Two Paths of Reformational Philosophy: Early Writings of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd by

J. Glenn Friesen

This is a critique of Anthony Tol's interpretation of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven, as set out in his thesis Philosophy in the Making: D.H.Th. Vollenhoven and the Emergence of Reformed Philosophy (Dordt Press). There are two major problems. First, Tol does not examine the earliest writings of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. Second, since he wants to show the emergence of reformational philosophy, it is essential to look at outside sources that influenced both philosophers. Tol generally restricts his analysis to comparing their writings in relation to each other, and thereby misses the different ways that they were influenced by other sources. When we look at these other sources, a very different story emerges. The story is of two friends who developed and reformed philosophy in two very divergent ways. Both rejected scholastic dualism, but in opposite ways: one by emphasizing the centrality of the supratemporal and the other by emphasizing the fully temporal nature of creation. It is in terms of this alternative story of the emergence of reformational philosophy that I will discuss Tol’s dissertation.

Reformational philosophy as developed by Dirk Vollenhoven and Herman Dooyeweerd took the stage against the background of Reformational thought as seen in the work of Abraham Kuyper. Together they developed a systematic elaboration of Kuyper’s notion of sphere sovereignty. However, whereas Kuyper had largely developed his insights in a social context, Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd carried this basic insight through far more rigorously and comprehensively than had their pioneering predecessor. They built on the foundations laid by Kuyper and elaborated his social vision to develop a philosophy of the created order as a whole that would take full account of the totality of human experience. In this article I shall outline Vollenhoven’s philosophical development.

Two Paths of Reformational Philosophy: Early Writings of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd by J. Glenn Friesen © 2011 Introduction Anthony Tol’s 2010 doctoral dissertation on D.H.Th. Vollenhoven has been published in two separate volumes, in two different languages, by two different publishers, and under two different titles. The first is Isagôgè Philosophiae 1930-1945, published by VU Uitgeverij. This is a text-critical edition of numerous versions of Vollenhoven’s Introduction to Philosophy, which existed primarily in syllabus form for his students. It is obvious that Tol has spent an enormous amount of time editing this work, and the result is a fine technical achievement. The second volume is Philosophy in the Making: D.H.Th. Vollenhoven and the Emergence of Reformed Philosophy, published by Dordt Press. This volume started as an introduction to the Isagôgè Philosophiae, but became a separate work. It contains many important details, including useful information on Vollenhoven’s dualistic ideas in his doctoral dissertation of 1918, his wrestling with the ideas of various other philosophers, and the way that he was later influenced by Antheunis Janse to reject the immortality of the soul. But this volume is seriously flawed in its methodology, and contains numerous inaccuracies, particularly in its comparisons to the very different philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd. There are two major problems. First, Tol does not examine the earliest writings of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. Second, since he wants to show the emergence of reformational philosophy, it is essential to look at outside sources that influenced both philosophers. Tol generally restricts his analysis to comparing their writings in relation to each other, and thereby misses the different ways that they were influenced by other sources. 2 When we look at these other sources, a very different story emerges. It is the story of two university students who were friends and who later became brothers-in-law. Dooyeweerd was more interested in the arts and Vollenhoven more interested in theology. But together they helped found a student journal Opbouw, where they enthusiastically wrote about Frederik van Eeden, Richard Wagner and Henri Bergson. Vollenhoven at that time was attracted to the ideas of Chantepie de la Saussaye and A.H. de Hartog. Both of these men were strongly influenced by the ideas of Jacob Boehme and Franz von Baader. Boehme also influenced Frederik van Eeden. But around 1916, Vollenhoven’s first thesis supervisor, Jan Woltjer dissuaded him from these ideas. Vollenhoven wrote his dissertation on the intuitionist ideas of the mathematicians L.E.J. Brouwer (1881-1966) and G. Mannoury (1867-1956). Both Brouwer and Mannoury were closely associated with Van Eeden. So in his thesis, Vollenhoven considered some of the same ideas that had interested him previously, but now interpreted in the light of Woltjer’s dualistic theism. Dooyeweerd