UNGA 2065 (XX) Question of The Falkland Islands 16 Dec 1965

Since the publication of the monograph by Isaac Areco, Titulos de la Republica Argentina a la Soberania y Possession de las Islas Malvinas, published in 1885,1 there have been numerous attempts to survey and resolve the centuries long conflict over the disputed Falklands (Malvinas)2 archipelago. What is noteworthy about many of these studies is that they are firmly based within the parameters of history; history shaped the dispute, therefore there is a presumption that history will resolve the dispute. This modest contribution to the question of the sovereignty over the Falklands (Malvinas) is distinct from these, as it does not peer back into this history in an attempt to answer the legal question as to where sovereignty should reside; instead, it considers the future; it acts to supplement previously produced literature by assessing the contemporary role of law in the pacific settlement of the Falklands (Malvinas) dispute. The paper which this presentation is based upon is comprised of three primary components. The first is, as is typical in works reflecting the Falklands (Malvinas) dispute, an overview of the contemporary status of the dispute. The second aspect presents the mechanisms that exist within international relations that might be utilised in order to bring about pacific settlement of the dispute. It builds on the work of Merrills, and others such as Raimondo, whose piece addressing the Role for the UN in relation to the sovereignty dispute over the Falklands (Malvinas) proved illuminating.3 In the final section, the focus of the presentation moves away from the doctrinal, and into the critical, broaching the fundamental question as to what is the relationship between international law and politics. Koskenniemi’s notion of international law as the ‘gentle civiliser of nations’ is adopted, and it is argued that when a political regime collapses law can play a crucial role in the establishment of the emergent political relationship. Finally, it will be assessed whether we are in the midst of one such moment, with the changing relationship between the UK and Argentina, as evidenced in the September 2016 joint statement4 - arguably precipitated by the changing political positions within both countries – being representative of this.

OUP, 1988

Historical Rights Self-Determination and British Sovereignty Two Principles of Self-Determination Sovereignty Redefine: Oil and the Falklands Dispute Sovereignty and the External Causes of the War Sovereignty and the Internal Causes of the War The Effect and Future of the Falklands Conflict

This article considers Britain’s relationship with the Falkland Islands and the wider context of UK–Argentine relations. It does so by considering three main themes. First, the current Argentine government’s strategy towards the Falklands (Islas Malvinas) and the manner in which the question of disputed ownership has been tied into wider Latin American relationships designed to unsettle UK and Falkland Islands interests. Second, the debate surrounding the defence of the Falklands is examined for the purpose of considering how this issue, especially sensitive given the 30th anniversary of the 1982 conflict, brings into sharp relief the implications of recent defence and spending reviews. Finally, the article aims to assess and evaluate the manner in which the Falkland Islands community engages with and responds to worsening UK–Argentine relations. It is concluded that UK–Argentine relations are in their worst state since 1982 and that there is little or no prospect of any improvement given the Argentine government’s commitment to force the UK into entering sovereignty negotiations. On its side, the UK and the Falkland Islands’ community do not believe that sovereignty is negotiable and would rather consider how more cordial relations could be established in a manner reminiscent of the late 1990s.

In 2008, two British authors with no academic profile, Graham Pascoe and Peter Pepper, published in English and in Spanish a booklet titled "Getting it Right. The Real History of the Falklands/Malvinas". Since then it has been published in different versions. The last one, officially distributed by the British government to the United Nations Decolonization Committee in June 2015, pompously entitled "False Falklands History at the United Nations: How Argentina misled the UN in 1964 - and continues to do so. " It is simply an attempt to rewrite history. The British unofficial pamphlet tries in vain to misrepresent the solid historical-juridical arguments that demonstrate Argentine sovereignty and tries to convince the reader that the islands are inhabited by a people of multinational origin who would be holder of the right of peoples to self-determination. The work of Marcelo Kohen and Facundo Rodríguez refutes each of the new British arguments, both from the historical and legal point of view. It gives the reader first-hand information, much of it hitherto not exploited in the abundant bibliography. It is an indispensable source for understanding the positions of the parties to the dispute whose solution is still pending.

International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 1985

During 1980 and 1981 the Anglo-Argentine dispute over the Falkland Islands attracted relatively little interest either in Britain or in the wider international community, and at the time it seemed easy to dismiss the topic as a trivial imperial postscript. Lord Carrington, British Foreign Secretary to April 1982, is alleged to have admitted that it rated number 242 on the Foreign Office's list of priorities.1 At the United Nations the Falklands question was far from being a mainstream issue and Sir Anthony Parsons, the British represettative at the time of the 1982 war, has confirmed that prior to 1982 the islands were perceived from the UN as 'very peripheral' in both the political and geographical senses.2 Only in Argentina was the matter treated as significant. However, the Falklands war transformed this situation, and the phrase 'the Falklands factor' was coined to refer to such changes, which included a surge of interest in the origins, nature and development of the dispute and an enhanced British commitment to the islands, reflected in successive ministerial statements and epitomized by Mrs Thatcher's visit to the Falklands in January 1983. Previously deemed unworthy of significant expenditure on account of their continuing economic and demographic decline,3 the islands had rated no visitor more important than a junior Foreign Office minister. In such circumstances their sovereignty had been treated as a subject for Anglo-Argentine negotiations. But the 1982 war changed all that, and in January 1983 Mrs Thatcher informed the islanders that she was 'converted' as regarded their position vis a' vis Britain. This was a point reaffirmed on several subsequent occasions, including her 1984 Christmas broadcast in which she asserted that 'I am not negotiating the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands with anyone, they are British'.4 The Falklands since the war As a result, Britain is committed now to retain the Falklands, to respect as 'paramount' the islanders' wishes for self-determination and to 'keep the Falklands British', to foster their economic and social development, and to defend them against a perceived Argentine threat. The so-called 'Fortress Falklands' policy symbolizes this new course, highlighted for example by the large garrison presence and the new airfield at * Dr Beck is Reader in International History at Kingston Polytechnic. His book on The international politics ofAntarctica is due for publication in late 1985. This article has been developed from papers delivered in May 1985 to the Advanced Policy Forum of the Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, and the Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales (CARI), Buenos Aires. 1. Walter Little, 'The Falklands affair: a review of the literature',