29,64 29,53 28,34 Timor-Leste 28,09 27,05 Maldives 26,88 26,85 26,75 24,11 Andorra 23,32 21,95 Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 12,67 19,89 7,6 6,29 Aruba 4,85 4,85 Bermuda 3,48 3,48 3,48 3,48 New Caledonia 3,48 3,48 French Polynesia 2,93 2,93 2,38 2,38 Northern Mariana Islands 1,55 11,28 103 TABLE 5: ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION Economic Globalization 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Singapore 97,64 94,75 Malta 93,95 92,4 92,18 91,33 Hungary 89,62 89,57 Sweden 88,91 88,72 87,4 86,15 Cyprus 85,11 85,08 Austria 84,59 84,02 83,55 83,47 Chile 82,52 81,57 New Zealand 81,17 80,55 79,08 78,78 Malaysia 78,76 78,65 Spain 78,4 78,1 78,01 77,03 Australia 76,41 76,02 Canada 75,84 75,77 75,72 75,72 Mongolia 75,44 75,33 Trinidad and Tobago 74,75 74,48 73,94 73,27 Mauritius 73,14 72,78 France 72,15 71,72 71,72 71,55 Saudi Arabia 69,58 69,45 Thailand 69,24 68,39 68,19 67,97 Kazakhstan 67,65 67,37 Kuwait 67,36 67,35 67,17 66,93 Armenia 66,53 66,43 Ukraine 65,81 64,84 64,66 64,61 Jordan 64,55 64,45 Moldova 64,19 64,05 63,43 63,41 Vietnam 63,37 63,16 Cambodia 62,93 62,36 62,06 61,8 Tunisia 61,49 61,22 United States 60,83 60,33 59,99 59,94 Botswana 59,62 59,61 Indonesia 59,56 58,54 58 57,95 Belize 57,36 57,36 Cape Verde 57,36 57,19 56,73 56,08 Russian Federation 55,55 55,44 Fiji 54,59 54,53 53,32 52,84 Colombia 52,78 52,37 Mozambique 51,89 51,73 51,61 51,61 China 51,12 50,8 Togo 50,78 50,34 49,92 49,53 Egypt, Arab Rep. 49,3 47,67 Algeria 47,67 47,13 46,57 46,44 Malawi 46,02 44,93 Senegal 44,5 44,49 44,01 43,69 Syrian Arab Republic 43,03 42,71 Argentina 42,7 42,61 42,48 42,12 Sierra Leone 41,71 40,72 Sri Lanka 40,69 40,47 40,31 39,9 Venezuela, RB 39,46 39,25 Congo, Dem. Rep. 38,88 38,47 37,02 35,45 Central African Republic 35,06 Nepal 28,92 34,47 28,46 26,47 25,69 Aruba Netherlands Antilles Bermuda Channel Islands Cayman Islands Eritrea Gambia, The Greenland Iraq Lao PDR Libya Macao, China Northern Mariana Islands Puerto Rico Solomon Islands Sao Tome and Principe Tajikistan Tonga Virgin Islands (U.S.) 104 TABLE 6: GLOBALIZATION INDEX 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Belgium 92,3 91,79 Austria 91,33 89,48 88,89 88,12 Sweden 87,63 87,07 Switzerland 86,85 86,28 86,08 85,39 Canada 85,38 85,15 Finland 84,86 84,85 84,21 83,86 Slovak Republic 83,49 81,99 Germany 81,59 81,08 81,01 80,31 Estonia 79,72 79,1 New Zealand 78,23 78,22 77,27 76,85 Malta 76,09 75,66 United States 75,36 74,76 72,91 72,79 Iceland 72,73 72,53 Bulgaria 72,03 71,73 70,97 70,1 Turkey 69,02 69 Bahrain 68,86 68,34 67,78 67,78 Lebanon 67,51 67,49 Uruguay 67,43 65,28 64,9 64,39 Peru 64,3 63,73 Moldova 63,64 63,49 62,59 62,31 Bosnia and Herzegovina 62,31 61,78 Georgia 61,64 61,56 61,38 61,38 Nigeria 61,2 60,93 Macedonia, FYR 60,22 60,1 59,67 59,58 China 59,43 59,25 Brazil 59,21 59,21 58,54 58,32 Argentina 58,3 58,28 Kazakhstan 58,1 58,04 57,97 57,57 Mongolia 57,29 56,71 Philippines 56,12 56,12 55,62 55,2 Namibia 54,99 54,98 Armenia 54,95 54,72 54,55 54,51 Nicaragua 54,42 54,01 Senegal 53,45 53,08 53,08 52,4 Algeria 52,37 52,05 Pakistan 51,84 51,68 51,57 51,51 Swaziland 51,14 50,88 Togo 50,7 50,67 50,56 49,85 Djibouti 49,82 49,44 Cuba 48,94 48,88 48,79 48,23 Antigua and Barbuda 48,16 47,99 Suriname 47,98 47,68 47,68 47,02 Lesotho 47 46,87 Uganda 46,24 46,18 46,06 46,05 Cape Verde 45,76 45,71 Cameroon 45,54 45,22 45,18 45,07 Angola 44,73 44,43 New Caledonia 44,35 44,05 43,97 43,68 Syrian Arab Republic 43,67 42,6 Madagascar 42,58 42,53 42,31 42,26 Rwanda 42,24 42,2 Tajikistan 41,65 40,79 40,75 40,65 St. Vincent and the Grenadi 40,56 40,24 Iraq 40,15 40,1 39,94 39,12 Sierra Leone 38,97 38,05 Ethiopia 37,81 37,46 36,87 36,33 Sudan 36,19 36,06 Haiti 35,75 35,2 35 34,41 Burundi 33,5 32,79 Afghanistan 31,98 31,46 31,05 30,81 Bhutan 27,91 27,34 Lao PDR 26,72 26,52 26,26 25,46 Timor-Leste 24,35 American Samoa Faeroe Islands Guam Monaco Puerto Rico Somalia Globalization Index 105 TABEL 7: SOCIAL GLOBALIZATION Social Globalization 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Cyprus 91,81 90,99 Austria 90,79 89,84 89,79 88,81 Netherlands 88,8 88,59 France 85,82 85,78 85,44 85,19 Czech Republic 83,21 82,67 Slovak Republic 82,23 82,06 81,46 81,4 Kuwait 81,29 81,12 Greece 80,6 80,44 80,07 79,82 United Arab Emirates 78,91 77,02 Liechtenstein 76,56 76,24 76,2 75,69 Italy 75,02 74,36 Malaysia 73,31 72,97 72,82 72,6 Israel 72,22 70,99 Croatia 70,82 70,67 69,93 69,84 Puerto Rico 69,39 69,27 Romania 69,03 67,2 67,19 Macao, China 6667,01 64,88 Turkey 64,85 64,62 64,22 63,92 Jordan 63,55 63,39 Bahrain 63,27 62,73 62,47 61,91 Brunei Darussalam 61,88 60,6 Oman 58,75 58,65 58,56 58,45 Montenegro 58,21 58,07 57,78 Antigua and Barbuda 54,2957,49 53,89 Fiji 53,79 53,72 Azerbaijan 53,01 52,43 52,1 51,96 Barbados 51,86 51,7 St. Kitts and Nevis 51,16 51,02 50,99 50,8 Morocco 50,77 50,6 Palau 50,5 49,6 49,42 48,94 Maldives 48,85 48,79 Honduras 47,72 47,12 47,02 46,94 Venezuela, RB 46,28 46,26 Korea, Rep. 45,96 45,75 45,28 45,08 Guatemala 44,77 44,73 Ecuador 44,59 44,05 43,32 43,27 Greenland 42,81 42,47 Samoa 42,2 41,83 41,48 41,38 Belize 41,36 41,31 Brazil 41 40,89 40,42 40,18 Peru 40,09 40,05 Tunisia 39,09 38,52 38,36 37,9 Philippines 37,79 37,13 Sao Tome and Principe 36,51 36,44 35,96 35,93 Algeria 35,28 35,25 Togo 35,22 34,91 34,58 34,27 Syrian Arab Republic 34,19 33,99 Vanuatu 33,27 32,81 31,98 31,63 Bhutan 30,59 30,51 Mongolia 29,89 29,74 29,42 29,02 Cameroon 28,88 28,65 Kiribati 28,3 27,94 27,93 27,59 Zambia 27,52 27,46 Solomon Islands 26,81 26,61 26,57 26,47 Yemen, Rep. 26,26 26,13 Tajikistan 26,05 24,39 24,34 24,25 Eritrea 24,19 24,16 Guinea-Bissau 23,9 23,24 22,59 22,42 Timor-Leste 21,72 21,67 Equatorial Guinea 21,59 21,43 21,38 21,28 Madagascar 21,02 20,99 Chad 20,51 20,08 19,9 19,5 Angola 18,97 18,95 Ethiopia 16,99 16,56 16,15 15,88 Myanmar 0 15,19 Channel Islands 0 0 0 0 Isle of Man 0 0 0 106 Considering the ratio of regional and country aspects of EU external policy – innovative technologies of EU will substantially impact the growth of Central Asia. Due to the region’s undergoing rapid structural transformation, having institutional changes, non- competitive products or factor markets and the condition of the commodity economy nature, which is common for Central Asia. Soviet closed economic complex - was simply not adapted to the new conditions. In the course of the market, largely spontaneous transformation survived the most liquid sector of exporting raw materials and semi-finished products. In fact, all countries have experienced massive deindustrialization, loss of quality and simplifying the structure of the total production. Nowadays is presented the extremely high dependence on imports of consumer goods, technology and sophisticated products. From fluctuations in the prices for major export commodities and other factors that governances do not control. Having an economy that does guarantee – neither stability nor sovereignty nor decent welfare – is destabilizing factor for region. In order to overcome the economic and industrial challenges in every country of Central Asia have been adopted the development Strategies: Strategy of Industrial and Innovation Development of Kazakhstan for 2003-2015, The Welfare Improvement Strategy of Uzbekistan for 2013-2015, Sustainable Development Strategy of Kyrgyzstan for 2013-2017, Turkmenistan’s foreign policy strategy: following the course of friendship, good neighborliness and mutually beneficial cooperation. It remains to determine whether these strategies will gain efficiency and will constitute the growth of economies. The scope for improvement and growth do not depend only internal forces but significantly on adopting technologies and innovations. In this case the Czech and Slovak Republics experiences are very important for Central Asia – due 107 to Czech and Slovak technologies with its implications and applications to frame and implement economic policies that can maintain the stability in Central Asia; the only issue here are these opportunities will be adequately and comprehensively applied in region. 108  Section D Czech approach The majority of experts of Central Asian region in Czech Republic are unanimously emphasize the interest of other countries in region; in particular, Russia, USA and China showing increasing interest about the potential energy and strategic position of Central Asia. One of the well-known experts Slavomír Horák has large number of publications with main topic is the economic opportunities of different actors in region. Czech foreign policy in Central Asian region is guided by the interests and values of the state according to principles of promoting the Czech Republic as part of the European Union; committed to contribute to application and development of the common cultural, material and spiritual values as an integral part of the European heritage. Czech foreign policy especially in the context of the European integration process is determined to firm bilateral relations. It relies on the traditional values of the Czech political thinking, which builds on the usefulness of dialogue, integration and the need to understand the complexity of the contemporary world. Clarifying the relationships existing between Czech Republic and Central Asian countries is a necessary to understand the causes, origins, impact on policy-making and strategies of policy-makers. The majority of EU decisions are taken within existing EU frameworks (Lelieveldt, 2011), nevertheless decision-making in the EU is time to time 109 described as technocratic, as consequences of different approaches often make difficult to reach effective decisions. Inefficient and inflexible decision-making is a common way to treat policy failures (Scharpf, 1988). The existing barriers do not allow apply the potential of each Member State and Union in general. The Czech Republic recognizes that the EU is sometimes perceived from the outside as closed Community. Therefore, main motto of the Czech Presidency in 2009 had become “Europe without barriers”. The Czech Republic external dimension considers pointing out the existence of barriers for low level of liberalization of trade with third countries, inadequate energy policy of the European Union, the slower pace of expansion EU, and the obstacles existing within transatlantic economic cooperation. Further progress is in creating a common migration and asylum policy following the removal of barriers to mobility between Member States of the Union, as well as achieves greater external openness (Czech Committee for the EU, 2007). The financial crisis provided an enormous stimulus for cooperation with growing- economic countries. In this case the membership of Kazakhstan in Customs Union (with market of population over 167 million people) can be lucrative for decision- making policies. Moreover the economic issues on patent and certificate authorization and requirements are unified in the territory of Customs Union. The crisis convinced politicians that something needed to be done. Czech Republic included Kazakhstan in their list of 12 priority countries for business interaction. The Czech Republic began in the region the developing projects in the field of migration, development work since 2008, namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The projects are funded by the Department for Asylum and Migration Policy 110 of the Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic from the International Development Cooperation. These projects supported migratory capacity to support all three states, as well as support for returnee reintegration mechanisms, but also the population at risk of migration. Over € 150,000 has been allocated in 2008-2009 to support area countries of Central Asia in migration management and support reintegration mechanisms. It was planned that in July 2013 MFA of the Czech Republic to continue further to the operational strategy mid-term evaluation conducted humanitarian budget utilization and global humanitarian needs. According to its results, and depending on the state of available funds will be in III - IV quarter supported activities humanitarian funds and UN agencies (CERF54, OCHA55, UNHCR56, UNICEF57, UNRWA58, and WFP59). In relation to international obligations and current needs will be implemented food aid - embassies tentatively indicated the need for food and nutrition assistance in Tajikistan and few African countries. The balance of any outstanding humanitarian budget will support humanitarian activities. Czech are active in CADAP 60 is divided into four programs DAMOS 61, MEDISSA62, TREAT63 and OCAN64, DAMOS run by Czech representatives. DAMOS program designed to increase national capacity and the introduction of international standards in the comprehensive report on the drug situation in the country. 54 CERF – The Central Emergency Response Fund – a humanitarian fund established by the United Nations 55 OCHA – The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 56 UNHCR – Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 57 UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund 58 UNRWA – The United Nations Relief and Works Agency 59 WFP – United Nations World Food Program 60 CADAP is project commissioned by the European Commission conducted by a consortium of European countries, coordinated by the German company for international assistance (GIZ). CADAP project is part of the Action Plan on Drugs EU - Central Asia, signed in 2009 within the framework of the Czech Presidency of the Council of the European Union. 61 DAMOS – implemented by ResAd, Czech Republic, to help the governments develop a better understanding of the drug trafficking, drug use, misuse and abuse, as well as their consequences in Central Asia. 62 MEDISSA – implemented by the National Bureau for Drug Prevention (KBPN) Poland, to help the governments prevent potential new drug users and reduce the number of current drug addicts by better informing the public of drug usage risks. 63 TREAT – implemented by Zentrum fur interdisziolinare Suchforschiung of Hamburg University (ZIS), Germany, to support the introduction of modern drug addiction treatment methods within the public health system and the prison system. 64 OCAN – implemented by GIZ, Germany, to help to project management issues of all three specific components. 111  Section E Slovak approach In the matter of Slovak foreign policy in Central Asian region the primary implementation of interests of the Slovak Republic is the key approach within external policy of European Union. In 2014 is 10 years of the accession of Slovak Republic to EU. During this period Slovak Government supported the decision-making process based on joint action by Member States and European institutions on rules and regulations of EU. Special attention paid to the Government of the Slovak Republic and the cross-sectional EU multiannual strategic issues which have a direct effect on the performance of key roles in the financial, economic, regional and social development, security and foreign policy of Slovak Republic; inter alia, for preparing the multiannual financial framework for 2014-2020, the implementation of the Europe 2020 objectives, to stabilize the financial environment, as well as the field of EU external relations the context of foreign policy priorities. Economic diplomacy is one of the pillars of Slovak foreign activities. Primary attention paid to the promotion of exports and tourism, foreign investments, currency stability, equalization of Slovak producers on the EU internal market and enhancing energy security. The Government works with relevant organizations, especially with the Slovak Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The Government provides comprehensive and 112 effective support to Slovak business entities. The pro-export policy focuses on the potential of fast-growing economies in the world and search for new opportunities, to which adjusts the priority of development assistance, as well as on the expansion of export-oriented capacities of Eximbanka65. Representatives of business circles of government involved in the foreign policy planning and organization. Through export promotion council will ensure greater coherence and synergy of all actors working in the field of economic diplomacy and in promoting trade and economic interests abroad. Abovementioned issues of foreign policies of Czech Republic and Slovak Republic will be achieved through programmatic and institutional strengthening of the EU policy. In this matter it becomes actual the relevance of energy resources and security aspects of Central Asian region and have been recognized as a cornerstone of implementing the EU foreign policy. Since the 1st May 2004 the Slovak Republic is a member of the European Union, Slovakia follows the EU foreign policy approach. Stability and security are the EU’s top priorities in Central Asia and are not just indispensable for peace and prosperity in the entire Caspian and Black Sea region, but are also directly linked to Europe’s security. In the area of security, Europe also promotes cross-border cooperation within Central Asia. Closed, and in some cases even mined, borders between Central Asian countries continue to claim human lives and hinder the movement of people and goods. At the same time, cross-border drug trafficking is increasingly becoming an obstacle to modernizing the affected societies. Fair distribution and use of water resources, as well as environmental protection issues, constitute major regional challenges. 65 EXIMBANKA was founded in 1997 in Bratislava Slovakia, the bank’s mission is to support the Slovak exports through banking and insurance activities. Its mission is to improve the economic exchange between the Slovak Republic and foreign countries, also increase the competitiveness of Slovak producers in foreign markets. 113 The crisis in Kyrgyzstan showed that lasting stability, peace and prosperity can only develop soundly if all the fundamental social forces enjoy fair levels of involvement in economic and political development. The EU also supports political development in the Central Asian states within a comprehensive, partnership-based approach. Here, it is guided by the canon of values embraced by institutions like the United Nations and the OSCE. Slovak Republic in Kazakhstan, seen as politically stable partner of EU and NATO, also as a country with important diplomatic activities in global and regional international organizations such as the United Nations (UN in Geneva, UNRCCA 66 in Ashgabat), WTO67, OECD68, IAEA69 and as member country of V–470. Slovakia as an independent state for the Kazakhstan society is still new country on the map of Europe, about its history and culture are only vague ideas, as well as the history of culture of Kazakhstan in Slovakia, and here is the great importance of public diplomacy of both countries. The Slovak Republic imports almost 90% of primary energy resources from abroad. This figure ranks Slovakia among the EU Members States with the highest share of external energy dependence. Slovakia imports 99% of oil, 98% of natural gas and 100% of nuclear fuel from Russia. The share of natural gas in the energy mix of Slovakia represents 35%, nuclear energy 25% and oil 18%. In other words, more than two-thirds (74%) of the current energy mix of Slovakia depends on supplies of primary energy resources from a single country – the Russian Federation. The necessity of diversification of natural gas supplies has become a priority of the policy of the Government of the Slovak Republic after the gas crisis suffered in January 2009. The 66 UNRCCA – The United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (Head of centre is well-known Slovak diplomat Miroslav Jenca) 67 WTO – World Trade Organization 68 OECD – The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 69 IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency 70 V-4 – Visegrad Group also known as Visegrad Four – reflects the common interests of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia 114 main challenge concerning oil supplies rests in the fact that, after 2014, there is a threat of termination of supply of Russian oil. It should be mentioned a close relationship with Kazakhstan, which is becoming more an important strategic partner for the EU, especially in the field of energy. This was underlined by President J.M.Barroso during his visit to Astana in June 2013 71. EU representatives are working on the text of a new agreement to expand cooperation and partnership between the EU and Kazakhstan, which should open up further opportunities to expand cooperation, including in the energy sector. 71 Statement by President Baroso following his meeting with the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-496_en.htm 115  Chapter IV The policy analysis in the region The influence of main actors in the region The contemporary geopolitical context in Central Asia is in active stage of transformation involving the preferences of different political actors, the strategic rivalry presented by the Russian Federation, European Union states, United States of America, Turkey, Iran and China. This chapter is primarily concerned with identifying the political actors in region and their influence on developing a systematic framework with which to evaluate them. Chapter presents the projects and instruments of influence of different actors. Actors may differ from each other in their influence and potential. A classic definition of power is the potential a person of group has to realize their own will in a social action even against the resistance of others’ (Weber, 2007, 247) Weber suggests that power is an attribute, power is reinforce or depends on the powerful actor’s decision on whether to use this power. Power is the potential or capability an actor has to influence other actors and decision outcomes. Influence is the proportion of the potential which the actor accomplishes on a given controversial issue. (Thomson, 2011, 189) There are many definitions may be used to explain the influence of actors in the geopolitical game which is taken place in Central Asian region. Outside actors have impact of the integration processes in the CIS and Central Asia at the global political context in the Greater Central Asia. 116 4.1. Analysis of main actors’ roles in the Central Asia This analysis organized in three sections. First section describing the objectives of main actors in region, second section is about comparative analysis of former Soviet countries and contemporary situation after gaining the independence by five Central Asian countries, third section is a description of principal issues of formulation and regulation of actors’ politics in the region. 4.1.1. The policy analysis activity in the region It is quite indicative that the factors influencing the course of Central Asian region development are distinguished by geopolitical principles of regionalism. This involves consideration of the region as a common geopolitical landscape, located in Eurasia; territory with a common political objective (including security priorities), economic (including transport) interests. In addition, these countries follow a specific political, economic line of conduct in the region carried out by taking into account its internal resources into the context of existing strategies of interests. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the energy potential of Central Asia has been an integral part of the geopolitical discourse, both inside and outside of the region. Despite the fact that the attention was initially focused on preventing potential leakage of weapons-grade uranium in a poorly protected places in Kazakhstan, at this early stage was formed commercial relations with International petroleum consortium (IPC), often with considerable diplomatic support. Unified Energy System of Central Asia has been built to provide supplies to Russian major cities and transportation routes and, through it, with limited inter-regional infrastructure, which would allow establishing joint use of 117 local resources. This table represents some indicators of institutional changes in Central Asia after the collapse of Soviet Union: TABLE 8: INDICATORS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN CENTRAL ASIA Data / USSR CA Strategy Institutions 1991 2013 Human development Index 0.920 / Rank Ranks 69, support regional 26 102-125 cooperation and regional security fight against drug trafficking Political Stability Percentile Rank KZ 36, KR promote the reform of the (Comprehensive National (0-100) 20, TJ 15, internal policies Strength: A Basic Study) 20 TK60, UZ 30 World Bank WGI 2013 Education Index 0.900/Rank Ranks 35, strengthen cooperation in 22 67-84 protecting the environment, migration, education, health Pillars/Institutions by WEF N/A Rank KZ 55, achieve more effective KR 133, N/A management as a complement to regional cooperation Source: World Bank, 2013 As is seen the Human development index and Education index were quite high in Soviet Union, in past 20 years of independence all Central Asian countries have lost their intellectual potential, and nowadays is present the situation of brain-drain in these countries. 118 To achieve the improvement in different social, political and economic areas is necessary to support the regional cooperation, regional security, educational programs, and provide more effective management control as well as the fight against corruption in all countries. After the collapse of the ruble zone in 1993 and, accordingly, any deprivation of recoverability the common post-Soviet economic space, the Central Asian governments have decided that the most obvious way for political and economic sovereignty is through the maximization of revenues from oil and gas through investments and export diversification. The economy of six former states of the Soviet Union, with a total population of almost 75 million, grew with astonishing average speed of 19.7% than $ 200 billion in 2012. According to forecasts of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which increased fourfold over the last 12 years (up to $ 51 billion), Uzbekistan's economy will grow even faster, and ahead of Kazakhstan, will be the largest in Central Asia by 2035. Economy of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan showed an average annual growth of 23.9% and 22.7%, respectively, between 2000 and 2012. Economy of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, on average grew by 16.1% annually, from $ 2.23 billion in 2000 to $ 13.46 billion in 2012, Kazakhstan's GDP, the largest regional economy has grown 11-fold to $ 18.3 billion in 2000 to more than $ 200 billion in 2012 (ADB, 2014). By the defining in the geopolitical context in Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which led to competition for oil and gas deposits in the region; the oil and gas industry is in a state of rapid and painful transformation. Estimated reserves of oil in Kazakhstan are at a level of 100 billion barrels, which puts it in third place among energy suppliers. The estimated reserves of natural gas amount to 5 trillion cubic 119 meters. Kazakhstan holds the world's largest reserves of barite, uranium, tungsten and lead. In addition, in the Asian region, it is in second place for deposits of silver, chromate, zinc, in third place - for the extraction of manganese, has found deposits of gold, iron and copper72. Estimated reserves of oil on the territory of Kyrgyzstan are 1 billion tons73 For Russia the key is to keep a supply on its domestic market. Geopolitical interest of Western countries in the region becomes increasingly limited to security threats; the same way the EU countries view the development of the energy sector and with it a more diversified export portfolio as promotion of regional security, ensuring a smooth transition to a market economy, as well as resistance to Russian revanchism. In the first place, the Central Asian states quickly transformed from the consumers of established geopolitical game into its agents. The leaders of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, all to a greater or lesser extent, have sought to balance the national sovereignty, the interests of the western capital and appease Russian “right of access” to the region. Nevertheless, the Uzbek President Islam Karimov was perhaps, the first Central Asian leader, which had actively sought to influence the broader geostrategic environment, using geography and resources of Uzbekistan for the national interest. After 2001, Karimov defunct status of Uzbekistan as a country on the “front line”, for the strengthening of relations in the field of security with the U.S., which, although subsequently worsened (mainly after Andizhan massacre in 2005 74), and served as demonstration that geopolitical relations, to a certain extent, depend on the efforts of the regional subjects. 72 These data were presented at the 19th Kazakhstan International Exhibition and Conference “Oil and Gas” KIOGE 2011 5-8 October 2011, Almaty, Kazakhstan 73 According to data of Kyrgyz Agency KyrTAG http://forbes.kz/news/2012/03/30/newsid_2551 74 According to witnesses in Andizhan were killed 5000 people (among them women and children) by governmental forces. 120 In the energy context, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have sought to balance the commercial links with Russia, selectively approaching the access to the western capital and technical expertise, in order to gradually diversify entry points on the world oil market and to establish gas trade in Europe, South Asia, China and Iran. In particular, in Kazakhstan the government has sought to actively use the proximity its raw material base for a number of markets through the gradual tightening conditions of work for IPC with 2003 by participating in such a strategic export projects, as well as pipeline Baku- Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and the oil pipeline Kazakhstan-China. For Turkmenistan, maximizing capacity gas exports has become the leitmotiv of foreign policy, forming relations with Iran, Afghanistan (including the Taliban in period up to 2001, and, most importantly, with China, through preferential concessions on the mining and supply significant volumes of Turkmen gas through complex Central Asia-China. The second disadvantage pattern, at least, is in the energy sector was that the external geopolitical influence is already did not include providing direct or non-formal control of the local control, and the more receipt of any type of territorial hegemony, that had been anticipated in the concept of a big game by theoretician and conservationist H.J.Mackinder 75. Given the historically existing Moscow's control over the region and a significant territorial proximity of Russia to Kazakhstan, Central Asia is perceived in Russia as a potential channel of transit security threats, such as illegal migration, drug trafficking and Islamic terrorism, as well as a potential source of external threats to internal security. For the Europe, China and US, Central Asia itself in many ways is not important. No one will provide meaningful safeguards or spend significant resources on the formation (or facilitating the coordinated management) of the internal geopolitics of the region. Thus, the importance of Central Asia lay not in the innermost being of the region, but rather in how it relates to outside interests, the main one of which is energy 75 H.J.Mackinder Geographical pivot of history. 121 security. In general, energy geopolitics in the post-Soviet period has been built around two commandments: first, to maximize the sovereignty and independence of action of the Central Asian efforts of local and foreign actors, and secondly, the different perceptions of security and threats in the region that may affect foreign interests. While analyzing different points of view of Russian researchers, some of them treat certain aspects of the EU Central Asian policy as a “forcing away” Russia out of the region, a number of experts in the analysis of international cooperation in Central Asia are emphasizing based on the concept that presence of a consolidated policy of the EU countries, as well as their interests in terms of economic and political expansion to gain control over energy resources of Central Asia76 (Belokrinitsky, Sklyarov). Other researchers point to a conflict of interest and competition between the EU and the U.S. in various fields. This thesis does not purport to test the theory of great geo-strategic game; instead, it examines the relative importance of certain actors and its relevance to review process of cooperation of Czech Republic and Slovak Republic in the region. 76 Belokrinitsky V. Sklyarov, L., The current situation in Central Asia and Caucasus: A view from Iran, 1996 122 TABLE 9: ANALYSIS OF MAIN ACTORS Institutional Economical presence Military presence presence Russian EAEC (or Eurasian Economic CSTO Federation EurAsEC), CIS, Community, Customs Union Military bases in 3 Customs Union, (market of 180 mln.) countries* SCO, In 2014 Russia give Kyrgyzstan weapons worth $ 1.1 billion USA USAID, OSI Overall U.S. military spending Military base in Manas In article of Eurasianet (Open Society in fiscal 2012 by country is as airport in Kyrgyzstan. In American journalist J.Kucera Institute),NDI follows: April 2013 it was informed that U.S. military (National Kazakhstan U.S. $ 137.3 million reported that spends in 2012 in Central Democratic Kyrgyzstan U.S. $ 218.1 million Kazakhstan is ready to Asia, more than $ 1.31 billion Institute), IRI Tajikistan including 820 million dollars provide NATO port (International U.S. $ 11.7 million only in Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan Aktau in the Caspian According to data provided by Republic Institute) U.S. $ 820.5 million Sea for the transit the Agency for Logistics - CACI (The Central Asia Uzbekistan operations from wing Pentagon's supplier of Counternarcotics U.S. $ 105.9 million Afghanistan. troops - the amount of 1.3 Initiative), The US Training center in billion dollars is a seven-fold U.S. Embassy Tursunzade, each year increase over 2012. Democratic 100 Tajik military get Commission, The training (45 km from Eurasia Dushanbe) Foundation of Central Asia, Soros Foundation. China SCO, CAREC The share of Chinese CETC International will China Petrol Company companies in the oil industry supply to Kyrgyzstan Zhongda. in Kazakhstan in 2013 small radar, In SCO area will be exceeded 40%. China has communications established a network of invested in the Kyrgyz equipment, as well as common satellite economy more than $ 1 the opening of a joint communication billion. venture for the 40% of loans of Tajikistan production of military belongs to China products. China is planning to provide Kyrgyz army military equipment and weapons for $ 17.5 million Turkey TIKA (Turkish In the last 20 years Turkey has Turkish Prime Minister Turkish-Kazakh International Cooperation and provided app. $1 bln. to R.T. Erdoğan announced Hoca Ahmet Yesevi Development Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, in February 2013 about University, Suleyman Demirel Agency), Turkic Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan possibilities to join University in Kazakhstan, Nearly 2000 companies have the Shanghai Cooperation Turkish-Kyzgyz Manas Council, Summit been operating in Central Asia University in Kyrzystan 123  of Turkic nations Organization TURKSOY (International Organization for Turkic Culture) Turkish Gülen schools. EU OSCE, IOM, World Bank, European Bank NATO, CABSI (Central ODDA, Erazmus Mundus, KAS (Konrad- of Reconstruction and Asia Border Security Tempus, Adenauer- Development (EBRD), Initiative) CARICC Vocational Education and Stiftung), European Investment Bank (Central Asia Regional Training, CERN, Aga (EIB) Information and and the Central Asia Khan Coordination Center) Research and Education Development Network. NGOs Network NATO has Individual Central Eurasia Project, ODHIR, UNDP Partnership Action Plan International Alert, Kazakhstan for Kazakhstan since 31 Amnesty International EU January 2006 Office, East-West Institute, International Crisis Group, Centre for European Policy Studies * In Kazakhstan 1) 5th State Test Cosmodrome (in the Baikonur) ; 2) Private transport aviation regiment of Russian Air Force aircraft (Kostanai); 3) Independent Radar Node Space Forces (Priosersk, Sary-Shagan) ; 4) State test site Sary-Shagan- strategic air and missile defense units. In Kyrgystan 1) Russian Air Force Base Kant; 2) Testing Facilities of anti-torpedo (in Karakol, Issyk-Kul); 3) 338th naval communications "Mirage" (station "Prometheus"); 4) Seismic Station (working on behalf of the Strategic Missile Forces). The protocol was ratified between Russia and Kyrgyzstan on cooperation in the military field in the period preceding the entry into force of this agreement. This document will provide the effect of bilateral agreements governing the issues of presence in Kyrgyzstan, Russian military units to 29 January 2017, and the agreement - the Russian military presence on the territory of the Kyrgyz republic until 2032. In Tajikistan 1) 201st Russian military base (from 2004, with personnel of 7000 officers in Dushanbe, Kurgan-Tube, Kulyab); 2) Optoelectronic complex “Window” (“Nurek”) space control system. Russia and Kazakhstan have made a decisive step in creating a unified regional air defense system (NORAD). May 26, 2014 President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev signed the law on ratification of an agreement with the Russian Federation. Agreement on the establishment of a unified air defense zone was signed by Moscow 124 and Astana in January 2013. According to this document, the forces joint air defense system will be led by a team appointed by the presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan on the proposal of defense ministers of both countries. In addition, it is planned to establish rules of combat duty and exchange of information. Russia has consistently engaged in the creation of unified air defense zones with the CIS countries since 2007. For this project in February 2009 joined Belorussia. It is expected that to unified air defense will join Armenia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. In the future is planned to form Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asian zones of air defense. Coincidentally, shortly before the ratification of the agreement on air defense, the United States conducted the first test of a missile defense system (NMD) “Aegis” ground-based, which is designed for placement in Eastern Europe. The U.S. military on the Hawaiian island of Kauai simulated launch, a goal of that has successfully intercepted antimissile Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) Block IB. According to the head of the analytical department of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis A. Hramchihin - Unified air defense system of Russia and Kazakhstan has primarily political significance, due to Ukrainian events - is a very important moment for the Russian leadership. Russia in all ways shows that the issues of its isolation are out of question. And although the military sphere is not formally refers to the Eurasian Union, it is clear that any formats integration among the countries - members of the Eurasian Union are positive in formation of this alliance. According to the head revision of military information ITAR-TASS V. Litovkin - In the framework of CSTO77, there are three lines of joint air defense system - Western direction - it created a unified air defense system of Belarus and Russia, South direction, where the air defense system created by Russia and Armenia, 77 CSTO – Collective Security Treaty Organization 125  plus Central Asian destination: a unified system of Russia and Kazakhstan (Litovkin, 2014). In this table are presented the analysis main actors in Central Asian region: TABLE 10: ANALYSIS OF INTERESTS OF ACTORS Actors Objectives Focus on Focus on Level of Decision making security development intervention Russia Control of High focus on Low focus High level Russian natural security on long term Government resources development interest CSTO Protection of Customs Union Russia from Promotion of extremism and Russian drug trafficking language and culture Czech 1) Economic Medium focus High level on Low level EU common Republic relations on security development long term foreign policy 2) Energy & interest transport General Risks Education 3) Environment Human and water rights & resources democracy Slovak 1) Medium focus High level on Low level EU common Republic Diversification on security development long term foreign policy of interest hydrocarbons Preventive 2) diplomacy Economic Environment development and water resources Education Human rights & democracy China Control of Medium focus High level High level SCO natural on security focus on long term Intergovernmental resources Control over development interest cooperation Economic Uygur influence & separatism expansion Avoid a destabilizing force in Central Asia 126 USA Geopolitical High level long Low level High level US Government interest term interest focus on long term Prevention of Prevent Islamic development interest emerging the fundamentalism influence of Military Russia and presence & China engagement Turkey Geopolitical Low focus on Low level High level Turkish interest security focus on long term Government Economic development interest TUSKON relations Turksoy TIKA Turkish colleges 4.1.1.1. The Russian Federation Russia yet had not the opportunity to develop a new complete strategy in Central Asia. Moscow following the Soviet stereotypes remains absorbed with its internal problems. Russian behavior in the region is characterized by an element of inconsistency, the priority of short-term interests over the long term ones. In this regard, the rates on the military presence remains more acceptable to the Russian approach cause is less expensive (compared, for example, with the development of economic and political ties) and quite effective. At the present stage of strategic importance to Moscow stands out the need to counter the Afghan-Islamic factor. Establishment of a Russian military base in Tajikistan (the information about this base was mentioned on page 100 of dissertation) is a clear indication of the choice of Tajikistan as a country to represent the Russian geopolitical interests in Central Asia and around it. This choice does not imply recognition of Tajikistan as a key state in Central Asia, but suggests that this republic is a link in the regional security. Russia, for reasons of geopolitical expediency, benefits from a convenient occasion without significant material and political costs for strategic foothold in the region. Moreover, Russia continues to show interest in the transportation of energy resources in the region. 