completed his doctorate in jurisprudence. After they completed their studies, both men wanted to develop a philosophy within the neo-Calvinist worldview. The breakthrough came in 1922, when a mysterious “find” showed them a more biblical way of doing such a philosophy than their previous neo-Kantian direction. It is my view that this “find” was Okke Norel’s 1920 article on J.H. Gunning, Jr. and his ideas relating Calvinism to science. The article accounts for the change in direction of their ideas after 1922. Gunning was associated with Chantepie de la Saussaye, and so there was a repetition of the ideas deriving from Boehme and Baader that had so influenced the two friends in their student days, but this time in the context of a Calvinistic philosophy. At the end of 1922, Dooyeweerd started work at the Kuyper foundation, and he discovered that some of Kuyper’s ideas fit with these ideas. Dooyeweerd built on Kuyper’s neo-Calvinistic ideas, using Gunning, de la Saussaye and Baader to develop his reformational philosophy. From those sources, Dooyeweerd obtained the idea of our supratemporal heart, the center of all temporal functions including the function of thought. The very term ‘supratemporal’ [boventijdelijk] is found in Gunning, who also uses the term ‘New Critique’ to describe his approach to philosophy. This idea of the supratemporal heart allowed Dooyeweerd to reform philosophy from its scholastic and 3 dualistic views, and to reject those ideas of Christian realism and humanism that depend on an over-valuation of rationality, or the “autonomy of thought.” It also provided him with the “law-Idea” that he would use to describe his philosophy. Vollenhoven was also influenced by Norel’s 1920 article, particularly its idea that our thinking is only one function within cosmic reality, and in the idea of our heart “direction.” Vollenhoven had the opportunity to again adopt the ideas of de la Saussaye that had interested him as a student. But in 1922, another event caused Vollenhoven to develop his philosophy in a very different way from Dooyeweerd. This was the influence of Antheunis Janse, who convinced Vollenhoven to reject the idea of the immortality of the soul. As a result, Vollenhoven substituted a fully temporal view of humanity. Within that temporalized framework, Vollenhoven attempted to use the theosophical insight that our rationality is only one of our functions. But for other ideas, he reached back to the ideas of his mentor Woltjer, and the ideas of Franz Brentano (1838-1917). The ideas of both Woltjer and Brentano are very evident in Vollenhoven’s Isagôgè. Vollenhoven never used the term ‘law-Idea,’ and he rejected the idea that the modalities are modes of consciousness. And Vollenhoven rejected that part of Kuyper’s neo-Calvinism that was of particular interest to Dooyeweerd. And so the story is of two friends who developed and reformed philosophy in two divergent ways. Both rejected scholastic dualism, but in opposite ways: one by emphasizing the centrality of the supratemporal and the other by emphasizing the fully temporal nature of creation. It is in terms of this alternative story of the emergence of reformational philosophy that I will discuss Tol’s dissertation. The discussion will involve going down different paths and looking at influences that Tol omits in his dissertation. In this way I hope to build on the facts that Tol has collected, but to present them in a way that makes better use of comparative philosophy and the historical emergence of ideas. Both volumes of Tol’s dissertation show changes in Vollenhoven’s thought over time, as well as Vollenhoven’s continuing uncertainty with respect to some major issues. Here is a detailed review and critique of both volumes, with an emphasis on the issue of the 4 relation to Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. I begin with the second volume, since it deals with the earlier period of time. I. Philosophy in the Making: D.H.Th. Vollenhoven and the Emergence of Reformed Philosophy A. Influence or two separate ways of doing reformational philosophy? Tol believes that Vollenhoven has not been “given his due” as one of the co-founders of reformational philosophy (Tol, 265, 315-18). Vollenhoven’s influence is “far more prominent than has been recognized or at least admitted to date” and Tol wants to “set the record straight” (Tol, 223). There is no doubt that Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd discussed other philosophers, such as neo-Kantians. Tol’s dissertation is very good in showing this relationship. But even if they discussed and used these ideas, such joint research does not show an influence by Vollenhoven. Dooyeweerd later repudiated these ideas, and he denied that his discussions with Vollenhoven had any influence on the way that his philosophy finally developed. They were a detour, wrong ideas on the way to developing his own philosophy. 