Firesetting Firefighters: Reconsidering a Persistent Problem--Firefighter Arson Research

Volume 5 Matt Hinds-Aldrich, Assistant Professor of Fire Science at Anna Maria College and Ph.D. student at the University of Kent, United Kingdom Firesetting Firefighters: Reconsidering a Persistent Problem Abstract This article reconsiders the historical problem of firesetting firefighters. The research draws upon an original dataset of firefighters arrested (n = 1,213) for arson dating back to the early nineteenth century. The quantitative analysis provides an empirical foundation upon which I base a theoretical argument that questions traditional understandings of the problem. In par- ticular, I challenge the literature that suggests that firefighter arsonists exhibit a deviant and distinctive hero complex. I argue that the most striking feature of this problem is the fine line that separates enthusiastic young members who are always the first to help out from those who attempt to prove their meddle by creating opportunities to evidence their dedication and fire- fighting prowess. Introduction set fires inadvertently limits the utility of our mitigation The remarkable superiority in firefighting strategies. By taking a step back and reconsidering our displayed by Volunteer Company 2 of Beverly, to well-entrenched beliefs about what animates firefighter the chagrin of its rival, Company 1 there, went up arsonists, it is hoped that we can begin to develop a in thin smoke today.... more concerted and coherent response to the problem. Pressed to explain and contextualize the problem It all started as a result of the usual friendly of firefighter arsonists, social commentators and fire rivalry between “vamps.” It was on that basis for a service personnel alike tend to pull from every conceiv- time, but fires ordinarily being scarce in Beverly, able explanation. Some have speculated that it is tied Company 2 became impatient and ill content to to the atomization of local communities; others peg it to play checkers in the firehouse when there were the boredom of rural life, the success of fire-prevention honors to be won through “smoke-eating.” efforts, the moral hazard of financial remuneration, and especially the compulsion of psychological pathol- Then fires began breaking out with regularity. ogy (Lewis & Yarnell, 1951; United Press International Each time, no sooner did the alarm sound than [UPI], 1983; Marks, 1993; Huff, 1994; Dvorchak, 1995; the members of Company 2 were trundling their Cabe, 1996; Arbuckle, 2001a; Arbuckle, 2001b; Co- chemical engine to the street, and with that love lumbia Broadcasting System [CBS], 2003; Chulov, of thunderous noise peculiar to the fire-fighter, 2004; Australian Institute of Criminology [AIC], 2005a). were making their way to the scene whooping While each of these explanations begins to unravel like cowboys. (New York Times [NYT], 1931, the complexity of the firefighter arson problem, each March18) explanation fails to offer a coherent theory to account A quick glance at any of the major newswire services for the historical persistence of firesetting within the fire under the term firefighter is sure to bring up innumer- service. Moreover, most of these explanations are pred- able articles about lives saved and livelihoods ruined. icated upon the belief that this is, in fact, a new or at It is also likely to bring up a seemingly growing list least a growing phenomenon. The argument advanced of articles about firefighters charged with setting the here requires an honest assessment of the nature of very fires they were intended to fight. The apparent the fire service, which encourages us to avoid looking escalation of firesetting firefighters has forced the fire at firefighter arson simply as a problem of individual service not only in the United States but also across pathology but also one unintentionally conditioned by the world to acknowledge the problem and develop the fundamental paradoxes of the fire service. policies and strategies to address this concern. Despite In this article I offer an alternative understanding that (or perhaps because of) this attention, the number of reconsiders the contemporary thinking about firefighter firefighters arrested annually has apparently continued arsonists that tends to portray them as demonstrably to climb northward.1 This article addresses the problem different or even psychologically dysfunctional and by of firefighter arson by drawing particular attention to extension easily identifiable and excludable. To develop the underlying suppositions that inform the traditional this argument, I pull from a wide cross section of litera- understanding of the phenomenon of firesetting fire- ture as well as a purpose-built dataset of 1,213 firefight- fighters. More importantly, this article questions whether ers who have been arrested for setting fires dating back the traditional understanding of why some firefighters to the early 1800s.2 It is important to note that this is 33 International Fire Service Journal of Leadership and Management as much a theoretical work as a quantitative analysis. drew considerable attention on the idiosyncratic empiri- As such, the emphasis and distribution of this article cal minutiae of the particular small sample of arsonists is weighted towards the theoretical development and they happened to study rather than making generaliz- consequently delves deeper into the history and context able arguments about the nature of firesetting. of arson research, particularly as it relates to the study Spurred by the revolutionary writings of Sigmund of firefighter arsonists. Accordingly, the literature review Freud, the study of arsonists took on a new sense ends with an elaboration of my argument on the nature of urgency. What previous scholarship had lacked in of arson within the fire service. theoretical rigor, the work of Freud and his contempo- The second section concerns the empirical findings raries made up for in complex theoretical suppositions. of this research. I briefly touch upon the methodological Following this tradition, setting fires became but one concerns of this type of archival research before turning example of the impulses that lay just beyond the reach to the analytical portion of this research, which inte- of conscious thought — impulses everyone is (or could grates the data presentation with the data analysis/dis- be) subject to. It followed that if left unchecked, anyone, cussion. Given the problems of generalizing the sample not simply the so-called mentally disturbed, could fall available through the media archives to the unknown foul of socially acceptable norms and consequently population of firefighter arsonist, I limit my analysis to legal prohibitions. With respect to setting fires, Freud descriptive statistics in this article. The third and final (1930) suggested that the fires were part of a more section of the article concludes with a discussion of complex process whereby the arsonists attempted to the analytical and practical policy implications of such exercise some control over their lives by symbolically a perspective. In keeping with the tenor of the article, I urinating upon the flames. Thus, the emphasis was discuss how the argument advanced here forces us to placed upon the extinguishment of fires as opposed to reconsider our traditional one-size-fits-all policy sugges- their ignition. While Freud did not use this perspective tions regularly advocated. The article concludes with an to explain firesetting firefighters, Schmid’s work,1914, assessment of the future nature of the firefighter arson as cited in Lewis & Yarnell (1951, p. 196) and Stekel’s problem and possible directions for future research. work,1924, as cited in Lewis & Yarnell (1951, p. 196) did; noting among other things the high rates of en- Previous Literature uresis (bed-wetting) among those who wanted to be firemen. The study of firesetting amongst the very ones charged Where Freudian psychoanalysis was long on rich with protecting society from the scourge of fire has long theoretical suppositions, it was often short on solid captivated scholars and lay observers alike. Arsonists, empirical evidence. As a consequence, the backlash whether firefighters or not, have historically posed a that followed sought to ground psychological research considerable threat to social life. As society developed with observable and generalizable findings. Large-scale at breakneck speed, it was precariously positioned one studies, like that of Lewis and Yarnell (1951), attempted errant flame away from almost certain ruin. Conse- to strike a balance. Employing various sources ranging quently, arsonists were spared little mercy at the hands from psychiatric case histories to newspaper accounts, of the sovereign and the citizens alike. In the shadow Lewis and Yarnell paint a picture of arsonists as cold, of this strong public sentiment, the related disciplines dysfunctional, and ineffectual people. In contrast to of psychology and psychiatry were among the first to powerful people who have various means to secure take up the issue of arson so as to both protect society their social position and to affect revenge, they suggest from the threat of an arsonist and the arsonist from the that these weak people find themselves without the vengeance of society (Lewis & Yarnell, 1951). means or capabilities to keep up and are presumably As psychologists began to probe the troubled more likely to resort to the instrumental and affective psyches of arsonists, many seemed to defy logical capacities of arson to retaliate. The theme of power explanation. Pyromania soon filled the void and quickly has consequently served as a powerful moralizing became the catchall category lacking a much-needed trope because it sought to place sole responsibility measure of specificity (Geller, McDermeit, & Brown, back squarely on the shoulders of the deviant arson- 