127 For Russia, as for the other countries participating in the development of oil and gas fields, construction and operation of pipelines, energy transportation is not as economical but more a political issue, primarily as the effective control over the situation in the region. In economic terms, the Central Asian region is not a priority for Russia now. Russia desires to play a special role in relations with the countries of the region, including as a guarantor of security stability, continues together with the tendency in the context of weakening Russian influence in Central Asia. The complexity of the socio- political, economic situation currently diverts from Moscow forming a new strategy to develop relations with countries of the region, where core moment estimated to be mutually beneficial economic cooperation. Increased understanding of Russia's political, economic elite, the availability of new realities and occurred changes in the region, the desire to distance from the elements of the imperial approach, certainly will continue to be a powerful stabilizing factor in the geopolitical situation in Central Asia. 4.1.1.2. United States of America U.S. foreign policy strategy for Central Asia is mainly based on geopolitical approach, considerations including its own strategic priorities and interests. These approaches remain dominant in the system of multiple assessments of the region from the United States. It is caused by a wide range of elements of relations with Russia, China, Iran, the Islamic world, due to, primarily, the need to maintain favorable for the formation of the U.S. balance of power, both at the regional and global levels. Certainly in the long term the U.S. would like to see Central Asia in their vital interests, however, at this stage, taking into account the existing realities, Washington seeks to 128 prevent from having the major impact of some countries (as Russia, China and Iran) which, because of their potential that could limit or reduce U.S. influence. The U.S. continues to encourage the activity of Turkey in the region, primarily through the concepts of energy transportation in the Turkish area. For some extent by following reasons: internal political character - a complex situation in Turkey, the possibility of strengthening the position here of some forces weakening pro-Western orientation; geo strategic considering Turkey as one of the reliable allies in the Euro-Atlantic cooperation, including NATO attempts to secure Ankara as a key state of the conductor of Washington's policy in the region. In addition, the implementation of other transport projects (except Afghan, Caucasian routes) would lead to strengthening the position of one of the three regional leaders – Russia, China and Iran that, as was already noted, is not included in U.S. plans. Moreover, to some extent American policy in the region is a hostage of internal contradictions within policy-making circles of the United States. On the one hand, in the U.S., is exists strong position of those forces whose approaches are based on evaluation of advantage or disadvantage for U.S. of any actions abroad. On the other hand as in the state considering themselves a bulwark of democracy in the world, has a great influence of liberal approach, based on the desire to expand and support democratic values everywhere, to build a relationship with the outside world on the basis of the principle of the so- called “democratic standards”. These approaches are sometimes are reflected in U.S. foreign policy “bipolar” strategy. This fact often causes fair international accusations and criticism of Washington78 (Lavrov, 2014). 78 Lavrov Sergey, Minister of MFA of Russian Federation, Moscow 5, June, 2014. http://www.globalaffairs.ru/global-processes/Vozvrata-k-prezhnei-modeli-ne-budet-16691 129 One of the reflections of the U.S internal issues is so called the policy of “double standards”, it would seem, are similar, including in “democratic” country conditions, often considered in contradict positions. An important element of the U.S. approach is manifested in the context of the problem to ensure American competitiveness in the global economy, including international finance, at the regional level is caused by the formation of conditions for unhindered economic, financial access to Central Asia. The main object remains the energy potential; U.S. having an interest in the development of transport infrastructure in the region to the west (Eurasian corridor, East-West route), the values of which theoretical justification is given in the bill of “Silk Road Strategy: XXI Century”, approved by the Senate (March 1999). It should be noted that, U.S. policy plays a fairly progressive role towards maintaining the geopolitical balance in the region of integration into the international community. However, some approaches in contemporary Washington politics causes some skepticism, seems idealistic desire to “build a Western-style democracies in the short term”, common perception among some US representatives of policy-making circles, do not account for the presence of a whole range of threats to the security challenges in the region, which are destructive to the stability of Central Asia and the whole Eurasia. Certainly in this context, the consideration the specifics of the situation in region is welcomed, which can significantly enhance the credibility of Washington in Central Asia. The basic idea is in the concept of the “New Silk Road 79” (The New Silk Road), which Washington intends to implement in order to strengthen trade relations in Asia and support Afghanistan after the withdrawal of coalition forces from the country in 2014. 79 In November 2012, Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State of the United States of America, speaking at the Singapore Management University on “economic diplomacy”, once more mentioned about the development of transport corridors between Central and South Asia is a key element in Washington's long-term strategy for Afghanistan. 130 Planned development of infrastructure, installation of energy and transport, and paths that pass through Afghanistan and which will link the markets of Central Asia. 80 As part of US Economic Statecraft (economic instruments of government) to use the economic instruments to strengthen US diplomatic course abroad and domestic economy by supporting US companies for developing opportunities in Central Asia. In the summer 2012 it has helped to bring 25 U.S. companies on the American-Uzbek Business Forum in Tashkent, and also participated in the organization of the 2 nd Exhibition of U.S. companies in the Turkmenistan, the participants of which were over 100 companies.”81 (EurasiaNet) Therefore basically the interest of US in region first of all concerned the policy of military presence, not only in Kyrgyz Republic 82 and also in Caspian port Aktau in Kazakhstan for the transit from Afghanistan, this was stated by President Nursultan Nazarbayev in Almaty at the end of April 2013 at the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Istanbul Process on Afghanistan 83. 80 Remarks on India and the United States: A Vision for the 21st Century, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/07/168840.htm. http://news.tj/ru/news/klinton-novyi-shelkovyi-put-yavlyaetsya-klyuchevym-elementom-dolgosrochnoi-strategii-ssha- po-af 81 EurasiaNet: Why the U.S. is increasing presence in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan? Permanent address - http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1354721820 82 In Kyrgyz Republic are present following NGOs and analytical centers financed directly from US funds: CAFMI – Central Asian Free Market Institute, Legal Clinic “Adilet”, “Center for Social Technologies”, Research consortium “Perspective”, “The Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society”, “Foundation for International Solidarity”, the Human Rights Foundation “Interbilim”, Human Rights Center “Bir Duino Kyrgyzstan”. 83 Almaty Ministerial Conference of the Istanbul Process on Afghanistan, April 26, 2013 131 4.1.1.3. European Union The EU has been engaged with the five countries in Central Asia from the very moment states gained their independence in the early 1990s. By 2007 these relations had developed significantly and revealed closeness of values and of economic and security interests. The growing dynamics of the bilateral relations between the EU Member States and Central Asian countries also confirmed that there is a significant potential for strategic cooperation between the EU and the region. The EU Member States recognized that their bilateral relations would benefit from a coordinated, more focused common approach to Central Asia, hence the adoption of the EU-Central Asia Strategy, which had been provided the necessary blend of interests and values. It also took into account the specificities of the Central Asian countries and developed individual approaches to each of them, without leaving aside the regional cooperation. As a next step, action-oriented initiatives were developed in the priority areas, identified by the Strategy, such as: common security threats, rule of law, education, environment and water. Again, they combined the regional and bilateral approaches. Central Asia has a centuries-old tradition of bringing Europe and Asia together. It lies at a strategically important intersection between the two continents. The Central Asia states of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have known considerable evolution in political and economic transformation since attaining their independence. By signing the United Nations Millennium Declaration they set themselves ambitious goals. They would like to establish statehood, safeguarded multi-ethnic understanding and inter-religious communication. By joining the OSCE, they subscribed to the Organization’s values, standards and commitments. 132 At the beginning of the 21 st century, the time has come for a new partnership between the EU and Central Asia states in a globalised world, but European position towards Central Asia is characterized as cautious restrained, largely due to ongoing comprehension of changes in Eurasia by EU policy-making circles. At the present stage there are no EU geopolitical interests in the region. In economic terms, the active development of relations between the EU and Central Asian region, prevented by not for distance to Central Asia to Europe, but for high transport costs throughout the European-Central Asian route, its insecurity, and ongoing contradictions between some countries. EU continues to show an interest in the ideas of integration cooperation between the countries of Eastern Europe, Caucasus, and Central Asia. However, the interest of the European Communities towards the Pacific Ocean, increasing engagement with Asia- Pacific countries, is weakening value of communication with the Russian Federation provides to European countries possibilities of full engagement territories of Central Asian states as a transport corridor. The emphases fact that the main guarantor (including financial) success of the transport (and not only energy) project “East-West” is precisely the European direction. Most infrastructure projects in neighboring countries in Central Asia, in the Caucasus, is organically integrated into a comprehensive program of the European Commission to establish a transport information highways Europe - Caucasus – Asia, which grants the EU a special place in their relations with the Central Asian republics. Furthermore, the ability of the EU to play a privileged role in the region also linked to the fact that European-Central Asian relations are not burdened by past ambitions. They are based on a more thoughtful realistic approach unlike relations with other countries. At the political level, primarily in the area of security, the importance of the EU's relations with the region already determined by the fact that all Central Asian countries 133 are members of the OSCE. Currently allows them to develop direct relations with European states, bypassing any intermediaries. According to experts, further expansion of relations with Central Asia will be uniquely useful for the EU in terms of economic policy prosperity. According to some European analysts, a strong economic, diplomatic involvement of the EU in Central Asia, especially in the Caspian region, would prevent Russia excessive exclusivity, the U.S., potentially, and the PRC, thereby fostering an element of stability, not only in the region but Eurasia in general. Despite the fact that relations between the EU and Central Asian countries are developing quite rapidly, there are some problems whose solution requires careful attention. In this thesis subsection we will look in detail at each of these problems. The first problem is the risk of conflict and instability in the Central Asian region. Serious and prolonged instability in one of the Central Asian countries can lead to dangerous consequences for the entire region. This applies primarily to Uzbekistan, where more than 25 million people and which is the most populous country in Central Asia. Borders in the region are, for the most part, transparent and poorly demarcated, and little can be done to prevent illegal border crossings by individuals or groups of people. Conflict escalation in one country can lead to refugee flows, which can quickly overwhelm the neighbors for their reception. Since the infrastructure against these countries is still heavily dependent on each other, the excitement in any country can have serious economic consequences for others. Leaving aside the humanitarian problems, instability in Central Asia may affect the interests of the EU and its Member States in different ways. As recent experience has shown, a potential target of refugees is Europe. There is also a more direct interest in 134 ensuring security in the region: the events in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere show that failed states and chronically unstable regions are ideal place for terrorist and criminal groups. European researchers identify other transnational risks in the Central Asian region: illegal arms trafficking, organized crime in general, and the degradation of the environment. Along with the illegal drug trade, terrorism, mass migration, in their opinion, they have a negative impact on both the individual components of the social structure of (undermining the legitimacy of state institutions, provide fertile ground for corruption, causes damage to the economy and prevent the successful implementation of reforms, promote the growth of social tension), and so in general destabilize the domestic and international situation, and thereby threaten the EU's strategic interests in Central Asia. In the Eastern European academic society the external EU policy in Central Asia is covered by different research centers and authors. One of the first few publications is a collective monograph, published in 1994; by the Brussels Association study of the Trans-European politics – “The European Union and Turkey in Eurasia”, a large part of which is made up of European researchers dedicated to EU policy, EU countries in the regions of Central Asia and Caucasus 84. In subsequent years, some studies have been prepared on the implementation of EU regional strategy. In the 2006 in Paris went public the report of the Institute for Security Studies European Union by A.Matveeva “EU stakes in Central Asia” 85. In 2008 in Brussels a study was published by Centre for European Policy Studies “Engaging in Central Asia. The new strategy of the European Union in the heart of Eurasia” 86. 84 The European Union and Turkey in the Eurasian Area, 1994 85 Matveeva A. EU Stakes in Central Asia, Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006 86 Engaging Central Asia. The European Union’s New Strategy in the Heart of Eurasia, 2008 135 Many European experts conduct research on related topics: EU policy and EU countries pertaining to the former Soviet Union and the Caspian region, international relations in Central Asia, the internal political development of these countries. In 2011, there were many publications on the use of energy resources in the Caspian region, many experts believe that the strengthening of political pressure on the issue of transportation of Caspian resources. In the 1990s - early 2000s, the most influential Western European Centre for the Study of Contemporary History of Central Asia was the London Royal Institute of International Relations. Its “Program for Russia and Eurasia” under the direction of R.Allison consolidated major British and other foreign experts on Central Asia as E. Herzig, S. Akiner, N. McFarlane, L. Johnson, G. Uinrou, S. Horsman and others who published works on political and military aspects of international cooperation in the region87 (Herzig). Some of the projects of research programs were sponsored by oil and gas companies, and are dedicated to the study of the developing energy resources of the Caspian states. According to some experts, the competition for gas supplies to Europe could lead to conflict in the Caspian Sea, whose identity still remains as a subject area of international disputes. However, in 2012 EU Energy Commissioner Guenther Oettinger mentioned that if Russia would use the tactics of threats, it will become a big problem. He made it clear that if Moscow will prevent the construction of the Trans-Caspian pipeline, then Europe will not allow it to build the “South Stream”, competing with other projects such as Nabucco, ITGI and TAP88. In 2012 Putin was solving the problems with Turkish partners. Moscow continues to urge the EU to provide the “South Stream” the status of cross- border European network (Trans European Network, TEN). This status will bring 87 Herzig E. Iran and the Former Soviet South, 1995 88 Speech by Günther Oettinger on South Stream, http://www.europeanenergyreview.eu/site/pagina.php?id=2999 , accessed at 23 Jan 2013. 136 Gazprom pipeline under the EU antitrust rules. Differences, in particular, were outlined against the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline89, the agreement on the construction of which was signed in 200990. In the changed situation are diversifying the methods of geopolitical game: if previously the main instrument control was access to the European “pipe”, then now would be the gas itself. It is well known that for “Gazprom” it is more and more difficult to fulfill the increasing demands of Europe's gas supplies in recent years (according to the consensus assessment of the leading international forecasting centers, the European countries’ need for additional import of gas may reach 80 billion cubic meters by 2020, and by 2030 it may exceed 140 billion cubic meters91), and if gas will be deprived of the Central Asian sources, it can be quite an impact on Moscow in order to control the supply of raw materials to Europe. In the past EU aid was delivered through the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) program, which in 2007 was replaced by a broader regional instrument, the Development Cooperation Instrument. DCI delivers aid to developing countries and has a broad range of objectives, including poverty reduction, governance and assistance in post-crisis situations to fragile states. Out of the EU programs and instruments applied to Central Asia, only DCI provides multi-annual indicative programming, which in 2007-10 amounted to €314 million and in 2011-13 to 321 million €. 89 Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline length of 550 km, the pipeline will be laid from the Turkish Black Sea city of Samsun to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. The project was originally designed to pump annually 60-70 million tons of oil a year, and had to let her carry around busy Bosporus and Dardanelles. Energy Minister Alexander Novak noted that there is disagreement between the parties on the tariff for oil transportation. "In those calculations, which were in 2011, used the figures of around 55 dollars per ton. Far as I know, those calculations, which were made by the Turkish side to be about $ 77 per ton," – he commented. "I do not really understand why the oil pipeline project stalled. It is beneficial for both parties - Russia and Turkey - are perplexed head of investment analysis of" Univer "Dmitry Alexandrov. 90 Putin solves problems with Turkish partners 12.03.2012 / Sergei Kulikov Source - Nezavisimaya Gazeta permanent article address - http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1354511040 91 http://www.south-stream.info/en/press/faq/ 137  TABLE 11: ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC PROJECTS IN REGION Countries Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan EU From 2007 to 2012, the EU From 2007 to From 2007-2012, In 2007-2012, the European In 2007-2012, the committed to Kazakhstan 2012, the EU the EU committed EU committed an Investment EU committed an an estimated €56.70 million committed an an estimated estimated €38.6 Bank (EIB) is estimated €100.2 under the Development estimated €28.46 mln under million under the in region mln under the Cooperation Instrument, as 106.15 mln. In the DCI. EIHRD DCI. As in since 2008. DCI. In addition, well as €3.15 million under addition, €21.11 and NSA-LA have Turkmenistan, EUR 100 m €21.65 mln was the Non-State Actors and mln were not applied to EIHRD and NSA- has been provided through Local Authorities in allocated to DCI Turkmenistan. LA have not made DCI thematic Development (NSA-LA) thematic applied to available for programs (Food thematic programs and programs (Food Uzbekistan. use in Central Security and €2.36 million through the Security, Food Asia NSA-LA) and European Instrument for Facility and €2.7 mln through Democracy and Human NSA-LA) and In 2013 trade the EIDHR. As Rights (EIHRD). Of the €17.83 million volume with part of the DCI, total €62.71 million, 91 per through other countries in the EU has been cent was channeled to instruments the region was providing government agencies using (EIHRD and about 35,335 assistance a project-oriented approach. Instrument for million Euros through sector The remaining 9 per cent Stability (IfS)). budget support, went to civil society Kyrgyzstan saw amounting to organizations through a boost in funds €47.75 from 2007 grants and calls for allocated under to 2012. proposals. the IfS instrument after EIB and the April 2010 Tajikistan sign revolution and MoU to foster subsequent mutual cooperatin ethnic violence in April, 2013. in the south of EIB is conducting the country in the review for the June 2010. Kairakkum From 2007 to Hydro-Power 2012, the EU Plant provided €61 Rehabilitation mln through Project in close sector budget cooperation with support. the EBRD. Russian Among 89 subjects of the The proposal to By CSTO 220 At present, there There are 885 In 2013 trade Russian Federation there Kyrgyz army million to are operating 138 entities with volume with Federation are 76 economic and trade allocate by Tajikistan for companies with Russian capital, countries in partnership with Kazakh CSTO $ 1.1 upgrading and the participation accredited the region was partners. Investments of billion needs of the of Russian capital representative of about large Russian companies: In August 2012 armed forces47% implemented over 102 companies. In $ 30 billion, JSC "Lukoil" ($ 5 billion), considerably of Tajikistan's 120 projects in Russia there are of which $ "Gazprom" ($ 1 billion), intensified GDP is generated various sectors. 489 entities with 22.5 billion JSC "INTER RAO UES" ($ Russian-Kyrgyz by the transfer of Itera Company in the participation accounted for 138  0.2 billion) of "Rusal" ($ cooperation on Tajik migrants. 2010 completed of the Uzbek Russia- 0.4 billion). Active major projects Russian the execution the capital. “Lukoil” Kazakhstan investment activities carried in the energy investments in the construction of a is involved in two trade out by State Corporation sector .In the Tajik economy is gas pipeline in the projects app. $ 5 Within five "Rosatom", "Rosneft", 2009 Russia $ 1.5 billion92 Karakum Desert bln. “Gazprom” years of OJSC "Bank VTB", VEB, granted loan of and is currently expects to invest “Gazprom” JSC "Mechel", JSC $ 300 mln and working with in 2013, about $1 will invest in "Severstal" and many provided free “Zarubezhneft” as mln to increase Kyrgyzstan others. Total volume of financial major investment gas production at nearly $ 679 Russian investments in assistance in the project of oil and existing fields. mln at the Kazakhstan is more than $ amount of $ 150 gas fields in Block same time, all 7 billion mln. Singed 21 Caspian shelf. of the assets agreement to of the national write off $ 489 gas operator mln “KyrgyzGas”, Kyrgyzstan's including gas debt to Russia. pipelines, gas distribution stations, underground fuel storage are transferred to “Gazprom” for one dollar USA Over the past 20 years, In Kyrgyzstan, As part of the In 2011, has been The agreement of In 2013, the “Chevron” has invested are involved 40 Agreement to received $1.7 implementing 20 State about $ 20 bln. in organizations, Promote million in anti- projects worth $ Department Kazakhstan, including enterprises of investments in the terrorism 2.8 billion was has allocated taxes, was about $ 77 U.S. country are 9 program. reached during $ 7 million to billion. In the social CASA-1000 Tajik-American The draft budget the Uzbek- fund regional development of Atyrau project – joint ventures and for 2014 the State American cooperation region were invested $ 800 Electricity 8 enterprises Department and Business Forum and activities mln. ConocoPhillips owned transmission entirely owned by the U.S. Agency in Tashkent in of anti-drug a stake of 24.5% in the project between U.S. investors. for International 2012 U.S. agencies of prospective offshore project Kyrgyzstan and The assistance Development, business Kyrgyzstan, "N" near Aktau. Tajikistan (477 activities by reduced the representatives Kazakhstan, ConocoPhillips owned Km) and from construction of amount of grant were invited to Tajikistan, 8.4% stake in the Tajikistan to five bridges aid to participate in the Turkmenistan consortium Kashagan. Afghanistan and linking Tajikistan Turkmenistan: $ free industrial- and These shares were acquired Pakistan (750 and Afghanistan 6,1 up 9%less economic zone Uzbekistan by KMG in 2013 and was Km) in the frontier than the $ 6,8 “Navoi” and sold to China areas. requested for “Angren” 2013. China Kazakhstan has become a In Kyrgyz About $ 1 billion China has China invested $ In 2013 trade major supplier of uranium Republic were in soft loans for invested $ 8.1 4 billion of volume with to China. Chinese registered 110 the construction billion to develop Chinese countries in investments in the form of Chinese of roads, bridges gas fields and the investment and the region was soft loans and direct companies. and power lines construction of a there are plans for about $ 40.2 92 Asia Plus Aug., 2013, http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1375776360 Accessed at 06.08.2013 139  investment in oil production Total amount of in exchange for gas pipeline to oil and gas, billion, amounted to $15.5 billion.93 Chinese mining of gold, China. uranium, road increase of 13 In 2009 China extended $10 investment has uranium, rare According to the construction and percent as billion loan to Kazakhstan exceeded $1 metals. report of British chemical compared to International transit corridor billion. Chinese According to the Petroleum in 2012 industries 2012 "Western Europe - Western have leased for State Statistics Turkmenistan was Over the past China" 8445 kilometers, 3.5 50 years the Committee of the largest gas Xi Jinping in 12 years, times reduce transportation. largest deposit Tajikistan, in the supplier to China September 2013 China's trade After 10 years of of iron ore country has more providing 51.4 % signed other 31 with Central transportation through Zhetim-Too. than 20 Chinese of import needs. agreements worth Asia has Kazakhstan will increase by According to companies Qatar, the 2nd - about $ 15 billion. increased by 2.5 times*In December the agreements Tajikistan and largest supplier, 25 times. 2011, on the border of reached during China National provided 16.4%. With $ 1.8 China and Kazakhstan was the state visit of Petroleum And with start of billion in opened the International Chinese Corporation production at the 2000 to 46 in Border Cooperation Center President Xi signed a giant oil field 2012. ‘Khorgos’ Jinping in cooperation Turkmen Xi Jinping Supplies of gas will expand September 2013 agreement in May Galkinish, will recalled plans up to 60 billion m3. Also is Beijing will 2014 import by 1833- to bring in expanding Kazakhstan- allocate nearly $ km gas pipeline 2016 the China oil pipeline up to 20 3 billion into crossing the mutual trade million tons of oil. Xi the Kyrgyz territory of turnover with Jinping’s visit in September projects. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to 2013 is regarded as a highly Kazakhstan up to the level of $ productive, the results of 65 billion m3per 40 billion which were signed 22 year. agreements worth about $ 30 billion. China will allocate to Kazakhstan more than $ 1 billion of funds be directed to non-oil sector of the economy and reconstruction of the refinery. Turkey Turkish investments in Ankara has In Tajikistan, In recent years, Tashkent after the In 2013 trade Kazakhstan's economy announced that registered 46 joint Turkish Andijan massacre volume with since 1993 reached almost $ will provide to ventures. Direct companies have put pressure on countries in 1.8 billion. In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan $ investments of initiated projects the Turkish the region was today been registered 3422 106 million Turkish in Turkmenistan. business, about $ 3.6 companies with Turkish loan. In 2011, companies in The total value of deportation and billion, the capital. Number of Kazakh Turkey has also total $11.5 mil. In these projects was imprisonment of number of companies in Turkey has written off Turkey registered more than $21 Turkish investments of reached 150. Have been Kyrgyzstan's and operate nine billion the businessmen. In Turkish discussed the possibilities external debt of companies from contribution of Uzbekistan, companies of cooperation in the $ 51 million Tajikistan with a Turkish operate 516 exceeded $ creation Kazakh-Turkish total capital of 1.1 companies has companies with 4.7 bil. Value industrial zone in the South- mil Turkish liras. made a total of Turkish capital. In of projects in Kazakhstan region on 40 Turkish 12%. About 600 2011-2012, the region 93 Verkhoturov D.Китайский фактор и вывод иностранных войск из Афганистана http://www.afghanistan.ru/doc/62318.html Accessed at 18.07.2013 140  acres near the airport and companies Turkish volume of involving route Western Europe - implemented 31 companies have Turkish direct Turkish Western China projects worth been registered, investments in the companies is about $ 435 mil total number of implementation of around $ 50 projects is more the Public bln. than 600, March Investment TUSKON – 31, 1993 was Program of Turkish established a joint Uzbekistan Confederation Turkmen-Turkish exceeded $ 353 of Joint Stock million Businessmen Commercial Bank and Industrialists is very active in region * Глава государства объявил проект "Западная Европа - Западный Китай" всенародной стройкой // http://www.bnews.kz/main/economics/glava-gosudarstva-obyavil-proekt-zapadnaya-evropa-zapadnyj-kitaj- vsenarodnoj-strojkoj/ 4.1.1.1.1. Kazakhstan Due to income from its energy resources, Kazakhstan has long been considered the most stable and promising Central Asian state. And yet there are warning signs. In 2013 waiting for the 20th anniversary of its independence, in the Republic of Kazakhstan were organized series of terrorist attacks. Kazakhstan, formerly perhaps the most peaceful country in Central Asia, faced with the growing activity of extremist organizations that have embarked on the path of armed struggle against government. In 2011 – 2012 in different parts of Kazakhstan 12 attacks took place, which caused the deaths of many people. According to experts the activation of radical Islam in Kazakhstan is becoming systemic issue. Liquidated security forces fighting extremist groups are only the top of the iceberg. In the republic today operates a large number of radical Islamist groups, which are a breeding ground for terrorism, “the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan94”, “Jamaat Mujahideen Central 94 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) - largest Islamist political organizations in post-Soviet Central Asia, appears in the list of U.S. State Department as one of dangerous international terrorist organizations. 141 Asia95”, “Hizb-ut-Tahrir96”, Kyrgyz groups “Tablighi Jamaat 97” and “Jaish al-Mahdi 98” and Uyghur “East Turkestan Islamic Movement 99”, “East Turkestan Liberation Organization100”, “Shark Azatlyk Tashkilati101”. In 2011 in Almaty region has been IMU was founded in 1996, consists of a number of former activists of Islamist organizations in Uzbekistan, whose activities were banned by President Islam Karimov in 1992-93. Most members of the movement in the early 90s were members of Islamist organizations “Adolat Uyushmasi” (Namangan), “The Islamic Revival Party” (founded in 1990 in Astrakhan, the Uzbek branch - in January 1991), “wa Odamiylik insonparvarlik” (Kokand), “Islamic Party of Turkestan” “Islom Lashkorlari” (soldiers of Islam), etc. IMU leadership works closely with a number of international and regional organizations and Islamist movements, primarily with “Al-Qaeda”, “Taliban”, “Hizb ut-Tahrir”, “Muslim Brotherhood”, etc. Its activities on the territory of Central Asia, as well as outside the IMU provides mainly due to the financial support of the international Islamist movement and donations of wealthy representatives of the Uzbek minority in Afghanistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. In addition, the IMU periodically receives financial assistance from some special services, primarily from the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence ISI. (The structure of this powerful intelligence organization, there are two departments that deal with Islamist groups the Central Asian region, in particular, work with IMU). 95 Jamaat Mujahideen Central Asia – also known as “Islamic Jihad Group”, created by members of IMU, trained in camps of Al –Qaeda, in 2004 terrorist group was identified by National Security Committee of Kazakhstan (NSC) a terroristic attack was prevented in Kazakhstan. In 2006 UN Security Council on initiative of Kazakhstan included Jamaat Mujahideen Central Asia into UN list of terrorist organizations. 96 Hizb-ut-Tahrir - accurate full name - Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (from Arabic - Islamic Liberation Party). Sunni religious and political organization founded in 1953 in Jerusalem, by Sharia Court judge Takiuddin en- Nabhani. After his death in 1977, the amir (leader) of the party became a Palestinian Abdul Kadim Zallum, born in 1925 living in Jordan. Hizb ut-Tahrir proclaims itself a political party whose ideology is Islam. The party's goal is to facilitate the return of Muslims to the Islamic way of life (based on the norms of Shariah) and spread of the Islamic faith in world through jihad. At the same time declared that the realization of this goal is only possible by recreating a single (uniting the entire Muslim world) theocratic state - caliphate. The Hizb ut-Tahrir documents all Muslim countries are characterized as non-Islamic, and the cause of all the current problems of the Muslim Ummah is declared “no Islam in its daily life”, including “the absence of the Islamic system of government”. It is assumed that the struggle for the realization of these goals will include three stages, the first of which formed the core of the party, “preparation the people who believe in the goals, objectives and methods of the party”; the second is an active “interaction with the Ummah”; The third stage begins after the establishment of an Islamic state and includes, inter alia, “the mission reports of Islam to the rest of the world”. The party does not set deadlines recreate the Caliphate, hoping in this matter only on “the help of Allah”. 97 Tablighi Jamaat is religious movement, founded in 1926 in India, by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas. The main goal of the movement is considered to be a spiritual conversion to Islam through the work of participants to appeal to Muslims, regardless of their social and economic status in order to bring them to the religious practices of Islam, as Prophet Muhammad said. 98 Jaish al-Mahdi – also known as Army of Religious Ruler in Kyrgyzstan, terrorist group formed in 2010 in 2014 organization was declared as extremist by the judicial authorities of Kyrgyzstan. 99 East Turkestan Islamic Movement –also known as Movement of Eastern Turkestan Islamic separatist group founded by Uyghurs in Chinese Xinjiang Province is listed as terrorist organization in 2002, responsible for terrorists’ attacks in China in 2001, 2013. 100 East Turkestan Liberation Organization – also known as Free Turkestan, formed in 1996, Uyghur separatist organization fights against Chinese Government, is declared as terrorist’s organization in Kazakhstan and China. 142 detained more than 300 members of the “Tablighi Jamaat” and “Hizb-ut-Tahrir”. Often the arrests and trials against extremists Kazakh authorities prefer to hold in private; not wanting to reinforce the impression of a mass nature of such events. Burst of terrorist activity in Kazakhstan is directly related to Russia. Western Kazakhstan which is one of the main centers of the extremists is bordering the Russian North Caucasus. In 2011- 2012 in the counter-terrorist operations were killed 20 citizens of Kazakhstan, who fought on the side of the Islamists. In the future, this process can be reversed and when to get experience militants back to their homeland in order to apply it in practice. 4.1.1.1.2. Kyrgyzstan In March 2005, President Askar Akayev was ousted after the population opposed the parliamentary election fraud. The government of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev was overthrown in 2010. These events as example of intense struggle for power and control of the limited economic resources of the country led to prolonged instability and caused sporadic outbreaks of violence. State institutions almost inactive, promised reforms, including constitutional change in the direction of limiting presidential power, the resumption of the campaign against corruption and efforts to improve living standards are not present, which further reduced the people’s support for government. 101 Shark Azatlyk Tashkilati is Uyghur separatists group, part of East Turkestan Islamic Movement. 143 4.1.1.1.3. Tajikistan Tajikistan is, apparently, still under the impact of the civil war in the 1990s which is seen in the economic and political life. The country is classified as very poor and heavily dependent on remittances from hundreds of thousands of Tajiks working abroad. The level of corruption is very high, and the income from the Afghan heroin trade linked to the institutions of power. Fear of a return to civil war was the reason that the dissent in society was minimized, and the government of President Emomali Rakhmon quite successfully managed to push the opposition to a secondary position. However, that long-term stability is taken for granted, for appearing in a new generation of memories of war are much weaker and it is unlikely that it will justify the consequences of war as well as poverty and authoritarianism. It maintains a close relationship with Russia, but it caused problems in Tajikistan or in the Russian economy is accompanied by a reduction of work opportunities of migrant Tajiks, which can lead to dangerous social and economic consequences for Tajikistan. 4.1.1.1.4. Turkmenistan Turkmenistan is one of the most closed and repressive regimes in the world. Absolute control over political life and income from the rich reserves of natural gas in combination provide a semblance of stability. However, the systematic destruction of civil society, education, health systems and the complete absence of even the semblance of independent political institutions means that the country can experience the humanitarian crisis, and the state in the medium and long term may be on the verge of collapse. 144 4.1.1.1.5. Uzbekistan Serious instability is the greatest threat to Uzbekistan. This country is the second largest in Central Asia after the Turkmenistan on scale of political repression, and on the manifestations of explicit violence the regime of President Islam Karimov has surpassed the Niyazov’s regime 102. For many years discontent of Uzbek population and exploitative ruinous economic policies forcing millions of people to fight for survival in Uzbekistan. In May 2005, Uzbek security forces crushed the uprising in Andijan, a town in the east of the country, where were killed numerous unarmed civilians. Since then, the government cracked down on independent journalists, activists, human rights and civil society. Relations with the Western countries were decreased in recent years, although relations with Russia and China, which agreed with the interpretation of the events in Andijan. After the events in Andijan in the country established semblance of calm, but the government shows no willingness to solve problems. As in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the combination of many years of authoritarian rule along with availability of resources, bringing high profits, suggests that after President´s death possible care from the scene will probably be accompanied by a fierce struggle over his legacy. Risk of further instability in the short and medium term is high. The second problem is energy security. The conflict between Ukraine and Russia, the annexation of the Crimea issue and energy security has become a subject of discussion at the highest political level in the European Union, and senior officials in Brussels and Saparmurat Niyazov (Annaniyazov, was born February 19, 1940, in village of Kipchak, Ashgabat region – 102 died December 21, 2006, Ashgabat), Turkmenbashi (head of Turkmens), was named Serdar (leader) and Eternally Great Saparmurat Turkmenbashi - Soviet Turkmen party’s statesman and politician, leader of Turkmenistan from 1985 to 2006 (in 1985-91 - the first secretary of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan in 1990-2006 – “President for Life of Turkmenistan”). Niyazov's rule was characterized by the establishment in country personal dictatorial power, as well as a large-scale cult of personality, which declined after his death. 145 the EU member states capitals have begun to take steps to reduce dependence on Russia. Belatedly, the EU has begun to understand the potential importance of Central Asia. Its oil and gas resources that could be delivered directly to Europe through the Caucasus and Turkey are considered as at least a partial solution to the problem of diversification of energy sources. 146 4.1.3. Energy opportunities in Central Asia Three of the five Central Asian countries have significant reserves of energy. Resources of Kazakhstan most large oil reserves it among the top ten countries in the world, and the largest gas reserves - among the top fifteen. Turkmenistan has large untapped gas reserves; Uzbekistan is also a major gas producer. Almost all of its gas exports to the north Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia, where part of it is supplied to Ukraine by Russia-controlled pipelines. Kazakhstani gas is exported mainly in Russia. Uzbek gas is consumed in the region, but significant amounts are also exported to Russia. In fact, except for Turkmen gas pumped south to Iran, Russia monopolized imports of Central Asian gas. In 2005, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan gave more than 50 billion cubic meters of gas, which is more than 10% of its level of consumption in Russia. The reason for this lies in orientation of gas pipeline infrastructure inherited from the Soviet Union, and built for the transportation of hydrocarbons from Central Asia to Russia. Since the Russian gas transportation controls, these countries do not have sufficient leverage in negotiations, and they are forced to sell gas at well below market prices. According to a representative of a European energy company, Russia “bought” gas from Central Asia and resold it, instead of Russian gas to Europe with a significant margin. (ENI, 2013) Russia is highly dependent on gas supplies from Central Asia, both in terms of domestic consumption and for exports to Europe. Experts are skeptical about the possibility of Russia to use storage or backup power fields for domestic 147  consumption and supply in the international market, even in the case of short- term disruptions in the supply of Central Asian gas. In this case, it would be faced with a dilemma involving the reduction or supply for domestic consumers or to neighbors103. EU member states have no strategic gas reserves (stockpiling gas, unlike oil, is not a common practice), and thus faced a dangerous power deficit if instability in Central Asia led to a halt of gas supply (D.Satbayev, 2014). 