1. The problem of showing Vollenhoven’s positive influence on Dooyeweerd Tol acknowledges the difficulty of showing Vollenhoven’s influence. Here are some of the factors to consider: a) Disagreements between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd were kept private (Tol, 19, 264), and only revealed late in life. My own research indicates that they disagreed on almost every issue (Friesen 2005b). Tol acknowledges my article (Tol, 18 fn4), but his references to specific disagreements are scattered throughout his text. I have collected them in Appendix A. b) In 1973, Dooyeweerd published a tribute to Vollenhoven. He refers to the “pre- reformational phase” when Vollenhoven’s was still “quite bound to the “traditional metaphysics of realist scholasticism.” Dooyeweerd then describes his own founding role in reformational philosophy. He refers to “my philosophy.” Tol says that Dooyeweerd situates Vollenhoven from “the perspective of his own philosophy” (Tol, 265 and fn70). That seems correct. It does not mean that Vollenhoven did not have his own philosophy. 5 Of course it was rude for Dooyeweerd to use this tribute to talk about his own work. But Dooyeweerd must have felt it necessary to do this in order to prevent continued confusion between his philosophy and Vollenhoven’s. As Theodore Plantinga remarked, Dooyeweerd had the chance to acknowledge Vollenhoven’s role, but did not (Plantinga, 111-12). c) The window of time in which Vollenhoven’s influence could occur is very small: if there was a positive influence, it was likely in 1922. This is because: (1) Vollenhoven’s 1918 dissertation contains dualistic views that he later viewed as misguided (Tol, 79). Up until the end of 1922, his views remained substantially the same (Tol, 75). (2) At the end of 1922, Vollenhoven met Antheunis Janse, who changed his views dramatically. Vollenhoven had a mental breakdown that necessitated hospitalization; he did not recover until the end of 1923 (Tol, 10, 235). (3) Vollenhoven’s own evidence is that the important change in his philosophy came late in 1923, after his mental breakdown (Tol, 265). It was a “definitive shift” (Tol, 276). And at that time, Janse was influencing Vollenhoven (Tol, 268). In 1925, Vollenhoven agreed with Janse that the soul is not immortal (Tol, 10, 242). (4) In 1923, during the time that Vollenhoven was “out of reach” (Tol, 10), Dooyeweerd developed his idea of the Law-idea, an idea that Vollenhoven never shared. It is at this time that Dooyeweerd first used the terminology of “law-idea” and “law-spheres” (Tol, 267). So Tol needs to prove Vollenhoven’s influence before 1923. (5) But the date gets pushed back even further, since Dooyeweerd published a significant article in 1922 that contains ideas like modalities that would be key to reformational philosophy. How can there be influence if Vollenhoven’s own view had not changed until after 1923? Dooyeweerd’s evidence is that discussions with Vollenhoven prior to 1923 had “not the least influence” on the direction of his philosophy. They were just “just beating the air somewhat about neo-Kantianism and so forth” (Tol, 269 fn 76). (6) Vollenhoven refers to an unidentified “find” that influenced both him and Dooyeweerd in 1922. Although he does not identify the document, Tol argues that it must 6 have contained certain ideas in order for both philosophers to change in the way that they did after that time. Tol argues that Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd must have discussed these ideas because the 1922 article by Dooyeweerd uses these same ideas, at a time before he joined the Kuyper Foundation. The changes in Vollenhoven are hard to trace, since after his illness, he did not publish again until 1925 (Tol, 76). So Tol has to rely primarily on Dooyeweerd’s writings (Tol, 364). But how do these writings by Dooyeweerd prove the influence of Vollenhoven? If anything, they would seem to prove the converse. (7) An explanation that makes more sense and makes better use of comparative philosophy is to try to identify the “find.” I believe it was Norel’s article of 1920, which summarized J.H. Gunning Jr.’s views of science, which were in turn based on Franz von Baader. Norel’s article was published in Stemmen des Tijds, a journal to which Vollenhoven submitted an article in 1919; part of that article was finally published in that journal in 1922, along with another article by Vollenhoven. Vollenhoven continued to publish in that journal, including the crucial article in 1926 relied on by Tol. So Vollenhoven was very aware of this journal; he would have been aware of Norel’s, article. Norel’s article accounts for both Dooyeweerd’s 1922 article as well as Vollenhoven’s later ideas, including the idea that “knowing resorts under being.” But 1 they relied on the article in very different ways. Even Dooyeweerd’s 1922 article shows strong divergences from Vollenhoven. (8) Dooyeweerd’s 1922 use of Norel’s 1920 article also accounts for Dooyeweerd’s statement that “the first rudimental conception” of his philosophy had already ripened before he came to the Kuyper Foundation (NC I, v). 