1997; Doley, 2003a). Thus, pyromania was presumably ists themselves. As such, it also served to distance the the psychological motivation behind firesetting; and the normal us from the abnormal them. fact that they set fires was often adequate evidence that This polemic intention was particularly noticeable they were pyromaniacs (Huff, Gary, & Icove, 2001). This when Lewis and Yarnell turned their attention to fire- logical circularity allowed researchers to find pyroma- fighters and fire buffs arrested for setting fires or calling niacs in all walks of life: among prepubescent female in false alarms. With poetic disdain, Lewis and Yarnell servants (Lewis & Yarnell, 1951), epileptics (Meshede’s (1951) write: “A craving to be the center of the stage work, 1873, as cited in Lewis & Yarnell, 1951), and even and the recipient of public acclaim, even for once, is those actively engaged in the fire-suppression effort (de within the soul of every person — the smaller the man, Montyel’s work, 1885, as cited in Lewis & Yarnell, 1951). the more he secretly wishes such type of recognition” As will become important later, these early studies (p. 193). Nowhere, they argue, is this more salient than confused description for explanation and consequently 34  Volume 5 with “volunteer firemen [sic] who set fires.” (p. 193). In a ment, profit, and extremism. The extensive research passage worth repeating in full, they continue: agenda that followed was thus intended to validate and elaborate the suggested links between the catalogued Probably, many of these men who become regu- motivations and the behavioral minutiae (Icove & Es- lar firemen, were indirectly influenced in making tepp, 1987; Sapp 1994; Sapp & Huff, 1994; Sapp, Huff, this vocational choice by a childish desire to be- & Gary, 1994). While these studies seemed to distance come a fireman, who could put out fires and be themselves from the fuzzy empiricism of the psycho- praised for saving lives and property; or because analysts, they simply obscured their shared interest in they were fundamentally not aggressive and did power within their behavioral typologies and psycho- not like to force their way in competition; they logical profiles. preferred the security and routine of an organiza- The notion of psychological profiling, or more tion such as offered by the fire department, with accurately Criminal Investigative Analysis, advanced its indirect identification with power and fame. by the NCAVC is problematic for the study of arsonists and firefighter arsonists in particular. The problem rests It is in the volunteer fire departments, orga- in part with the linguistic fluidity surrounding the related nized by “public-minded” citizens for the mutual terms — profiles and profiling, which owes much to the protection of their own property, that this factor wildly imaginary portrayal of the latter in the popular assumes importance. (p. 193) culture. The problem becomes particularly apparent While it is less clear whether their distain is directed at when one confuses a profile — a composite portrait firefighters in general or the arsonists that occasionally of the likely characteristics of a statistically average populate their ranks, what is clear is that they share person — with the practice of profiling — hypothesizing the view of F. R. Morgaridge that “the same reason the characteristics of an unknown individual from a mix that prompts a man to join a volunteer fire department of investigative information and intuition. The problem sometimes leads him to set fires” (National Fire Pro- lies in the clever rhetorical trick employed by Douglas tection Quarterly [NFPQ], 1927, p. 217).3 Here again et al. (2006), whereby simple phrases like tend or choosing to simply pass the political hot potato only generally transform the flat empiricism of quantitative serves to further cloud the issue. The strong moralizing datasets into the seductive imagery of offender profiles tendency is understandable given the considerable derived by profiling. That is where discrete statistical sense of betrayal many analysts likely harbor, though findings give way to questionable poetic license: getting mired in pedantic political and intellectual jousts The typical excitement arsonist is a juvenile or does little to address the issue at hand — preventing young adult male with ten or more years of for- further occurrences. mal education. This offender is generally unem- The questions of power and pyromania began ployed, single and living with one or both parents. to take a backseat to the question of motive, which His family tends to be from the middle-class presumed to offer more meaningful guidance to those or lower-middle-class bracket. In general, this actually engaged in the business of catching and pros- offender is socially inadequate, particularly in ecuting arsonists. Inciardi (1970), for instance, offered heterosexual relationships. (Douglas et al., 2006, a six-pronged typology to classify the motivations for p. 268, emphasis added) committing arson — revenge, excitement, institution- alized, insurance-claim, vandalism, and to cover up Besides failing to offer any measure of comparison be- another crime. This effort to classify motives gained tween this subset of arsonists and the wider population, considerable momentum, particularly as the incidents they manage, by referring to this type of analysis as a of arson appeared to reach epidemic proportions in the profile, to wrap traditional empirical findings in the emo- early 1980s (see Doley, 2003b, for a review). Much of tive language of deviancy and thus they paint offenders this momentum can be traced to the work of Federal as aberrant, abnormal, or simply different.4 Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent Anthony The concern about the casual use of terms like Rider (1980a, 1980b, 1980c) who used a study of ar- profiles is driven home when we look at the firefighter sonists to develop an argument for the utility of psycho- arson research conducted by Timothy Huff (1994) and logical profiles, a point I will return to shortly. Ken Cabe (1996), who both drew upon this trend of In the early 1990s under the auspices of the Na- offering composite profiles of likely offenders. Huff’s and tional Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC), Cabe’s analyses, which only really differed noticeably Rider’s contemporaries attempted to match crime- in terms of whether the arsonist worked alone or in a scene behaviors to classificatory motivational sche- group, reminds us of the impact of inadvertent sampling mata (Douglas, Bugress, Burgess, & Ressler, 2006). biases, which further complicates the utility of profiles.5 With regards to arson, Douglas et al. (2006) drew upon More importantly, the profiles they developed suggested Inciardi’s (1970) typology, offering a revised six-pronged that the firesetting firefighters appear to be anything typology, which has by now become the de facto but qualitatively distinct from their non-firesetting col- standard employed by academics and practitioners leagues. Cabe (1996) argues that firefighter arsonists alike: vandalism, excitement, revenge, crime conceal- tend to be: “White males, age 17–26, … have poor 35 International Fire Service Journal of Leadership and Management relationships with their father, and over protective moth- can take from this more circumspect perspective is that ers, … are fascinated with the fire service and its trap- there might be a more grounded reason for the fireset- pings,” and so on (pp. 7–10, emphasis added). Cabe’s ting after all. profile only serves to distract from his more salient The great emphasis placed upon one’s commit- observations that offer a more robust explanation for ment to the fire service may create the very conditions the firesetting: whereby young members, in particular, take it just that one step too far. Thus, Terryville (NY) Fire Chief Robert Most of those arrested have less than 2 years Herold answers his own rhetorical question: “He was with the Fire Service, and most are associated devoted, dedicated, and dependable, there was no with a department that has few fire calls. They’ve indication whatsoever he had a problem” (UPI, 1983). completed a home study course plus 96 hours of Paradoxically, his devotion, dedication, and depend- formal instruction. They are excited, eager, and ability may have been part and parcel of the problem. motivated. And the alarm doesn’t sound nearly Now this is not to suggest that being dedicated causes enough. (pp. 7–10) firesetting or that all dedicated and devoted members The accuracy of the profiles is not the issue here. The have a propensity for setting fires, for that would be ab- issue is that by drawing upon the fuzzy rhetoric of pro- surd. What is being argued is that the desire to be ac- files, there is a tendency to lose the forest for the trees. cepted and respected by one’s peers and mentors may More recently, writing about the firefighter arson lead some firefighters to search for alternative means problem has become something of a cottage indus- to demonstrate their proficiency. This is exactly what try that has sustained considerable academic (Doley, Paul Reichenbach of the Office of the Pennsylvania Fire 1998, 2003c; Doley & Fineman [in press]; Smith, 2003; Commissioner notes: Kinney, 2003; Lindroth, 2003), fire service (Arbuckle, They’re generally younger, in their teens or early 2001a; Arbuckle, 2001b; Aurnhammer, 2002, 2006; 20s. They entered the fire service expecting a lot United States Fire Administration [USFA], 2003; AIC, of excitement and that’s typically not the case. 2005a, 2005b, 2005c; Murphy, J. K. & Murphy, 2010; They say, “We haven’t fought a fire in six months. Cumberland Valley Volunteer Fireman’s Association Let’s go start one”… They think they have to [CVVFA], 2010), and journalistic interest (Dvorchak, prove themselves to somebody. (Finley, 2008) 1995; Lee, 2002; CBS, 