103 Kazakh expert Dossym Satbayev’s interview to Interfax (Kazakhstan) http://www.interfax.kz/?lang=rus&int_id=quotings_of_the_day&news_id=6026 148 4.1.4. The competition for natural resources Besides Russia, many other countries like to access to Central Asian gas. Consideration of the US-backed proposal to construct a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to supply gas to Pakistan and India markets was delayed for several years because of the situation in Afghanistan. China, which is connected to the pipeline with Kazakhstan, also signed agreements with Turkmenistan on gas imports and signed an agreement on investments of $ 600 million in the gas industry of Uzbekistan. In 2014 “Gazprom” and China's CNPC signed an agreement in Shanghai, Russian gas exports to China. Details of the deal were not disclosed, the total contract price is $ 400 billion for 30 years. Decision by EU Member States on imports of gas from the region, which is home to some of the most repressive regimes require a balanced assessment of the situation of human rights, as well as strategic interests. If we assume that the obstacles to the creation of the infrastructure can be overcome, the actual supply of energy would depend on regional stability and economic cooperation would require attention to the problems of transparency and good governance. Finally, as shown by experience in Nigeria104 and other countries need to pay attention to the problems of local development in those regions where there are mining companies. In any case, that EU is going to have an impact on the development potential of Central Asia energy and related export sectors and routes, it should demonstrate activity will impact the influence in the region. 104 Odesola, I.F., 2012, Coal Development in Nigeria: prospects and challenges, International Journal of Engineering and Applied Sciences. 149 Third but not least important issue is the health care. Health care systems in Central Asia are in crisis. Potential occurrence of diseases such as HIV / AIDS and multidrug-resistant (MDR) is long term threat to the EU. In the near future, the EU should consider the potentially dangerous consequences of an influenza epidemic in the region, where the health care system is weak, overstretched and underfunded. Although the Central Asian countries have no common borders with the EU, bird flu had demonstrated its ability to quickly cross the expanses of Eurasia, by migratory birds fly to Europe every year from Siberia and Central Asia. In addition, the social consequences of the multiple crises of the health system in Central Asia, in particular HIV / AIDS threaten the overall stability and development prospects of the region, which may have implications for European security. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the quality of the health care system in all Central Asian republics have dropped dramatically as a result of growing poverty and the impact that has had a transition period for the social security system. In Tajikistan, these factors were reinforced consequences of civil war. In Turkmenistan, the health care crisis is the direct result of targeted disruption of the government health system, through measures such as dismissal in 2004 15 thousand skilled workers and the decree adopted by the president in 2005, the closure of all hospitals outside the state capital - Ashgabat. The government banned specifies in hospital sheets or reports a number of infectious diseases, including tuberculosis and cholera. After 1990 in all five countries life expectancy has fallen sharply, and by 2013 it was about ten years less than the EU average. Maternal mortality in 2010 is six - eight times higher than the level of the EU (in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan - ten times by UN Data 105). These trends are unlikely to soon change significantly for the better. All countries, except Turkmenistan, are unlikely to achieve goals in incidence of HIV / AIDS and 105 http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=maternal%2Bmortality&d=MDG&f=seriesRowID:553#f_1 150 tuberculosis. The region is a struggle with the increasing number of infectious diseases, such as systemic diseases like cancer, in terms of the incidence of which it occupies the worst place in the developed and developing countries. Governments in the region are increasingly less able to meet the needs of health care. However, the main costs are borne by patients, and the already afflicted poverty. The spread of infectious diseases, especially HIV / AIDS and tuberculosis, is a key issue. Increased level of sexually transmitted diseases, particularly syphilis is an additional warning sign of potential HIV / AIDS epidemic. The incidence of tuberculosis has reached critical levels throughout the region, and significantly increased incidence of multidrug-resistant. The reason for this lies in the collapse of the health system and the lack of attention to out-patient treatment at the final stage. Since2 012, the incidence of tuberculosis has more than doubled in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (UN Data 2012 average 66-8: case detection of tuberculosis, highest rate 81 is in Kazakhstan 106). U.S. and World Health Organization (WHO) interact in the initiative to promote the internationally recommended strategy for TB (tuberculosis) control (DOTS – “short-course directly observed treatment”) in order to limit the spread of forms of the virus with multidrug resistance. But such aid will not be enough to overcome the serious infrastructure failures destroy the health care system and the system of disaster management, which leaves Central Asian governments unarmed against the threat of serious epidemics. 106 http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=tuberculosis+&d=WHO&f=MEASURE_CODE%3aTB_1 151 The fourth issue - radicalism and terrorism. Among the terrorist organizations operating in Central Asia are the following:  “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan”- operates in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan;  “Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami” (Party of Islamic Liberation) - operates in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan;  “Muslim Brotherhood107” (JAMA 'AT / HARAKAT IKHWAN al - MUSLIMEEN) - groups of this organization is a network of autonomous cells acting under different names. With regard to the CAR interest are the following:  “Social Reform108” (JAMIAT AL - ISLAH AL - IJTIMAI) - has offices in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; “Islamic Call Committee” (LAJNAT AL - DAWAA AL - ISLAMIYA; “Dawa Islamiya” its radical wings.  “Committee of Muslims of Asia 109” - was supported by “Labban Foundation”  “Islamic Center of Development 110” - operates in Osh city, Kyrgyzstan;  “Akromidy” - for Islamic religious group of Uzbekistan acts in Fergana Valley (Uzbekistan);  “Adolat Uyushmasi111” (Justice Society) - a religious-extremist organization operating in Namangan, Uzbekistan; 107 Muslim Brotherhood - international religious and political association founded in 1928 by Hassan al- Banna in Ismailia (Egypt). Since 1933 the headquarters of the organization was transferred to Cairo, it has strong influence in Tunisia, Libya, Syria and many other Arab countries. In 2013 by the Egyptian government was declared a terrorist organization, in 2014 was declared as terrorist organization in Saudi Arabia. 108 Social Reform - JAMIAT AL - ISLAH AL – IJTIMAI – active group formed in 2003, connected to IMU and Movement of Turkestan, funded terrorist organizations in the North Caucasus. 109 Committee of Muslims of Asia acting under the International Islamic organization based in Kuwait. 110 The center is responsible for training of radical group in Osh (south Kyrgyzstan) 152   “Islom lashkarlari112” (Soldiers of Islam) - operates in Uzbekistan;  “Tovba113” (Repentance) - has supporters and activists in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan;  “Movement of Eastern Turkestan114” – acts in Xinjiang, China; implemented a series of attacks in Central Asian states;  “National Revolutionary Front of Eastern Turkestan” - extremist organization, aims to create the territory of Uyghur’s Central Asia State;  “East Turkestan Liberation Organization115”;  “Eastern Turkestan Islamic Party116”. Discontent caused by repression, corruption and poor governance has led to the fact that radical Islamist groups began to use in Central Asia some support of the population. The most influential of these is the Hizb ut-Tahrir, a secret movement is active in the Islamic world, which seeks to unite Muslims as part of an Islamic caliphate. Cells of supporters are in most Central Asian states. They are engaged mainly in distribution of leaflets, audio - and video materials, which have criticized the activities of governments in the region and argue that achieving justice will only be possible when the caliphate. Representatives of Hizb ut-Tahrir claim that their movement seeks to achieve its objectives completely nonviolent. Governments in the region reacted differently to the emergence of Hizb ut-Tahrir, which began to be active at least since the mid-1990s. The 111 Adolat Uyushmasi – Justice Society, founded in 1991 by Takhir Yuldash, also known as Muhammad Tahir Farooq radical Islamist founder and leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 112 Islom lashkarlari - founded by radical Islamist Takhir Yuldash 113 Tovba - paramilitary group was organized also by Takhir Yuldash and others. 114 East Turkestan Islamic Movement –also known as Movement of Eastern Turkestan Islamic separatist group founded by Uyghurs in Chinese Xinjiang Province is listed as terrorist organization in 2002, responsible for terrorists’ attacks in China in 2001, 2013. 115 East Turkestan Liberation Organization – also known as Free Turkestan, formed in 1996, Uyghur separatist organization fights against Chinese Government, is declared as terrorist’s organization in Kazakhstan and China. 116 Eastern Turkestan Islamic Party – extremist organization, connected with their peers in a number of countries - Afghanistan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. 153 greatest movement undergoes repression in Uzbekistan, where persons accused of belonging to this movement, sentenced to long prison terms. Tajikistan, likewise, took an uncompromising stance towards the organization, which is particularly active in the Sughd region in the north of country. October 2013 President Emomali Rahmon received CSTO Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha, the sides discussed practical measures to help strengthen the Afghan-Tajik border. Recall that the decision on aid to the Republic of Tajikistan in border security, primarily in the military-technical sphere, was taken during a summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, held in Sochi on September 2013, after a meeting with Tajik President, Bordyuzha informed about taking actions as by providing border guards in Tajikistan military equipment, including modern weapons, equipment and optical devices. Kyrgyz authorities produced only a few arrests of Hizb ut-Tahrir members, Kazakhstan had also shown great tolerance, although more recently members of this organization are under increasing pressure. Turkmenistan is characterized as extreme closed country, so political processes are difficult to assess. Local residents, during Niyazov's government and society were often treated to drug tolerance, as “imperfections”. In many places, drug trafficking wore almost open, particularly in the area of Ashgabat or some southern markets provinces (regions). During G. Berdimuhamedov’s presidency authorities tried to change this situation. In 2008, in Turkmenistan, a new security protection service of a healthy society - a specialized structure designed to combat drug trafficking. Purge of personnel in government, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs and indirect data of MFA. Repression exposed several previously “untouchable” officials and corruption protection mechanisms do not work. In 2009, a scandal sacked Interior Minister 154 Orazgeldy Amanmuradov, and the president publicly listed a number of major crimes related to drug trafficking, committed with the connivance of the Interior Affairs. Produced reshuffle could be partly explained by the logic of the political struggle in the top leadership of the republic, but anyway, they allowed a broad anti-drug campaign. Major drug traffickers were arrested republic, including underground millionaire Rahatay Razzakova, who died in prison. Later, a series of arrests of other members of the national business (Kuziev Y., Charyev N., etc.), but it is unknown whether they were related to drug trafficking or arrested in connection with other criminal acts. Were destroyed large narcotic retail point, and the operation in 2008 Khitrovka (Ashgabat – capital of Turkmenistan) accompanied by armed clashes, were killed by the security forces. In 2010, a campaign took place to eradicate illicit cultivation of opium that existed on the territory of Turkmenistan. These measures have undoubtedly positive effect. Polls residents of Ashgabat, Lebap and Mary provinces of Turkmenistan indicate that cases of open drug trade virtually ceased, “street” prices for drugs, opiates increased several times, markedly decreased drug use. Reported that along with the reduction of the national drug market it also qualitative changes occur: the main flow of contraband starts a circuitous route from Azerbaijan and Turkey, with a growing share in it begins to be at opiates of Afghan origin, and synthetic drugs. Losses incurred as a result of these changes, the Afghan drug trade, the assessment cannot be, but they seem to have been very significant and one of the factors that caused the deterioration of the situation on the Turkmen-Afghan border. 155 4.1.1.5. Current situation and prospects It would be a mistake to say that drug trafficking from Afghanistan is completely eliminated. Border guards in these places for a few attempts of illegal border crossing on the Afghan side, and there are cases of participation in smuggling as carriers and Afghan and Turkmen citizens. Turkmen “alternative press” writes that the wholesale buyers in the area and enjoys the patronage of local law enforcement (in Ashgabat – capital of Turkmenistan). Generally, in Turkmenistan problem of drug trafficking and extremism go hand in hand. Radical organizations penetrate into the country through migration flows from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and try to create their own infrastructure on the territory of Turkmenistan. In particular, in December officially reported disclosure in Ashgabat National University cells, presumably belonging to the “Hizb ut-Tahrir”, headed by student B. Yagshymuratov previously studied in Osh (south Kyrgyzstan). In Lebap was disclosed the cell of “Salafi117”, led by H. Sahypov, bring promotional material from Dushanbe (capital of Tajikistan). Recently, the authorities began liquidation cell organization known as “Nurdzhalar”, which thanks to the patronage of some prominent representatives of Turkish business in Turkmenistan and even had almost official status. Undoubtedly, these measures will not remain without attention of terrorist groups in Afghanistan, whose confrontation with official Ashgabat will only get worse in the near 117 Salafi - branch of Islam that unites Muslim religious leaders, who in different periods of Islam history were calling to focus on lifestyle and faith of early Muslim community, on the righteous predecessors. Later, in Islam, emerged a radical religious and political movement - Wahhabism. Proponents of this movement do not consider it a political and exclusively religious. They call themselves Salafis (so called the true followers of the righteous predecessors - the Salaf). Today, Wahhabism is the dominant Islamic doctrine in Saudi Arabia. 156 future. The Turkmen side seeks to protect themselves from criminal and terrorist groups associated with IMT and the Taliban; Afghan armed opposition - is increasingly seen as one of the Turkmenistan military opponents. Already in advocating armed opposition increasingly traced emphasis on the fact that Turkmenistan is one of the suppliers of fuel for the Afghan army and international forces. Under these conditions, it would be logical Turkmenistan deepen anti-terrorism cooperation with Afghanistan, Russia and Tajikistan, however, the official Ashgabat fears that the intensification of official contacts violates “neutral” status of the republic in international politics. While the official statements of Hizb ut-Tahrir is often portrayed as an organization that represents a threat was not presented any convincing evidence that the members of this movement are related to terrorist acts. However, other radical groups have demonstrated their willingness to use violence. Among them is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which arose after the suppression of the Islamist opposition of Uzbekistan in the early 1990s. In 2000s IMU organized a series of armed incursions into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan from their bases in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. These attacks were recorded, and the movement's supporters were expelled from Tajikistan. IMU then apparently joined in Afghanistan to the Taliban and al-Qaeda; leaders of IMU were probably killed during combat operations in Afghanistan in 2001, when the U.S. started to liquidate the Taliban; survivors of the IMU, believed to be hiding in the areas adjacent to the Afghan-Pakistani border. Breakup IMU may have led to the emergence of small groups, "freelance" militants operating throughout the region. Their actions are largely criminal in nature, although they have certain religious overtones. In Tajikistan, many such groups and individuals have been harassed. 157 As far as the IMU is still a serious terrorist threat remains unclear; reliable information is not enough, and the governments of some countries, especially Uzbekistan, are showing a tendency to exaggerate the threat of terrorism to justify further repression of dissent. However, apparently, the threat of individual acts of violence by individuals or small, formerly united by the groups, although it is not clear how these groups are able to prepare a large-scale terrorist attacks. Over the past years, none of the representative of the European countries or European organizations does not become a victim of violence, especially against them and attributed to extremist organizations. Nevertheless, the current political situation, weak institutions, corruption endemic to the region, discontent largest religious institutions, extremely rigorous enforcement of laws, and varying degrees of restrictions on the expression of legitimate dissent, are the nutritional environment in which radical groups of all kinds, as terrorist and others may recruit their supporters. Desire to suppress radicalism by force alone, without having to remove the main problems posed by its probably only aggravate the situation. The main slogan of the representatives of Hizb ut-Tahrir that Muslims will achieve justice only with the establishment of a caliphate in the region can find a receptive audience. The fifth issue - human rights and good governance. According to Freedom House’s 2014 report “Nations in Transit” the situation with human rights is different: some things are better in Kyrgyzstan worse - in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan and very badly - in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Some problems are common to all countries, albeit to varying degrees: poor prison conditions, arbitrary and impunity of the security services, violence against women and discrimination against them, and corruption. Economic desperation leads to the fact that an increasing number of people becoming victims of trafficking: women and girls - for sexual exploitation, 158 men - labor exploitation. Forced labor, including child labor, is because for concern in the regions of cotton production in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, is a major concern of torture, especially in Uzbekistan. According to the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Central Asian countries have yet to hold such an election, presidential or parliamentary, which would have been deemed fully free and fair, widespread corruption and abuse of power causing growing resentment, especially in the poorest regions. The sixth issue is the drug trade. The estimated annual consumption of heroin in Europe is 135 tons, with 90% of this volume is produced in Afghanistan. Central Asia is a transit route for 30% of Afghan heroin, much of which is designed to supply the Russian market (and the rest mainly routed through Pakistan and Iran to Turkey) (UN Data, 2011118) As a result, the Central Asian states suffer from drug-related system of organized crime and corruption, as well as drug addiction of its citizens and the related social and health problems. All this has a serious impact on regional stability. Sources: Afghanistan produces nearly 90% of the world's opium. It is increasingly being exported in the form of heroin or morphine, opiates and not raw, as it increases its price, while reducing the volume of cargo and reducing the risk of detection. In 2013, Afghanistan was produced more than 5500 tons of heroin and morphine119. This amount would be enough to provide heroin EU market for more than three years. About half of Afghanistan's GDP is provided by the production of opium, which is a growing obstacle to security and development. EU saw itself as one of the “general partners” Afghan administration, and the transition from the “Bonn process (2001) to the “Afghanistan Compact” (2006) and Afghanistan National Development Strategy 118 UN Data 2011, www.unodc.org 119 http://www.un.org/russian/news/story.asp?NewsID=16021#.U8azNfmSxqW 159 (2008) the international community gives the fight against drug trafficking “multipurpose priority”. Opium production prevents security and undermines the rule of law in Afghanistan, providing a source of funding for the rebel groups, which leads to increased influence of local drug lords to the detriment of the legitimate government and the growth of corruption. It also hinders the development of the legal industry due to high inflation and the fact that the infrastructure is mainly used for the production of opium, and not another, legal products. Limitation of drug trafficking in the Central Asian region would alleviate many distortions in the economy and stimulate reduction of the value of opium. Transit routes of Central Asia. Central Asia suffers from its strategic location as a point of intersection of global flows of drug trafficking. Traffickers have restored the ancient Silk Road for the transportation of opiates from Afghanistan to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, where they are transported by planes, rail or road in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and then in Russia and the EU. Traffickers use weak border protection system affected by corruption, lack of adequate infrastructure and the lack of national and regional law enforcement cooperation. European Monitoring Centre for Drug and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) Data: 160 Drug trafficking and the creation of new domestic drug markets have led to the growth of organized crime. Proceeds of drug trafficking invested in legitimate business, providing drug traffickers control local industry. Limited capacity and widespread corruption impede effective law enforcement structures. Bribery, especially among poorly paid border guards, was widespread, and generates economic relations impeding development. According to Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International, all five Central Asian states are located at the end of the rankings. Saving negative regional political and economic trends would reduce the already limited opportunities in the fight against smuggling and drug trafficking and improve the prospect of radical groups on the use of the drug trade to finance their activities. Apparently, most of the drug flux passing through the central Asia, or in the region directly consumed or Russian is sent to, and only a small amount ultimately reaches Europe. This fact, according to a representative of one of the EU member states, led to “a lively political debate”, because the view was expressed that it would be useful to spend money on closing other drug-trafficking routes, which directly and deliberately reach the EU. However, concern for the European Union there is ample reason. As 161 noted, the income from the sale of heroin is a potential source of funding for terrorist organizations. The main objective of criminal groups around the world is to extend its influence beyond the region in which they were formed. We must evaluate the possibility of the Central Asian drug traffickers to establish links with groups outside the region. Seventh issue is situation in Afghanistan. If Central Asia once not of great interest for the European Union, after September 11, 2001 its geographical location gives it a special significance. Since Afghanistan is an important priority for the European Union, the Central Asia can hardly be let out of view. Clearly, that stability in Afghanistan requires stable neighbors. May 2014 on the background of withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan government of neighboring Uzbekistan forward to continued cooperation with NATO. In the near future was opened in Tashkent NATO representation in May 16. The opening ceremony was going to take part Appathurai, a spokesman for the NATO Secretary General for Central Asia and the Caucasus. Like other countries neighboring Afghanistan, Uzbekistan concerned by the threats, paired with a significant reduction of foreign military presence in the region. Tashkent shared concerns about the spread of extremism outside the IRA. Currently Tashkent hopes to expand cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance in return transit cargo from Afghanistan. It is expected that the Uzbek side will get part of exported weapons, military equipment and spare parts. February 2014 National Chamber of Entrepreneurs (NCE) of Kazakhstan plans to open a sales office in Afghanistan. 162 Head of the International Cooperation Department Rustam Abdusalamov made a statement at a business seminar “Export development in Central Asia. NCE representative in Afghanistan” Arman Kassenov informed that Afghanistan imports up to 93% of goods, from food to medicine and diesel generators for home heating during the cold season and cars. He expressed confidence that Kazakhstan could put significant pressure on Turkey and Iran on the Afghan market diesel fuel 120 (Newskaz, 2014). Also were raised the issue of establishing direct flights between Kazakhstan and Afghanistan, the lack of which is a significant factor inhibiting trade and economic cooperation between the two countries. During the adoption of credentials from ambassadors of Afghanistan, Japan, Pakistan, the Netherlands and Oman President Nursultan Nazarbayev at the ceremony noted that Kazakhstan and Afghanistan friendly relations and expressed hope for further strengthening cooperation. Kazakh President mentioned that Kazakhstan participates in the construction of hospitals and schools, repair roads and bridges, humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, as well as an educational program for Afghan specialists121 (CA-News, 2014). In this regard, the reconstruction of Afghanistan will largely depend on the activity of foreign investors. April 2014 at the management level the Chamber of Commerce of Tajikistan and representatives of USAID trade prospects were considered a tripartite Business Council of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan. According to a press release from the Chamber of Commerce of the Republic of Tajikistan (CC RT), the signing of a tripartite agreement on trade cooperation between 120 A. Kassenov, Newskaz.ru http://www.newskaz.ru/economy/20140211/6118595.html 121 CA-NEWS, 2014 https://afghanistan.ru/doc/category/vokrug-afganistana/srednyaya-aziya/page/3 163 these three countries would establish a dialogue on economic cooperation and bring it to the level of business representatives in these countries. Deputy Head of CC RT Asanali Karmal noted that Tajikistan is interested in increasing exports and finding new markets for their products, in connection with which regional trade agreements meet its interests122 (Asia-Plus, 2014). Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are involved in CASA-1000 project123, which after implementation will allow these countries to supply surplus electricity in summer energy deficient Afghanistan and Pakistan. 4.1.1.6. Turkey The whole complex of both internal and external problems, especially in relations with neighboring countries, indicate that Ankara's Central Asian vector of policies designed to resolve foreign policy priority challenges facing Turkey. At the present stage, the main aspect of the activity of Turkey remains its aspiration to become a full member of the Western community, and in real time - to join the European Union. Political line of Turkey in the region is largely (though not primarily) caused by its desire to strengthen its international image, to demonstrate the appropriateness of the West of its intermediary role in Central Asia, to prove the necessity of its inclusion into the EU. 122 Asia-Plus, 2014 http://news.tj/en/newspaper 123 Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan are the two countries in Central Asia, which account for some of the largest reserves in the world drinking water resources. Both countries have an excess of electricity in summer. Nearby, in South Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan are lack of power and rapidly growing demands. Pakistan is not able to meet the needs of its citizens in electricity, especially during the hot summers, and this leads to frequent outages that harm industrial production, sometimes entail the closure of small businesses and lead to job losses. At the same time, millions of people continue to live without electricity. The new system of transmission lines (STL), which will connect the four countries - called the CASA-1000, will allow the most efficient use of environmentally friendly hydropower resources in Central Asian countries, giving them the ability to transmit and sell electricity surplus summer energy deficient countries of South Asia. In addition, the CASA-1000 project will support national actions to improve access to electricity, integration and expansion of markets for trade development, as well as help find sustainable solutions in the field of water resources management. The project launched among the Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan. http://www.casa-1000.org/ 164 These conclusions can also be drawn from the mission statement Turkish government in which the priorities of the foreign policy course called: strengthening transatlantic cooperation, relations with the U.S. and NATO, EU integration and the development of comprehensive relations with Central Asia and the Caucasus. However, the Kurdish issue and the internal struggle between the supporters of Islamic and secular development and the growing contradiction with the EU on the adoption of European structures, divert significant material financial and political resources of Ankara from taking action in the region. Nevertheless, it seems that currently foreign policy activity of Ankara is becoming less significant factor for most of Central Asia. Demonstrated at the time Turkey's inability to provide the States of the region sufficient financial, economic and political support significantly limited its presence in Central Asia. Turkish ambitions (especially not publicized in government circles) for leadership in the region associated with ethno- ideological slogan of Pan-Turkism, also do not find the appropriate response in the Central Asian states. In addition recently gaining ground facts about the participation of some Turkish representatives in an Islamic extremism and religious advocacy against the citizens of Central Asia as well as in Turkish territory; will definitely indicates that the development of the Central Asian-Turkish relations may be additional barriers, than no interest countries in the region, neither the Ankara. It appears that the implementation of the trans-Caucasus transport corridor project, especially its oil and gas element and turning Turkey into the crossroads of Asia, 165 Europe and the Middle East, yet supports in Ankara hopes to increase in the future of its economic and political influence in the region, and therefore the values for EU. The Russian influence in region is military presence in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Moscow’s main strategic stronghold in the region is the Customs Union. The attention of the consumer of oil and gas focused on the shores of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. These two countries have common neighbor Turkey. Recent events are signifying the change of geopolitical perspective of Turkey and Europe. Istanbul is a crucial capital of the global economy and finance, a hub for trade, business and air transports (Flights to Central Asia provided mainly by Turkish Airlines). These events bring the entire region out of its isolation and not only oil and gas but technologies, environment policies, human capital enhancement, foreign direct investments in non oil sectors will be growing at high rates as already seen in the last years. The international community starts now to perceive this new event and emerging power conditionality in the full region and in the all Middle East. The “neo-Osmanic” policy pursues a new Turkish strategy in Central Asia, common Turkic origin may simplify fulfillment of Turkic Union scenario, which has quiet reliable future in the region. Even more interesting scenario is the effect of joining Turkey to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a dialogue partner. On the one hand, the dialogue partner status is not observer status at the SCO. In particular, the dialogue partners do not participate in all the meetings and do not have access to confidential information, but nevertheless there are involved in the preparation of documents and strategies of the SCO 124. Turkey ambition in region may promote the following tasks: 1) the possibility of penetration in Central Asia, where is strong influence of the SCO, 2) activation of bilateral relations and joint economic projects with China (although for Beijing there is some risk - the 124 SCO – Shanghai Cooperation Organization 166 Turks are long-time partners of Uighurs) and 3) the strengthening of the position in the Middle East in opposition with Iran. Advance of Turkey in SCO at all the precipitancy is limited to an accurate framework. Nevertheless, the status of the observer in the organization for Ankara should not be excluded. General conclusion is that by 2023 Turkey has every chance to take place as the influential power on crossing of strategic ways of Eurasia. On the one hand, without having chances to enter EU, Turkey will be able to strengthen influence on Brussels, having become the key player in the Black Sea and Balkan regions. On the other hand, in process of the expanding in SCO, Turkey becomes the important competitor of China and Russia for influence in Central Asia. Nowadays SCO is not just an influential international organization, its main value is the ample control of the Eurasian continent. At the moment no other organization in the world is dominated in Eurasia, as SCO does. Turkey's fledgling motivated to vote in the world is its increased economic strength and international influence. It is no accident in one of the replicas of Erdogan's address to the EU Council; He was referring to Turkey's rapid development and the financial crisis and stagnation in the European Union. There are issues of expanding the cooperation between Turkey and the United States. And it is highly increased the role of Turkey in the region, in which it drove to the provisions of Egypt's leading power. For that Ankara is easily sacrificed existed in the past, economic and military ties with Israel. Effect of Ankara strengthened in all countries that were part of the past of the Ottoman Empire. For the moderate Islamists, who raised heads in the Arab region through the spring, the existing political system in Turkey is an example. Turkish leaders are encouraging a desire to emulate. Left aside the political setting of Ankara, proposed not to have quarrels with their neighbors. Turkey has actively participated in the events in Syria. In Turkish territory, not only firmly established the Syrian armed groups, but, according to some reports, the rebel forces. Moreover, increasingly in NATO circles expressed the 167 wishes of liberated areas in the contiguous zone of Syria and Turkey. Recall that Turkey has the second largest army in NATO. It should also be borne in mind that the further Turkish involvement in the affairs of Syria could lead to a deterioration of its relations with other neighboring countries - Iran. Scope of activity in Turkey is not limited to the adjacent region. It is very noticeable in the former Soviet Union, especially in countries with Turkic- speaking population. There, in addition to strengthening the economic position stronger cultural influence of Turkey, Ankara, having overseen the schools, increasing the flow of graduates entering the universities in Turkey. For the first time held the summit of Turkic-speaking countries. All of this suggests that the broader framework of Turkey's interests in the region, it's as if inter-regional power (NG, 12.2011). 4.1.1.7. Chinese People's Republic (PRC) China, showing its inherent realistic approach, prefers a cautious policy toward Central Asia. Externally, China's strategic interests in Central Asia appear insignificant (that does not show the real approach). In geopolitical terms, China is aware of the undesirability of prematurity demonstrate its ambitions in the region. While the view of the international community was locked on Russia and the U.S. around use of chemical weapons in Syria, Beijing with its usual pragmatism strengthens its position in Central Asia. In September 2013 Xi Jinping and his Turkmen counterpart Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov announced the start of commercial operation of the second largest gas field in the country Galkinish, whose reserves are estimated at 21.2 168 trillion meters3. Prior to that, the two leaders signed a formal agreement to build extended pipeline between Turkmenistan and Chinese Xinjiang. In December 2009, the predecessor of Xi Jinping, Hu Jintao, and the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have opened gas pipeline Turkmenistan- China , which can run about 40 billion meters3 of gas per year . Due to China’s plans to increase gas purchases in Central Asia in 2020 to more than 65 billion meters3, local leaders increasingly see Beijing as a privileged economic partner and they believe that it is more important than Russia and any other foreign actors. In Central Asia China is promoting many economic projects; on this matter there is worth of interest to review the issues of CAREC125 - Ministerial Conference on Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation. The projects of CAREC are being competitive with other projects which are launched in the Central Asian region by other countries. The Chinese leadership has repeatedly emphasized that supports conservation with Central Asian countries friendly relations between themselves and Russia, does not seek to fill any vacuum created by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The involvement of China in the case of Central Asia is also largely driven by the preservation of such a problem for China as the unstable situation in the eastern part of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, which already delivers Beijing troubles growth of Islamic nationalist sentiment with the advent of contagious example for creating national-state formations and the situation of separatism enhancement tendencies in China. However, there is a view that one of the central elements of passivity China in the region by Beijing being not interested attracting international attention to the problems of 125 CAREC (The Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation) is a proactive facilitator of cooperation on the basis of projects in transport, trade, energy and other key sectors of mutual interest. It is a partnership of 10 countries and six multilateral institutions working together to promote development through regional cooperation, leading to accelerated growth and poverty reduction. Countries: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. Institutions: the Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund, Islamic Development Bank, United Nations Development Program and the World Bank. The Asian Development Bank also serves as the CAREC Secretariat. 