1 Tol uses the phrase “knowing resorts under being” more than 20 times in this work. The phrase is an incorrect use of English. There is a Dutch word ‘ressorteren,’ which Van Dale’s dictionary says means “onder een gezags- of rechtsgebied behoren” [to fall under an area of authority or law], but this meaning of “fall under” cannot be translated by ‘resort.’ Nor is this phrase, or even the word ‘ressorteren’ found in the source that Tol indicates (Vollenhoven 1926a). Tol uses the phrase to mean “thinking is a part of being.” The best evidence is that Vollenhoven obtained this insight was obtained from Norel’s 1920 article; it is the basis for the rejection of the autonomy of thought in the sense that thinking is not autonomous with respect to our other cosmic functions. 7 (9) After Dooyeweerd came to the Kuyper Foundation, he read Kuyper for the first time. It was then that he learned of Kuyper’s view of the heart as the central point in man’s existence (see discussion below). This was a turning point in his philosophy (NC I, v). I believe that this is because it allowed Dooyeweerd to connect Kuyper with the ideas from the Norel article, which refers to the same idea: our central heart, of which our rational thought is just one part in the periphery. That is why “knowing resorts under being.” Rationality is only one function of our central being. (10) Dooyeweerd must also have read the writings of Gunning’s associate Chantepie de la Saussaye, since it is obvious that his later work relies on these ideas, although he never acknowledges their source (see discussion below and Appendix D). That gives me confidence that my explanation is on the right track, and it confirms again in a very clear way that Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is related to that of Franz von Baader. Already in the 19 century, Chantepie de la Saussaye found scholasticism in Calvinism that needed th reforming. (11) This also makes sense of what Dooyeweerd says about discussions with Vollenhoven in The Hague after he arrived at the Kuyper Foundation in 1922. He and Vollenhoven saw problems in Kuyper’s world and life view. Vollenhoven had come to the same conclusion “in his own way.” There is nothing “seriously skewed” in Dooyeweerd’s account as Tol says (Tol, 267). 2 (12) Tol says that Vollenhoven presented “another way” of practicing reformational philosophy (Tol, 270). Both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd found “a way” of reforming philosophy that is critical of traditional scholasticism; Dooyeweerd ‘co-founded’ philosophy “in his own way” (Tol, 11, 412 fn 53). To say that there are two ways allows us to take Dooyeweerd at his word (and Tol says at least once that we have no reason not to accept it (Tol, 313). Vollenhoven’s way of reforming scholasticism was to abandon a dualistic anthropology; but (influenced by Janse), he chose to fully temporalize man’s existence. The modalities for him are not modes of a central consciousness, but abstractions from temporal reality. In contrast, Dooyeweerd supratemporalized the soul, 2 The mere fact that Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven had previously had “close contact” does not mean that it was on this topic. 8 viewing the body as a temporal expression of the soul (which he denied was a dualism), and he regarded the modalities as modes of consciousness. (13) This solution of a common source, used in different ways, means that it is inappropriate to argue that Vollenhoven influenced Dooyeweerd in a positive sense. 2. The problem of showing a negative influence by Vollenhoven Vollenhoven repudiated the ideas in his dissertation. So even if that dissertation influenced Dooyeweerd, it would be a negative influence. That is an odd way of attempting to rehabilitate Vollenhoven’s reputation. It is a patronizing argument, like saying, “I used to believe that, but now I know better.” Yet that is what Tol seems to want to argue: that Dooyeweerd used ideas that Vollenhoven once used but later rejected, ideas like the selfhood, intuition, the experience of succession of time. But close scrutiny shows that even this negative argument must fail. Dooyeweerd was not indebted to Vollenhoven for these ideas. There are sources prior to Vollenhoven’s dissertation on which both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd relied. Furthermore, Dooyeweerd used these terms in different ways, and did not regard them as negative at all. 3. What were the sources that they used? Even to ask, “Which philosopher was more original?” or “Which philosopher influenced the other?” is to ask the wrong question. Dooyeweerd denied that his philosophy was original (WdW IIII, vii-viii; not in NC); he placed his philosophy in relation to a perennial tradition (WdW I, 82; NC I, 118). The real issue is to track down the sources that Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven used to develop their philosophies. Did they use common sources? If so, then the issue of influence of one on the other does not arise. Did they use different sources, or did they use the same sources in different ways? Again the issue of influence does not arise. Did they use Kuyper’s neo-Calvinism in the same way? Tol’s dissertation does not adequately deal with these issues, and these problems in his methodology need to be addressed. Methodological issues. 