2003; Ansley, 2004; Warne- Smith, 2004; Chulov, 2004; Gazarik & Peirce, 2005; Here we draw together two important and related Holden, 2010; Ring, 2011). Now that the concern has themes: the desire for excitement and acceptance. begun to gain traction, many fire services around the While they do not take up the topic of firefighter world have rolled out various initiatives to thwart the arson themselves, John Benoit and Ken Perkins (1997) problem. Though despite this growing interest, little has (Perkins & Benoit, 2004) lend credibility to this explana- changed. If anything the number of incidents reported tion for the preponderance of young male firefighters in the media has continued to grow — a point I will in the dishonor rolls of firefighter arsonists. Benoit and return to shortly. Perkins (1997) suggest that when confronted with the unspoken, “boring reality of firefighting”— long periods Theoretical Perspective of inactivity occasionally punctuated by fleeting mo- ments of intense activity — new recruits either embrace So what are we to make of the firefighter arson prob- the service aspects of the fire service, whereby fire- lem? Once we begin to look beyond the limiting dis- fighting becomes “serious leisure,” or they leave the fire course of abnormality, we see another strand running service in search of misadventure elsewhere (p. 24). If throughout the literature on firefighter arsonists. That is, we reconsider Benoit and Perkins’ initial formulation, we we begin to see a pragmatic perspective that acknowl- might be able to argue that there exists an additional edges that the root of this deviance may well be unfor- third option. This possible third option suggests that tunately woven within the very fabric of the fire service. some ambitious and eager (young) firefighters may We see a perspective that suggests that overzealous actually create a third option by setting fires to satisfy firefighters take their effort to be model firefighters well the excitement they crave as well as to provide opportu- beyond the bounds of legal or acceptable behavior. If nities to put their newly honed skills into practice. we return to the work of Lewis and Yarnell (1951), for From this vantage point, there is some support for instance, we see another whole side of their analysis. the first of the two common motives offered for fire- We see 91 (generally young) men who, whether work- fighter arson — the desire for excitement. The second ing in groups (n = 40) or alone (n = 51), “have strong common explanation — the desire to be seen as a communal strivings, align themselves with fraternal hero, often termed vanity firesetting — is far more prob- organizations, crave the thrills and alleged heroic activi- lematic. The notion of vanity firesetting like pyromania is ties of the firefighters and enjoy the ceremonies and problematic for several reasons: the first concerns the the decorations allowed them for such work” (p. 205). circular logic employed whereby firefighter arsonists are Whether these characteristics were the cause or effect said to be motivated by a need to be seen as a hero, of their firesetting though remains to be seen. What we because firefighter arsonists are vanity firesetters and 36  Volume 5 vanity firesetters want to be heroes. More importantly, effort to remove a social blight from the local community these “would–be-hero firesetters” (p. 228) discussed and provide an opportunity for the arsonist and their by Lewis and Yarnell (1951) and others (Hoyek, 1951; colleagues to brush up on their skills. See Katz (1988) Inciardi, 1970; Orr, 1989)6 are presumed to have a for a theoretical elaboration of this inverted conception pathological drive to set fires: “These are the firesetters of morality. motivated primarily by vanity — the little men with gran- It is important to note that setting fires to get rid of diose social ambitions whose natural equipment dooms potential hazards or social blights is not without prece- them to insignificance” (Lewis & Yarnell, 1951, p. 228). dence. In fact, this practice is well-established within This hero complex, as it is occasionally termed, again both the structural and wildland fire services where wraps the firesetting in the seductive and polemic lan- training fires set in acquired (condemned) structures guage of abnormality. This is not to suggest that some and prescribed fires are recognized ways to provide firesetters are not driven by some immature desire to training opportunities as well as eliminating or reduc- be viewed positively; the problem is that it obscures ing potentially hazardous environments.9 Thus, setting the equally possible non-pathological factors — like the an unapproved (and illegal) fire may be rationalized by competitive struggle for “masculine acendency [sic]” firefighter arsonists as a good end even if the means (Lewis & Yarnell, 1951, p. 420). are questionable at best. This warped morality was the The idea of vanity firesetting draws attention to one basis of the blockbuster film Backdraft (1991), which of the underlying reasons that we continue to think portrayed a firefighter turned arsonist who attempts to in terms of psychological dysfunction — our desire make a moral political statement about the dangers of to distance ourselves from the organizational pariahs reducing firefighter staffing by setting a series of explo- who have disgraced the profession. If we are to under- sive fires to prove the social value of firefighters.10 stand this form of firesetting, we might more accurately The problem may not be that firefighter arsonists are term it, an atta-boy complex.7 The point being that the unmotivated or obstinate as the Taylorist organizational acknowledgement sought does not appear to be pre- misbehavior literature might suggest. The problem is dominantly outwardly facing; that is, it does not appear that they are overzealous in their efforts to do what they that they seek recognition from the general public but think is right to the point where they may be willing to from their colleagues and mentors (Huff, 1994; Marks, take matters into their own hands and begin freelanc- 1993). To speak of heroism, then, is to confuse the ing. Thus, we might expect that they are as likely to be situation by employing a term that firefighters, or other the “Firefighter of the Year” type who is always going emergency or armed services for that matter, them- above and beyond the call of duty as the troublemaker selves are unlikely to use. For firefighters rarely, if ever, type who is the source of regular scrutiny (Smith, 2003, refer to their own actions or those of their colleagues p. 10). Rather than going through the proper bureau- (except perhaps as part of a posthumous recognition or cratic channels to mitigate perceived problems, they in the context of a joke) in such terms; rather, firefight- take matters into their own hands. This occupational ers are more apt to acknowledge the good work of their overzealousness is more than just the heavily lauded colleagues with a firm pat on the back and gruff “good notions of devotion, dedication, and dependability; it is work out there.” This understated masculine acknowl- occupational socialization and commitment gone awry. edgement is miles away from the soft admiration char- acteristic of talk of heroism. Empirical Analysis The atta-boy complex I discuss here as an alterna- tive to the lie of heroism (Desmond, 2008) encourages This section begins with a brief discussion of the us to reconsider how the firefighter arsonist(s) may methods employed in constructing the dataset on attempt to downplay the firesetting with the belief that which the analysis is based before moving on to the risks are manageable and act perhaps even justified substantive analysis, which is confined to descriptive and necessary. This provocative assertion stands statistics.11 This article employs a large purpose- conventional logic on its head, suggesting that the fires built dataset of firefighters arrested for setting fires may be the product of a warped, if somewhat plausible, (n = 1,213) representing sixteen countries, though effort to do right by their colleagues and community. A predominantly the United States (91%, n = 1,102).12 case in Brooklyn, Illinois, in 2001 illustrated this point This data was derived from a number of archival clearly. As was the case there, firefighter arsonists sources over the course of several years. The vast may, in fact, believe they are doing the community a majority of cases were culled from media accounts of considerable service by eliminating dilapidated and arrests and convictions. This included detailed searches even crime-ridden properties.8 The same logic could be on the LexisNexis® news archive, the New York Times applied in relation to the forests where there exists con- archive, Niche News feed services (like www.firehouse. siderable debate about whether United States Forest com), and other related resources. The preponderance Service (USFS) policies limiting logging and aggressive of English-speaking countries (97.7%, n = 1,183) fire extinguishment have allowed the forests to fill with presumably speaks more to the use of English explosive levels of fuel (Desmond, 2007). Thus the fires language newswires than this being a distinctively may, in fact, be thought a justified or even righteous Anglo-American problem. 