169 Xinjiang. So, the situation in some other regions of China, such as Tibet, the complexity of the market issues already undermine the international credibility of the stability of the PRC, and are the cause of Western “interference” in the internal affairs of the country. It seems that the situation in the east of China does not allow using this area for active geopolitical penetration in the Central Asian region. Is difficult to predict the possible consequences of (inter-ethnic, inter-civilization, interreligious plan etc.) that can occur after Beijing’s a deeply thought-out foreign policy moves in Central Asia. However, there are different estimates of the Chinese influence in Central Asia. For the most part it is common to several Kazakh and Kyrgyz political scientists who argue that for their countries from China carried out the so-called “expansion” accompanied by high migration activity of Chinese population. At the same time, it appears that migratory pressure of China, observed around its perimeter, mainly due to the internal situation in the country has not yet elevated to the rank of state policy. In addition, an important point of understanding the Beijing doctrine of the Central Asian is the fact that recently observed increased activity in the region. Growing Chinese interest is noticeable, especially in the economic sphere, on a background investment growth of trade, increased attention to transportation projects, including the construction of a network of pipelines from Central Asia, also settling on market issues. It appears that based on the current interest in PRC foreign policy level is the desire to protect its eastern rears for more active line in the Asia-Pacific region (APR), to prevent the possibility of their flashpoints, form stable conditions for the further development of relations with the new states of the region, at the domestic level - to stabilize the situation in Xinjiang and tie it to China via pipelines and intensification of the economy. Furthermore, the growing interest of China in cooperation with the 170 fledgling united Europe now dictates the need to find a reliable form of communication links with the EU. In this regard, the development of transport infrastructure elements China with Central Asia in the future serve as a foundation capable to broad engagement of China (as APR) with the European countries. China's approach to Central Asia is inherently strategic long-term, does not focus any immediate priorities. Analysis of recent trends in the Chinese political line suggests that the current level of China's influence in the region will continue with wide range of relationships, primarily with the countries themselves to Central Asia, Russia, the U.S., and potentially the EU. Beijing's role in the region, it seems, will gradually increase in the near future in proportion to weaken of Russian influence, strengthening Sino- European cooperation. In the longer term strengthening of the China position in the Asia-Pacific region (including, it is possible due to the decision in favor the number of Chinese territorial disputes), improving the socio-economic situation in the eastern regions of the country, it seems, would have far-reaching implications for the future of Central the entire continent of Asia. Major logistic projects: May 2014 in the Chinese port of Lianyungang began construction of Kazakhstani logistics terminal, which should be one of the elements of the economic zone of the Silk Road. This port is used by the Republic of Kazakhstan for freight traffic in 1995 under an agreement with China, and last year on the results of President Xi's visit to Kazakhstan has agreed to provide to Kazakhstan territory at the port for the construction of its own terminal. And between JSC “National Company Kazakhstan Railways” and 171 Lianyungang Port Company in February 2014 signed an agreement on joint management of logistics terminal through a joint venture, the Kazakh-Chinese international company Lianyungang city. Kazakhstan in the joint venture will be owned 49% of shares and China - 51%. Cost of construction of the logistics center will be 99.3 million US dollars. It is planned that by the end of 2015, the terminal will be able to cater for loads in excess of 250,000 twenty-foot equivalents with the prospect of increasing capacity in half by 2020. May 2014 during the 9th session of the Kazakh-Chinese bilateral cooperation in railway transport with China an agreement was reached on the need for transcontinental transportation between China and Kazakhstan. During the meeting were discussed issues of increasing transit traffic through border crossings Dostyk - Alashankol and Altynkol - Khorgos. Now to this zone will join Kazakhstan logistics terminal in the port of Lianyungang. This port is notable for its geographic location, the shipping lines with the Japanese port of Osaka, South Korean port of Busan, as well as rail links with several major Chinese ports. These activities are carried out as part of the industrialization of Kazakhstan and the Republic of turning into a logistical hub in Central Asia, as previously established and now operates a special economic zone “Khorgos - East Gate” with a focus on logistics and trade with China. Kazakhstan also plans to build a grain terminal on the border of Turkmenistan and Iran to export grain and commissioning of a new railway line that will connect Kazakhstan with Iran via Turkmenistan. Furthermore, the introduction of the terminal in the system and start its full operation will reduce the role of Kyrgyzstan as an intermediary in trade between China and 172 Central Asian countries, as well as seriously worsen already joyless perspectives Kyrgyz market “Dordoi” and will stimulate the elites in Kyrgyzstan turn to Eurasian integration. Kazakhstan seriously strengthens its position republic hub in the heart of Eurasia. CAREC projects In October 2012 was held the 11 th Conference of CAREC in Wuhan (China) where has been approved by one of the most ambitious plans for the development of transport infrastructure in Central Asia for over the past few decades. It includes the construction and rehabilitation of roads, railways, airports, ports, providing the necessary service infrastructure to the tune of $ 22.5 billion plan, called plan of Wuhan (Wuhan Action Plan), estimated up to 2020 and will be implemented on through multilateral cooperation CAREC member countries and international financial institutions 126. Essentially, CAREC is a regional organization dedicated to the integration of the region into the global economy. In this sense, the organization is largely opposed to the Customs Union. The report “CAREC-2020 Strategic Framework” states: “In view of the general population, numbering more than 320 million people., The domestic market of the CAREC region has an impressive size. Customs Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, offers the opportunity for further expansion of the market for another 168 million people. While Kazakhstan stands as a point of access to the markets of the Russian Federation and Belarus. In other words, the strategic objective of CAREC is to, through Kazakhstan, members of both organizations, to subordinate its economic impact of Customs Union, draw it in the market for other countries. Despite the fact that Russia is not part of CAREC, in the organization of many of the documents are 126 Competing integration organization CAREC was established at the Asian Development Bank (ADB), back in 1997, and set a goal of economic cooperation between the countries of Central Asia, including Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China (mainly Xinjiang), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 173 prepared in Russian and in all initiatives include the impact of the Russian economy. This clearly shows the importance of Russia for the integration of the organization. Threat to take over of the market by the Customs Union so strong, that CAREC is based on the major international financial institutions. Capital is only the one at the beginning of the ADB (Asian Development Bank) in 2012 $ 165 billion, while the capital of the Eurasian Development Bank, established by Russia and Kazakhstan is $ 1.5 billion; in the development of the CAREC region may be directed major investments that will ensure its economic growth, and while Eurasian integration organizations that cannot oppose a comparable investment resources. However, the absorption of the market of the Customs Union - this is the case, obviously, in the distant future. In the period until 2020 CAREC poses another problem. Deputy Director of the IMF's Middle East and Central Asia Juha Kähkönen in his report at the 11 th Ministerial Conference in Wuhan, said that the macroeconomic outlook for the region is encouraging, but there is need to strengthen the economic integration of the countries, and also to strengthen the budget and the banking sector, to eliminate barriers in trade and capital flows. Wuhan plan includes three major projects: the development of transport, trade and customs regulations and the development of CAREC Institute's work plan for the 2013-2017 years. Of these, the most ambitious and important project is transport projects. Roads determine the economic development of the countries Transport plan in general was developed at the 11th meeting of the Committee for the Coordination of the transport sector in Manila in May 2012, as recorded in “Implementing CAREC 2020: The Wuhan Action Plan”127. To 2020 will be developed and signed by the pilot agreement between the participating countries, in which they commit themselves to work together to increase the capacity of individual roads and highways. Behind all this activity was 127 Approved in Wuhan, this plan is in the organization's strategy 2020: "... in order to facilitate the implementation of an effective cross-border transport links between the countries of CAREC". Wuhan plan emphasizes that Member States on a voluntary basis, in the framework of the six corridors CAREC, will lead the construction and development of its transportation infrastructure 174 observed and the Secretariat of the ADB CAREC. The scheme resembles the metro corridors. On the one hand, it is built on the basis of the existing system of roads and railways in Central Asia. But on the other hand, it must establish a system of links between Urumqi and Kabul, with the off to the neighboring regions of arteries. So, corridor 1 forms bond southern Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Xinjiang and Russia. Corridor 2 forms of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. 3 forms a corridor link northern Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to Russia and Iran. Corridor 5 forms a transit line from West China to Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is one of the most important, because it connects almost all countries of CAREC. Corridor 6 connects northern Afghanistan and Uzbekistan to Russia and Iran. Under this scheme, it is clear that the economic center of CAREC accounts for Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and northern Afghanistan, because there is a big part of the corridor, and they are numerous crossings to facilitate cargo handling and transport services. The other countries in the periphery of the proposed scheme are that integration organization. Judging by the fact that this center is the most populous CAREC, there will also create the most favorable conditions for investment in the production of goods and services. This small sub-region focuses more cheap labor from the significant potential of this population growth - one of the most important conditions for investment. Other countries in the CAREC will supply raw materials and to ensure the transit of goods to foreign markets. In the future, obviously, the main inflow of investments from international financial institutions have just this, the central part of CAREC, and it is in the long term of 15-20 years can get ahead in its economic development. This is a good example of how the planning of roads and transport corridors generally determines the economic development of countries. The focus of road in the development of the 175 transport system focuses on the development of roads. There are 70 projects listed in Wuhan plan, 39 are related to the construction or rehabilitation of roads 128. TABLE 12: LOGISTIC PROJECTS IN REGION Countries Highways Railways Sea ports Airports Service infrastructure Afghanistan 5 3 1 Azerbaijan 2 1 Kazakhstan 4 1 Kyrgyzstan 4 1 1 1 Mongolia 2 3 Pakistan 14 Tajikistan 3 2 Turkmenistan 2 Uzbekistan 5 5 1 9 Total 39 15 1 2 13 Source: CAREC, 2012 If an analysis of the size of investments in individual areas of the transport system CAREC, the emphasis on roads will become even more pronounced. The development of roads has 66.2% of all the funds planned for the implementation of infrastructure projects. The development of the railways sent 27.5% of the planned funds. TABLE 13: CAREC PROJECTS IN REGION Countries Highways Railways Sea ports Airports Service infrastructure Afghanistan 802 650 Azerbaijan 1478,6 795 50 Kazakhstan 2784 2007 Kyrgyzstan 370 415,6 105 4 Mongolia 2360 137 Pakistan 5426 Tajikistan 876 270 Turkmenistan 654 Uzbekistan 847 1510,5 5,8 1044,7 Total ($ mln.) 14943,6 6288,1 50 110,8 1185,7 Source: CAREC, 2012 128 Dmitri Verkhoturov, a political scientist “New Eastern Outlook” 12.03.2012 Source - New Eastern Outlook Permanent address - http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1354516620 176 Although previously China's regional diplomacy was limited to trade and energy issues, the tour of Xi Jinping provided a new political dimension. Following the example of Russia, the U.S. and the EU, Beijing launched its own regional initiative called the Great Silk Road. During his visit in September 2013 to the “Nazarbayev University 129” the Chinese President urged his Central Asian colleagues to strengthen international cooperation to modernize road infrastructure, expand cultural exchanges and to conduct a coordinated political dialogue. During his visit there were singed many official documents, only in Kazakhstan were singed 22, it must be mentioned that Xi Jinping emphasized as priority to increase the volume of bilateral trade between China and Kazakhstan in 2015 to $ 40 billion. Chinese initiative contradicts not only the idea of Washington's New Silk Road, but also the European strategy for the New Central Asia Partnership, as well as long-standing Russian tradition to maintain their dominance through a number of regional organizations. Even if Beijing continues with Moscow adheres to the strategic course of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, it tries to increase its economic influence in the SCO, offering to Central Asian republics programs of economic assistance, low-interest loans and other forms of support. In respect to an analysis of studies of European experts has allowed tracing the evolution of the academic community views on the situation in Central Asia, which could affect the perception of the situation and the political decision-making circles in the EU countries. A number of European experts on Central Asia acted as consultants of EU countries and EU institutions in the formulation of regional policies. In addition to British experts in Germany, Federal Institute of East European and International Studies specialized on a study of Central Asia in the 1990s, as well as Institute for International and Security Affairs, Institute of Turkic Studies at the Free 129 One of the best universities in Central Asia, named after President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Narazbayev, the university situated in capital of Kazakhstan Astana. 177 University of Berlin. Various aspects of the development of Central Asian countries studied in the works of French experts - O.Rua and A. de Tengue (CNRS, Paris), and A.Dubuenne, D.Ellii (Institute of Political Studies, Paris), a Swedish specialist S.Kornell (University of Uppsala, Sweden), the Belgian analyst B.Koppieters (Free University of Brussels, Belgium) and others130. Since the late 1990s in a deterioration of the military-political situation in Central Asia, interest in the region in the European scientific community has grown significantly. The study of military and non-military aspects of regional security is a priority for the Centre of Conflict British Royal Military Academy 131. The International Crisis Group, which has representation in the Kyrgyz city of Osh, was to focus on the analysis of internal threats to stability in Central Asia within the framework of the research program “Asia”132. Among the Central Asian specialists in international policy studies of the European Union in Central Asia, took place in Kazakhstan. It addresses some aspects of the work of researchers from the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Research (KISR). Overview of the bilateral relations formation between the EU and Kazakhstan for 1992-1997 is contained in publications of M.Laumulin 133. In a paper prepared in collaboration with M.Laumulin, T.Seyfullina stand out stages of the Central Asian policy of the EU, the European Union considers the reaction to the deteriorating situation in the region in the late 1990s, attempts to outline the scope of the common interests of the EU countries in Central Asia134. The authors of these publications in the analysis of EU policy focused on the views of German political and academic circles in the international situation in Central Asia. The main results of research and M.Laumulin, T.Seyfullina were 130 Roy O. Tensions etniques, instabilite regionale, Le monde Diplomatique. 1993 131 Available on: http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/ca/ 132 Available on: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index 133 Лаумулин М.Т. Казахстан и Запад: ретроспектива отношений в 1990-е гг. Центральная Азия и Кавказ.2000 №2(8). Available on: http://www.ca-c.org/journal/cac-08-2000/07.laumill/shtml 134 Лаумулин М., Сейфуллина Т. Интересы и политика Европейского Союза в Центральной Азии и Каспийском регионе. Available on: http://www.kisi.kz/site.html?id=633 178 reproduced in 2002 in two collective publications KISR, on international cooperation in Central Asia in the areas of security and energy135. Of particular concern in Europe caused a situation that has arisen because of the rivalry with the neighboring countries of the region - most notably Turkey and Russia, as well as Iran, China and Pakistan - on the new directions of trade and transport and energy routes from Central Asia and the Caspian Sea (Gumpel V.) It is time to analyze the progress of the strategy over the first decade of EU Strategy in Central Asia, identify new trends and challenges, lessons learned, to focus on the early warning of conflicts, adjust priorities. Strengthening the EU Strategy for Central Asia on the basis of appropriate tools and funding will allow strengthening the EU's position as a necessary and desirable partner for stability and security in this fragile region. In the area of environmental and water resources, where leadership role for the EU play Italy and Romania, the cooperation programs of the EU and some Member States provides for the implementation of major measures to address serious problems in the region, as well as further support measures for regional cooperation, activities under this program, with the support of new structures (high-level dialogue on environmental issues and working groups on environmental management, water resources and climate change), as well as deployable now the new platform support. 135 Нефтегазовые ресурсы Казахстана в системе мировых и региональных отношений. 2002.Алматы; Центральная Азия до и после 11 сентября: геополитика и безопасность. 2002. Алматы. 179 TABLE 14: Analysis of Czech and Slovak Republics programs: Priorities/ Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Whole Country region Human Slovak rights and Republic democracy Education Czech Slovak Czech Czech Republic Republic Republic Republic Slovak Republic Economic Slovak development Republic Energy and Czech transport Republic Environment Slovak Slovak Czech and water Republic Republic Republic resources Czech Republic General Czech Czech risks Republic Republic There was a significant strengthening of relations with the Kyrgyz Republic, as reflected in the EU's efforts to overcome the crisis in the country in 2010 and thereafter. Full opening of the EU Delegation in Bishkek in 2010 was a major step forward in the relationship and will be a key component in the implementation of measures to further support the stability and development of the country. EU intends to support the success of the country's ongoing democratic and legal reforms, as well as measures to promote post-conflict reconciliation. All five Central Asian countries play an important role in the international efforts to promote stability and development in Afghanistan, reflecting a common interest in ensuring the success of these efforts. The solution to this problem of international and regional importance will be a key priority in relations between the EU and Central Asia in the coming years. In this context, the EU urges the countries of Central Asia to 180 support the process of the “Heart of Asia”, initiated at a conference in Istanbul in November 2011. This process aimed to promote regional political and economic cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbors. For its part, the EU actively collaborates with partners to support such regional initiatives to be monitored countries in the region. In the field of development cooperation the EU prepare a framework agreement for the period 2014-2020 period. Development of the program will be based on new approaches to the organization of EU development cooperation (“Agenda for Change”), in accordance with which the EU needs to improve the setting of goals and objectives of the organization of its aid, forming activities and actions in accordance with such tasks in including activating measures for donor coordination. The EU step up its efforts in the countries with the lowest level of income. Cooperation in the energy sector is one of the priority areas of cooperation between the EU and Central Asia. Central Asia is rich in energy resources and the region is becoming a major source of oil and gas to the world markets. Diversification of energy supply and export routes, as well as the integration of energy markets of mutual interest. Central Asia has a huge potential for energy savings and use of renewable energy sources such as solar, wind and hydropower. Region can play a big role in the transit of energy resources. EU and several Member States have made a significant contribution to the implementation of integrated programs for environmental protection and management of water resources in accordance with the Strategy of cooperation between the EU and Central Asia. The first-ever joint communiqué EU - Central Asia, published in November 2009 in Rome, was the starting point for joint action to regulate relations in the sphere of nature and climate change, and water resources management. In particular, one of the main activities of the EU is to assist Central Asian partners to overcome the 181 consequences of climate change for the region and to assist them in adapting to climate change. Other priority areas are environmental education and participation of civil society. Analysis of key areas of activity  Creating broad support for large-scale climatic events in the partner countries; support in translating international commitments into concrete action at the country level to mitigate the effects of climate change and the transition to a low carbon economy , continue to support the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDN);  Intensify coordinated efforts at the EU level, including with the European Agency for the Environment, to assist Central Asian countries in their efforts to improve institutional and capacity- building to combat climate change in an integrated manner at the local , national and regional level;  Expand the dialogue and increase the number of activities in the Working Group of the EU - Central Asia on environmental management and climate change, to ensure the participation of civil society in this dialogue in order to address their knowledge and experience, and use climate change as matters of common interest for the development of regional cooperation in Central Asia;  Facilitate the implementation of measures to integrate environmental policy with regard to the conclusions drawn in the 2011 Ministerial Conference “Environment for Europe”, to promote the inclusion of the Central Asian countries in the EU -led Unified Environmental Information System (SEIS) in the region covered by the European Neighborhood Policy;  Support for the implementation of Dialogues national water policy and the complex legal acts with all five countries, will increase the level of involvement of the EU and the visibility of the EU;  Provide further support for the approach for water management based on the “principle of basin river management" in devising measures of cross-border cooperation in the field of water resources management, to support the role of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) for interregional cooperation.  Promote measures to further ensure compliance with the provisions of international conventions and legal principles in respect of shared water resources, which provide the basis for developing solutions specific to the region , including in particular the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes , and the Protocol Convention on water and sanitation and to promote the ratification of other relevant environmental conventions all Central Asian states; 182   To support the region in addressing toxic industrial waste to support measures to restore areas contaminated by uranium waste. The following analysis had been applied from the work of professor A.T.Losada “La politica del mar”136 (2000). This dissertation is quoting the main passages with his permission. “The analysis of the behavior of actors serves as an interpretive tool to establish which the role is played by each one. The methodology proposal contains no exclusionary encourage, six main or most common types of roles: that or those who exercise or have control and validation functions on the politics or results (goalie), or that or those who exercise de facto or hold the responsibility to lead the process and get a result set, which is this is (director), or those who have that ability to filter or select proposed policies and solutions (filtering), or that or those that promote or use their resources for a particular type of policy results (promoter), or that or those who act in a manner contrary and direct their actions to slow the consolidation of policies driven by the promoter or promoters (opposition), and finally, that or those who choose the search for ways to negotiation and consensus among different actors involved (mediator)” end of quotation (Losada, 2000). 136 A.T.Losada “La politica del mar” Politicas publicas y autonomía. El caso de la pesca gallega. 2000 183 The unique location at the crossroads of Central Asia, the Eurasian geopolitical relations, the trend is the increasing interaction of world and regional powers determines that the region can rightly be considered one of the main elements of security in the former Soviet Union and, in general, to identify as a certain element of stability in Eurasia. It appears that the approaches to Central Asia by Russia, the U.S., China, the EU, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and India will continue to some extent based on the principle of geopolitical regionalism and the desire to make the most of their internal and external resources to secure the region. Unfortunately, some factors will continue to demonstrate unpopular choice in the modern world, but effective policy instruments, such as power (military) and ideological approaches. TABLE 15: ANALYSIS OF OBJECTIVES OF ACTORS. Source: adopted from Losada, 2000 Actors Objectives Regulation Implementation Central Asian Director Director Director Local (caretaker) Promoter Mediation governments Filtration EU Mediator Director Promotion Czech and Slovak Mediation republics Russian Control Opposition Opposition Federation Filtration Mediation China Opposer Opposition Opposition Mediation USA Opposer Opposition Opposition 184  Central Asia once again became perceived as an area of Russia's vital interests and as its sphere of influence. Accordingly, any non-consensual penetration with Moscow or external interference in this area was seen as a geopolitical challenge and threat to Russian interests137 (Zvyagelskaya, 2003). However, it is obvious that the sesquicentennial Russian dominance in the region is faced with pressure from other global and regional actors. The main direction of Turkey's policy towards the Central Asian states has been the gradual retraction of economic interests in Ankara ‘orbit’ by connecting to the existing regional associations and the creation of new economic groups followed a political rapprochement. It should be noted that after the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Turkey was one of the first countries which recognized the independence of former Soviet republics, and was first among those countries that officially established diplomatic relations with all the countries of Central Asia. Turkey tried to deploy the model “Turkic world” to include the countries of Central Asia138. Besides, the Central Asian countries with large reserves of minerals, faced with the problem of transportation of energy to world markets. Energy transportation routes began to depend mainly not on the technical capabilities, but on the whole group of interstate relations transit countries and world powers (ORSAM – Centre for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies, 2012) 137 Zvyagelskaya I., Makarov D. Russian perceptions of Western policy in Central Asia / / Southern flank of the CIS. Central Asia - Caspian Sea - Caucasus: Opportunities and Challenges for Russia / Edited by M. Narinskaya and A. Malgina. Moscow: "Logos", 2003. P.106. 138 ORSAM Report: #135, 27 November 2012. FEATURES TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY WITH REGARD TO THE POST-SOVIET STATES / / http://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/anasayfa.aspx 185 Beijing abstains from all kinds of confrontations with Russia (as opposed to the militant approach of China towards its neighbors in the East and Southeast Asia), China's influential politicians, of course, take advantage of the oversights of the Kremlin and its limited capacity. China takes into account Russia's stagnated economy, which gradually loses its position in the region; Beijing has become a major trading partner of the Central Asian states. Chinese-built pipelines increased regional integration in Central Asia, without decreasing any of the sovereignty of states. Oil and gas pipelines in China help Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to redirect their energy routes away from Russia, and reduce their dependence on Moscow. By 2020, China will become the largest consumer of oil and natural gas of Central Asian region. In addition, funded by the Chinese refinery, which was built in Kyrgyzstan must break the Kremlin’s monopoly of fuel supply139 (Beshimov, 2014) The European Union considers Central Asia as a region in a state of transformation, within programs of cooperation the European Union, on the one hand, is trying to pursue a value-oriented policy of cooperation with the countries of the former Soviet Union, and on the other hand, to ensure compliance with its economic and geopolitical interests in the region. As a result, a conflict arises between values and interests of EU's policy in the region. One of the main factors determining the development of the situation in the Central Asian region in 2014 is expected withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan. Transfer activity of radical Islamists from Afghanistan to other countries in Central Asia most heavily hit Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Threat of Islamism will 139 Beshimov B., 2014 The struggle for Central Asia: Russia vs. China. 186 also affect Kazakhstan, but much success radicals are unlikely to be able achieve, because Kazakhstan has learned to deal with such phenomena, including cooperation with Russia and China. The main objective of foreign policy alignment Astana will equal relations with Russia, China, U.S. and EU. Virtually all of these factors show increased interest in transporting in a favorable direction of energy resources in the region. Moreover, it should be understood that this strategy has specific geopolitical goals. Thus, control of fuel and energy resources and their means of transport play an increasingly important role in determining the geopolitical position of a country. Analysis and planning of energy routes, impact preference for any of them, clearly understand that their route will determine regional alliances, external influence and the geopolitical situation in Central Asia and Eurasian region. Definitely, dynamic and sustainable development in Central Asia, increasing its value to the global community can only occur in conditions of stability and geopolitical balance. Among the priorities for improving the region's geopolitical situation will remain the desire to neutralize the adverse processes in Central Asia: the threat of entering the region in the sphere of influence of powers hatching any regional or global ambitions and will definitely spread the ideas of Islamic radicalism. One of the main conditions for stability in the region is the tendency to further intra-and inter-regional integration and cooperation (including in areas such as coherent policies in the field of transport and communications, the use of energy and water resources, increased attention to the problem of religious moral education of the population, the fight against Islamic extremism, etc.). The same purpose and meets the further formation of high-grade bonds to diversify the countries of Central Asia to the outside world, including the restoration of “Silk Road” 187 that will give the region its former communications within the meaning of the entire Eurasian continent. I would like to believe that Central Asia, in collaboration with all actors, especially such as Russia, the U.S., the EU, as well as regional leaders as China, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, India, etc., will allow achieve results for the stability and prosperity of the peoples of the region and the whole of Eurasia. Currently, lots of controversial issues in the cooperation of Central Asian region and EU, for example, the same strategy because of its one-sided focus on the dynamics of the implementation of tasks in particular the European Union and Central Asia is somewhat secondary action. The document is essentially a mere declaration of principles and intentions. Some awkwardness Strategy gives a clear prioritization of its areas of cooperation, reflected in the provision of “enhanced approach” to the countries of Central Asia. However, the Central Asian countries are waiting for the EU investments, projects to diversify energy supplies and support initiatives aimed at regional integration. If the EU mired in lengthy discussions and presentations of strategies with no clear goals, Russia and China will take the initiatives. In terms of economic and political transition in countries the situation can be found in mutual support. The European Union is a good example (example of non-statehood) of how one region with countries many were able to put aside their differences and ambitions for absolute leadership by building a common space for the future of its citizens and future generations. 188  6.1. The military presence in Central Asia and its relevance to security situation In an era of global challenges and threats the struggle for world influence in countries, continents, markets, natural resources, products, services, and communications became more visible. Currently geopolitical confrontation revolves around Eurasian continent, the largest on the planet with a varied geographical landscape, rich fauna and flora, essential part of the world's natural resources. For Central Asia the U.S. Atlantic plans involve refocusing on countries that traditionally belonged to Russian sphere of influence – is Central Asian region. The former Soviet republics in Central Asia will be included in the United States’ sphere of influence, coupled with American control over Afghanistan allows to close circle around the Islamic Republic of Iran. As a result, increase the effect of external pressure, economic and trade embargo can be carried out fast military operation against Iran140 (Invissin, 2012). Despite the existing plans for U.S. and their allies troops’ withdrawal in Afghanistan, there is not any predicted settlement of situation around the country. Nowadays, the most important military-political blocs and institutions of security in Central Asia are: Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). 140 Iran in Russia's Eurasian foreign policy: Proceedings of the International Conference (Moscow, May 15, 2012): “INVISSIN” 2012. 189 In mid-November 2013 in Kyrgyzstan within a joint project with the OSCE was destroyed by the detonation of more than 50 man-portable air missile systems “Arrow (Strela) 2M” and about 100 missiles, which are used in an anti-complex “Baby (Malutka)”. In the future to be destroyed 2 million units of light firearms. In anticipation of withdrawal in 2014 of NATO troops from Afghanistan, OSCE Centre in Bishkek increased its support to Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies in the protection of borders, the reflection of possible terrorist attacks, as well as effective control of existing weapons. As part of a joint projects work is underway to destroy unsuitable for further use surpluses arms and light firearms and ammunition. OSCE Centre in Bishkek also implements projects to improve the operational readiness of the antiterrorist entities of Kyrgyzstan. Also it assisted in the construction and equipping of training centers, purchase of special equipment. Since the beginning of 2013 at command and staff for tactical counter-terrorism exercises worked out different attack scenarios and different versions of problematic situations. One of the exercises was devoted to the possibility to takeover of hydroelectric station by terrorists. With support of OSCE Centre in early November 2013 at Bishkek opened a modern training center for customs officers of Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan. It is expected that during 2013-2014 there will be trained over 350 Kyrgyz and Afghan officers. Special attention is paid to courses suppression of drug trafficking. Because through Kyrgyzstan passes so-called northern route of Afghan drug trafficking; trafficking related to activity of different groups of people141. 141 It should be noted that the main activity of “Hizb ut-Tahrir” is deployed in Central Asia. Since 2003, the organization is included in the list of terrorist. 190 At the present stage of globalization, most regional and local problems become transnational issues or even international conflicts, therefore regional partnerships and regional networks, including those involving governments, sub-regional and regional organizations are becoming crucial actors for implementing solutions of these conflicts. The contemporary situation in Afghanistan is alarming for all Central Asian countries, even though not all of them share common borders. In general the conflict in Afghanistan and threats emanating from this country are forcing states in this region to take additional measures to enhance security, diverting resources needed to address socio-economic problems, to implement development plans, transit potential and modernization of the region. The borders with Afghanistan are poorly controlled. The drug trade in this region is part of the picture of instability, especially as it provides income and transit routes for Taliban and other extremist groups. The porous Tajik-Afghan border made Tajikistan a major transit point for transporting Afghan heroin to Russia and Europe. Other routes are via the Uzbek-Afghan and Turkmen-Afghan borders. According to a UN report, in 2013, opium cultivation in Afghanistan was increased up to a 36% against the previous year. The opium was planted on 209,000 hectares, which has increased from 2012 total of 154,000 hectares142 (UNODC). A diffusion facilitated by the number of Afghani refuges in Iran and Pakistan already numbering some millions that one day will return to their homeland. According to many Russian experts, the U.S. are preparing the foothold in Afghanistan, as Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Institute of Demography, Migration and Regional Development, an expert on Afghanistan Yuri Krupnov says: “it's important for the U.S. to control the transit in Afghanistan, through which no one can lay oil and gas pipelines from the Persian Gulf and Iran. No gas, no petrol supplies to India and China without addressing 142 World Drug Report 2014, www.unodc.org 191 the U.S. - that's the essence of this process. Given that Americans may rigidly structure Central Asia, this will be a reliable barrier to any transit fantasies of the Central Asian or the Persian Gulf states”143. In 2012 Washington and Kabul signed agreement on strategic partnership - 2024. White House managed to sign a bilateral agreement in Kabul with Afghan leader Hamid Karzai on strategic partnership between two countries. In response, Taliban, while U.S. was trying in every way “to outline the path to peace”, made a powerful series of attacks in the Afghan capital. Simultaneously, thousands of Afghans marched, accusing NATO troops of killing four children in a firefight with insurgents’ movement Taliban in the southern province of Zabul. The demonstrators blocked road leading from Kabul to Kandahar, shouting anti- American slogans. It should be noted that the visit of the American President was timed to the anniversary of the destruction of the leader of the terrorist network “Al Qaeda” Osama bin Laden, who was eliminated as a result of an undercover operation of U.S. Special Forces on the night of 1 to 2 May 2011144. According to Panovkin, “the Agreement reminded a symbolic document and it did not contain any specific issues, but the treaty defined Afghanistan as the U.S. key partner outside of NATO for the long term. Although stipulated that the United States does not seek to establish permanent military bases in Afghanistan, but, instead, U.S. offers its military aid to the Afghan people and their education. U.S. and NATO will continue to work with Afghan authorities since December 2014, when international troops leave the country. A significant portion of the funding the Afghan armed forces, starting from now, will be provided by the United States, which among other donor states will annually allocate Afghanistan $ 4 billion over ten years. The funds will support the combat capability of the national army. 143 Y.Krupnov, 2012 http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1336108980 144 Panovkin D., 2012 http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1336108980 192  It is known that after the withdrawal of coalition forces, the United States is ready to leave there about 20 thousand soldiers. Of course, this is not the amount that can be critical in eliminating the terrorist threat or contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in Afghanistan. But this is enough to ensure the normal operation of the network of various military facilities, including Afghanistan, which according to the agreement, the United States have the right of access” (Panovkin, 2012). In principle, this means that the Americans were able to do what could achieve at the time neither Britain nor Russia - to gain a foothold in Afghanistan, while possessing a variety of opportunities for political, military and economic control over the region. “Of course, this is only one aspect of a “strategic partnership” the U.S. and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, in this partnership lies very unpleasant moment for U.S., which, over time, can not only greatly complicate bilateral relations, but also to call into question the very idea of need for any cooperation. Instead of Western-style democracy is increasingly looming threat of the emergence and spread of theocratic Islamist formations. And it appears that political Islam does not need an alliance with the United States. “But in the Arab world, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan and some other countries, political Islam raises its head. And it turns out that an American victory is a Pyrrhic victory” (Krupnov, 2012). According to Evseenko, Obama's visit to Afghanistan resulted more than the widely commented event by Russian experts. But most of these comments were in the spirit of “politically correctness” and, therefore, did not focus attention on the consequences of the agreement for the region and for Central Asia (Evseenko, 2012). 