Many Students of Color have encountered cultural disrespect within their K-12 education relating to their names. While the racial undertones to the mispronouncing of names in schools are often understated, the authors argue that these incidents are racial microagressions- subtle daily insults that, as a form of racism, support a racial and cultural hierarchy of minority marginalization. Furthermore, enduring these subtle experiences with racism can have a lasting impact on the self-perceptions and worldviews of a child. Using a Critical Race Theory (CRT) framework and qualitative data, this study was designed to explore the racial microaggressions and internalized racial microaggressions of Students of Color in K-12 schools, as it relates to their names. Narratives were collected through individual interviews and email short answer questionnaires, through solicitation of various education list-serves. The data was coded for emergent themes, and is organized into three sections: 1) Racial microaggressions and names in school, 2) Internalized racial microagressions, and 3) Addressing racial microagressions and internalized microagressions in schools. The goal of this article is to name the racism that many Students of Color have endured in schools, as well as to heighten awareness in teachers to prevent further similar experiences.

This paper is an attempt to inject enthusiasm into the paradox of inaccessibility and the promotion of accessible environments through revisiting the impact of social exclusion and inaccessibility in the lives of disabled people. I undertake this rethinking of the inaccessibility question theoretically and jurisprudentially. My approach is to turn towards a ground breaking, albeit 11 year old European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case Price v United Kingdom (2001). I tease out the reasoning of this novel judgment and assess its possible application in other jurisdictions and social contexts. This paper discusses the ways that the court negotiates the matter of onto-violence experienced by a disabled woman in a particular space (a police cell and later prison hospital). Core to my analysis is the notion that society is governed by ableist relations that view civil society and civil(ized) environments on the basis of a particular reified citizenship – he who is young, abled bodied male and free. I unpack and explore the impact of those ableist relations in causing the arising of daily experiences of micro aggression and consequential internalized ableism. Disability jurisprudence is an emerging field in disability studies and this paper explores the novel form of argumentation adopted in Price to rethink the ways that law can provide a remedy for particularized social exclusion and the reframing of the parameters of the tolerance that associates inaccessibility as a form of microaggression. The paper is interdisciplinary in the sense that it is a conversation that brings together sociology, psychology, geography, disability studies and of course law, in dialogue to create an imaginary about the causation of social injury (onto violence) of inaccessible environments and imaginary possibilities for the establishment of legal norms that center and thus validate disabled peoples experiences, resulting in the cessation of not just onto-violence at the level of individual disabled people but also cessation systemically through the inauguration of anticipatory standards that are mindful of the diversity of communitarian life. In Part I of the paper I begin with a context discussion on the nature of social exclusion and then move to a conversation about experiencing onto-violence. In particular I unfold the concepts of microaggression, disability narcissism and internalized ableism to reveal the profound and accumulative consequences of inaccessibility beyond mere; albeit significant deprivation of access. Part II turns to human rights law, to the (ECtHR) case Price v United Kingdom (2001), in the form of a case analysis and then considers the judgment and its consequences for the reading of potential Sri Lankan approaches to disability jurisprudence through the lens of the Fundamental Rights provisions in the 1978 Constitution.

A theory of collective violence must explain both why it is collective and why it is violent. Whereas my earlier work addresses the question of why collective violence is violent, here I apply and extend Donald Black's theory of partisanship to the question of why violence collectivizes. I propose in general that the collectivization of violence is a direct function of strong partisanship. Strong partisanship arises when third parties (1) support one side against the other and (2) are solidary among themselves. Such support occurs when third parties are socially close to one side and remote from the other and when one side has more social status than the other. Third parties are solidary when they are intimate, culturally homogeneous, and interdependent. I focus in particular on lynching: Lynching is a joint function of strong partisanship toward the alleged victim and weak partisanship toward the alleged offender. Unequal strong partisanship appears in both classic lynchings (of outsiders) and communal ynchings (of insiders) across societies and history. Where partisanship is weak or strong on both sides, lynching is unlikely to occur. Evidence includes patterns of lynching in various tribal societies, the American South, imperial China, and medieval Europe.

There is an expansion of empirical research that at its core is an attempt to quantify the “feely” aspects of living in raced (and other stigmatized) bodies. This research is offered as part concession, part insistence on the reality of the “special” circumstances of living in raced bodies. While this move has the potential of making headway in debates about the character of racism and the unique nature of the harms of contemporary racism – through an analysis of stereotype threat research, microaggression research, and the reception of both discourses – I will argue that this scientization of the phenomenology of race and racism also stalls progress on the most significant challenges for the current conversation about race and racism: how to listen and how to be heard

Occurring in a broad range of non-western and western countries, violence committed against women in the name of family honor has been viewed in several ways, including as a crime, as gendered violence, or as a violation of human rights. But from a purely explanatory point of view, family honor violence is most profitably viewed as a type of social control, specifically penal social control. As punishment, honor violence appears to obey the same principles as other forms of punishment. Drawing on the theoretical strategy of pure sociology, the present article highlights two such principles: punishment increases with the social distance and social inferiority of the offender. These twin principles help to explain a broad range of facts about when and where family honor violence will occur, and how severe – in particular, how lethal – it will be.