37 International Fire Service Journal of Leadership and Management The selection of sources for this project was primary responsibility may be more managerial than primarily a function of availability. The earliest case fire fighting. I also included auxiliary personnel such uncovered was adjudicated in1833. However, more as Junior firefighters (n = 68), firefighters in the training than 80 percent of the cases occurred in the past two academy (n = 8), fire police (n = 4),17 and industrial/ decades (mean = 1997, s.d. = 18.6), topping out with military firefighters (n = 2) whom may not be opera- 104 firefighters arrested in 2008 alone (see Figure 1). tional firefighters in the strictest sense of the word but Previous literature on the topic of firefighter arson has are nonetheless intimately connected to the local fire consistently lamented the lack of comprehensive data service. Fire buffs on the other hand were excluded (Huff, 1994; Cabe, 1996; USFA, 2003; Lindroth, 2003; outright.18 Kinney, 2003; Smith, 2003; Rider, 1980a).13 The lack of The remaining 1,213 cases were, as expected, consistent official data is further compounded by the predominantly male (87.8%, n = 1,065), which is similar inconsistency found in media coverage, due in sure to grow when the cases where the subject was no small part to the impact of media processes.14 The listed anonymously as a firefighter (10.3%, n = 125) concern is that artificial trends could develop that are are factored in. While unquestionably a minority of simply a reporting artifact subject to the ebb and flow cases, 25 female firefighters were arrested, though of media cycles and popular attention.15 The historical over half (56%, n = 14) were part of a larger group invisibility of firefighter arson has forced researchers of male firefighter arsonists. Determining the ethnic to derive their own data from whatever sources they or racial composition of the sample conclusively was had access to, which spoke as much of the methods problematic because few news articles identified the and population sampled than to the phenomenon race of the firefighter, though many recent news reports itself (Huff, 1994). Ultimately, the dark figure of now include photographs. While the majority of cases firefighter arson both helps to explain the considerable (84.3%, n = 1,023) did not indicate the race or ethnicity growth curve captured in this data as well as poses of the firefighter, we might presume that the sample considerable problems in terms of generalizing the reflects the wider demographic composition of the fire findings of any firefighter arson study to the wider yet service. The sample showed 14.2% (n = 172) were unknown population of firefighter arsonists. listed as Caucasian, 1.2% (n = 14) as African-American, The question of how to operationalize the concept of 0.2% (n = 3) as Hispanic, and 0.1% (n = 1) as Native firefighter arson similarly proved more difficult than ini- American. tially envisioned. At first glance, the topic seems rather Like women, the minimal representation of minor- self-evident. However, as I detailed elsewhere (Hinds- ity groups should not be overlooked for they offer an Aldrich, 2011), getting at what actually constitutes a interesting vantage point on the topic. For instance, a firefighter arsonist was as much a political decision group of young African-American volunteer firefighters as methodological one. To thwart potential debates, I in Maryland in 1989–90 illustrated exactly the dynamics narrowly defined the term, especially as it concerns the at play: distinction between an active member and a former Before the fire, we were just sitting around bored. firefighter.16 I included those people tasked with extin- We were talking about how the chief yells at us guishing incidents of fire and ranking officials whose for the things we do wrong and everyone was Figure 1: Arrest Distribution by Decade Arrests Per Decade 700 675 600 500 Frequency 400 300 261 200 98 100 86 24 20 24 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 8 3 4 5 2 0 9 49 9 9 79 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 1 d 83 85 86 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 te 18 18 lis -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -2 -2 - 0- - Un 30 40 60 70 80 90 00 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 00 10 5 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 ar Ye Arrests Aggregated by Decade 38  Volume 5 saying, “Let’s wait for the next fire to come out Figure 2: Age Distribution and maybe we can do good on it.” And then the words, “Set a fire” came up. (Price, 1990, p. A1) In the end, the 11 young African-American firefighters Age Distribution arrested in the case(s) (actually two unrelated cases occurring in neighboring stations though uncovered 700 658 simultaneously) only invited the very rebuke they had 600 hoped to avoid. If anything, it is likely that young nontra- 500 ditional members have an exaggerated desire to prove Frequency themselves to their colleagues. This equality run amok 400 may lend credence to the argument advanced here that 300 more than the lure of the fire, the arsonists sought to fit 231 229 in and prove themselves to their colleagues, whether or 200 not their colleagues would approve of their behavior. 100 58 These young men in Maryland shared another key 31 6 element with many others in the sample: their youth 0 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 Age Not (see Figure 2). While firefighter arson is not the ex- Listed Age clusive domain of young members (with 14 firefighter arsonists that were between 50 and 64 years old when arrested), it does tend to be committed by younger members (mean 24, s.d. 7.7, mode 19). However, 18.9% (n = 229) of the cases did not list the age(s) of the suspect(s), which may skew the data. To get around capacity as well.21 In fact, 26 (2.1%) of the arsonists this concern, the ages were dummy coded according to had achieved the rank of Lieutenant (or its international whether the suspect was listed as an adult or juvenile, first-level supervisory equivalent), 29 (2.4%) were Cap- using 18 years old as a cutoff. Accordingly, only 8.8% tains, 19 (1.6%) were Battalion/Assistant/Deputy Chiefs, (n = 107) were listed as juveniles or were younger 27 (2.5%) were Chiefs, and 5 (0.4%) served on the Fire than 18 at the time of the fire(s) while 90.9% (n = Department’s Board of Directors in some capacity. John 1,103) were listed as adults. Taken together, these two Orr (1989) was one of two (0.2%) fire investigators, indicators suggest that while the firefighters may have while the remaining nine (0.9%) held other miscella- crossed the legal threshold of adulthood, they may not neous advanced positions in their respective depart- have matured much beyond that point. ments. The type of fire department the arsonists were mem- The rank distribution is further explained by the bers of is similarly instructive. The sample was heavily tenure distribution. While the vast majority (76.8%, weighted towards volunteer, retained19 or paid-on-call n = 932) of the cases did not make clear how long firefighters (90.8%, n = 1,102), though Morgaridge the firefighter had been a member, the remaining (cited in NFPQ, 1927) and Burke (2001) would be dis- distribution shared a similar curve as the age mayed that 4.7% (n = 57) of the sample were paid mu- distribution with just over 75 percent (n = 211) of the nicipal firefighters. Wildland firefighters also represented cases, in which their tenure was listed, started by a a small subgroup (2.3%, n = 27), which was subdivided firefighter with five or less years of service. Moreover, between career wildland firefighters (n = 13) and con- 43.7 percent (n = 123) of the listed cases were set by tract wildland firefighters (n = 14), though the distinc- firefighters with a year or less of service — including tion was not always particularly clear. The remaining one young firefighter who set a fire to celebrate being cases were split between auxiliary/emergency medical voted on as a member of his fire department earlier in services (EMS)/fire police members (n = 4), industrial/ the evening. military firefighters (n = 2), and cases in which the type Another possible explanation for the firesetting is the of department was not clear (n = 21). role of group dynamics. The sample was split relatively In terms of rank, it is unsurprising, given the average evenly between those who set their fire alone (48.8%, age of the sample, that the majority were low-ranking n = 592) and those who were part of a group of other members. More specifically, 78 percent were listed at firefighters (50.9%, n = 618).22 The split was also rela- the default rank of firefighter20 (n = 946), 4.4 percent tively even when broken down by volunteers (alone were classified as operational probationary firefight- n = 521, group n = 594). However career municipal fire- ers (n = 52), 5.6 percent were listed as nonoperational fighters (alone n = 42, group n = 20) disproportionally Junior firefighters or Explorers (n = 68), and 0.7 percent set fires by themselves, potentially suggesting differing were listed as being in the training academy (n = 8) motives for the firesetting. When broken down by age, at the time. More troublingly, a number had moved up juveniles set disproportionally more fires with others in the rank structure to a supervisory position, though (alone n = 24, group n = 83) than do adults (alone they may still have served operationally in a firefighter n = 574, group n = 547). While high-ranking members 39 International Fire Service Journal of Leadership and Management were a decided minority in the sample, their firesetting the excitement of extinguishing a fire or even a psy- was telling. Of the 28 Fire Chiefs arrested, 64.2 percent chological deviance? How should we move forward so (n = 18) were part of a group; similarly the 70 percent of as to begin to mitigate further cases? First, we must the 20 Battalion/Assistant/Deputy Chiefs arrested (n = dispatch with the idea that all firefighter arsonists have 14) were also part of a group. a problem with fire or, said another way, that they are If we presume the participation of such high-ranking arsonists turned firefighters. As was argued at length members could be seen to make the firesetting appear thus far in this article, the notion that at the primary root acceptable to their subordinates, we should be unsur- of this firesetting is some sort of psychological abnor- prised