193 In this thesis we are not going to do a complete analysis of consequences of the US-Afghan partnership for Russia, but it makes sense to highlight a few aspects of it. NATO leaders reaffirmed the plan of the international military mission in Afghanistan; President Obama gave a specific strategy of withdrawal from an unpopular war in Afghanistan. The strategy, which was based on the withdrawal of U.S. and other troops from Afghanistan in 2014, had risks for Obama and could jeopardize achievement of the U.S. military, which they achieved in ten years of war, it complicated by unresolved dispute with Pakistan, which refused to open land routes for rapid withdrawal of international troops. The plan means a clear turn for the international force to the final phase of the war, which began after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Afghanistan is the second of two wars that Obama inherited from previous presidents and their ability to complete their positive impact on the campaign and increase the chances of re-election. NATO leaders agreed on a plan for the gradual withdrawal of troops, after which all the responsibilities to protect civilians will take the Afghan security forces. International troops will provide support to the final withdrawal in 2014. Each country will determine the plan and the pace of withdrawal, which will be coordinated with NATO planners. In Afghanistan are based 132 thousand soldiers, two thirds of which are American soldiers. After 2014, instead of the military operations international troops will be involved in missions to train and support. However, prolonged presence that would entail financial support to Afghan forces will cost billions of dollars a year after the withdrawal. The agreement means that Afghanistan is fully integrated into the American structure of Greater Central Asia (New Silk Road). Moreover - as part of the agreement of Afghanistan becoming a tool of U.S. policy in the region, the leverage with which the U.S. and its allies 194 would manipulate regional stability, handling benefited from a level of threat to states bordering Afghanistan. The agreement is quite similar to Gandamaks agreement in 1879 that deprived Afghanistan right to pursue an independent foreign policy and put Afghan Emir Yaqub Khan under the control of the British representative in Kabul (Evseenko, 2012). Some Russian commentators tied to emphasize the two provisions of the Agreement - first, by the end of 2014 should leave all the American soldiers, except for instructors dedicated to helping the Afghan army, as well as group special forces for “counterterrorism operations” against “Al –Qaeda”; the fact stands out that these instructors and special forces, who remain in the country after 2014, they will be posted on the Afghan military bases. As an example of “good will and respect for the sovereignty of Afghanistan” is enshrined in the Agreement on the belief that the two most problematic topics for Karzai administration - night raids and a prison at Bagram air base placed under “full control of Afghan law enforcement”. First of all, the number of instructors Agreement did not specified. Also, no mention of employees of private military companies and the number of “housing recovery”, under cover of which, if necessary, can be placed in any number of Afghan troops. The number of instructor corps includes (according to previous agreements), also the British and Indian instructors, that is reasonable doubt about the sincerity of the “small number of foreign instructors”. With “Afghan military bases” is even more interesting. According to the agreement, all assets and property that are in the possession of U.S. troops will remain so for an indefinite period of time. Thus, it is only the fact that the military infrastructure created ISAF, the 195 Afghan government is transferred for temporary use, and it, is hard to call the strengthening of sovereignty. A similar story is a prison on Bagram Air Base. The fact is that for the past year, the U.S. side release from prison people in high position in Taliban and other group’s ranks, in negotiations with the Afghan armed opposition, held in Qatar. Realization "of the program of strategic release" U.S. had two objectives: to support operational channels of communication with the armed opposition and - strengthening its influence among Islamic extremists. Talking about the “subtleties” of the Agreement commentators overlooked another position that completely negates the talk about “the increased independence of Afghanistan” - the position that control of the air space of the country will carry the American experts and behind also remains uncontrolled right to any form of air movement throughout Afghanistan. The separate issue is a financial support by the U.S. and NATO assist the Karzai administration and the Afghan national security forces in the long term. The agreement provides for the U.S. commitment “to support social and economic development of Afghanistan” for the period till 2024. However, the organization of such funding does not provide specific amounts. It is assumed that each year, the President's administration will ask Congress for a certain amount, and this amount will be calculated on the basis of their specific political realities of Afghanistan. In fact, this allows the U.S. to use the socio-economic needs of Afghanistan to finance the entire foreign policy in Central Asia, from the program of New Silk Road and finishing operations of the security services. The representatives of Karzai administration do not understand this point and suggests that “the Afghan side would like to see the U.S. take on more specific commitments to provide financial assistance to Afghanistan”, they genuinely believe that the Agreement has been 196  developed for the needs of Afghanistan. In fact, this agreement has a completely different purpose - strengthening the U.S. position in the region and the use of Afghanistan as a base for American expansion into Central Asia (Evseenko, 2012). Russian expert Evseenko continues that Barack Obama and former Afghan Ambassador to the U.S. Tayeb Jawad spoke with remarkable candor. Ex-ambassador said bluntly that the agreement demonstrates America's intention to remain in his country, and could not resist the terrible hint: “If any of the neighbors have bad intentions to Afghanistan they should know that the U.S. is going to be here anymore”. Analysis of the history of U.S. relations with “Al-Qaeda” allows any impartial observer to conclude that it was no longer a question of destruction of the organization, and establishment of full control, over a Sunni radicalism, and include it in the toolbox U.S. foreign policy. And if “Middle East Al-Qaeda” is already working in the right way to Washington by announcing its main adversaries Tehran and Damascus, for the Central Asian, Afghan, Pakistani and Xiang-Uighur extremists control was not achieved. And yet, without subordination extremists in these regions, the further advance the U.S. in region will be difficult and a step towards the achievement of strategic objectives, which is the US- Afghan agreement remain unfulfilled (Evseenko, 2012). The agreement is not a purely bilateral and it has significant challenges to other countries in the region. Its first effects will be felt by Central Asian states, Russia, Pakistan and Iran. And next in line is China. Strategic interest of China to Afghanistan is ensuring its security issues. Actually, this is the main characteristic of modern foreign policy of Beijing, which is dictated by the interests of a strictly internal development of China. In 197  the case of Afghanistan, it is primarily the impact on the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region which is a long-term ‘Achilles' heel’ of China. The presence of zones of instability not far away from areas is contrary to the interests of China, especially as members of Xinjiang separatist organizations have been repeatedly seen in Afghanistan and Central Asia. The latter factor gave rise to talk about the possible presence of bases in Afghanistan for militant training activities in Xinjiang 145 (Kaukenov, 2012). Leaving aside the “Chinese” and “Pakistan” perspective, there is some challenges of the Agreement for Iran and Russia. During the years of NATO forces in Afghanistan, heroin production there has grown a few dozen times, that now there is 90% of the world's opium consumption. According to Russian expert Panovkin, “In reality, this is a new opium war waged by the United States (as British Empire did in China). Afghan opium became part of U.S. foreign policy strategy, in fact - it has become a tool of the economy. It is, in fact, is precisely what is U.S. policy to drug trafficking in Afghanistan – is providing enrichment of drug trafficking current Afghan administration. Opium poppy cultivation and extraction of raw opium is happening today all over Afghanistan, and in the provinces of Nangarhar, Khost, Paktia, Helmand, Kunar, Balkh, Kunduz and Faizabad create a closed industrial cycle, including opium cultivation, extraction of raw opium and its processing into morphine base and heroin continue to the end product - heroin hydrochloride its storage and placing on 145 Kazakhstani expert Kaukenov A., “Chinese diplomacy”, Regnum, 2012 198  heroin markets – Pakistani Chitral and Afghan Kandahar. By the way, in the same Kandahar is officially launched a full network of banks lending of opium poppy under future crops. By July 2011 in Kandahar was run by the local head of the provincial council - Ahmad Wali Karzai, half-brother of Hamid Karzai. Most of the profits earned through drug trafficking, runs through American banks. And out of these funds the U.S. partially offset their costs of operations in Afghanistan and the implementation of the expansion in the region” (Panovkin, 2012). Particularly promising strategic projects are the development of transport communications, passing from the Central Asian region through Afghanistan to the South of Asia. Uzbekistan participates in building railroads, bridges and social facilities in the northern Afghan regions, which have improved the condition of the road infrastructure. The Afghan transport system is increasingly integrated with the Uzbek transport communications. In December 2011 at the newly constructed railroad Hairaton-Mazar-e-Sharif the first train started to connect the northern border of the country. “This is a welcome development which should facilitate the transport of supplies to Afghanistan, and contributes to the development of trade relations in the region. The train arrived without a load on the newly constructed station in Mazar-i- Sharif after a 75-kilometer distance from the border with Uzbekistan”, told the deputy minister of public works Afghanistan Noor Gul Mangal, who supervised the project. The railway is the first step in an ambitious project that will link Afghanistan with the neighboring countries and pave the way for the development of trade relations between Europe and Asia. IRA never had a functioning railway, since projects have been abandoned for various reasons, but the civil war of recent decades has made it 199 impossible to build railways. In the short term the railway will help to relieve the internal terminal port Khairaton. Due to the geographical position Afghanistan has the potential of becoming a trade, energy and transport hub of the region that will promote its long-term sustainable development. It could also become an important hub connecting the Middle East and Southeast Asia in the network passing through a corridor. Creating a Trans-Afghan corridor by constructing new railways to connect cities in Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Iran, and Pakistan will carry freight coming from Southeast Asia to Europe. This is shorter than passing through Far Eastern rail corridors and generally will expand the transport and communications and transit opportunities of this region. Kazakhstani expert Dosym Satbyev has stated that Uzbekistan is interested to expand the zone of influence in Afghanistan, because it is in its vital interests. Such attempts on the part of Tashkent were made before, when it supported the Afghan warlord general Abdul Rashid Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek. As for Turkmenistan, Ashgabat is taking interest in Afghanistan as a country through which to implement the transit of natural gas. The history of this interest goes back to the 90s, when the gas pipeline project from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan and beyond, through which Turkmen gas will flow, not only was lobbied by Ashgabat but also by United States (Čech 2011). According to the press service of the government of Turkmenistan, at meeting between Turkmen and Afghan sides issues of strengthening stability and economic development of IRA, the expansion of cooperation in region in transport transit, agriculture and 200 power generation were discussed “at meetings was pointed out the value of a number of projects initiated by Turkmenistan, in particular TAPI gas pipeline and railway Atamyrat-Imamnazar-Akin-Andhoy and construction of a power line rail Mary- Atamyrat Andhoy . This would increase the export of electricity to Afghanistan five times and meet 70% of the neighboring country's electricity needs, “- said representative of the Government of Turkmenistan. Tajikistan also supplies electrical power in small amounts to Afghan city of Kunduz. However, chronic problems with Uzbekistan, such as the mutual personal dislike of the two presidents, impair Tajik trade, energy self-sufficiency and economic development. Afghan fighters could threaten the security of Tajikistan through long and transparent borders. Another issue is a major hydroelectric dam in Tajikistan which is controlled by Russia; the dam has now become a source of contention between the two countries. Unlike Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are more interested to promote infrastructure projects. In this connection the CASA-1000 project should be mentioned, with the construction of a power line from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan (Satbayev, 2012). Kazakhstan also constructed factories and will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, supplying grain, flour, rice and other goods. The government of the Republic of Kazakhstan provided $ 2.3 million for building schools, hospitals and roads in Afghanistan. In 2012 Kazakhstan allocated $ 2 million on development of Afghan police patrols 146. 146 Afganistan.Ru http :/ / www.afghanistan.ru/doc/23031.html 201  Since 2010, every year up to 200 Afghan students come to study in Kazakhstan. A total of 1,000 Afghan students will get education as doctors and teachers at Kazakh universities under a special 50 million dollar program that runs from 2010 to 2018147. Afghanistan’s socio-economic rehabilitation is an essential guarantee of regional and international security and stability,” told Kazakh Foreign Minister Erlan Idrissov, as he pledged Astana continues support for more robust international efforts to assist this country return to the peaceful life (MFA of RK, 2014). According to MFA of RK, Kazakhstan supports the New Silk Road initiative for creating infrastructure such as roads and rail lines to link Afghanistan with its neighbors also by building Kazakhstan’s portion of an international highway corridor that will connect Western China with Western Europe through Russia. Kazakhstan government and their Afghan counter partners stressed out the need for concerted efforts to fight terrorism and extremism in this region, adding that regional cooperation is the main key to the success of this goal, as well as economic prosperity148. The president of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev said: Afghan drug trade is the main threat to Collective Security Treaty (CSTO). Drug trafficking from Afghanistan is a major threat to countries of CSTO. The President noted that he sees no threat of war for country and other members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, as a really serious problem is the illegal drug trafficking. “This distribution is increasing - Nazarbayev said. - Afghanistan continues to 147 The program provides for students training in following fields as: health care (300 people), agriculture (129), law enforcement (75), humanitarian and journalism (40), science (6 persons), social sciences, economics and business (18), art (18), the law (6), the protection of the state border (45), engineering (91 people) and pedagogy (66 people), informs portal «BNews.kz». 148 MFA RK 2012 http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/en 202 annually increase the production of drugs and their products and the event of the completion of ISAF mission is unknown what kind of power is established in Afghanistan, and what policies will hold the Afghan government (CA-NEWS149) No doubt there is another factor. As a result of implementation of Agreement will activate terrorist underground in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The results are obvious, for example in 2014 another group of 16 Kazakhstan’s citizens went for jihad in Syria; they joined organization named “Islamic State of Iraq and Levant”. These people posted on a video in which display weapons and talk about their purposes. This video is thoroughly studied by domestic diplomats and security officials of Kazakhstan, supposedly these people are forming part of “Free Syrian Army”. The so-called “Free Syrian Army” is considered moderate group. It’s quite officially supported by the U.S., France, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. First, the main purpose of this army of insurgents was the struggle against Syrian President Bashar Assad, now they are taking part in the war for the establishment of the Middle East, the Islamic Caliphate. Major fighting extremists are now in Iraq - they even managed to take under control a few large cities. Only in the last few months of 2014 in the war zone were already more than a hundred citizens of Kazakhstan. Most of them are dead - they died for the geopolitical interests of 149 Kazakh President Nazarbayev’s speech Afganistan.Ru http://www.afghanistan.ru/doc/22619.html 203 some particular groups. And it is quite obvious that the channel recruitment in the Middle East is still in force, and citizens of Kazakhstan continue to be killed in this armed conflict150. In fact, the core of preparation centers lead by people closely associated with the residency of American and British intelligence agencies operating in Afghanistan. Evseenko also states, that “some sources indicated of mass support of people of Central Asian republics, supposedly based on Afghan Uzbeks and Tajiks common interests and common aspirations of their “brothers” on the other side of border in Afghanistan is nothing more than widespread misconception, this is a myth that was created. Even through exist a common history and language, but their interests and geopolitical orientation diverge farther. Tajikistan's population tends to integrate with Russia, and Afghan Tajiks increasingly migrate to other countries, where material assistance is presented” (Evseenko, 2012) In Iran negative effects of the Agreement are more than obvious. First, using its exclusive position in airspace, the U.S. will use this fact to maintain aircraft and electronic intelligence on Iran. Secondly, the flow of aid to terrorist’s “Jundallah”151 will be increased in the funding programs and support anti-governmental groups in Iran. 150 Permanent address - http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1406007060 151 Jundallah (Iran) is a militant organization, claiming to fight for rights of Sunni Muslims in Iran. 204  The strategic partnership agreement as part of the New Silk Road is against the idea of Eurasian integration within Customs Union and Common Economic Space and plans to create by 1 January 2015 of Eurasian Economic Union152 (Evseenko, 2012). 152 Evseenko, N., 2014 http :/ / www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1336652220 205  6.1.1.1. Chinese factor of geopolitics Along with plans reformatting of geopolitical map of vast region from Suez Canal to Tibet is taken measures to neutralize geopolitical potential of leading countries of continent and, above all, China. Around China is set to a “double game”. On the one hand, the U.S. and Britain are considering a “geostrategic partnership”153 with China as an effective tool to establish control over the entire Eurasian continent, solutions to global financial and economic problems. On the other hand, work is focusing on destabilization of the inner political situation in China, undermining the foundations of its territorial integrity. ‘To get’ to China is more convenient through control of Central Asian states, as well as Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and Tibet, which are geographically adjacent to this region and with strong separatist sentiment in favor of secession from China. Beijing makes attempts at political and trade-economic penetration in Central Asian region. In this regard, now is becoming more important China initiative to revive the Silk Road infrastructure in the context of China's Asia Pacific strategy. According to Beijing's view, development of Asia Pacific cooperation as opposed to Euro-Atlantic model of trade and economic cooperation will allow China greatly strengthen its position in the global market for resources, 153 Brzezinski Z. The Group of Two that could change the world, 2009 FT. 206  goods and services. Currently, new trade and economic opportunities are limited by the lack of transportation alternatives to land resources and goods. Volume of trade between China and Central Asia is growing rapidly and has been increased cooperation mainly in fossil fuels. Chinese energy companies involved in development of oil and gas fields in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, the old forms and extent of cooperation are no longer satisfied neither China nor Central Asia. In 2011-2015 China's military budget doubled and exceeds the total defense spending of all other key nations in Asia-Pacific Region (APR), except for the United States. With additional funds Beijing intends to spend on the modernization of the army and its equipment with more modern types of weapons. In particular, it is about investing in development of fifth generation fighter jets and unmanned aerial vehicles; in addition, increased spending on development of space technology. This assumes a reduction of the armed forces of China, which will increase defense spending in terms of each individual soldier. This will ensure a qualitative transformation of the Chinese army. Thus, China is seeking to gradually reduce the level of military spending, the United States, where the budget in this area for 2012 is 531 billion dollars will take a long time to China failed to come close to the volume of U.S. military budget 154 (Bezrukov, 2012). 154 http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1329287460 207  China ranks third on volume of investments in the economy of Kazakhstan. In terms of investor countries in 2010, most investments are drawn from the Netherlands (5.7 billion U.S. dollars) and France (1.5 billion U.S. dollars). China is third, with size of 1.2 billion U.S. dollars investment slightly ahead of the United Kingdom. The latest 1 billion U.S. dollars investment took place in 2013. European trend becomes even more pronounced when we look at the geography of foreign participation in the forced industrialization. By Map of innovative industrialization (Kazakhstani Governmental program of development since 2010 155) had to connect investors from 13 different countries in 29 projects worth 20.5 billion US dollars. (3 trillion tenge – Kazakh currency). The vast majority of European capitals have first place (France, Germany, and Turkey). The second position is occupied by Russia and Belarus. China, South Korea and Japan are in the third position. Of the total foreign trade turnover of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the export- import operations with China accounts for about one-third. In an effort to prevent the dominance of China in Eurasia exists tendency to create a clash of interests between Beijing and other major Eurasian countries, in particular Russia, India, and Iran. In Russia, currently vying two fundamental geopolitical approaches towards China. First by largest energy companies in Russia and China recently announced the signing of a 155 The main objectives of innovative industrialization to consolidate business and government efforts and concentration of Kazakhstan's resources on development of priority sectors of the economy; creation of a favorable business environment and investment climate; increase in the intensity and productivity of the national economy. The main priorities are: development of traditional export sectors with diversification of products and continuation of process chain to deep processing; development of innovative industries, products with high added value and high productivity. 208  revolutionary deal, which will initiate the joint development of the huge energy deposits in Eastern Siberia. Foothold in Central Asia, the U.S. and the UK are not without reasons expect to take direct control of the Straits of Malacca, which, along with Taiwan and the Strait of Hormuz has geostrategic importance for Beijing. Through the Malacca Strait, which connects the Pacific Ocean to the Indian in China receives about 80% of its oil. The plans remain Atlantic geo-strategy scenarios incite the Indo-Pakistani conflict. According to reports in the mass media, after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 intend seriously to gain a foothold in the Indian subcontinent. In this regard, China is eager to prevent the development of such a scenario in vast region of its traditional interests. Chinese intend to place a naval base in the Pakistani port of Gwadar156 (Centre of strategic studies, 2012). In order to contain China's geopolitical ambitions are prerequisites heightened tensions in Sino-Indian relations157 (Deviyatov, 2007) In Washington and London are well aware that current level of trade and economic cooperation, in which trade has already reached tens of billions of US dollars, creates good prospects for rapprochement between Beijing and Delhi in the political and economic sphere. It is necessary to keep in mind that India has an observer as part of continental political bloc SCO strongly influenced by Beijing. 156 Kremlin: From here we will face "Swedes" 25.10.2012 / / Center for Strategic Studies and forecasts: [site]. URL: http://www.csef.ru/index.php/ru/oborona-i-bezopasnost/project/340-voenno-strategicheskie-otsenki-i-prognozy/1- stati/3720-kreml-otsel-grozit-my-budem 157 Deviyatov, A., Practical Sinology. –Moscow, "Eastern Book", 2007. 209 For these and other reasons, the United States and the United Kingdom intend to emerging strategic alliance with New Delhi used as a counterbalance to Beijing is gaining influence in Eurasia. U.S. Senate ratification of a nuclear agreement with India is tantamount to recognition of the nuclear status of the country, which makes it a member of the club, which is composed of only five powers - the permanent members of the UN Security Council - the U.S., Russia, Britain, France and China. At the same time is achieving the goal of the transition process under the control of Washington's military development in India and as a consequence in the military and diplomatic policy of this state (Centre of strategic studies, 2012). In recent years, Chinese leadership began to actively use the “soft power” in conducting internal and external policies. First, Chinese authorities began to seriously consider role of non-traditional instruments of influence on the world community when Hu Jintao took the leadership. From this point in work in creating a positive image of China abroad got different accents. Beijing's foreign policy was aimed at supporting peace returns, and the condemnation of the uni-polar world of power politics. In Hu Jintao's report at the XVII Congress of CPC Central theme of “soft power” got a specific place, it was stated that “in our day culture is becoming an increasingly important element of competition in the total power of the state and development of culture in country must be accompanied by an increase in its international influence 158” (Hu Jintao, 2011) 158 China seeks no hegemony and harmony Hu Jintao, 2011 http://www.rg.ru/2011/06/10/china.html 210  Subsequently, new China's leadership led by Xi Jinping had developed a number of foreign policy programs designed to attract the world public opinion, promoting thesis of peaceful development path of China; for example, a new policy initiatives such as “public diplomacy” (公共外交), and “peripheral diplomacy” (周边外交). Since inclusion of the concept of “soft power” in program material of Communist Party, Chinese authorities have decided to actively export Chinese culture to neighboring countries. At 6th Plenum of 17th CPC Central Committee convocation, held in October 2011, was already adopted by a key policy document entitled “Decision of CPC Central Committee some of important issues of deepening reform of cultural system, to promote development and prosperity of socialist culture”. Also in the ruling CPC Central Committee plenum pointed need to “implement an exit strategy outside culture, enhance the international influence of Chinese culture, to show the world a new way of reform and opening up of China 159” (China & US focus, 2014). In concept of Chinese policy of soft power to include specific mechanisms aimed at creating a favorable image of the country abroad, among which we can highlight the following points: First, conduct multilateral policy to ensure global security, prevent deterioration of the international situation and the strengthening of global political and economic stability. Thus, China's foreign policy is directly linked 159 http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/chinas-periphery-diplomacy-initiative- implications-for-china-neighbors-and-the-united-states/ 211 to principle of “harmonious world”. China's foreign policy in recent years shows that Beijing strongly support removed from any action that could lead to new conflicts. However, it should be noted that when it comes to territorial disputes, Beijing may take a ‘tough’ stand. Evidence of this can be controversy about supplies several islands in South China Sea between Japan, Vietnam, Philippines and China; Second, is to cooperate by providing assistance in economic, social, health, educational spheres, and also in area of humanitarian assistance. At the same time, highlighting the Beijing’s great credit, unlike most Western countries, does not tie interstate relations to political and ideological issues; Third, carry out various cultural actions, which require the most fully represent the positive features of Chinese culture with a focus on achievements of PRC. In this context, China offers the world its own understanding of development of interstate relations. Permanent promotion of Chinese traditions and strategic lines for several years, a project creating worldwide network of Confucius Institutes, the first of which was opened in 2004 in Seoul. Of key importance is attached to activities of such institutions in the United States, where at the moment there are about 400 institutes, centers and classes of Confucius. 212  The project to establish Confucius Institutes abroad is supervised by Office of PRC government to spread Chinese language in the world (Chinese Hanban160). According to data for 2012 in 96 countries and regions of the world operated 358 institutes and 500 Confucius classes, including in Asia - 65, Europe - 73, America - 51, Africa - 16 Oceania - 6, in Russia - 12. To 2020 is planned to bring the total number of Confucius Institutes in the world until 1000. Confucius Institutes open when operating abroad education. Thanks to extensive financial and personnel support from Beijing, Confucius Institutes are able to offer attractive conditions for those who wish to learn Chinese. As a rule, there are low study fees. According to some reports, Hanban annually allocates about 100 thousand US dollars in funding of each institute161. Recently, there are increasing negative assessments of Confucius centers, especially in Western countries. So, in newspaper Globe and Mail authors called Canadian universities and colleges to refrain from partnership with the Confucius Institute, justifying it by the fact that these structures promote elements of Chinese policies that are incompatible with liberal education. Their introduction into the learning process helps to ensure that there is beginning to take a stand in Beijing on sensitive issues such as Tibet and Taiwan situations, activities forbidden in China “Falun Gong” teaching. As a result, according to 160 Hanban – is short for the Office of Chinese Language Council International, is a non-governmental organization, affiliated to the Ministry of Education of China. 161 Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban) - http://english.hanban.org/ 213  Canadian researchers, Confucius Institute purposefully promotes political views of Communist Party of China in foreign educational institutions 162. At the present, Chinese authorities are making efforts to implement an effective policy of “soft power”. The main directions of the implementation of such a policy in the foreign policy concept of China are Asia Pacific, Africa, Latin America and Central Asia. Despite all measures to contain Chinese ambitions, Beijing does not intend to abandon its geo-historical expansion plans on the mainland and in particular, the increment of its territory to neighboring countries. In 2013, Chinese newspaper Wenweipo published an article entitled as “six wars in which China must participate in the next 50 years”. Among them, the “war” for unification with Taiwan (2020-2025), the return of Spartli islands (2025-2030.) Dyaoyuyado (Senkaku) and Ryukyu (2040-2045), Association Outer Mongolia (2045-2050) return islands off Russia (2055-2060)163. 162 According to Canadian Association of University Teachers’ Confucius Institutes are operated by an authoritarian government, it is a propaganda of certain ideas, which contradict with academic freedom and human rights freedom. http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/01/01/confucius-institutes/ 163 Six wars in which China must participate in the next 50 years [electronic resource] / / Military Review [website]. URL: http://topwar.ru/34758-shest-voyn-v-kotoryh-kitay-dolzhen-uchastvovat-v-sleduyuschie-50- let.html 214 6.1.1.1.1. New tools of Beijing's Central Asian policy According to some Chinese analysts, today in Central Asia unfolds competition between the U.S., EU, Russia and China for access to energy and politico- economic potential of this region. A significant role in determining the leaders in this rivalry play sympathy of population and local political elites. To achieve this goal Beijing tries to form and actively use all the components of policy of “soft power”, thus counteracting the plans of Washington and Moscow. Unlike countries of Southeast Asia, Central Asia is not observed large-scale Chinese cultural influence of mass political action, broad financing of educational and other programs. Given presence in Central Asian countries of sustainable concerns about rapid growth of China's power, it is obvious that initial target of PRC leadership is weakening anti-Chinese sentiment in region. Moreover, given the uncertainty of further development of countries of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, instability in Afghanistan can have a destructive impact on the entire Central Asian region, creating a zone of instability along western borders of China, which will seriously constrain its development. It should be noted that Beijing encourages rapid development of Xinjiang which largely due to economic cooperation with Central Asia. 215 Modern Chinese diplomacy in Central Asia differ pragmatism and emphasis on prioritizing the implementation of economic, transport and communication projects. Chinese leadership has not yet developed a formal program to promote its policy of “soft power” in the region. Nevertheless, according to Chinese activities in conducting widespread cultural and educational events in the region, we can assume that authorities will soon take a policy document. While it can be argued that increase of financial credit, expansion of economic ties and deepening cultural and educational programs form the core of “soft power” in China's relations with Central Asian states. This strategy includes three areas: 1) Education. In recent years, number of students from Central Asian countries studying in China is increasing because Chinese authorities create favorable conditions for them. An increasing number of students are enrolled in the Central Xinjiang. For example, Xinjiang Normal University (SPU), located in Urumqi, aimed primarily at students from the neighboring republics. In addition to universities in Xinjiang also functions courses for foreigners who, after training courses get education in only Chinese language. The University for Foreign Students organized a free half board and free hostel accommodation. The number of students enrolled in higher education institutions across China only from Kazakhstan, is more than 7.5 thousand. An integral element of Chinese influence’s spread remains through Confucius education institutions. A common practice is to open all kinds of funds at institutions sponsoring exchange programs for students and support 216 development of educational programs about China. In particular, the Institute has a foundation called “Chinese Bridge”, which annually with assistance of dozens of Confucius Institutes of the Central Asian republics provides courses in China at the expense of host organization; more than two thousand Chinese teachers working in educational centers of Central Asian countries. Currently in Kazakhstan there are operating 4 Confucius Institutes: in Almaty, Astana, Karaganda and Aktobe cities. A similar number of institutions open in Kyrgyzstan. In recent years, an increasing number of students here, studying Chinese language, as well as leaving to study in China. According to the Ministry of Education of Kyrgyzstan, in Bishkek only in universities more than two thousand students are taught in Chinese. Annually to China sent about a hundred students. According to Director of the Confucius Institute at National University Jay Wang, Beijing financed two more programs by SCO, enabling about 50 students of Kyrgyzstan Chinese speakers during academic year to be able to be trained in China. In Tajikistan and Uzbekistan the Confucius Institute situated at National Universities of these republics. Today, Turkmenistan in Confucius Institutes, and Chinese universities enrolled more than 1.5 thousand Turkmen students; 2) Culture and Media. One of the main engines of China's “soft power” is to promote Chinese language and culture abroad. For these purposes are all sorts of programs and projects aimed at enhancing the positive image of China. In 217 particular, site of scientific, technical and economic information of China announced introduction of Central Asian Confucius Institutes a new curriculum called “China on the tongue” purpose of this program is - promotion of Chinese culture to the world through learning Chinese culinary arts. Under this program, China will send cooks to Central Asian republics. Another effective form of promotion of cultural influence is revitalization of Chinese media in Central Asia. In terms of reducing criticism about human rights violations in China, the Chinese authorities have relied on strengthening work in field of propaganda abroad. To do this, the PRC government, strengthen activities such Chinese media as news “Xinhua” overseas edition of party newspaper “Zhenminzhibao” Chinese television with international channels. They are designed to increase awareness of foreign citizens about China. Today, in Kazakhstan there are representatives of newspapers “Zhenminzhibao” and “Guanminzhibao” agency “Xinhua” China Radio International, and China Central Television CCTV. Additional channel of cultural influence on Central Asian countries is the activity of public funds and other Chinese institutions, organizing large-scale events at the expense of Chinese government. 3) Business and Politics. In Chinese diplomacy towards Central Asia considerable importance is attached to intensify business ties. Special role in the implementation of policy of “soft power” and expanding sphere of influence in Central Asian markets play an annual exhibition EXPO “China – 218  Eurasia”. It contributes to development of numerous business contacts and helps the Chinese state-owned companies, small and medium enterprises to invest and cooperate with business community of the republics. September 2, 2012 Premier Wen Jiabao at the opening of second annual exhibition EXPO “China – Eurasia” in Urumqi encouraged Chinese enterprises to increase investment in tcountries of Eurasia and to explore possibility of creating new platforms for economic relations in framework of Economic Cooperation Fund “China - Central Asia” and Foundation for cooperation in agriculture164 (Kaukenov, 2012). As a sign of “soft power” using by the Chinese authorities is enough flexibility in Central Asian-Chinese relations. As practice shows, implementation of bilateral projects in this region Beijing presents soft conditions here unlike other non-regional powers. In particular, for all the discussion of railway project “China - Kyrgyzstan – Uzbekistan” Chinese authorities have shown great restraint and patience. It is known that Kyrgyz authorities changed the draft several times. Originally Kyrgyzstan agreed on condition give access to China for its large deposits of non-ferrous metals, signed the agreement on formula “resources in exchange for investments”. However, August 8, 2012 Kyrgyz President Atambayev said that this scheme is not appropriate, and decision was accepted by the Chinese authorities quietly, moreover, in course held in Beijing of 9th meeting of Intergovernmental Kyrgyz-Chinese Committee on Trade and Economic Cooperation they suggested considering other schemes 164 Kazakhstani expert Kaukenov A., “Chinese diplomacy”, Regnum, 2012 219  of Sino-Kyrgyz-Uzbek railway project165, in particular by establishing a joint venture project. Chinese policymakers’ flexibility is also reflected in distancing themselves from participation in projects that could potentially lead to a conflict between Central Asian countries. So, for example, China's leaders initially agreed to participate in construction of power plants in Tajikistan Zarafshan. However, subsequently, at design stage of this project, suspended all work. Thus Beijing did not provoke further deterioration of relations between Dushanbe and Tashkent. As compensation, China invited to participate in other projects in Tajikistan, in particular, in the same year, Chinese banks provided Tajikistan with a loan of $ 1 billion for infrastructure projects, including the reconstruction of Dushanbe - Khujand tunnel and to seal tunnel Shahristan Anzob. In subsequent years, China has participated in implementation of dozens of infrastructure and transport projects in territory of Tajik republic. Finally, it is appropriate to note recent initiative of Beijing to build “economic corridor along the Silk Road”. This project is actually a response to China's existing regional integration associations. 