to find 67.6 percent of the 68 (n = 46) Junior fire- mality unintentionally blinds us to the more mundane fighters were part of groups — though this is certainly and problematic truth that firefighter arsonists may not not to suggest that senior members who guide Junior appear demonstrably different from their equally dedi- or Explorer programs support the firesetting. The argu- cated colleagues. ment here is not simply that peer pressure may con- By viewing these arsonists as bad apples that can tribute to the firesetting, which is obvious, but that the be plucked before they spoil the bushel, we fundamen- group nature of many of the cases supports the asser- tally misunderstand the issue by implying that our best tion that many firefighter arsonists are not necessarily or only course of action is to carefully pick over new- psychologically abnormal or even necessarily seeking comers for any sign of blemish (Marks, 1993). Unfor- the visceral excitement of setting the fire but are likely tunately, this bad-apple approach is at the heart of the attempting to evidence their prowess and dedication to majority of policy recommendations proffered to date. their confederates and colleagues. In this concluding section, I critically assess the various Another aspect that deserves further consideration attempts to address the problem and attempt to chart a is familial relationships among some of the firefighters. way forward. While the data available is very limited (unlisted cases, The traditional bad-apple perspective is particularly 94.6%, n = 1,148), a handful of firefighter arsonists problematic in that it leads us to develop a circle-the- were related to other fire service members, (5.6% had wagons mentality, whereby we place all our emphasis a relative listed). For instance, 36 of the arsonists had upon guarding the boundary between us and them a parent in the fire service (often in a high-ranking without realizing that the seeds of this problem are position), 19 had a sibling, 4 had another relative (i.e., just as likely to sprout from within. The primary recom- cousin or uncle), 3 had a spouse, and 2 had a child mendation offered by most commentators is to develop in the fire service. Others had parents or direct family rigorous background checks (USFA, 2003; Doley, members in esteemed social positions — law enforce- 2003b; Lindroth, 2003; Ansley, 2004; Murphy and Mur- ment or local politics. phy, 2010). Background checks can take many forms, Most importantly, the number of firefighter arson- from employment histories, school records, credit ists who have family members also active in the fire reports, driving records, past fire-service references, or service, while perhaps unsurprising given the historical most commonly criminal-records checks. To this end, tendency for multiple generations of a family to serve some states have adopted laws prohibiting convicted in the fire service, suggests that these individuals are arsonists from serving as firefighters (Pennsylvania likely well known in the local community and local fire Voluntary Fire Service [PaVFS] Act 168, 2006; South service even before they join. As such, it suggests that Carolina Firefighters Employment and Registration Act background checks may be of limited utility, especially if [SCFERA], 2001), encouraged prosecutors and judges there is an undercurrent of political pressure to accept to include similar prohibitions as part of sentencing certain members based on whom they are related to. recommendations, or considered establishing arsonist Taken together, these empirical findings add another registries (Associated Press [AP], 2009). This concern layer to the substantive argument that many firefighter is not entirely unfounded because there have been arsonists appear to be motivated as much by social instances where convicted firefighter arsonists have factors within the fire service than psychological fac- attempted to or have successfully (re)joined fire depart- tors within their mind. Overall, the number of firefighter ments as a recent case from Mississippi illustrated (AP, arsonists that set fires in conjunction with other firefight- 2011). ers suggests that in order to understand and uncover While it is vital that fire departments exercise due the root of firefighter arson cases, we should be focus- diligence in vetting prospective firefighters, they must ing considerable attention on the social dynamics of also appreciate that background checks are necessary the firehouse as much as the psychological makeup of but not sufficient (Huff, 1994). Given the youth of many prospective firefighters. of the offenders, they are unlikely to have consider- able criminal records, if any at all, and even those with Policy Implication criminal records may have them sealed or expunged once spent. This is not to suggest that criminal-records So what if we do accept the argument that firefighter checks are futile or unnecessary, far from it. However, arsonists are as likely to be motivated by an interest to we cannot put too much faith in background checks prove their dedication and competence as they are by alone — as a number of recent cases have shown. In 40  Volume 5 fact, Huff (1994) also noted that, “most of the group of- This investigative diligence can pay dividends not fenders appeared not to have the inclination to set any just for discovering firesetting firefighters but other fires before joining the department. The idea occurred arsonists as well. Perhaps the most straightforward to them later.” Focusing our attention primarily upon approach is to habitually request, listen, and trace the patrolling the border looking for deviant prospective fire- initial caller(s) reporting the fire. While I noted the trend fighters, no matter how sophisticated the tools we have too late into the data collection to accurately record the at our disposal, is likely to fall short because it draws frequency, a considerable number of firefighter arson- our attention in the wrong direction. ists also called in the fire(s) they set. In fact, some Even rather novel approaches such as the Arson made little effort to hide their identity by either referring Screening and Prediction (ASAP) instrument devel- to dispatchers by first name or in one case leaving their oped by criminologist Allen Sapp may be hamstrung pager on high volume so that the dispatcher could hear by the same shortcomings. The ASAP screening tool the fire tones in the background while speaking with the was designed to be administered by local fire service otherwise anonymous caller. Similarly, fire investigators officials without the need for a background in psychol- should habitually record the names of the first-arriving ogy or specific training. The instrument simply mea- firefighters to the scene or the fire station through radio sures respondent’s answers against the South Carolina transmissions, personal recollections, or electronic door Forestry Commission profile of firefighter arsonists. lock records. Again this action can assist in fire investi- As such, it is not intended to conclusively identify past gations that do not necessarily involve firefighters be- firesetting or even future firesetting; rather, it is intended cause their observations upon arrival can help establish simply to identify persons whose background or inter- the origin of the fire, suspicious witness behaviors, or ests may make them worthy of further scrutiny. It is the like. thus another tool that fire service leaders can employ to Huff’s (1994) recommendation that fire officials look inform their decision on whether to hire or accept a pro- for a rash of so-called nuisance fires (e.g., trash piles, spective firefighter. The greatest strength of the ASAP hay bales, and brush fires) presumably holds true today. instrument may be inadvertent. A fire department that Amazingly, as Huff also hints, investigators should also adopts this instrument or similar training sessions for all be wary if the fire station itself catches fire; this unfortu- firefighters — new and old — signals that it is watch- nately also holds true as 31 of the firefighter arsonists ing and takes a zero-tolerance approach to firesetting, in this dataset actually set fire to their own fire station, which may discourage some members from going some more than once. Often these trends become evi- down that path. dent when calls are consistently geographically plotted Moreover, background checks and screening instru- or categorized by day of the week or time of day. When ments are likely to be ineffective when they are not part cross-referenced with the list of first-arriving or first-due of a larger concerted effort to send an honest message firefighters, patterns may also emerge. The challenge about the responsibilities and realities of the fire service remains how to cast light on the problem in both the in- to new recruits (Murphy & Murphy, 2010). If we accept vestigative and academic sense without building resent- the adapted version of Benoit and Perkins’ (1997) seri- ment and casting a pale over the millions of firefighters ous leisure thesis, we should also be more forthcoming whose image has been (and continues to be) tarnished about the potential boring reality of the fire service to by the actions of a small but visible minority. new recruits. More provocatively, we may also want to While it may not seem to have much bearing on fire- reconsider the types of behaviors and actions that we fighter arson investigations, more comprehensive na- recognize officially or unofficially such as attending the tional firefighter arson data is needed to develop more most calls, being first on scene, or acting heroically. robust investigative strategies as well as the ground- While this type of award may honor valor and com- work for a firefighter arson early-warning system now mitment, it may also serve as a perverse incentive for that computer technology and