165 For project of Sino-Kyrgyz-Uzbek railway, the Chinese side offers two route options. First: China - Kyrgyzstan - Uzbekistan may transit through Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and then back. Further access to the railways of Turkmenistan and from there the road goes into Iran, then to Turkey, and then through the ports and rail ferry connects with the European part. This means only one thing - any technical operation increases the cost of transportation and increase the time of delivery. The second route option: from Uzbek Railways route goes to Kazakhstan and through the port of Aktau on the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan. This option for China is most profitable, because it already has two ways to Kazakhstan. Simply put, in terms of trans-Eurasian continental transit it is an important project. But if the Chinese and Uzbek sides are willing to pay 5 billion US dollars, all becomes very clear, it is not in favor of Kyrgyzstan, also if they will get control over mineral deposits and the mining industry of Kyrgyzstan. 220  Despite Beijing's efforts to create a positive image of China in region, population of Central Asian countries is still inclined to see a threat in the face of China. Simultaneously with intensification of contacts between Central Asia and China in mass media of Kazakhstan and other Central Asian republics in general more frequent publication on “Chinese threat” that fuel public concerns about Beijing's imperial ambitions. Such materials will strengthen the anti- Chinese sentiment among population. This, in turn, has a negative impact on process of implementation of joint Kazakh-Chinese projects. As an example, frequent cases of fights between visiting Chinese migrant workers and local residents166. Thus, to date, increasing economic strength of China allows it to occupy a key position at the summits G20, G7, and at meetings of UN Security Council. Against this background, in order to convert the economic success in political field the country's leadership has decided to intensify its efforts to use “soft power” in foreign policy. According to Chinese experts, main reason for using “soft power” of Chinese diplomacy is not to convince the world of moral superiority of Chinese way of development and versatility of proposed solutions to PRC or other problems, and to reconcile with fact that the world community about inevitable rise of China. Today, main directions of implementation of this policy in foreign policy concept of China are Asia Pacific, Africa, Latin America and Central Asia; 166 http://rus.azattyq.org/content/kazakh-chinese-workers-fight-atyrau/24677945.html 221  China focuses on strengthening its own power by gradual formation of a positive image and its image of a reliable economic and political partner in minds of the elites and population of the region. Given intensification of Central Asian-Chinese relations in almost all spheres, we can assume that in the future the extent of China's “soft power” in Central Asia will rise sharply. From this it follows that the expansion of China's economic, political and cultural influence in Central Asia - is an objective process. It seems that behavior of new generation of Chinese politicians due to complex endogenous and exogenous factors should include desire to transform the existing model of economic development in the direction of reducing export dependence. China needs to stimulate domestic demand-supply system to reduce dependence on disasters world economic and financial situation. So in order to stabilize first wave of the crisis in 2008-2009 Beijing was forced to adopt a package of measures to support export-oriented domestic producers in amount of 600 billion US dollars167 . Thus according to the Chinese department of the Swiss bank UBS, China has means to another complex of such measures, but does not use them. In this regard, it appears that on the one hand, Beijing wants to avoid a “credit inflation bubbles” that led to the crisis in Europe and the U.S., on the other - to reallocate their investments. In latter case, probably most promising avenue is to invest in transport and energy projects in Central Asia, which will enable China: 167 Zawadzki M. How to treat China, Expert # 42 (824), 2012 222  - To prompt economic ties strategically important in terms of economy and security issues of region and promote development of its western provinces that can turn into major consumers of Central Asian hydrocarbons and importers of finished products. - To reduce price of necessary resources for the Chinese economy due to increased competition among suppliers because of time constraints of their commodity needs. In particular, Beijing is forced to buy hydrocarbon feedstock in the Russian Federation at market prices, while Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan do it by a more favorable rates168 that instability in the Middle East and North Africa, where China gets more than 50 % of total energy, acts as an incentive to expand its presence in Central Asia. Probably the trigger for this shift in foreign policy rhetoric of Beijing served following external determinants: - Firstly, the Crimea annexation by Russia, it is understandable that there is an unspoken agreement on the division of spheres of influence in Central Asia and Russia, ultimately, against the background of design structures of China and Eurasian Union may cause to lose of region as its sphere of influence. - Secondly, the need for China to be a reliable in Central Asian region in the light of military build-up (primarily manifested in the form of deployment 168 Zawadzki M. How to treat China, Expert # 42 (824), 2012 223  authentication system defense in Southeast Asia due to tendency to use tools of real politics in international relations (the war in Libya, Syria, Ukraine). Meanwhile, there are a number of external economic conditions for amplification of China in Central Asia; “ricochet” is introduced competition in triangle of China - Russia - United States in other regions of the world. As one of the prerequisites for such failure should be identified projects totaling 3 billion US dollars for construction of a deepwater port in the Crimea in accession of Russia. This port has strategic importance to China, because it becomes a sea international maritime hub on the route of goods from the East to Europe under the “Economic Belt of Great Silk Road”. On the other hand, there is a gradual escalation of the Sino-Russian competition in the Arctic region, which serves an additional irritant issue in relations between Moscow and Beijing, while in Central Asia, land routes through which along with Northern Sea Route are an alternative to the existing southern China Sea post to Europe via the Suez channel 169 (Blank, 2014). At the same time China is indisputable leadership in Central Asia can provide its independence from Russia in its relations with the EU, as the northern route due to geographical position of Russian Federation with all hands will be linked to the need to agree on conditions of its operation with Moscow. However, in Southeast Asia through establishment of the United States intend to formalize partnership Pacific economic blockade of China, which makes last to force search for alternative southern sea routes to Europe Railways. 169 Blank S., Enter Asia: The Arctic Heats Up, World Affairs Journal, March/April, 2014 224 The role of SCO in context of Afghanistan is largely due to the specifics of SCO hopes to fill, which is lacking in this organization. Since achieving stability of Afghanistan is common interest of all countries of the SCO, it is most appropriate point of contact. Therefore, for many years offered a “security belt” by SCO around Afghanistan. This idea, by the way, eventually failed because no one offered any distinct mechanisms of its creation, or on need to participate actively in SCO, etc. Because of organizational problems, more than making Afghanistan the status of an observer is not moved forward. And with gaining momentum of competition between China and Russia in Central Asia, prospect of real SCO cases remains very elusive. In SCO to combat international terrorism was created Regional Antiterrorist Structure in 2002, designed to coordinate interaction of competent authorities of the participating countries in fight against terrorism and extremism and conduct anti-terrorism exercises, and participate in preparation of international instruments against terrorism, collecting and analyzing information, and others. Though Russia does not consider the SCO as a military organization, it is generally appreciates the work in this direction. The SCO has documents on cooperation with Organization of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which is now the main international instrument for coordination of anti-terrorist activities in Russia and three other SCO member states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). SCO conducted the most extensive military exercises in the past 10 years, maneuver called “Peace Mission 2014” held in Chinese province of Inner Mongolia 24-29 August 2014; military exercise was attended by seven thousand troops. These most extensive in recent years, apparently maneuvers held on 225 background of growing importance of the SCO and deterioration of relations between Russia and Western countries. Thus, China is very interested in strengthening their positions in Afghanistan, for which Chinese government uses all possible mechanisms: first of all economic leverage, making special emphasis on traditional Chinese spheres resource extraction and infrastructure construction. Also, China is trying to use SCO in their interests in Afghanistan, killing two birds with one stone: strengthening the organization's position and hence it in Central Asia also is using the multi-format to strengthen its capabilities in Afghanistan. Thus, new policy of China in Central Asia is determined by a number of external and internal factors. The external factors include: escalation of geopolitical competition in format of proposed land transport and energy projects, instability in the Middle East and North Africa - main energy suppliers in China, events in Ukraine in connection to Crimea - one of major transit areas in Chinese project revival of Great Silk Road, geographical advantages Russia to operate Northern Sea Route, the militarization of Southeast Asia, as well as U.S. plans for an economic blockade of China in this region. Internal factors refer to Chinese leadership's desire to reduce the economy's dependence on the global economic situation by reducing exports and increasing investment in internal and external infrastructure projects, “drain” competitors of Chinese companies, reducing their access to its domestic market, and reduce price of imported inputs, initiating increased competition between them. The concept of economic belt of the Silk Road was first announced during visit to Central Asia President Xi Jinping in 2013, who during his regional tour also agreed on investments and contracts worth tens of billions of US dollars. 226 Russian officials seem to be concerned that SCO is primarily a security organization; can play a role in promoting economic initiatives. Such fears are understandable, given the fact that Russia is going through difficult times because of need to conduct economic competition in this region, with China being the largest trading partner of four of the five Central Asian states. So, despite the fact that China and Russia approaches to regional security issues on principle matters do not contradict each other, strategic objectives of Russia and China in SCO should be considered largely as a formality, by virtue of significant differences between national interests of both countries on a number of regional aspects, mainly on economic affairs and competition for leadership in organization. At the same time, Beijing is interested in monitoring situation in Central Asian republics and the possibility of a timely response to certain changes in region, which would prevent realization of its interests. USA and EU are ‘suspicious’ of SCO, considering organization of a new incarnation of a multi-polar world. EU may got late to “energy pie” of Central Asia – a region controlled by SCO. Despite the fact that goals and objectives of SCO and NATO are close in this region, organizations fighting against extremism and terrorism, relations between them are not effective (Suzdalcev, 2009). 227 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a unique experience of sub-regional and inter-civilizational dialogue, the main trends in the development of which will find use in XXI century. The superposition of these factors determines features of proposed PRC economic integration in Central Asia within framework developed by large- scale project “Economic Belt of Great Silk Road”. Dynamic start its implementation, as well as showing interest in Beijing to ensure military security of this region an indicator of fact that China will gradually turn into regional superpower. 228  7.1. The role and place of Afghanistan policy in the region This part of analysis deals with actual topic Afghanistan's relations with countries of this region and importance of these relationships for settlement of situation in Afghanistan, explains how difficult legacy that has developed over many decades and ruinous civil war, and opposite, sometimes conflicting goals and objectives of neighboring countries of Afghanistan as well as other members of geopolitical process. Priority for Afghanistan is comprehensive strengthening of relations with countries of South and Central Asia and formation of a regional community where Afghanistan would occupy central position. It is obvious, that development of Afghanistan's relations with major world powers will be determined by significance of these relationships in order to stabilize Afghan position in Asia. Methods of regional foreign policy in Afghanistan should be based on economic cooperation with neighboring countries and that, accordingly, should lead to the formation of strong common interests and, ultimately, to the creation of robust mechanisms for regional security. Key features of foreign policy in modern times should be based on: 1) National interest, taking into account the interests of countries in this region; 2) Belief in obvious key role in Afghanistan in regional arena, which is defined as features long history and tradition, and location of country; 229 3) Consideration of a direct link between unfriendly policy of some foreign countries and domestic instability that these states seek every possible way to exploit, and it could minimize the negative impact. The main components that determine conditions of Afghan security at the present stage: Invaded by the troops Afghan state and its very existence with its cultural and political foundations might be put under the question. Afghan specialists in international relations are stressing out those main features that might affect situation in Afghanistan after troops’ withdrawal. First, it has already started growing contradictions between USA and EU, and secondly, intensification of U.S. policy in Central Asian Region (CAR), and here main movement of U.S. strategic interests, thirdly, a permanent increase in importance of China and Russia in regional and world stage, and finally, more obvious importance of Afghanistan in regional and global processes. According to Limin (Chinese expert) “in foreseeable future, system of international relations will come to state of relative stability. Agree with opinion of Chinese experts: despite the fact that the structure will remain where coexist one superpower and several major powers, the United States is supposed to be too dispersed their resources and strategic approach edge of exhaustion, which will allow each of regional actors, achieving local equilibrium forces with U.S., successfully defend their specific interests at regional level. Ultimately U.S. local containment of each of actors will cause global strategic balance170 (Limin, 2012). As for Afghanistan, it seems to be necessary, first of all, reestablishment of a new system of relations with international community, which should resort to a qualitatively new 170 Chinese foreign minister visits Afghanistan, Xinhua, Zheng Limin, 2012 230 relationship with donor countries. The concept of “aid to Afghanistan” by foreign actors, and instead offer them concept of “cooperation and mutual interests”. The foreign presence in country is not only, and perhaps not so much in favor of Afghanistan, but in the interests of countries involved in so-called “Afghan conflict" and “small handouts” as provided material assistance to Afghanistan is not needed. It's no secret that most of the country is occupied by foreign troops, which even high- Afghan officials cannot access, not to mention country's population. If all the time those foreign troops are in Afghanistan, Afghan leaders came to concept of mutual interests and needs of population. Secondly, to strengthen combat capability of national army, police and intelligence services. However, since achievement of superiority over armed opposition, supported by Pakistan in near future is impossible, it is necessary to develop such a tactic in which Afghan security forces would have advantage over local anti-governmental forces and its allies, which would prevent their spread to neighboring provinces. Third, in order to achieve stability in Afghanistan is necessary to develop cooperation with regional bodies, such as for example the SCO, CSTO, Eurasian Union. Not only Afghanistan should be involved in these organizations but also Pakistan, India and Iran. The fourth – security policy in Afghanistan should be to improve its role in this region's economies. This will require all efforts in implementation of planned regional projects such as TAPI and SASA-1000. Another component is development of logistics. In this case, development of road systems of Afghanistan, especially railway system and its connection to systems of Uzbekistan, 231 Tajikistan, Iran and Pakistan would give an additional impetus to countries in region to ensure security of Afghanistan. And indeed, the creation of region's countries joint projects in economic, energy and cultural areas will be a good chance to prove in Afghanistan. The restoration of peace in Afghanistan is impossible without comprehensive interest and participation in the process of all countries, especially Pakistan. In foreign policy, Afghanistan is advisable to set two main goals: to create favorable external conditions for modernization of the state and approval of the country as a focus of interest in this region. Therefore, to solve problem of Afghanistan’s rescue involved in armed conflict requires development of trade and economic contacts for attracting investment and technology. From this perspective, most important targets for Afghan diplomacy are, firstly, perhaps the most productive development of economic ties with Central Asian region. Secondly, main actors in region, who are can be the source of capital and most significant, the trading partners. Afghanistan has more possibilities to influence economic relations between countries of region, than major powers, which, respectively, are less likely to consider their interests. But many Afghan analysts see a policy of strategic partnership is with the U.S. and Western countries because of possibility of more influence on stabilization of situation in country and attract Western capital. For objective reasons, such an approach is the most realistic, based on the limited capabilities of today’s Afghanistan. The “mythical version” of forming a regional community assumes “conquest of informal leadership i region”. Thus, can been seen as desire of Russia and China for regional hegemony which is regarded as a condition of security in the region and a multi-polar system of international relations. 232 The way to achieve this goal is the formation of a regional community in which Afghanistan geographic reasons and potential would be a natural center of gravity. Such an approach is not very well fit into the traditional scheme of foreign policy in this region, but it fits the need to resist U.S. attempts to contain China and Russia with help of situation in region, and in the future and will help to solve Afghan problem as lead fast-growing China and Russia, guarantees their right to a casting vote in regional and global processes, and consequently, Afghanistan must be ready for the development of such a scenario 171. However, the main motive of foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan after withdrawal of foreign troops should be considered a desire to promote emergence of a new system of regional relations, in which Afghanistan, regardless of wishes and preferences of other countries, would occupy a good position, without being isolated, would not be a subject to pressure and manipulation and rightfully could count on keeping their interests along with interests of other states in the region. 171 Polya, S., Centre for Modern Afghanistan Studieshttp://www.afghanistan.ru/doc/21471.html 233  Chapter IV, section B The development of trade-economic, technological and cultural cooperation between the Czech Republic and Slovakia with Central Asia countries 1.1. Investment and technology of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in Kazakhstan Kazakhstan is economically the most developed country of the former Soviet countries of Central Asia. Currently belongs to a major regional exporter of oil, gas and wheat. In 1997, President N.Nazarbayev adopted the country's development strategy till 2030 with the aim of creating an economically developed, safe, healthy and educated society. In accordance with the development plan, in 2010, was admitted a five-year plan for industrial diversification, focusing on the development of transport, pharmaceutical, telecommunications, petrochemical and food sectors of the economy. In 2012, the President called for the development of transport infrastructure with a view to the creation of Kazakhstan's regional transportation center of the new Silk Road. According to the Statistical Yearbook of BP “World Energy Report” of 2012, Kazakhstan has verified oil reserves in the amount of 3.9 billion tons mined and 1.8 million barrels of oil per day, which are 2.1 global productions. Proved reserves of natural gas are 1.9 trillion m3 and ensures production of 19.3 billion m3 of gas per year. In 2015 it is expected that mining will reach 3.5 million barrels / day, of which 3 234 million will go for export. Geological reserves of the largest Kazakh Kashagan field are estimated at two billion tons of gas and oil. Oil and gas export to Kazakhstan is a major source of revenue to the state budget and ensuring economic growth of the country. Kazakhstan is an important trading partner for the EU. More than half of the foreign trade turnover of the country accounted for by the EU and 47% of investments in Kazakhstan comes from the EU. November 20, 2013 Brussels hosted the 7th ministerial meeting of countries of Central Asia and the European Union. Kazakhstan was represented by Foreign Minister Y.Idrisov. Sides discussed issues of interregional cooperation within the EU Strategy for Central Asia, as well as identified promising areas for further cooperation. Furthermore, the parties reviewed and discussed the key initiatives of the European Union in Central Asia aimed at reforming the judicial system, improving standards and quality of education, improving environmental protection, increase mutual trade and investment flows. In December 2013 in Brussels during the XII meeting of the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee EU and Kazakhstan were considered the issues of trade and economic, political, cultural and humanitarian cooperation, as well as the possibility of a new agreement on partnership and cooperation, also were discussed prospects of simplification of visa regime between the EU and Kazakhstan 172. It was noted that Kazakhstan has been actively involved in the activities undertaken within the framework of a regional EU Strategy. In particular, the next meeting in the framework of the European rule of law Initiative in Central Asia was invited to take place in Astana in 2014, which was supported by all participants. On meeting were discussed legal cooperation in the fight against terrorism, corruption and organized crime. In this context Y.Idrisov noted the progress made on the issue of accession of Kazakhstan to 172 http://www.zakon.kz/4589361-v-brjussele-obsudili-uproshhenie.html 235 six key European conventions in the field of criminal proceedings and the fight against corruption, calling on all European structures to support the initiative of Kazakhstan aimed at further harmonization of national legislation in line with best international practices. One of the priority areas of partnership with the EU Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan has identified cooperation in attracting Kazakhstan innovation and technology, as well as cooperation in the field of education. Kazakh diplomat called on EU management to join the partnership program “Green Bridge” by supporting the transfer of innovative ‘green’ technologies in the Central Asian region. In addition, at the meeting had been discussed security issues in Central Asia, including in the context of the forthcoming withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan, the fight against new global threats and poverty, and to promote the Central Asian states. Kazakhstan is one of the most important trading partners of the Czech Republic in the area of Central Asia and belongs to the 12 “priority countries” in terms of export potential of the Czech Republic. 1.1.1. History of Diplomatic Relations between the Czech Republic and Kazakhstan January 1, 1993 diplomatic relations between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Czech Republic were established. April 1997 is opening date of diplomatic mission of Kazakhstan in Prague. November 4, 2004 – The diplomatic mission converted to the Embassy. From February 2008 – Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the Czech Republic is Karashev Anarbek Baktygazovich. From April 2008 – Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Kazakhstan to the Czech Republic is Bedrich Kopecky. 236 Between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Czech Republic is maintained a regular political dialogue. Both states have a common approach to issues of peace and security at the global and regional level, close cooperation between the European Union and the countries of Central Asia in economic and human terms. September 8-10, 2004 the official visit of the President of the Czech Republic Vaclav Klaus in the Republic of Kazakhstan took place, during this visit the Czech leader held meetings with the governmental officials of Kazakhstan, discussed the issues of political, trade and economic cooperation. In May of 2009 Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Lower House of the Parliament of the Czech Republic Ya.Gamachek MP and member of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic P.Lebeda participated in the conference “Modern Kazakhstan and Path to Europe “, held in Astana. In July, 2010 was formed by the parliamentary group of friendship with Kazakhstan headed by the leader KSCM V.Filippov and the parliamentary groups including the influential Czech politicians, including former Mayor of Prague P.Bem (GFC). In the Majilis is also a group for cooperation with the Czech Republic consists of 33 members, the Chairman of the group is Rogalev VP In June of 2010. Astana visited by the Deputy Minister for National Minorities of the Government of the Czech Republic Ch.Valek to participate in the OSCE Conference on Tolerance and Non-Discrimination. In February 2011. during the visit of the Executive Secretary of the MFA R.S.Zhoshybaeva signed two inter-governmental agreements on the abolition of visa requirements for holders of diplomatic passports, and the return of persons with illegal stay (readmission), one interagency protocol to the last agreement. In March 2011, Grigory Marchenko the head of the National Bank of Kazakhstan visited Prague to participate at the European Banking Forum. December 1-2, 2010 Astana OSCE Summit was attended by First Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs K.Shvartsenberg. The official authorities of the Czech Republic supported the stated priorities of Kazakhstan and gave 237 a positive assessment of the OSCE chairmanship. In April 2011 Advisor to the Speaker of Kazakhstan Ya.Kogout as an independent observer of the progress of the early presidential elections visited the Czech Senate on international issues.23-24 October 2012 at the invitation of the President of the Czech Republic Vaclav Klaus, the first ever official visit of President Nazarbayev to the Czech Republic took place. At the meeting, Heads of States summarized the bilateral cooperation in 20 years which formed the legal basis of the Kazakh-Czech relations. TABLE 2.1: List of valid official documents in the economic sphere 1. Agreement between the Government of the Czech Republic and the signed on October 8, 1996, entered Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Promotion and into force on April 2, 1998; Reciprocal Protection of Investments 2. Agreement between the Czech Republic and the Republic of signed on April 9, 1998, entered Kazakhstan for the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of into force on October 29, 1999; fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and assets 3. Agreement between the Czech Republic and the Republic of the process of its ratification was Kazakhstan on cooperation in international road transport finished in 2003; 4. Agreement between the Government of the Czech Republic and the signed on September 8, 2004, Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on economic, industrial entered into force on November 21, and scientific cooperation 2006; 5. Agreement between the Government of the Czech Republic and the signed in April 1998; Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the fight against organized crime and illegal distribution of drugs and other intoxicating substances 6. Protocol between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Kazakhstan signed by November 25, 2010 in on Amendments to the Agreement between the Government of the Astana; Czech Republic and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 238 7. Agreement in the field of tourism between the Czech Republic and signed in Prague on November 3, Kazakhstan 2011. Documents are currently being prepared for signing: 1. Agreement between the Czech Republic and the Republic of To comply with EU law requires Kazakhstan for the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of the signing of the Protocol (as well fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital (originally as the Agreement on the promotion was signed in April, 4 1998) of investments). 2. Agreement on civil aviation between the Czech Republic and the At the end of March 2012 the Republic of Kazakhstan. In the field of civil aviation Ministry of Czech side handed over a draft text Transport has an interest to clarify the procedure for the conclusion of of the Kazakh Air Agreement. an intergovernmental agreement on air transport and air services. At the meeting in Prague in March 2011, representatives of the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Transport and Communications of Kazakhstan signed the Memorandum of cooperation of the Czech Republic and Kazakhstan in air transport. 3. Agreement on cooperation in the field of health - it is the agreement between the health ministries of both countries. 4. On Social Security Agreement – Czech authorities submitted in 2010 to the Kazakhstani party the Czech model draft of social security agreement. 5. Czech side expressed readiness to sign in the near future interstate treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. The Prosecutor General of Kazakhstan emphasized the importance of signing a document that would ensure further consolidation of the efforts of the two countries to fight transnational crime. 6. In June 2010, Kazakhstani party has confirmed the interest of the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of Population of Kazakhstan to sign the Agreement. 7. The Arrangement between the Ministry of Education of Czech Republic and Ministry of Education and Science of Kazakhstan on cooperation in the field of education - at the end of April 2011 the 239  Kazakhstan Ministry of Education and Science informed the Embassy of the Czech Republic in Astana that its draft agreement have been sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan for providing it to the Czech party. TABLE 2.2: List of valid international agreements between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Kazakhstan 1. Agreement between the Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic signed in Prague 23.10.2012 valid and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan on from 23/10/2012 cooperation in the military sphere 2. The Arrangement between the Ministry of Health of the Czech signed in Prague 23.10.2012 valid Republic and the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Kazakhstan on from 23/10/2012 cooperation in the field of health and medical science Type – bilateral agreement 3. Agreement on cooperation in tourism between the Ministry of signed in Prague 03.11.2011 Regional Development of the Czech Republic and the Ministry of entered in force 3/11/2011 Tourism and Sports of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Type – bilateral agreement 4. Agreement between the Czech Republic and the Republic of signed in Almaty 09.04.1998 Kazakhstan on the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of entered in force 01/26/2000 fiscal evasion with respect to taxes and on income. Type – bilateral agreement 5. Agreement between the Government of the Czech Republic and the signed in Almaty 09.08.2004 Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on economic, industrial entered in force 06/08/2009 and scientific-technical cooperation. Type – bilateral agreement 6. Agreement between the Government of the Czech Republic and the signed in Almaty 09.04.1998, Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on cooperation in the fight entered in force 20/8/1999 against organized crime, illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, terrorism and other dangerous types of crime. Type – bilateral agreement 7. Agreement between the Czech Republic and the Republic of signed in Prague 08.10.1996 Kazakhstan on the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments. entered in force 2/4/1998 240  Type – bilateral agreement 8. Protocol on Cooperation between the Ministry of Industry and Trade signed in Almaty 13/09/1993 of the Czech Republic and the Ministry of Foreign Economic entered in force 13/09/ 1993 Relations of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Type – bilateral agreement 9. Protocol between the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech signed in Prague 10.09.1996 Republic and the Ministry of Oil and Gas Industry of the Republic of entered in force 01/15/1997 Kazakhstan on the implementation of the Agreement between the Government of the CSSR and the USSR on Cooperation in acquiring Jamburgsky gas deposits173. Type – bilateral agreement 10. Agreement between the Government of the Czech Republic and the signed in Prague 12.13.1999 Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on international road. entered in force 10/13/2005 Type – bilateral agreement Source: MZV ČR TABLE 2.3: TURNOVER BETWEEN CZECH REPUBLIC AND KAZAKHSTAN Turnover between Czech Republic and Kazakhstan in thousands EUR € 1.000.000 € 800.000 € 600.000 € 400.000 € 200.000 €- 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Export Import Trade Balance Turnover According to: MZV ČR 173 Jamburgsky gas deposits inherited from Former Soviet Union agreement between Kazakhstan and Czech Republic 241  Turnover between Czech Republic and Kazakhstan in thousands EUR Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 € € € € € € € Export 102.033 134.281 90.953 127.869 153.280 270.044 296.486 € € € € € € € Import 144.033 371.523 203.810 317.840 466.155 433.937 471.870 Trade € € € € € € € Balance 42.000 237.242 112.857 189.971 312.875 163.893 175.384 € € € € € € € Turnover 246.067 505.803 294.762 445.709 619.435 703.981 768.355 The economic cooperation between Kazakhstan and the Czech Republic is based on the intergovernmental agreements; bilateral trade volume has stable growth (In 2012, turnover amounted to 903.8 million USD, Czech exports rose by 346.7 million USD and Czech imports decreased in 2012 to 557 million USD). Kazakhstan exports to the Czech Republic produce oil and gas industry, the chemical industry, in particular, yellow phosphorus, and metals. Imports from the Czech Republic consists of a variety of equipment, component parts, water treatment facilities, electrical appliances, pharmaceutical products, furniture, glass, ceramics and other consumer goods. By 2012, the Czech direct investment in Kazakhstan reached 205.8 million. The development of mutual relations will be prompt to more efficient way by the inclusion Kazakhstan to the list of the 12 most promising trade partners to the Czech Republic. This decision is one of the measures of the Czech government to gradually shift the center of gravity of foreign trade to the Eastern markets. There is reason to believe that the Czech Republic considers Kazakhstan as one of the most promising markets for Czech products in the Central Asian region. Increased interest remains in developing cooperation in the energy sector, which is associated with the intention of the Czech Republic to diversify its sources of energy imports. For Kazakhstan for the implementation of the State 242 Program of Forced Industrial-innovative Development 174 important to attract engineering technology from the Czech Republic, as this industry is the most strong point of the Czech economy, the basis of its export potential. In Kazakhstan are 76 enterprises with the Czech capital and 20 representative offices of accredited Czech companies. In April 2007, the opening of a direct flight “Prague - Almaty – Prague” performed by the airline “Czech Airlines” three times a week. Of “Asia Auto” of the Republic of Kazakhstan and A.S. “SKODA Auto” Czech Republic started line to assemble cars “SKODA OKTAVIA” and executive cars “PRESIDENT EDITION”. Since the launch of the plant has manufactured more than 1,500 cars. The biggest Czech company “Codeco” in 2010, launched the project in Almaty for elite residential complex of apartments “Czech terraces”. The project involves extensive use of modern developments in the field of building technology. In May 2011, one of Europe's largest producers of phosphorus, the Czech company “FOSFA” signed with JSC “Kazphosphate” agreement on a joint venture with the subsequent construction of the plant in 2012 to produce special products of yellow phosphorus. The company “Ecofluid” in Kazakhstan continues to implement projects for the reconstruction of treatment facilities. In 2010, the company won the tender for the replacement of utility systems in the Karaganda region. In health care, the Czech company “PURO KLIMA” implementing a project for the construction of public hospitals in Aktau city. The company “LINET” completed the project delivery of the latest medical equipment as part of the reconstruction of hospital emergency medical care in the Almaty city. The company “LAB Pharma spol.sro” launched a project to build a manufacturing factory in Astana on release dosage forms (2010 - 2011). In June 2012 the Czech company 174 The State Program of Forced Industrial-Innovative Development has been approved by the Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.Nazarbayev No.958 dated March 19, 2010. The goal of the program is to guarantee sustainable and well-balanced economic growth of the Republic of Kazakhstan by means of diversification and improvement of its competitiveness. 243 “FAVEA” Kazakhstani Company “Romat” signed agreement to build a factory for $ 30 million for the production of medications in Semey city. Intergovernmental commission cooperation: From 2005 was held 6 meetings, as part of the 6th session of the meeting was three working groups: general (issues of cooperation in the fields of industry, agriculture, health, tourism, environment, technical regulations, etc.). On cooperation in the energy sector the parties agreed to hold the next meeting of the Working Group on Energy Cooperation (EWG will discuss proposals from Czech companies to participate in the implementation of projects in Kazakhstan in nuclear power, power generation, oil and gas industry and the industry of renewable energy sources (EKOL, VITKOVICE MG, MAVEL, CKD Group, PSG International, VAE CONTROLS Group, SKODA JS, ERIELL, SOLENA Group, WIKOV, Ankaba). It was stated that, the company VITKOVICE MG is considering their participation in the construction of HPP-4 in Karaganda. For a more substantive discussion of investment projects in Kazakhstan in November 2014 planned a visit of Czech energy companies’ representatives in Astana and Almaty. On cooperation in the field of industry, the Czech side confirmed the interest of Czech companies to participate in the modernization of industrial enterprises of Kazakhstan in the framework of the existing industrial programs, it was agreed to increase the skills (by employee training and education) of the Kazakhstan Agency “KAZNEX Invest” on promoting export and attracting investments in the Czech Agency for Export Promotion “Czechtrade”. In the framework of the IGC meeting, June 12-13, 2012 in Almaty and Ust-Kamenogorsk, events were organized with the participation of Kazakh businessmen and Czech business delegation, during which a Memorandum of Cooperation between the Kazakhstan Agency “KAZNEX Invest” and Commerce and Industry of the Czech Republic; after the meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission was signed the final protocol. October 24, 2012 during the first official visit of President of Kazakhstan 244 Nursultan Nazarbayev was held in the Czech Republic, and was organized Czech business forum in which 13 documents were signed by more than 150 million Euros. It was also noted that in terms of direct investment in Kazakhstan Czech Republic takes 31st place. In the second half of 2011, the number of Czech companies that opened offices in Kazakhstan was increased to support its business activities in Kazakhstan. Currently Embassy in Astana already registered 30 distributors of Czech goods in Kazakhstan. Most Czech representations are in Almaty and the capital Astana. Interest of Czech companies also focuses on participation in international trade fairs such as tourism fair KITF, Kihei Fair for Medical Technology, and Energy Power Fair in Kazakhstan, World Food Fair, and agricultural fair AgriTek Astana etc. In October 2013 the Czech company “FANS a.s.” won a contract in the amount of 100 million Euros for the supply of refrigeration equipment in the engine room of the new plant complex in Kokshetau city. Construction work is scheduled during 2014. 