extensive digital data are those only too eager for the recognition. readily available. Yet, in the fifteen years since Cabe Fire departments and state training academies voiced his concern about the lack of national data, little should also develop and mandate training modules, like progress has been made. Beyond the academic interest the Hero to Zero Program developed by the Pennsyl- in consistent data, Cabe (1996) noted that the gather- vania Chapter of the International Association of Arson ing process has important knock-on effects: “Without Investigators (PA-IAAI) and the Pennsylvania State comprehensive information, the natural tendency is Fire Commissioner’s Office. This program is designed to view each case as an isolated incident” (pp. 7–10). to draw attention to the problem and the personal and The U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) special report on departmental ramifications of setting fires. Since we firefighter arsonists (2003) also noted that none of the cannot bank on the deterrent effect of punishment, we various national reporting systems such as the National must also be diligent in our effort to investigate ev- Fire Information Reporting System (NFIRS) cataloged ery fire in our jurisdiction (to the extent possible) and by the USFA and the Uniformed Crime Reports (UCR) encourage members to voice concerns anonymously if cataloged by the FBI allow for the collection of informa- they suspect firesetting among their colleagues (Huff, tion on firefighter arsonists. 1994). 41 International Fire Service Journal of Leadership and Management More recently the Bombing and Arson Tracking widespread respect from their colleagues and commu- System (BATS) run by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, nity. This is the fundamental paradox that the atta-boy Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has made an impor- complex attempts to explain. tant first step by including a space to note whether the The argument put forward here is by no means of- arsonist was a firefighter at the time of the fire(s), which fered as a justification or an effort to blame the social will hopefully help future researchers and practitioners environment while lessening the culpability of any of the gain a further understanding of exactly how pervasive a firefighters who have disgraced their profession. Rather problem this is. Hopefully, the other reporting systems the message here is to call into question the tendency will follow suit. Better still, hopefully they may also adopt to unconsciously employ the language of psychology in a detailed form like UCR Supplemental Homicide an effort to paint these offenders as qualitatively differ- Reports (SHR) for the reporting of more detailed infor- ent from the millions of firefighters who conscientiously mation. The problem remains that given the voluntary uphold the distinguished image of the fire service. This nature of fire and arson reporting and the ambigu- tendency obscures the pragmatic straightforward expla- ous jurisdictional debate between the fire and police nations that are often noted but quickly brushed aside services, reporting is sure to remain spotty at best. This in popular accounts of particular cases. data is available; we simply require intervention from Overall, this rather dystopian assessment of the our elected national officials and fire service leaders to nature of firesetting among firefighters does not paint push for the inclusion of this data — and we must sup- an optimistic picture for our effort to eliminate the prob- port them vigorously in this effort, despite the natural lem. Drawing the figurative wagons closer together and tendency to conceal dirty laundry. developing more robust screening mechanisms can only go so far. These programs may serve their pur- Conclusions pose by occasionally weeding out prospective arsonists (or criminals) turned firefighters, though they do little Firefighter arson remains a contemporary problem to weed out firefighters turned arsonists. It is these despite the sporadic efforts over more than 100 years firefighters turned arsonists that are at once the most to draw attention on the issue. Our understanding of troubling and the most interesting. firesetting firefighters has historically mirrored the wider The tools of law enforcement can unfortunately do literature on arson. Each of these perspectives offers little other than deal with these acute outbreaks. If we an interesting window onto the problem. However, there are to get beyond dealing with the acute outbreaks, is not a single universal motivation for all firefighter we must as a matter of urgency gain a more robust arsonists nor is there a single theoretical lens that understanding of the frustratingly fine line between gives us sufficient purchase on the reasoning of every acceptable, committed behavior and unacceptable, firesetting firefighter.23 The topic of firesetting firefighters overzealous behavior, particularly as a precursor to is also too multifaceted to explain every incident and occupational deviance. This is where I depart from offender with a single offender profile (Doley, 2003b). Huff (1994) who notes that “while grants [to study the The theoretical lens developed here suggests that the problem in greater depth] are nice, the immediate and fundamental paradoxes inherent in the fire service that apparent answer to prevent firefighter arson is decep- reward commitment, initiative, and fireground experi- tively simple: applicant screening.” Screening programs ence may inadvertently convey the message to some are only part of the solution. firefighters that it is acceptable to set fires in certain Screening programs, which have been employed reli- circumstances. This theoretical lens simply offers an giously in police departments for years, generally weed alternative perspective on the issue, though it too is not out only criminals turned cops not cops turned crimi- a panacea. nals. For example, if we stick with the policing analogy, There appears to be considerable theoretical trac- screening programs are likely to flag applicants who tion for the argument that many firesetting firefighters may be corruptible, those with questionable criminal are animated by a desire to be respected by their col- connections, those with mounting personal debt, etcet- leagues. They appear to have convinced themselves era, though it is not as likely to isolate those who might that rather than waiting for (the increasingly rare) get so caught up in making things right or getting their opportunities to demonstrate their prowess when fires guy that they would push procedural, legal, or ethical occur normally, they should take matters into their own boundaries. What is needed is a better understanding hands. The historical dataset employed here further of how occupational overzealousness, as I have come lends weight to this position. The preponderance of to term it, develops in public sector and/or public safety young men with less than five years of service in the organizations. Only then can we begin to explain how sample suggests that they may have reached a turning these Dirty Harry-like figures (Klockars, 1980) (be they point, a point whereby they have been in their posi- firefighters, police officers, or for that matter military per- tions long enough to see the boring reality of the fire sonnel) could reconcile attempting to do right through service while not long enough to have gained a suf- inappropriate or illegal means, all the while carrying out ficient foothold in the business of fire fighting to warrant their duties “whooping like cowboys” (NYT, 1931). 42  Volume 5 References Doley, R. (2003a). Pyromania: Fact or fiction? British Journal of Criminology, 43(4), 797–808. Ansley, G. (2004, July 2). Firefighters screened for arsonists. The New Doley, R. (2003b). 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Arson Investigators (IAAI), Denver, Colorado. Pittsburgh Tribune-Review. Retrieved from http://community. seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19950226&slug=2107067. Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC). (2005a). Firefighter arson: Part 1 — Incidence and motives (BushFIRE Arson Bulletin, No. 16). Geller, J. L., McDermeit, M., & Brown, J. M. (1997). Pyromania? What Retrieved from http://www.aic.gov.au/en/publications/current%20 does it mean? Journal of Forensic Sciences, 42(6), 1052–1057. series/bfab/1-20/bfab016.aspx Hinds-Aldrich, M. I. (2011). Defining the Firefighter Arson Problem: A Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC). (2005b). Firefighter arson: Part Research Note. Fire and Safety Studies Blog. Retrieved from http:// 2 — Profile (BushFIRE Arson Bulletin, No. 17). Retrieved from http:// fireandsafetystudies.wordpress.com/research-areas/firefighter-arson/ www.aic.gov.au/en/publications/current%20series/bfab/1-20/bfab017. aspx Holden, J. (2010, August 25). I-Team Special — Firefighter Arsonists: A sick scenario. [Television series episode]. In Joe Holden (producer), Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC). (2005c). Firefighter arson: Part WBRE News. Wilkes Barre-Scranton, PA: NBC Network. 3 — Case Study (BushFIRE Arson Bulletin, No. 18). Retrieved from http://www.aic.gov.au/en/publications/current%20series/bfab/1-20/ Hoyek, C. F. (1951). Criminal incendiarism. Journal of Criminal Law and bfab018.aspx Criminology, 41, 836–845. Benoit, J., & Perkins, K. (1997). Volunteer fire-fighting activity in North Huff, T. G. (1994). Fire-setting fire fighters: Arsonists in the fire America as serious leisure. World Leisure and Recreation, 39(3), department: Identification and prevention. Quantico, VA: Federal 23–29. Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC). Retrieved from http://www.nvfc.org/news/ Breckenridge, M. (1995, November 14). Mill town’s firefighters charged hn_firefighter_arson.html with setting the blazes they fought. Domestic News, Associated Press (AP). Huff, T., Gary, G., & Icove, D. (2001). The myth of pyromania. Fire and Arson Investigator, 52(1), 28–37. Burke, G. (2001, August 8). Few paid firefighters are involved in arson, Letter to the Editor. St. Petersburg Times, p. 2. Icove, D. J., & Estepp, M. (1987). Motive-based offender profiles of arson and fire-related crime. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 56(4), 17–23. Cabe, K. (1996). Firefighter arson: Local alarm. Fire Management Notes, 56(1), 7–10. Retrieved from www.state.sc.us/forest/lear.htm Inciardi, J. A. (1970). The adult firesetter: A typology. Criminology, 8(2), 145–155. Chulov, M. (2004, August 23). Firebugs in fire engines. The Australian, p. 12. Katz, J. (1988). The seductions of crime: The moral and sensual attractions of doing evil. New York: Basic Books. Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS). (2003, June 4). Too close to the fire. [Television series episode]. In Mary-Jayne McKay (producer), Kinney, S. M. (2003). Arson from within: A study of firefighters who set Sixty Minutes. New York, NY: CBS Network. fires (Unpublished master’s thesis). Eastern Kentucky University, Richmond, KY. Cumberland Valley Volunteer Fireman’s Association (CVVFA). (2010). Fire Service Reputation Management: White Paper. Retrieved from Klockars, C. B. (1980). The Dirty Harry problem. The Annals of the http://www.firefighterbehavior.com/sitecontent/index/page/White%20 American Academy of Political and Social Science, 452(1), 33–47. Paper Lee, H. K. (2002, September 1). A call to track firefighter arsonists. The Desmond, M. (2007). On the fireline: Living and dying with wildland San Francisco Chronicle, p. A23. firefighters. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lewis, N. D. C., & Yarnell, H. (1951). Pathological firesetting (pyromania). Desmond, M. (2008). The lie of heroism. Contexts, 7(1), 56–58. Nervous and Mental Disease Monographs, No. 82. New York: Coolidge Foundation. Doley, R. (1998). Firefighters who light fires: The threat from within. Australasian Fire and Emergency Services Authorities Council Lindroth, R. (2003). Firefighter arson: Recovery after betrayal. USFA (AFAC) Journal. Retrieved from http://pandora.nla.gov.au/ Executive Fire Officer Program research paper. Retrieved from www. parchive/1999/Z1999-Jul-26/www.ausfire.com/journal/arsonrt2.pdf usfa.dhs.gov/pdf/efop/efo37057.pdf 43 International Fire Service Journal of Leadership and Management Marks, P. (1993, May 24). When heroes turn into outlaws: Firefighters’ arson arrests raise complex questions. New York Times. Retrieved Endnotes from http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/24/nyregion/when-heroes-turn- into-outlaws-firefighters-arson-arrests-raise-complex-questions.html 1 As will be discussed in greater detail later in this article, it is not possible to conclusively determine Murphy, J. K., & Murphy, B. L. (2010, May). Firefighter arsonists: Stopping the problem at the firehouse door. Fire Engineering. Retrieved from whether the number of firefighter arsonists is increasing http://www.fireengineering.com/index/articles/display.articles.fire- or whether given the attention the problem has gar- engineering.legal-matters.2010.07.murphy-firefighter-arsonists.html nered, we are now catching and prosecuting more National Fire Protection Quarterly (NFPQ). (1927). Volunteer firemen as through official legal channels. incendiaries, NFPQ, 10(3), 216–217. 2 Due to the methodological limitations of using archi- val newspaper accounts, I used the lower threshold New York Times (NYT). (1931, March 18). $50,000 fires laid to “Vamps” rivalry: Arrests at Beverly, N.J., mar remarkable record of crack of arrest for inclusion in the dataset. In many cases volunteer unit there. the subjects were also charged and convicted, but Orr, J. L. (1989). Profiles in arson: The vanity firesetter. American Fire this information was not consistently reported. When Journal, 41(7), 24–27. subsequent media coverage noted that a subject was acquitted or had the charges dropped, this was noted Pennsylvania Voluntary Fire Service (PaVFS) Act 168, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3301, Article C, Chapter 33.h.1 (1972 & Supp. 2006). in a Case Disposition variable and those cases were excluded from the analysis. Since the media did not al- Perkins, K., & Benoit, J. (2004). Volunteer satisfaction and serious ways document the final disposition of every case, it is leisure in rural fire departments: Implications for human capital. In R. Stebbins & M. Graham (Eds.), Volunteering as leisure/leisure as possible that some of the individuals included were ac- volunteering: An international assessment. Wallingford, UK: CABI tually acquitted, had the charges dropped in exchange Publishing. for their testimony, or otherwise were not adjudicated Price, D. M. (1990, September 15). Firefighter says criticism drove with or without prejudice. This is always a risk of using volunteers to arson: Chief’s rebuke stung Pr. George’s men. The archival newspaper data. Since the threshold for inclu- Washington Post, p. A1. sion was simply arrest, I do not and cannot imply that Rider, A. O. (1980a). The firesetter: A psychological profile, Part 1. FBI each individual is in fact guilty of the crime(s) for which Law Enforcement Bulletin, 49(6), 6–13. he or she was arrested or charged. Rider, A. O. (1980b). The firesetter: A psychological profile, Part 2. FBI 3 Equally problematic is his suggestion that he is, Law Enforcement Bulletin, 49(7), 16–17. “therefore, a strong adherent of the paid fire depart- Rider, A. O. (1980c). The firesetter: A psychological profile, Part 3. FBI ment” (1927, p. 217). A brief look at the history of Law Enforcement Bulletin, 49(8), 5–11. firefighter arson, as I will soon illustrate, will call into question Morgaridge’s suggested way forward. More im- Ring, K. (2011, January 10). Firefighter arson rare but troubling. Worcester Telegram & Gazette. Retrieved from http://www.telegram. portantly, while we might quickly dismiss his comments com/article/20110110/NEWS/101100363/0/SPORTS while serving as the Assistant General Manager of the National Board of Fire Underwriters as ideologically and Sapp, A. (1994). Motives of serial arsonists: Investigative implications [Monograph]. FBI National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime, politically motivated, we are well advised to pay heed United States Department of Justice. to his fundamental concern. This argument continues Sapp, A. D., & Huff, T. G. (1994). Arson homicides: Findings from a to divide the fire service along political lines. In a more national study. Quantico, VA: FBI Arson and Bombing Investigative recent Letter to the Editor, the Assistant to the General Services Subunit, National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime. President of the International Association of Fire Fight- Sapp, A. D., Huff, T. G., & Gary, G. P. (1994). A report of essential ers (IAFF) union took “ great umbrage” to a quote by a findings from a study of serial arsonists. Quantico, VA: National local fire service leader who off-handedly mentioned Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime, U.S. FBI Academy. that firefighter arson is rare and “paid firefighters do this Smith, J. (2003). Firefighter arson and the social bond (Unpublished kind of thing, too” (Burke, 2001, p. 2). Therefore, Burke master’s thesis). University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC. requested that all future articles dealing with this “unfor- South Carolina Firefighters Employment and Registration Act (SCFERA). tunate matter” refer to the accused clearly as “volunteer 40-80-30 (C) (2001). firefighters.” Turning the political trick around, he alleged that the original quote was “not based on fact, [rather it United Press International (UPI). (1983, Jan. 2). Firefighter jailed for arsons. Domestic News. served] to downplay the need for career firefighters in the county,” which led him to off-handedly retort, “most United States Fire Administration (USFA). (2003). Firefighter Arson: volunteer departments will take whoever applies to be Special Report. (Report No. TR-141). Emmitsburg, MD: USFA. a volunteer (and often at a younger age than profes- Wambaugh, J. (2002). Fire lover: A true story. New York: William Morrow. sionals) because they have a hard time recruiting and Warne-Smith, D. (2004, June 16). Hunt for arsonists in volunteers. The retaining volunteers these days” (p. 2). Political potshots Australian, p. 3. aside, this line of reasoning serves no purpose other than to obfuscate the issue and encourage both sides to pass the buck rather than deal honestly with the issue. 