245 1.2. Development cooperation with Slovak Republic Prospects for the development of business relationship determines the Strategic Development Plan of Kazakhstan adopted in 2010, which ran from 2020 onwards and also legislative changes designed for use the natural wealth of the country. The plan provides economic diversification and preference for the following priorities: crude oil, building infrastructure in the oil and gas, metallurgy, production of finished steel products, pharmaceuticals, defense industry, food industry, construction and manufacture of building materials, energy, transport and telecommunications. In order to support industrial and innovative development the Government plans to invest in the period 2010-2014 40 billion USD. Above mentioned plans of the Government of Kazakhstan, according to which up to 2020, an increasing proportion of non-resource traded export from 10% to 45% require massive investments to upgrade the technological and industrial base. This area creates space for Slovak companies to supply of technological equipment. Business entities from Slovakia can be implemented in Kazakh projects relating to the development and modernization of infrastructure (railroads, power distribution networks, and transport communications). There are possibilities also on the projects of construction of small hydropower plants, thermal power stations and the energy sector projects in general. Joint ventures, designed as the final assembly plant, can greatly modify the plan in a positive percentage of the Slovak export to Kazakhstan. Interesting area for Slovak companies are engineering, construction materials, transportation and logistics services, including printing, packaging machinery, processing of agricultural products, but also innovative areas (solar panels, wind turbines, water treatment, waste disposal). Due to 246 the regularization of the ‘Kazakh content’ (under current legislation, public procurement, a state-owned enterprises or state fund Samruk-Kazyna, as well as investments in the mining sector prefers goods of Kazakh origin, respectively, provides its minimum share of investment) will be more complicated to succeed entities direct delivery of finished products. One possible way could Slovak companies to resolve the situation, on the other hand use it to their advantage is the creation of joint ventures with Kazakh partners for the supply of production technologies, where part of the production will be based on the territory of Kazakhstan. SlovakAid175 operates in Kazakhstan since 2003. From 2003 to 2006, Slovakia has implemented ODA in Kazakhstan through a UNDP Trust Fund during this period was implemented 9 projects / 1 of which project to several countries of the Western Balkans and Asia /.In Kazakhstan, Slovakia focused on building democratic institutions, rule of law, civil society and peace, social development, economic development and infrastructure development. In 2007 SAMRS contracted 1 project worth 116 178.72€, in 2008 1 project worth 108 630 €. In 2009, no project has been contracted. Together from 2007 to 2009 SAMRS 176 contracted projects totaling 224 808.72 €. Until 2010, Kazakhstan belonged to priority countries of Slovak official development aid (ODA). The official development projects are implementing in Kazakhstan due to the realization of EU Strategy and the Commission’s assistance program for the period of 2007-2013 (Slovak Aid, 2010). In the period 2004-2009 there were 13 projects177 175 SlovakAID as Slovak Agency for International Development (SAMRS in Slovak abr.) is a governmental organization established by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, SAMRS mission is to ensure the implementation of the Official Development Assistance of the Slovak Republic in accordance with the programming and conceptual documents prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, binding documents of the European Union, the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and other international obligations. 176 SAMRS in Slovak abr. - SlovakAID as Slovak Agency for International Development 177 Národný program oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci na rok 2009, MZV SR, Bratislava, 2009, ISBN 80- 88726-16-9 247 approved for Kazakhstan. Projects implemented so far were in line with government priorities such as civil society support, development and restoration of basic infrastructure, and support to integration of the country to international groups and organizations. Projects approved for Kazakhstan mostly focused on supporting small and medium enterprises, civil society support and water and energy management. Comparative Slovak advantages used for their implementation especially in transfer of know-how from a state-run economy and political dictatorship to liberal democracy with market economy. Among Slovak organizations active in Kazakhstan are the Office for normalization, metrology and testing, Astraia, a.s., Slovak Hydrometeorology Institute, Elteco a.s., Profing s.r.o., Timan s.r.o., Pame Impex s.r.o. Výskumné centrum SFPA, and others. Slovak entities that implement ODA repeatedly concluded that Slovak assistance was not always received with gratitude because Kazakhstan has been experiencing a period of huge economic growth and, especially in large urban areas, where large investments concentrated. One of successful and positively assessed projects, it is useful to mention the project of the cooperation between Kazakhstani regional government authorities and Slovak self-governing regions, in particular, the Trnava Self-Governing Region and East-Kazakhstan Region and the Almaty Region, aimed at development of infrastructure for environmental monitoring networks and establishment of a political forum for sharing of transition experience. The goal of those projects was to intensify Slovak-Kazakhstani cooperation in the field of research and university cooperation, exchange of students and sharing know-how. Among 25 certification authorities of Kazakhstan 23 organizations have been accredited by the Slovak Accreditation Service in accordance with the ISO 17 025 standard (Report of Embassy of RK, 2011). In 2008, the “Genetics for Kazakhstan” project was approved for Kazakhstan (Slovenské biologické služby a.s., project main purpose was to increase production of 248 milk by means of top genetics supplied from the Slovak Republic, as well as purchase of tomography equipment and training of staff). The Slovak Republic and Kazakhstan have not signed any bilateral agreement on providing ODA; however, Slovak activities in the country were actively promoted as a part of the so called Week of Europe in Astana, in various lectures at universities or at press conferences. (It is assumed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic will reduce the number of countries supported by ODA from 19 to 10 due to cuts of state budget.) The aforementioned implies that none of Central Asian countries will be included in ODA projects. The resources will have to be replaced by other ones, the most important potential of mutual relations for the following years is the field of economic relations. 178 The main importers of goods from Kazakhstan in 2011 were China (18.5%), Italy (17.1%), Russia (8.5%), Netherlands (7.5%), and France (6.2%). The most important partners exporting to Kazakhstan: Russia (42.8%), China (13.2%), Germany (5.5%), Ukraine (4.6%), the USA (4.5%). In the context of the customs union Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Belarus, is a visible transfer of Kazakh import to the Member States of the Customs Union, and replace it imports from the rest of their countries. 178 In 2011 the Ernst & Young Company conducted research within which it became clear that more than a half of foreign investors (53%) estimate Kazakhstani legislation as insufficiently stable. And working in the country, and potential investors then emphasized need of transparent and stable standard and legal base, and also more careful assessment of consequences at adoption of new laws. It is interesting to note that in similar poll for 2012 about 50% of respondents also counted level of transparency and predictability of the standard and legal environment insufficient. http://forbes.kz/process/expertise/izderjki_kadrovyih_pasyansov 249 TABLE 2.4: TURNOVER BETWEEN SLOVAK REPUBLIC AND KAZAKHSTAN Turnover between Slovak Republic and Kazakhstan in thousands EUR € 100.000 € 50.000 €- 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Export Import Trade Balance Turnover Turnover between Slovak Republic and Kazakhstan in thousands EUR Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 € € € € € € € Export 61.170 43.385 31.860 32.998 53.123 61.686 80.310 € € € € € € € Import 27.920 20.980 6.252 19.416 21.830 14.783 8.058 Trade € € € € € € € Balance 33.250 22.405 25.608 13.660 31.293 46.903 72.252 € € € € € € € Turnover 89.090 64.364 38.113 52.492 74.953 76.469 88.368 Source according to: Štatistický úrad SR, MH SR TABLE 2.5: List of valid international agreements between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Kazakhstan 1. Agreement between the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic signed on January 22, 1997 and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the 250  military and military-technical cooperation 2. Protocol on Cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the signed on March 18, 1998 Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan 3. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the signed on March 18, 1998 Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on mutual visa-free traveling holders of diplomatic and service passports 4. Agreement between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of signed on March 21, 2007 Kazakhstan for the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and on capital 5. Memorandum of Understanding on Cultural Cooperation between the signed on November 21, 2007 Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Culture and Information of the Republic of Kazakhstan 6. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the signed on November 21, 2007 Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on cooperation in combating organized crime, terrorism, illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and precursors and other types of crime 7. Agreement between the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic signed on April 17, 2008 and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan on cooperation in the military field 8. Memorandum between the Ministry of Education of the Slovak signed on November 3, 2009 Republic and the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan on cooperation in the field of education 9. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the signed on March 30, 2010 Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on war graves Source according to: Štatistický úrad SR, MH SR Today Kazakhstan export volume ranks 40th among world exporters. Export destinations - 120 countries, including the finished products are delivered to 111 countries. 251 1.3. Cultural cooperation Kazakhstani community is multinational there are 140 nationalities and 17 religious groups, therefore the experience sharing on ethnic issues on the territories of Czech Republic and Slovak Republic may be interesting taking into account the role of mediating and managing interethnic issues arising in whole region. Recent ethnic conflict in the region is alarming. In January 2011 on the General Consulate of the Republic Hungary in Almaty was inaugurated the visa center of 5 countries: Austria, Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia. This event is remarkable and will stimulate the development of cooperation between countries. 252 2.1. Investment and technology of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in Uzbekistan In 2012 export from the Czech Republic to Uzbekistan exceeded the amount of 58 million euro, and was a record. Exports from Uzbekistan to the Czech Republic in 2012 exceeded 6 million euro. TABLE 3.1.: TURNOVER BETWEEN CZECH REPUBLIC AND UZBEKISTAN Turnover between Czech Republic and Uzbekistan in thousands EUR € 80.000 € 60.000 € 40.000 € 20.000 €- 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Export Import Trade Balance Turnover Turnover between Czech Republic and Uzbekistan in thousands EUR Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 € € € € € € € Export 26.665 24.789 37.747 32.545 41.300 61.494 63.629 € € € € € € € Import 6.986 14.331 6.955 8.329 7.355,00 6.241 4.450 Trade € € € € € € € Balance 19.679 10.459 30.793 24.215 33.946,00 55.253 59.180 € € € € € € € Turnover 33.652 39.120 44.702 40.874 48.655,00 67.735 68.079 Source: According to: MZV ČR 253 Czech investors have interest in projects of chemical industry, in pharmaceuticals, also in food industry, already Czech producers supply to Uzbekistan, including small and private enterprises, equipment for bakery, processing of agricultural products. TABLE 3.2.: List of valid international agreements between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Uzbekistan 1. Protocol on Cooperation between the Ministry of Industry and Trade of signed in Tashkent, the Czech Republic and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of September 10, 1993 the Republic of Uzbekistan 2. Agreement between the Government of the Czech Republic and the signed in Tashkent, June 17, Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan on cooperation in the fight 1998 against crime 3. Agreement between the Government of the Czech Republic and the signed in Tashkent, April 20, Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the international carriage 1999 of passengers and freight road transport 4. Agreement between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Uzbekistan signed on March 2, 2000 on the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes and on income. 5. Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Czech Republic signed in Tashkent, January on legal assistance and legal relations in civil and criminal cases 18, 2002 6. Agreement between the Government of the Czech Republic and the signed in Prague, April 15, Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan on cooperation and mutual 2003 assistance in customs matters 7. Agreement between the Government of the Czech Republic and the signed in Tashkent, June 28, Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan on economic, industrial and 2004 scientific cooperation 8. Protocol between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Uzbekistan signed in Tashkent, August amending the Agreement between the Czech Republic and the Republic 24, 2009 254  of Uzbekistan on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed on 15 January 1997 in Prague 9. Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Czech Republic signed in Tashkent, on aviation services November 8, 2011 10. Protocol between the Government of the Czech Republic and the signed in Prague, December Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan, which amends the Treaty 12, 2011 between the Government of the Czech Republic and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan for the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and on capital Source: MZV.ČR SlovakAid operates in Uzbekistan since 2003. From 2003 to 2006, Slovakia has implemented ODA179 in Uzbekistan through a UNDP Trust Fund during this period were carried out 3 projects / 1 of which project to several countries of the Western Balkans and Asia /.In Uzbekistan, Slovakia focused on building democratic institutions, rule of law, civil society and peace, social development, economic development and infrastructure development. In 2007 and 2009 SAMRS has been contracted any project for Uzbekistan. In 2008, a total of 2 projects total 333 443.83 €. TABLE 3.3.: List of valid international agreements between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Uzbekistan 1. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the signed in Tashkent, May 16, Government of Uzbekistan on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection 1995 of Investments 2. Treaty on the basis of the relationship and cooperation between the signed in Bratislava, January Slovak Republic and the Republic of Uzbekistan 16, 1997 3. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and signed in Bratislava, January 179 SlovakAID as Slovak Agency for International Development 255  Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the abolition of visa 17, 1997 requirements for holders of diplomatic and service passports 4. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the signed in Tashkent, March 6, Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan for the avoidance of double 2003 taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital 5. Protocol on Cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the signed in Bratislava, January Slovak Republic and the Ministry Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 17, 1997 Uzbekistan 6. Trade relations with Uzbekistan Slovak Republic after accession to the signed in Bratislava, EU has does not regulate the Agreement between the Government of the December 23, 1997 Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan on trade and economic and scientific and technical cooperation signed on 16.5.1995 in Tashkent. The validity of the Agreement, as well as Supplement No. 1 7. In order to restore the contractual-legal base in the field of economic signed in Bratislava cooperation the initiative of the Ministry of Economy processed and July 13, 2008 approved the Memorandum on cooperation between the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of External Economic Relations Republic of Uzbekistan Source according to: Štatistický úrad SR, MH SR The government of Uzbekistan declares interest in foreign investment, but the real situation is not very favorable for foreign investors, because of the Uzbek SUM is not freely convertible currency180, companies have difficulties to finance deliveries of components (and not facilitate the purchase of foreign currency) also the free movement of capital in the country is not secure (complications of the export). In addition to these 180 Since February 1, 2013 by Uzbek Government to banks in Uzbekistan was forbade selling to the individuals living in the country, foreign currency in cash. Sale is allowed only in a non-cash form — on the cash card. The cash which is on the card, it will be possible to use for purchase of air tickets, transfer into foreign accounts for treatment and study payment and for other non-commercial purposes. In retail trade and a services sector of Uzbekistan calculations in foreign currency are forbidden. To draw out the money enlisted on the card it will be possible only with their converting in national currency (sum). 256 complications can assign supply problems of electricity, gas, water, as well as unclear legislation and complicated administration. Among foreign companies are successful mostly large multinationals; to which state proceed more or less correctly, or companies whose production is intended primarily for export. Investments to Slovakia from Uzbekistan cannot be expected, since Uzbekistan itself needs foreign investment and local industry for competitive production with demand on the world market, or available funds to implement investments. On June 2011 Slovak Ambassador to Uzbekistan J.Siváček handed over shipment of tangible humanitarian aid to First Deputy Minister of Health of Uzbekistan A.Alimova medication a total value of 26,300 Euros, including antibiotics. Slovak Republic with regard to the volume of bilateral trade is not among the priority partners of Uzbekistan. Slovak foreign trade with Uzbekistan in recent years shows a positive balance of trade, the decrease occurred only in 2008, when began to show the effects of the global crisis. In 2011 the overall balance achieved value of 9.95 million Euros. TABLE 3.4.: TURNOVER BETWEEN SLOVAK REPUBLIC AND UZBEKISTAN Turnover between Slovak Republic and Uzbekistan in mln.EUR € 17.500 € 15.000 € 12.500 € 10.000 € 7.500 € 5.000 € 2.500 €- 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Export Import Trade Balance Turnover 257  Turnover between Slovak Republic and Uzbekistan in mln.EUR Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 € € € € € € € Export 9.003 9.612 4.543 8.077 10.180 7.674 11.879 € € € € € € € Import 5.766 6.642 2.054 546 230,00 129 233 Trade € € € € € € € Balance 3.237 7.251 2.489 7.531 9.950,00 7.545 11.646 € € € € € € € Turnover 14.769 16.254 6.597 8.623 10.140,00 7.803 12.112 Source according to: Štatistický úrad SR, MH SR There are some potential risks in Uzbek market. In the first place it should be noted lack of financial resources, both domestic shortages of currency as well as foreign currency. Further examples include difficult access to get loans; problems are with providing for banks guarantees for foreign loans. For Uzbek customer is therefore the ideal supplier who will deliver the goods on favorable terms, e.g. with delay the supply price. The risk of the domestic currency transfer to freely changeable conversion thus faced all suppliers, which may vary time to time, carries the risk of rate change, although in recent years the changes are not dramatic in any way. Another non-negligible risk of information from the Uzbek potential partners because all information is confidential. Information provided by the Uzbek partner, certainly not complete, therefore it is necessary to examine these and especially assemble information. There is can expect that someone at the very beginning of negotiations disclose everything. Therefore compilation of the contract is should be given due consideration. Also it should be noted that in Uzbekistan so called “clean” trade is not feasible, are always extremely important personal contacts. Also, it must be equipped with adequate language. 258 However, there is a strong consciousness of products from Czechoslovakia and they are seen as products of European quality. Products that are currently associated with Slovak, such as automobiles, are not in any way associated with it because of strong protectionist market, therefore practically absent. In connection with efforts of Uzbekistan to modernize its economy and build industrial base; there is room for Czech and Slovak companies operating in the supply of technology (water purifiers, health, irrigation, and food technology). Possibilities of application of Slovak producers are in the construction and reconstruction of thermal power plants (boilers supply) and generally in energy sector, where large investments are planned, such as the construction of new energy sources, as well as modernizing the electricity grid. For large investment projects are announced international tenders and, if funding is secured through loans from international financial organizations and supervised by them. In the context of General Motors factory existence there is a possibility of cooperation in the automotive industry. Since the government of Uzbekistan requires increasing localization of production, there is opportunity for Slovak companies acting as subcontractors for automakers in Slovakia. There are possibilities for the creation of joint ventures for the production of assembly parts for the local carmakers. Here, however, there are certain risks associated with investments in Uzbekistan, one of the major problems of exporters remain relatively high prices of Czech and Slovak goods compared with competitors’ weaknesses and opportunities in the export lending. Most significant investments in the country are on the basis of loans of foreign banks. The successful contractor on the local market includes Chinese companies to supply technological devices and offer favorable loans. 259 3.1. Investment and technology of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan along with Tajikistan is the poorest country181 in the post-Soviet Central Asia with a dominant agricultural sector (cotton, wool, tobacco, meat). The main export items include gold, mercury, uranium, natural gas, electricity. Kyrgyzstan was the first CIS country became in 1998 a member of the WTO and is one of the economically most liberal countries in the region. Geographic closeness, poor infrastructure along with political instability hinders the economic development of the country and the inflow of foreign investment in other than the mining sector (Kumtor mine). 182 President of Kyrgyzstan Almazbek Atambayev has ensured that the EU will allocate 13.5 million € to Kyrgyz economics. In Brussels during this official meeting Jose Manuel Barroso said: “It is important that the partners of Kyrgyzstan supported the strengthening of democracy”. Brussels has also promised to Bishkek 30 million € to ensure macroeconomic stability. Being heavily dependent on Russia, Kyrgyzstan is 181 The external debt of Kyrgyzstan in 2013 will reach $ 3.3 billion, said the Minister of Finance of Kyrgyzstan Olga Lavrova at a press conference in January 2013; “that is, the amount of external debt to GDP ratio will reach 45-46%, which is acceptable threshold, and does not go beyond what is permitted”. According to her, the domestic debt currently stands at $ 274 million soms. “It is our duty both external and internal debts do not grow highly , due to the fact that Turkish Government written off loans of $ 50 million and the Russian Government in the amount of $ 189 million is also by Russia will be written off $ 300 million of debt,” - explained the minister. According to the press service of the Ministry of Finance in 2013 to service the public debt was provided 15.4 billion soms. Source: KyrTAG http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1359109920 182 The largest company in Kyrzystan is Kumtor Operating Company (operated by Canadian CAMECO Corporation since 1992). In 2012 payments within the Kyrgyz Republic (including taxes, refining charges, payments to local suppliers of goods and services, infrastructure payments, charities, etc.) exceeded $298 million. During the period between 1994 and 2012, Kumtor Gold Project’s payments within the Kyrgyz Republic have exceeded $2.15 billion. http://www.kumtor.kg 260 going to join the Customs Union, which could complicate its rapprochement with the European Union. In the first half of 2012 the overall decline in Kyrgyzstan exports by 18% was caused by reduction of gold mining in the Kumtor mine by 60%, resulting in a reduction in GDP in the first half of 2012 by 5.6%. Economic growth, excluding the Kumtor mine, however, was 3.9%. A small amount of rain causing insufficient production of electricity at Toktogul hydroelectric power station reflects the electricity export. The high level of foreign debt remains the main problem of Kyrgyz economy. According to IMF183 experts, the government of Kyrgyzstan in the period 2012-2013 provide for a number of measures to strengthen macroeconomic stability and improving the investment climate in the country. The planned measures are reforms in tax administration, increase transparency of public finances and strengthening social protection systems. The energy sector is very important for the development of the country's infrastructure. Conditions for enlargement inflow of investment by foreign investors (Kazakhstan, China, and Russian Federation) will bring possibility to export electricity to China, Pakistan, Afghanistan (completion of hydropower Kambar 1 and Kambar 2). But state is unable to fulfill the expensive energy construction projects. Kyrgyzstan is in third place after the Russian Federation and Tajikistan in terms of hydropower potential. Award-winning potential of mountainous rivers is equal to 142 billion. KWh per year, of which today is used only 20%. In this sector there are ongoing negotiations with several investors from neighboring countries for the construction of hydropower plants on the middle and upper reaches of the Naryn River. On the rivers of Kyrgyzstan are several hydroelectric plants e.g. Toktogul (1200MW), Kurpsaj (800MW), Tashkumyr, UC-Kurgan. In 2012 an agreement was signed with Russian Federation to construct hydroelectric plant Kambar-Ata 1 (1200MW) and cascades of 183 IMF - International Monetary Fund 261 hydropower plants on the Naryn River. Construction and operation of large hydropower plants is a source of tension with neighboring countries, especially with Uzbekistan, since their operation affects the water regime of rivers supplying the agriculture- dependent Uzbekistan. The turnover of the Czech Republic and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan is not very high. Most goods imported from the Republic of Kyrgyzstan in the Czech Republic: the tools, products, chemicals, clothing, rubber, food ingredients, tar, etc. Most goods imported from the Czech Republic to the Republic of Kyrgyzstan: glass, wood, weapons and ammunition, optical equipment, beverages, aluminum products, etc. In the summer of 2012 in Kyrgyzstan was realized the Czech-Kyrgyz joint project on “Enhancing the research station Adygine”. The project was financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic within the framework of development assistance. The project has improved the station equipment: the conditions for plant employees, as well as for scientific expeditions. It was part of the project for energy system station and supplemented monitoring program. The Government of the Czech Republic in the framework of the development of economic, social and cultural spheres of the Kyrgyz Republic provided 5 grants to receive the State scholarship of education in higher education in the Czech Republic for the 2014-2015 academic years. 262 TABLE 4.1.: List of valid international agreements between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan 1. Treaty between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic signed in Moscow, August 12, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Legal 1982, valid till 01.01.1993 Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal 2. Consular Convention between the Czechoslovak signed in Moscow, April 27, Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist 1972, valid till 01.01.1993 Republics 3. Protocol on Cooperation between the Ministry of signed in Bishkek, March 7, Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic and the Ministry 1995 of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic 4. Agreement between the Government of the Czech signed in Bishkek, April 4, 1998 Republic and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on cooperation in the fight against organized crime, illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and precursors, terrorism and other types of crime 5. Agreement between the Government of the Czech signed in Prague, April 29, 2004 Republic and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic for air services Source: MZV.ČR 263 TABLE 4.2.: TURNOVER BETWEEN CZECH REPUBLIC AND KYRGYZSTAN Turnover between Czech Republic and Kyrgyzstan in thousands EUR € 8.000 € 7.000 € 6.000 € 5.000 € 4.000 € 3.000 € 2.000 € 1.000 €- 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Export Import Trade Balance Turnover Turnover between Czech Republic and Kyrgyzstan in thousands EUR Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 € € € € € € € Export 3.456 3.385 3.846 3.306 5.518 6.714 6.271 € € € € € € € Import 1.394 1.247 229 1.405 109,00 139 153 Trade € € € € € € € Balance 2.062 2.138 3.617 1.902 5.409,00 6.575 6.118 € € € € € € € Turnover 4.849 4.633 4.075 4.711 5.627,00 6.853 6.424 Source: According to: Štatistický úrad ČR Slovak Aid operates in Kyrgyzstan since 2003. From 2003 to 2006, Slovakia has implemented ODA in Kyrgyzstan by UNDP Trust Fund, and during this period, 13 projects have been implemented / 1 of which project to several countries of the Western Balkans and Asia /.In Kyrgyzstan, Slovakia focused on building democratic institutions, rule of law, civil society and peace, social development, economic development and infrastructure development. In 2007 SAMRS contracted 1 project in the amount of 231 596.40 €, in 2008, two projects total 219 390.89 €, in 2009 a total of 2 projects with a 264 total value of 211 404 EUR. Together from 2007 to 2009 SAMRS contracted projects for 662 391.29 €. TABLE 4.3.: TURNOVER BETWEEN SLOVAK REPUBLIC AND KYRGYZSTAN Turnover between Slovak Republic and Kyrgyzstan in thousands EUR € 6.000 € 5.000 € 4.000 € 3.000 € 2.000 € 1.000 €- 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Export Import Trade Balance Turnover Turnover between Slovak Republic and Kyrgyzstan in thousands EUR Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 € € € € € € € Export 4.897 1.998 1.597 1.720 1.920 1.669 2.012 € € € € € € € Import 10 39 4 9 4,00 1.475 25 Trade € € € € € € € Balance 4.887 1.959 1.593 1.711 1.916,00 194 1.987 € € € € € € € Turnover 4.907 2.037 1.601 1.728 1.924,00 3.144 2.037 Source according to: Štatistický úrad SR, MH SR TABLE 4.5.: List of valid international agreements between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan 1. Protocol on Cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the signed in April16, 1996 Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic 2. Agreement between the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic and signed in December 12, 1996 the Ministry of Defence of the Kyrgyz Republic on cooperation 265 3. Memorandum on cooperation and mutual understanding between the signed in December 12, 2003 Slovak Republic and the Kyrgyz Republic 4. Memorandum on cooperation in the economic field between the Ministry signed in April 4, 2008 of Economy of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of the Kyrgyz Republic 5. Agreement between the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic and the signed in April 4, 2010 Government Slovak Republic on mutual abolition of visa requirements for holders of diplomatic passports Source according to: Štatistický úrad SR, MH SR In Kyrgyzstan, lives a community of citizens of Slovak origin who are descendants of the team members of INTERHELPO (Slovak company based and operated in Kyrgyzstan in 30 years of the 20th century) and have Slovak nationality either they or their parents. According to available data in the capital Bishkek lives only around 150 expatriates. At the beginnings of 90s with gaining independence, the Kyrgyz Republic had large- scale industry, good prospects in electric power industry; large reserves already explored deposits of rare earth elements, competitive education, science, and quality workforce. It remained only to establish the gold trade, sell and integrate energy chain. Regretfully, total systemic corruption, the lawless privatization, state policy without thinking roll back to feudal relations and under these circumstances Kyrgyzstan has lost chances to progress in the economy. The Kyrgyz Republic accession into the World Trade Organization in 1998 completely ruined remnants of the Kyrgyz industry, and has opened the way for a powerful flow of cheap Chinese goods. Today only markets collect and re-export of goods from China at $ 10 billion, and the entire GDP in Kyrgyzstan is $ 6 billion. November 24, 2013 in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan hosted the international conference on “Intellectual initiative in the Process of Islamic Awakening in Central Asia”, to which 266 were invited religious and community leaders, scientists and experts from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. “Intellectual initiative” according to the organizers of the conference, was designed to create a platform for dialogue in Kyrgyzstan to Islamic scholars, experts and aimed at developing a joint ways to overcome the ideological, spiritual, social and political crisis of the Muslim communities in Central Asia, the preservation of peace and stability throughout the region, and to act as an intelligent response to the challenges of radicalization and the marginalization of the region. During the conference, participants discussed the role of religious leaders in achieving sustainable development, security and stability in Central Asia, the phenomenon of Islamic awakening in the context of related processes of the Middle East and Central Asia, as well as issues involving Islam to counter the ideology of terrorism and extremism in Central Asia. According to official data, in Kyrgyzstan, there are 91 institutions providing religious education, including 10 senior Islamic schools, 65 madrasas, 7 Christian higher educational institutions, 8 religious secondary schools, in total these organization are training 4630 students. The security issues in Kyrgyzstan are related also to the Manas air base, as a crucial transit hub for US forces, the Kyrgyz Government were speculating the withdrawal of US presence in Manas airport since the election runs from 2009, the controversial issue became of the weak points of former President Kurmanbek Bakiyev; and it continues to become an sensitive issue and bargain for contemporary government, due to its corruption and enrichment of local elites 184. 184 In May, during his spontaneous trip to Turkey Kyrgyz President Atambayev was proposed to expand its own Turkish business. In particular, he was offered at a good price to buy a couple of hotels in Antalya, in exchange for the transfer of the project of reconstruction of Manas and its management Turkish companies. In Turkey, Atambayev also met with some businessmen from the CIS, which work closely with American and British companies and intelligence agencies (in particular, it was notorious Telman Ismailov and Ghafoor Rakhimov ), and the conversations were that Atambayev allowed to participate in a joint business with them if he fulfills the requirements of the United States , Britain and Turkey on Manas. It is planned that the joint Kyrgyz- Turkish venture - the airport "Manas" - will be established by the beginning of 2014 and handed over the entire management of the Turkish 267 According to the calculations of the World Food Program, 2.2 million people in Kyrgyzstan, of which 66% of the rural population live below the poverty line. In general, this is the “poverty” touched every third – in 2013 its level increased to 38% compared to 18% in 2012 185. Slightly brightens this situation “money flow” from Kyrgyz migrant workers. In 2012 they moved to the Republic from Russia more than 1 billion USD. Given the instability in Kyrgyzstan greater strength gaining supporters of radical Islamist parties, among which occupies a special place, “Hizb ut-Tahrir”. The study of the organization's activities in the Kyrgyz Republic shows that its main purpose is to penetrate into the structures of state power in Kyrgyzstan. In Kyrgyzstan, about 3 thousand mosques, the number of all public organizations religious orientation is about 150. However, according to experts, “in recent years the rules of political games in Kyrgyzstan have changed and greater strength are gaining supporters of radical Islamist parties, which, possessing a serious ideological component”186. side. After all the necessary facilities, territory, services, etc. will be given a new commercial enterprise in the United States, or rather rent NATO. The agreement will be de jure not be the government of Kyrgyzstan, and the leadership of the new company. This complex will continue to perform all the basic transport functions, which are now performs TSC Manas, and part of the electronic- intelligence work. All U.S. military will officially be considered civilian employees; they will be replaced in part by the British and especially the Turkish experts. Even in recent months, Manas visited military experts from Qatar - from this country, along with some other closely related business for another Kyrgyz polition - Speaker Asylbek Jeenbekov. At meantime in the American base at that time actively under construction, contracts for construction of fixed deadlines in 2015-2020. In addition to the Manas system includes 26 radar stations scattered around the country (known as Sary -Tash in the Alai Valley, the area Kaji - Say in the Issyk -Kul region, Tokomak). With the launch of its commissioning will be monitored airspace not only the neighborhood of China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. At the same time there is building in Bishkek - officially - the new territory of the U.S. Embassy. This complex of buildings mainly located underground. Depth of construction - 28 meters from the territory of TSC There will be moved to a part of the electronic equipment of the CHP. About 200 U.S. troops from the CTP officially no longer the military and diplomatic status and were enrolled in the embassy staff. But the main center of the U.S. military presence and NATO moved to the south of Kyrgyzstan. The main points of interest of the U.S. and NATO are the Batken region. In Batken region are active Western non-governmental organizations, mainly British and American, about 50 organizations. Batken region can be completely cut off from Kyrgyzstan and will be fully under the control of the United States and NATO. 185 http://www.wfp.org/countries/kyrgyzstan/overview 186 “Stoletie” article in local Kyrgyz agency by I.Pankratentko. 268 4.1. Investment and technology of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in Tajikistan Tajikistan is the poorest countries in Central Asia, Tajikistan’s external debt as at December 2011 were to 2.955 billion. USD, which is 53.1% of the country's GDP. According to World Food Programme the 47.2% of population living on less than 1.3 USD a day, majority of population are spending up to 80% of their income on food. Tajikistan is ranked the 125 out of the 187 states on the UNDP’s 2012 Human Development Index187. A positive trend registered in Tajikistan is to increase the rate of economic growth. The volume of GDP for the period of 2011 reached 30.0 billion Somoni (approx. 4.8 billion. EUR), compared with 2010, an increase of 7.4%. According to unofficial information, the total population migration to neighboring countries represents 2 million people (mainly they are looking for job in Russia and Kazakhstan). Number of economically active population in 2010 was 2.1 million people. According to ‘official’ statistics in the country only 114 thousand people was registered unemployed. Tajikistan is a priority country Slovak ODA since 2003, but the country has never implemented any project. In 2004, the UNDP Trust Fund has been contracted joint project of several countries of the Western Balkans and Asia, among them for Tajikistan. The Republic of Tajikistan is building its foreign economic relations, especially with neighboring countries, EU countries and US, as well as with international financial 187 http://www.wfp.org/countries/tajikistan/overview 269 organizations. In recent years, increasing the impact of the China in the country's economy, currently it is the largest creditor of Tajikistan. The EU development aid allocated for the development of Tajikistan for 2011-2013 financial aid of 62 million EUR. It also expressed its support for Tajikistan's accession to the WTO. Future cooperation with Czech Republic as well as Slovak Republic can focus on the development of small and medium enterprises, especially in the field of agriculture (agricultural equipment supplies, supplies technology for processing fruits and vegetables, packers, for cooperation at the enterprise and agro-food sector), in building thermal power plants, hydroelectric plants188, as well as the construction of roads. The advantages include high economic potential of hydropower, which provide 93.7% of the total energy needs of the country. Despite significant source of power energy, Tajikistan lack of it, especially in the winter months. On this basis based energy- intensive aluminum production and wide electrochemical complexes. One of the main sectors of the fuel and energy complex is the coal industry. The relatively poor quality oil is mined in the north and the south, natural gas in Vah and Gissar valleys. From sites for natural gas pipeline was built till Dushanbe. To the north of the country, however, gas supplies from Uzbekistan (total length of pipelines 400 km), brown coal (1 billion tons) to launch the construction of thermal power plant. In Tajikistan the 30 sites lignite, of which 5 are functional. Brown coal is mined in open manner (which brings forth environmental problems). Total resources of hydrocarbon raw materials are estimated at 1,033.76 million tons, of which 113.1 million tons of oil, 863 billion m 3 of gas and 36 million tons of gas condensate. There is benefit from mining location to the 188 According absolute indicators of Tajikistan is on 8th place in the world in hydropower resources (300 billion. kW / year). 270 north of Tajikistan (Eastern Supetau, Rejgan, Kashkakum and Eastern Olimtoj). Tajikistan is heavily dependent on oil and gas supplies from Uzbekistan 189. TABLE 5.1.: TURNOVER BETWEEN CZECH REPUBLIC AND TAJIKISTAN Turnover between Czech Republic and Tajikistan in thousands EUR € 64.300 € 59.300 € 54.300 € 49.300 € 44.300 € 39.300 € 34.300 € 29.300 € 24.300 € 19.300 € 14.300 € 9.300 € 4.300 -€ 700 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Export Import Trade Balance Turnover Turnover between Czech Republic and Tajikistan in thousands EUR Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 € € € € € € € Export 1.809 1.819 5.261 5.993 2.885 3.988 5.035 € € € € € € € Import 56.209 15.156 1.632 2.255 3.291,00 2.662 1.623 Trade € € € € -€ € € Balance 54.401 13.337 3.629 3.738 406,00 1.326 3.412 € € € € € € € Turnover 58.018 16.974 6.893 8.248 6.176,00 6.650 6.658 Source: According to: MZV ČR The difficult economic situation in Tajikistan has reduced the volume of trade with the Czech Republic for the first five months of 2012. Czech exports in comparison with the same period in 2011 declined by 14% and imports by 23%. The main problem of the further development of the Czech export is an unpaid debt of about USD 2 million for 189 From 24.2.2011, the Government abolished the daily limit on power consumption. In some regions, however, still remained overnight limit consumption over time from 22.00 am to 5.00 pm. 271 previously supplied equipment for the cement plant in Dushanbe. Due to that the insurance company EGAP 190 is unable to insure new export credits, which naturally inhibits the negotiations on the supply of equipment of the Czech Republic for the construction investment and economic development in Tajikistan. Representation of Embassy in Tashkent through Embassy of Tajikistan in Uzbekistan by diplomatic note dated April 4, 2012 petitioned on the case of early debt repayment. In 2013 the Czech government in the Tajik city of Vahdat put into operation plant for the production of bottled (in plastic bottles) of mineral water capacity of 2,000 sheets per hour. Water is produced under the brand name OFTOBAK. TABLE 5.2.: List of valid international agreements between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Tajikistan 1. Protocol on Cooperation between the Ministry of signed in Prague, February 11, Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic and the 1994 Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Republic of Tajikistan 2. Agreement between the Czech Republic and the signed in Prague, February 11, Republic of Tajikistan on the Promotion and Reciprocal 1994 Protection of Investments, corrected notes dated 18.7. 1994 17.2 1995 3. Convention between the Czech Republic and the signed in Dushanbe, November Republic for the avoidance of double taxation with 7, 2006 respect to taxes on income and capital Source: MZV. ČR In mutual trade balance between Slovakia and Tajikistan: the most important import items are cotton, aluminum, agricultural products and electricity. The most important export items are petroleum products, chemicals, machinery and equipment, and textiles. 190 EGAP – Credit Insurance Corporation, founded in Czech Republic in 1992, Czech Republic has shareholder rights through Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Industry and Trade, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 272 TABLE 5.3: TURNOVER BETWEEN SLOVAK REPUBLIC AND TAJIKISTAN Turnover between Slovak Republic and Tajikistan in thousands EUR € 10.000,000 € 7.500,000 € 5.000,000 € 2.500,000 €- 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 -€ 2.500,000 -€ 5.000,000 -€ 7.500,000 Export Import Trade Balance Turnover Turnover between Slovak Republic and Tajikistan in thousands EUR Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 € € € € € € € Export 0,501 0,411 0,559 1.068 0,496 524,000 1.095,000 € € € € € € € Import 6.911 1.732 0,012 0,002 0,002 11 7 Trade -€ -€ € € € € € Balance 6.410 1.321 0 1.066 0,34 513 1.088 € € € € € € € Turnover 7.412 2.143 0 1.007 0,35 535 1.102 Source: According to: Štatistický úrad SR, MH SR TABLE 5.4.: List of valid international agreements between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Tajikistan 1. Agreement between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Tajikistan signed in February 14, 1994 on the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments Source according to: Štatistický úrad SR, MH SR 273 5.1. Investment and technology of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in Turkmenistan Turkmenistan is a neutral state, its foreign policy line implements the principles bilateral mutually beneficial cooperation, and however, does not reject or cooperation at the multilateral level. On the contrary, refuses to participate in military or military- political blocs. Turkmenistan is a member of international organizations and agencies, such as the UN, OSCE191, IMF192, IBRD193, Asian Development Bank, UNESCO, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, etc. Turkmenistan is a recipient of development aid (mainly USA). In 2012 the officials of Turkmenistan reported that the 18 foreign volunteers must leave the country. In recent years, Turkmenistan has reduced the number of volunteers from other countries that could receive. In 2013, had come only six people, while in 2003-2005, the volunteers were almost 10 times more194. Over the last decade been built in Turkmenistan dozens of industrial enterprises, most of which were built by foreign companies. Currently under construction are about 90 industrial buildings. Of the total volume of industrial production is fuel-energy complex 27.5%, chemicals 5.4%, 5.1% engineering, light industry 41% (is essentially a primary processing of cotton). The dominant is mining industry but still poorly developed. Natural resources are natural gas, oil, sulfur, iodine, ferrous metals, potassium and 191 OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 192 IMF- International Monetary Fund 193 IBRD – International Bank of Reconstruction and Development 194 By the end of 2012, the Peace Corps has completed its mission in Turkmenistan 274 mined salt. Fuel and energy sector is the most important part of economy; practically on this sector depends the entire economy of the country. In Turkmenistan operates 149 mining places for gas and gas condensate reserves of 49707.8 billion m3 of gas. Daily production represents 220 million m3. By long-term plan in 2030 Turkmenistan will increase its production to 230 billion m3 of gas per year, of which 70% for export. Electro-Energy is among the leading industries in Turkmenistan. Options of energy potential not only settle for the country’s needs, but also allow supplying to neighboring countries. To generate electricity Turkmenistan uses inexpensive and environmentally clean fuel natural gas. Relations between the EU and Turkmenistan follows the document “The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership”, which was adopted in June 2007. Considering to Czech and Turkmen mutual relations - Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Turkmenistan was signed in May 1998. “Interim Trade Agreement” was signed in November 1998. In May 2008, it was signed Memorandum of Understanding for cooperation in the energy sector. EU objectives in Central Asia, respectively Turkmenistan, are evident from the EC Regional Strategy for Central Asia 2007-2013 and Central Asia Indicative Program 2011 – 2013. A Czech export to Turkmenistan is developing positively, the annual index of the Czech export in 2013 reached 127.1%. The main commodities in commodity exports from Turkmenistan are natural gas, petroleum products, crude oil, electric energy, cotton yarn. The main commodities in commodity imports from Czech Republic represent technological equipment, transport equipment, electrical equipment, steel products and building materials. 275 TABLE 6.1. TURNOVER BETWEEN CZECH REPUBLIC AND TURKMENISTAN Turnover between Czech Republic and Turkmenistan in thousands EUR € 30.000 € 20.000 € 10.000 €- 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Export Import Trade Balance Turnover Turnover between Czech Republic and Turkmenistan in thousands EUR Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 € € € € € € € Export 5.889 14.922 9.344 12.735 12.169 17.599 17.897 € € € € € € € Import 340 780 75,000 324,000 1.109,000 661 1.494 Trade € € € € € € € Balance 5.549 14.142 9.269 12.411 11.061,00 16.937 16.402 € € € € € € € Turnover 6.230 15.702 9.419 13.058 13.278,00 18.260 19.391 Source: According to: MZV ČR TABLE 6.2. List of valid international agreements between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Turkmenistan 1. Protocol on Cooperation between the Ministry of signed in Ashkhabad, September, Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic and the 9 1993 Ministry of Economy and Finance of Turkmenistan 2. Convention between the Czech Republic and The Czech Government Turkmenistan for the avoidance of double taxation and approved to sign April 7, 2003, prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on however, has not yet been income and property signed. Source: MZV.ČR In April 2010 in Ashgabat took place 1 st “Turkmen Gas Congress” together with senior officials of the Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan congress attended by 276 representatives of the world's leading energy companies and EU Energy Commissioner G. Oettinger. The Czech government delegation was represented by Ambassador at Large for Energy Security V. Bartuška, Ambassador R. Kopecky, who later on the handover of credentials in Ashgabat on 28 September 2010 held a meeting with senior representatives of the Ministry of Petrochemical Industry of Turkmenistan and agreed upon the possibility of adopting a mission of Czech companies in Ashgabat. In 2012 took place the meeting with Turkmen officials and Czech party about the processing of authorization for over flight specials of Army of the Czech Republic through the Turkmenistan to Afghanistan. Have been also discussed current issues in the field of economic cooperation. Representatives of the Czech Embassy mentioned significant business case; supplier implemented the Czech Republic - equipment for drying natural gas deposits Dovletabad 3 state company “GK Turkmengaz”. A supplier contract worth nearly 140 million USD is the Brno Company DOMINANTA GROUP. 5.1.1. Gas export routes from Turkmenistan 1. Turkmenistan-Russia (CAC Central Asia-Center) - capacity 45 bln.m3/year, 2 Turkmenistan-China through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the length of the pipeline is 1800 km, capacity 40 bln.m3/year; construction terminated at the end of year 2009 is in operation 3. Caspian pipeline - signed an agreement on the implementation of the Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan 4. Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAPI) with links to India - operates a consortium working on the project. November 20, 2013 in Ashgabat was signed the 277 service agreement for the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI). The basic document for the promotion of TAPI is signed in 2010 Ashgabat intergovernmental agreement of the States Parties to start practical implementation of this project. In May 2012, the Turkmen government has signed an agreement for the sale of the Indian GAIL ltd and State Gas Systems of Pakistan. The corresponding agreement was signed with Afghanistan in July 2013. 195 5. In 2010, construction began the pipeline “East – West” with a length of 1000 km with links northwestern mining towns with Caspian pipeline (length 600 km), or with a link under the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and connection to the planned pipeline bound for Europe TABLE 6.3.: TURNOVER BETWEEN SLOVAK REPUBLIC AND TURKMENISTAN Turnover between Slovak Republic and Turkmenistan in thousands EUR € 50.000 € 40.000 € 30.000 € 20.000 € 10.000 €- -€ 10.000 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 -€ 20.000 -€ 30.000 -€ 40.000 -€ 50.000 Export Import Trade Balance Turnover 195 At this stage of a legal framework for addressing issues related to the formation of a consortium of TAPI, which will provide financing and construction of the power line. The design capacity of the TAPI is up to 33 billion m3 of gas per year. The length of the pipe may reach 1,735 kilometers. Highway should reach out to the largest gas field in Turkmenistan “Galkinish” through the Afghan cities of Herat and Kandahar, and reach its final point - the Community Fazilka, on the border between India and Pakistan. 278  Turnover between Slovak Republic and Turkmenistan in thousands EUR Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 € € € € € € € Export 866 2.772 4.015 2.220 2.583 2.784 3.642 € € € € € € € Import 671 1.946 4.000 2.203 2.571 826 151 Trade -€ € € € € € € Balance 40.933 1.120 3.985 2.186 2.559,00 1.958 3.491 € € € € € € € Turnover 41.604 826 15 17 12,00 3.610 3.793 Source: According to: Štatistický úrad SR, MH SR Priority basis for the development of foreign business is the supply of foreign investments especially in sectors of strategic importance, adapted to legal base, which is the customs duties and tax relieved imported goods, and deposit of a foreign entity for its own production and needs. TABLE 6.4. List of valid international agreements between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Turkmenistan 1. Protocol on Cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the signed in November 17, 1994 Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan 2. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the signed in June 22, 1996 Government of Turkmenistan on mutual abolition of visa requirements of holders of diplomatic and service passports 3. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the signed in August 8, 1996 Government of Turkmenistan for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to income taxes and on capital 4. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the signed in August 8, 1996 Government of Turkmenistan on cooperation in the fight against international terrorism, narcotics trafficking and other organized crime 5. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the signed in October 24, 1996 Government of Turkmenistan on air transportations Source according to: Štatistický úrad SR, MH SR 279 Conclusion In the first chapter were mentioned this model of thesis: FIGURE 1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK Institutions Interests Actors Central Asia Transition Geopolitical Security issues context Natural resources In order to conclude these issues are presented following points: 1. For institutional building up in region it is important to be able to adopt models of Czech Republic and Slovak Republic, even though these countries still are undergoing of transitional economics stage 2. The relevance of main actors in Central Asia shown in comparative analysis, by which we can conclude that not all actors have equal interests and that global governance will not proceed at the same speed to assist the tension, risk of conflicts in region 3. Future importance of a strategic evolution of present and future of energy perspective is crucial for region due to their abundance of natural resources and lack effective and innovative technologies 280  4. The relevance of conceptuality in national politics’ changes necessary for development of region in order to adopt and adapt the transitional models of ex- socialists countries as Czech Republic and Slovak Republic 5. Transition period brings new challenges in national policies of these countries, for future cooperation links are important to have focus on institutional pillars, to strengthen the cooperation in security issues, and last but not least the innovations, new technologies for economic growth and fully involvement of local economies in global market and transforming their natural resources oriented sectors to highly productivity sectors of economy. Comparative table of principal characteristic of policies mentioned in the thesis regarding to Central Asia: TABLE 17: COMPARATIVE TABLE OF PRINCIPAL CHARACTERISTICS OF POLICIES Source: Adopted from Losada, 2000 Policies in the past Contemporary situation Criteria Institutional order Institutional changes Style Predicted, planned development Patterns of corruption, clientelism, clan-based norms, patrimonialism Strategy One strategy for all socialist Each country has own strategies countries Regulation Systematic Non systematic Planification Planned economy and policy Adapting strategies and policies Policy Maintenance of status quo State building contents Central governance Market development Integrated economy Legislation building Industry building 281 During numerous intergovernmental commissions’ meetings the representatives of Central Asian countries were interested in this transformation process. Nevertheless, all these local governments should be aware of not only liberalization and stabilization are sufficient for successful transformation but most importantly adequate legislation and market institutions must be introduced in Central Asian region. The objectives of thesis were to focus and to analyze at institutional changes in Central Asian region, as we could see that this region is still under the process of institutional building up, the transformation of post-socialist countries is interesting and instructive, but also in their specific case institution and political leadership failed short facing the challenge of their programs. The analysis of development of relations between Central Asian states and Czech Republic along with Slovak Republic shows that these countries have not yet come close to their potential of cooperation. The dynamics of cooperation demonstrates the growth of trade numbers and collaboration links every year. As it seen in thesis the EU's foreign and security policy is present in region but more effective foreign policy is lead by Chinese government. Indicated data in thesis are showing the high numbers of trade between Central Asian countries and China, having in mind that EU is presented by many member countries, nevertheless China has a great potential in this region. The interests of the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic are mainly in economic sphere in this thesis are presented information about actual projects of cooperation between countries as well as statistics of volume of trade. The analysis of relevance of actors in region shows the necessity of EU foreign policy new approach in region, which might have dimension not only about the situation in Afghanistan after 2014, .but also regarding the Russian policy after Crimea annexation. 282 Another aspect of successful transformation of economies is regional cooperation. The first agreements on regional cooperation between Central Asian countries have been achieved in 1993. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan signed an agreement on measures to deepen economic integration, and in January 1994. However, “the process did not work” despite periodic statements on the need and the importance of regional integration, the countries of Central Asia have not been able to create an effective regional organization for several reasons, the key of which is at the political level is the unwillingness of the current generation of Central Asian elites to limit the sovereignty for the sake of strategic objectives. “Subjective factors”, in particular, the rivalry for regional leadership, personal relationships between presidents initially prevented recognizing an objective and logical socio-cultural integration. For efficient development of countries and value added regional cooperation is necessary to liberalize the political and economic levels of governance with greater transparency and accountability of the executive branch. Introduce the necessary elements of an effective control not only for the development of each country, but also as a means to support key aspects of cooperation. Reforms aimed at improving good governance should include the reform of public institutions and to address some issues related to corruption and governance that promote fruitful cooperation. It should be implemented the anti-corruption measures, these programs should be targeted to areas that deserve special attention in terms of victims of corruption, government financial agencies, including tax and customs agencies, the judiciary, police and border services. To participate in regional cooperation and regional organizations to strengthen reforms to generate economic and social benefits of integration, this in turn will provide the political impetus for further reforms domestically. International organizations should support national reforms and promote regional cooperation and integration through joint evaluating reforms in accordance with agreed standards and mechanisms for conflict 283 resolution. This support is provided by the European Union, in particular through the programs: BOMCA196, which helps to increase security in the Central Asian region, also assisting towards the contribution of legitimate trade and transit, and minimize any kind of the illicit trafficking; Program DIPECHO197 in the field of disaster preparedness covers all five Central Asian countries. CADAP198 helps on identifying actions to address particular problems associated with illicit drug issues. Czech party takes part actively in CADAP is divided into four programs DAMOS 199, MEDISSA200, TREAT201 and OCAN202, one component DAMOS run by Czech representatives. As well as maintain a network of public organizations, including regional chambers of commerce, non-governmental organizations dealing with key issues such as the environment, gender, human rights, and so on. For example Slovak chamber of commerce and Chamber of trade and commerce of Kazakhstan have cooperation ties; also the NGOs of countries are having results of collaboration. International community should support national reforms aimed at strengthening the accountability and transparency of governments in Central Asia, the eradication of 196 BOMCA – The Border Management Program in Central Asia (BOMCA) is large EU-UNDP assistance program in Central Asia 197 DIPECHO – Disaster Preparedness ECHO dedicated preparedness, launched in 1996; ECHO has invested more than €255 mil. in disaster preparedness. 198 CADAP – Central Asia Drug Action Program is EU funded program dedicated to assisting the further development of effective, comprehensive drug policies in Central Asia. 199 DAMOS – implemented by ResAd, Czech Republic, to help the governments develop a better understanding of the drug trafficking, drug use, misuse and abuse, as well as their consequences in Central Asia. 200 MEDISSA – implemented by the National Bureau for Drug Prevention (KBPN) Poland, to help the governments prevent potential new drug users and reduce the number of current drug addicts by better informing the public of drug usage risks. 201 TREAT – implemented by Zentrum fur interdisziolinare Suchforschiung of Hamburg University (ZIS), Germany, to support the introduction of modern drug addiction treatment methods within the public health system and the prison system. 202 OCAN – implemented by GIZ, Germany, to help to project management issues of all three specific components. 284 corruption by providing analytical, technical and financial assistance. Promote cooperation and support of regional institutions in developing programs at the national and local level, including targeted programs for conflict resolution, border management and the development of networks of organizations across the region. However, for the effective activity of the EU and the international community, including the immediate neighbors in the region, bilateral partners and donors, and multilateral organizations must not only have common goals, but also to work together. This is a challenging task in the context of geopolitical rivalry and differences in political systems and the views of the various partners in Central Asia. This dissertation as is trying to compose an apparently impossibly task: Great Central Asian region building up; EU most advanced laboratory of political, economic, institutional, social, environmental and cultural and human capital approach because it is very special condition of non statehood union, that means partnership between sovereign, independent, free countries; in this large frame the case of Czech and Slovak Republics very well interpreter how to connect the past to the future with reverence to Central Asia, for countries which has been for a long part of past century into so called USSR bloc. It is now time in the contemporary history, in international relations theories, in transnational and regional cooperation experiences, on the way all over the world to make clear the starting point of this dissertation, only EU could become a credible? fusible, flexible example and modern for future regional aggregation not only in Europe and Asia but also in Africa, Latin America and Asia Pacific quagmire. In the last process of EU enlargement still undergoing with the last membership of Croatia and ongoing negations with Balkan countries, Central and Eastern Europe had 285 assume a great role and in bridging problems and incapability, cultural and ideological barriers historical reason of conflicts, ethnical and language tensions, as nobody could have imagine as singing the founding the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Czech and Slovak republics in this sense are two small laboratories what we have said page after page in this dissertation. Climbing this rocky mounting of these challenging problems, the main support came to me, defending today this dissertation from the personal experience of almost ten years, living, working, studying in these countries. Statistically the number appears small. Trade, investment, bilateral agreement, European programs, even huge international development projects, could leave the great experience of Prague and Bratislava into the fog of the tables, numbers, percentage and comparative indexes. But a more careful weighted exam based on a wide reference text and reports utilized to this and allows us to conclude that a experiences of the last ten years had demonstrated how much in EU small partner had be extremely well performing in main policy of the Union. If the cornerstone of this dissertation aims and scope of the giving the perspective of the “Great Central Asian” regional building up, adopting of the EU non statehood to this very different part of Eurasia. The second pillar is related to a strategic evolution of present and future of oil producing countries vis-á-vis alternative energy perspective and already experimented new technological alternative to energy production (we talking of solar, wind, water, biomass and other small but available sources, nowadays usable due to technology advanced). Both are the follow up of the nuclear energy plants experiences and completely new innovation application of hydrogen turbine fuel cells, and fall out form these experimental prototypes to the industrial, civil and military use. 286 As could be easily imagined we are touching issues that in next 20-30 years will completely reshape not only the way of production the logistic of international trade, the flows of foreign direct investments but of our societies and the same human being role inside of new highly developed but not integrated world. Global governance will not proceed at the same speed and then we will assist the tension, risk of conflicts and citizens reaction in front of inequality and distribution of big change of third industrial revolution. All this said considering that Czech and Slovak Republics historically are playing the great mediation and integration role of differences not only in politics and economics as well as cultural, scientific, ideological and religious multiplicity, we focus the attention of this small scale laboratory to explain the EU enlargement as well as the experimental regional cooperation going on beyond the enlargement itself, this is the case of Central Asia. Of course this ambitious aims and scope of dissertation cannot answer to all the many contradictions and work in progress; still going on inside the same EU as the different speed institutional building up from one side and many initiatives and attempts to converge of these same regional approach conclusions even beyond the possible EU enlargement. I have collaborated my analysis with data, indexes, long and short term trends, weighted and international accepted criteria measurement social factors and outcomes, but I understand we need to go further as I have experienced a lacking of really sound, comparative, reliable data regarding Central Asian countries in front of the Eurostat very “to the point” database. I believe this could become my second step of research to which my intellectual efforts. 287 APPENDICES Position of Tajikistan Position of Uzbekistan 1. The transportation issues Blocking by Uzbekistan transit trains with Forced shutdown for a short time on the Tajik cargoes through the ruined railroad transit of cargo on railway line ‘Galaba- bridge on the stretch ‘Galaba-Amuzang’ Amuzang’ was related with the tragic events allegedly because of “terrorist act”. (so called “terroristic act”) whichtook place in December 2011 Uzbek authorities' refusal to assistance in the As a result of the full deterioration of the reconstruction of the Tajik side of the road railway line, which was built more than 50 section; reconstruction work in this sector years ago, and often repeated accidents do has not begun. not allow to use its throughput capacity by more than 10 per cent and further to its the safe operation A railway line is of vital importance for the All goods with destination to the Khatlon socio-economic support of Khatlon and area Tajik railway freely transmitted to other Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast of parts of the railroad of Tajikistan through the Republic of Tajikistan, representing interstate seam point Kudukli and delays in nearly three million people. Due to moving cars in this area are not take place. transportation blockade inhabitants of these areas were left without consumer goods, petroleum products, international humanitarian aid, including hospitals, schools and other social facilities. 2. The gas conflict January 5, 2012 Tajikistan signed an “Uztransgaz” fully complied with its agreement on a phased delivery of 200 specified for the current year guaranteed million cubic meters of Uzbek gas in 2012. contract deliveries of 45 million cubic meters In March, the Uzbek side stated that since natural gas to “Tajiktransgas” and the matter April 1 2012 completely cuts off gas supplies is the subject of the interaction of economic to Tajikistan, citing the reason for the agents, as is customary in international increase of their exports to Russia and China, practice. In connection with the operation of thereby aggravating tensions supplying the the Turkmen and Uzbek gas pipeline system population of Tajikistan and industrial separately from each other, the transit of objects with natural gas. Turkmen gas through Uzbekistan is not 288  possible. 3. The transit of electricity The Uzbek side for several years already Uzbekistan's withdrawal from the "United absolutely prohibited transit of Turkmen Energy System of Central Asia" is related to electricity across its territory to Tajikistan. several factors: As a consequence of the Tajik Government is 1. ECO was established during the Soviet forced to introduce strict limit energy period as part of the Unified Energy System consumption throughout the country. of the USSR and post-Soviet times has shown its incapacity. 2. the lack of effective mechanisms for its normal operation, leading to the threat of industrial accidents, 3. Regular unauthorized withdrawals of Tajikistan's electricity from neighboring countries. 4. Uzbekistan made this decision following Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. 4. The Rogun HPP In recent years, the Uzbek side is trying to Uzbekistan declares "failure of the project" prevent the construction of the Rogun construction of the Rogun hydropower plant hydroelectric power station on the inland for several reasons: waters of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan Thus, 1. " Bad choice " area under construction , without any consultation with the due to its location in the area Ilyaksko Vahsh neighboring countries of the Aral Sea, has - fault " is characterized by episodic built on its territory dozens of reservoirs, catastrophic earthquake of magnitude 9 or which allows it to concentrate large amounts more on the Richter scale ." In the event of an of Amu Darya and Sir Darya, thereby accident at the Rogun hydropower plant, aggravating the plight of the Aral Sea. Rogun according to the Uzbek experts not just say HPP in Tajikistan is the construction of the this with pages Governmental edition of century, the money for its construction was Uzbekistan, the height of the waves rushed collected all over the world. Now there is a down with a speed of 130 meters per second, feasibility study for the construction of will be 100 meters. What would “destroy on Rogun by the World Bank. all other plant and waterworks of Vakh, flood dozens of towns and villages in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, triggering unprecedented in its scope and man-made environmental disaster in the region of Central Asia” 2. Also, the consequences of operating power plant, large-scale drought, famine, and disease, displacement of millions of people living in the lower reaches of the Amu Darya. 3. The Uzbek side offers Tajikistan instead of 289  the Rogun HPP construction in the upper reaches of the Amu Darya complex of small hydro power plants, “which absolutely exclude all risks and would solve the problem of energy supply in Tajikistan efficiently and, importantly, much cheaper” 5. De-mining of joint borders sectors On 54 joint border areas by the Uzbek side In the acute phase of the civil war in are established mines that threaten the life Tajikistan in 1992-1996. Uzbek law and health of the citizens of both countries. enforcement bodies have been forced to Minefields were laid in 1999 without mining (besides the territory of the Republic notifying the Tajik side and incomplete of Uzbekistan) on some high-altitude areas of accounting of joint delimitation - the state border height of at least 3.5 km, demarcation. Minefields are not immune and where there was risk of seepage gangs, as not labeled. During this period, these well as the uncontrolled flow of drug minefields. Tajik citizens were killed, among trafficking on the territory of Uzbekistan, as a them more than 100 civilians, 93 people normal communication through concerted were seriously injured, more than half of border areas transition and it does not raise them are children. These actions contradict any problems on both sides. the Uzbek side for centuries to shape the spirit of traditional friendship and good neighborly relations between the two nations, as well as the generally accepted norms of international humanitarian law and the majority of international acts. 6. The growth of customs tariffs Uzbekistan unilaterally year significantly An increase of tariffs is a forced and a increases the rate of the fee for the transitreprisal for the railway administration in passenger trains formed Tajik railway. In Uzbekistan, as the railway administration 2012, the increase was 60%. It should be Tajikistan “Roh ohaniTochikiston” for a short noted that this is the fourth increase in thetime at times increased tariffs, namely in coefficient of indexation by the Uzbek 2011, 3 times, in 2012 - by 40 %. In this case, government, which already held a 32% for the same period of the “Uzbekistan increase in the cost of imported goods in Railways”, respectively the increase was only Tajikistan and have a negative impact on the 30 % and 32 %. Tariff increase has been social situation in the country. affected by the growth of multiple prices for rolling stock, spare parts, fuel and lubricants, as well as operating costs. 7. The controversial section of the border - Farhad dam Remain unresolved for many years and the 290 delimitation and demarcation of the Tajik- Uzbek border on its remaining disputed sections, in accordance with Article 4 of the Agreement between the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan on "State border." In this case, the Uzbek side requires the transfer of its property section of the border, Farhad dam to the territory. The Tajik side sees this as an attempt to annex the territory of a sovereign Tajikistan. 291 Field work In addition to the research in order to evaluate copperation between countires were prepared the quitionarre for few interviewers, among them: Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Czech Republic to the Republic of Kazakhstan JUDr. Bedřich Kopecký. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the Czech Republic Anarbek Karashev Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Slovak Republic to the Republic of Kazakhstan Dušan Podhorsky Leading expert of the Agency of the Slovak Foreign Policy Ivo Samson Personal interview with Dušan Podhorsky. 26.04.2013 His Excellency D. Podhorsky during the conversation in Bratislava commented the policies and cooperation issues. - K.Maksut: What are the priorities of Slovak Foreign policy in Central Asia? - D.Podhorsky: Slovak Foreign policy in region has same agenda as EU foreign policy, with particular interest in new market due to potential of import, because these countries produce only 5% of products and import 95 % of product from abroad. All these countries are resource oriented, for example Kyrgyzstan has only one factory. Slovak business community has interest in joint companies, and technical assistance. - In 2013 is 20th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Slovakia and Kazakhstan, what are objectives of the strengthening cooperation? - First of all the area of nuclear physics, the certification assistance, educational programs, security training programs, medical training, medical tourism, science and technologies. In Slovakia and Czech Republic are excellent centers for cancer treatments, Kazakhstan is the second in the world according to its uranium resources, we can provide technologies and assistance to build up this industry. Cooperation of Czech and Kazakhs are improving in automobile industry due to Skoda factory. - In your opinion are there any major challenges for implementing the EU regional policy in Central Asia? - In my opinion the corruption, clan- based governance, government-business relations, the influence of other actors as Turkey (having neo-Osmanic or Neo- Ottoman ambitions in region, would like to bring together all Turkic speaking nations,), of course China, SCO and its military cooperation ties. - Are there any determination how the evaluation of cooperation is done and how the results are analyzed and applied? - The presence and successful work of joint companies, the effective work of intergovernmental organizations, the opening and functioning of all Vyšehrad 292  countries embassies in Kazakhstan, the increase of students’ mobility number. I would like to mention that if Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan will continue in their nationalistic policies I think it won’t bring any improvement in political dialogue between Slovak Republic and Czech Republic; because we do not like nationalistic tendencies bring up in policy making. - Thank you very much for your interview Your Excellency Personal interview with Ivo Samson 13.12.2013 I.Samson during the conversation in Bratislava regarding cooperation between countries commented following: - In my opinion for Slovak and Czech diplomats Kazakhstan is most perspective dialogue partner in Central Asia. - The Russian speaking generation of businessmen is able to do business in these countries. - For Central Asian countries could be interesting to study our experience of joining EU by implementing major institutional changes in country. - Slovak and Czech experts are ready to provide any assistance to their counter partners in Central Asia. Other three interviews did not reply to any questions and did not provide information. 293 TABLE 18: According to data of European Comission the statistics of trade between EU and CA: 294  This information provided by World Bank indicators. TABLE 19: 1. Kazakhstan - Foreign direct investment Foreign direct investment, net outflows (% of GDP) 295 TABLE 20: 2. Kyrgyz Republic - Foreign direct investment Foreign direct investment, net outflows (% of GDP) 296 TABLE 21: 3. Tajikistan - Foreign direct investment Foreign direct investment, net (BoP, current US$) 297 TABLE 22: 4. Turkmenistan - Foreign direct investment foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$) 298 TABLE 23: 5. Uzbekistan - Foreign direct investment Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$) 299 TABLE 24: Slovak Republic - Foreign direct investment Foreign direct investment, net outflows (% of GDP) 300 TABLE 25: Czech Republic - Foreign direct investment Foreign direct investment, net outflows (% of GDP) 301 LIST OF TABLE INDICATED IN THESIS: FIGURE 1: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK TABLE 1: KEY SOCIECONOMIC INDICATORS IN CENTRAL ASIA TABLE 2: KEY SOCIECONOMIC INDICATORS IN CENTRAL ASIA UN Data 1991 TABLE 3: IMPORTANT GLOBAL INDECES IN CENTRAL ASIA TABLE 4: POLITICAL GLOBALIZATION TABLE 5: ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION TABLE 6: GLOBALIZATION INDEX TABLE 8: INDICATORS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN CENTRAL ASIA TABLE 9: ANALYSIS OF MAIN ACTORS TABLE 10: ANALYSIS OF INTERESTS OF ACTORS TABLE 11: ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC PROJECTS IN REGION TABLE 12: LOGISTIC PROJECTS IN REGION TABLE 13: CAREC PROJECTS IN REGION TABLE 14: Analysis of Czech and Slovak Republics programs TABLE 15: ANALYSIS OF OBJECTIVES OF ACTORS TABLE 2.1: List of valid official documents in the economic sphere TABLE 2.2: List of valid international agreements between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Kazakhstan TABLE 2.3: TURNOVER BETWEEN CZECH REPUBLIC AND KAZAKHSTAN TABLE 2.4: TURNOVER BETWEEN SLOVAK REPUBLIC AND KAZAKHSTAN TABLE 2.5: List of valid international agreements between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Kazakhstan TABLE 3.1.: TURNOVER BETWEEN CZECH REPUBLIC AND UZBEKISTAN TABLE 3.2.: List of valid international agreements between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Uzbekistan TABLE 3.3.: List of valid international agreements between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Uzbekistan TABLE 3.4.: TURNOVER BETWEEN SLOVAK REPUBLIC AND UZBEKISTAN 302 TABLE 4.1.:List of valid international agreements between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan TABLE 4.2.: TURNOVER BETWEEN CZECH REPUBLIC AND KYRGYZSTAN TABLE 4.3.: TURNOVER BETWEEN SLOVAK REPUBLIC AND KYRGYZSTAN TABLE 4.5.: List of valid international agreements between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan TABLE 5.1.: TURNOVER BETWEEN CZECH REPUBLIC AND TAJIKISTAN TABLE 5.2.: List of valid international agreements between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Tajikistan TABLE 5.3: TURNOVER BETWEEN SLOVAK REPUBLIC AND TAJIKISTAN TABLE 5.4.: List of valid international agreements between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Tajikistan TABLE 6.1. 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