4 It is also unclear whether these composite profiles lead to a degree of tunnel vision, whereby those who 44  Volume 5 do not fit the profile are overlooked, thereby artificially 10 The film Backdraft (1991) pulls loosely from an actual reinforcing the profile by only flagging up those who fit case in Greater Boston in the early 1980s where a the profile. group comprised of a firefighter and numerous fire 5 Huff interviewed those firefighter arsonists who had buffs set hundreds of fires allegedly to show the short- passed through the various filters of the criminal justice sightedness and danger of a highly contentious series system to receive a custodial sentence. Cabe (1996) of firefighter layoffs. The fires did $22 million in damage studied all firefighter arsonists in a limited geographic and injured 280 firefighters and civilians. area over a finite period of time. If the statistical profiles 11 A number of methodological and operationaliza- are based upon a very limited number of offenders who tion problems were encountered in the course of this may not be representative of the whole population of of- research. Adequately covering these concerns here fenders, the findings are not likely generalizable beyond proved to be beyond the scope of this article. For a the group studied. more detailed discussion of the problems and potential 6 It is not particularly clear who coined the term vanity solutions, please see the research by Hinds-Aldrich firesetting. Both Lewis and Yarnell (1951) and Hoyek (2011). (1951) use the term liberally, suggesting it was well 12 The sample pulls from 48 states. Many of the cases established by the 1950s. Disturbingly, one of the few clustered along the Eastern seaboard, the first ten in writers to focus exclusively on vanity firesetting was descending order: PA (n = 182), NY (n = 100), NJ Glendale (CA) firefighter and arson investigator Captain (n = 65), NC (n = 57), SC (n = 55), TX (n = 44), GA (n = John Orr (1989); see also Wambaugh (2002). John 42), VA (n = 41), WV (n = 41), MD (n = 40), and so on. Orr’s interest in vanity firesetters is particularly troubling These cases do not presumably represent all possible given that he was later convicted for numerous fires and cases but rather the cases discovered in the process four murders. of this research. For instance, in South Carolina, Cabe 7 An atta-boy is a colloquial phrase that is often used to (1996) reported that there were 33 arrests in 1993 and denote a commendation. It is derived from the phrase, 47 in 1994. However, there were only 13 and 12 cases, that’s my boy or that’a boy. The term is used here to respectively, recorded in this dataset for the same time capture the dynamic, whereby the fires are presumed period. Consequently, the number of actual cases is to be set to create an opportunity for the firefighters presumably considerably higher. to put their skills into practice and thereby gain the 13 This lack of data is tied in no small part to the moral respect of their colleagues. The term is somewhat hazard for fire departments when it comes to acknowl- tongue-in-cheek and may not be particularly ideal for it edging and addressing this sort of wrongdoing. Thus, too employs the language of abnormality — complex — those diligent fire departments that have acknowledged though it serves its purpose as an effort to counter the the problem and have begun to address the problem rhetoric of heroism. may actually be penalized for their efforts by inflated 8 A major case in the tiny hamlet of Arkwright, South figures. Meanwhile, jurisdictions that ignore the problem Carolina, in 1995 also illustrated this point. Many of the by handling it in-house are perversely rewarded with 150 fires the group, which included the current and past inaccurately low figures. Fire Chief and a member of the Board of Fire Com- 14 Said another way, it is important to know whether missioners, set were in vacant rundown buildings that cases are reported consistently throughout history and residents had complained attracted drug users from across jurisdictions, especially for long-term archival nearby Spartanburg. Shopkeeper Chad Lister noted, research. Similarly, it is important to consider how the “[The vacant buildings] were eyesores … If I was on the growth in the number and remit of media outlets and jury, I wouldn’t convict them” (Breckenridge, 1995). wire services may also create reporting artifacts in 9 In one of the more bizarre cases, two young firefight- long-term archival research. Official data, when it is ers in Tennessee set fire to a vacant building that had available, is also subject to similar questions. been set up for a training burn only days later. The 15 This is particularly evident when one considers what result was the same though the two found themselves might be most appropriately termed topical contagion, charged with arson for their impatience. Similarly, highly whereby a story in the media picks up a momentum of decorated and highly revered U.S. Forest Service its own and spreads geometrically and geographically. (USFS) Type-1 Incident Commander (one of only 14 in While it is not possible or feasible in the scope of this the country) Van Bateman was charged with setting two project to control for these media affects, the sample of- fires in the Coconino National Forest in Arizona. Bate- fers a broad cross section of cases to mitigate potential man, who had been flown by the Federal Emergency threats to validity. Management Agency (FEMA) to New York City to head 16 Former firefighters (n = 103) and retired firefighters its 9/11 response, admitted setting the fires though he (n = 5) were excluded from this sample, even though it argued that setting prescribed burns without official could be argued that they are/were intimately related to paperwork was common practice. He later pled guilty to the fire service. The cases were excluded (though the a felony count of “setting timber afire without authoriza- case details were retained in the dataset for compari- tion.” son purposes) so as not to distract from the findings 45 International Fire Service Journal of Leadership and Management presented here. The case for excluding former fire- Firefighter) were categorized according as such. It is fighters is particularly salient when the firefighter was possible that some of the firefighters listed with the administratively separated from the fire service for disci- default rank of firefighter may have held other positions plinary reasons. In those cases, a strong argument can or ranks — higher or lower. Additionally, the rank listed be made that the fire service acted correctly and should was the highest rank held since it was not always clear not be held to account for their former members’ sub- when or why they stepped down or were demoted. sequent actions as a recent case in Hawaii illustrated. 21 It is worth mentioning that some of the ranking mem- More often, however, the line between former and bers were not serving in that role at the time of the fire. current personnel comes down to timing. For firefight- For instance, a recent case out of Pennsylvania is il- ers are occasionally listed as former firefighters in press lustrative. The alleged subject had previously served as accounts when, upon a closer reading, the person was an Assistant Fire Chief of the volunteer section some- an active member at the time of the fire(s) but then time before he was hired for a paid part-time entry-level resigned after questioning or was quickly purged from firefighter position with the same department. Thus, the department’s roles as soon as their transgressions the highest rank achieved was recorded because it is came to light. For that reason, current members were important to note the position of responsibility held as defined as members who were active in the fire service well as being often difficult to determine whether they at the time of the fire, regardless of the later disposition were demoted or stepped down in light of an arson of their membership. investigation. The question of timing has perplexed others as 22 Firefighters were only considered to be part of a well. After the recent arson arrest of a former firefighter group if the group included at least one other firefighter. in Pennsylvania, several local commentators rhetori- A number of firefighters colluded with civilians; however, cally asked, when does someone lose the title former these cases were noted under a different variable be- firefighter? By the time he destroyed the auto parts cause it was decided that collusion between firefighters factory, which caused the company to fold and lay off was more pertinent. its entire workforce, he had not been a firefighter for 23 Ultimately, this empirical analysis cannot conclu- approximately a decade. Similarly, one of the most de- sively answer the question of motive. Previous research structive infernos of the Black Saturday fires in Victoria, shows reasons for firesetting among firefighters that are Australia, in early 2009 was allegedly lit by a man listed more or less independent of their association with the as a former firefighter though he had left the fire service fire service (Hinds-Aldrich, 2011). It was not feasible, decades earlier when mandatory background checks however, to exclude these cases from the dataset em- were instituted for all Australian firefighters in the early ployed in this study since it is not clear how the deter- 1990s. Despite obvious problems, any connection to the mination was made or how accurate that determination fire service, however tenuous or dated, is presented as was. a direct connection. 17 Fire police are non-fire-fighting personnel tasked with About the Author crowd and traffic control around fire scenes, popular in Matt Hinds-Aldrich is an Assistant Professor of some parts of the Northeastern United States. Fire Science at Anna Maria College. He is currently 18 Previous research often included fire buffs, civilians a member of a national firefighter arson working who have an active interest in fire fighting and its trap- group convened by the National Volunteer Fire pings though are not members of a fire-fighting organi- Council. He is also currently completing a Ph.D. zation, in addition to active firefighters; see for instance, at the University of Kent in England that examines Lewis and Yarnell (1951). the concept of firefighter culture. He served as a 19 The term retained firefighter is almost exclusively Brit- firefighter and trained as a fire investigator prior to ish, in that there are few true uncompensated volun- pursuing a doctorate. His previous writing has ex- teers. Retained firefighters in the United Kingdom (UK) plored the persistent use of arson during protests receive an annual stipend as well as are paid for the as well as the politicization of arson during the hours they spend on calls or training. American church arson epidemic and the German 20 The rank of firefighter was used as the default value. Reichstag fire. Matt can be contacted at: mhinds- Only news accounts that list a specific rank (i.e., aldrich@annamaria.edu Captain) or title (i.e., Training Officer or Probationary 46