1. It is true that both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd wanted to develop a philosophy along the lines a neo-Calvinist worldview. But Tol fails to examine how neo-Calvinism differs from historical Calvinism, and which parts of neo-Calvinism 9 Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd adopted. 2. Failure to include earlier sources by Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd that help to explain the emergence of their ideas and 3. Failure to look at other sources that explain the emergence of their ideas. After discussing these methodological issues, we will look at the following periods of time to test Tol’s allegations, taking these other sources into account. Vollenhoven’s Dissertation of 1918. Tol fails to examine the sources for Vollenhoven’s dissertation. Any ideas that Dooyeweerd may have shared can be shown to derive from other sources. In any event, Vollenhoven rejected the ideas in this dissertation as dualistic. Between 1918 and 1922. 1. Discussions regarding law. 2. Vollenhoven’s 1921 article 3. The influence of Antheunis Janse on Vollenhoven 4. The 1922 “find” 5. Dooyeweerd’s 1922 article 6. Dooyeweerd’s 1923 articles on the law-Idea, written while Vollenhoven was “out of reach” (mental breakdown). From 1924 onwards. 1. Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd both accepted appointments to the Free University in 1926. Both refer to modalities that cannot be reduced to each other. 2. Around 1928, Dooyeweerd discovers the idea of cosmic time and develops the idea of the supratemporality of the heart, thereby building on what he had learned from the Norel article and its sources 3. Vollenhoven, who has rejected the immortality of the soul, develops his philosophy in a different way, relying on Woltjer’s earlier ideas. We will now look at these issues in detail, beginning with the methodological issues. 10 B. Methodological Issues 1. Calvinism and Neo-Calvinism Both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd wanted to develop a philosophy within the Calvinist worldview. But what does that mean? What is the worldview that they were talking about? And in what way was their development so different? Tol begins his discussion of neo-Calvinism with Abraham Kuyper and the founding of the Free University (Tol, 42 ff). He assumes that Kuyper’s ideas stand in a continuous tradition going back to Calvin. But even in 1923, Dooyeweerd said that he was not following the historical Calvin so much as Kuyper’s neo-Calvinism (Verburg 63). In 1935 Dooyeweerd objected to the term ‘Calvinistic’ to describe his philosophy (WdW I, 35). He objected again in 1964, near the end of his career (Dooyeweerd 2007). He did not want to give the impression that his philosophy was sectarian, of interest to only a limited circle of people. Tol gives a very useful discussion of how, when the Free University was formed, its reformational principles were left undefined. Later, a committee was set up to try to 3 define the principles. Some of these principles were: (1) Reason is not separate from faith; (2) There is both an objective and a subjective rational order; (3) The present situation of the cosmos is abnormal (fallen); (4) We should seek the law in empirical phenomena; (5) We are to investigate how regeneration (palingenesis) affects enlightenment (illuminatio); and (6) These principles are “given with our self- consciousness.” Tol reviews some interpretations of these principles. But apart from asking whether the duplex ordo of rationality is a ‘scholastic’ reference to a supranatural order of truth, Tol does not explore the sources of these principles or indeed how Kuyper’s neo-Calvinism differed from historical Calvinism (Tol, 46-51). 3 Dooyeweerd later praised the Free University for not defining reformational principles, but leaving them open for positivization (Dooyeweerd 2007). Vollenhoven too, saw them as “orienting directives” (Tol, 61). 11 Recent research has shown that Kuyper was strongly influenced by Franz von Baader (1765-1841) through the works of J.H. Gunning, Jr. (1829-1905) and of Chantepie de la Saussaye (1818-1874), two theologians who introduced Baader’s ideas to Reformed theology in the Netherlands (Friesen 2003b, 2007; Mietus 2006, 2009). Vollenhoven 4 himself had once been attracted to the ideas of de la Saussaye and A.H. de Hartog, who also praised Baader (Stellingwerff 1992, 10; de Hartog 1915). And as already mentioned, 5 an article on Gunning’s views on science, derived from Baader, was published in 1920 in Stemmen des Tijds. Tol does not explore these influences at all, so we will look at them in more detail. Both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd were eager to work out a philosophy “in the spirit of Kuyper’s basic conception of Calvinism as a world and life view that was to be clearly distinguishable from both the Roman Catholic and the Humanistic ones” (Tol, 267). Tol is certainly correct that “there was a difference of implementation from the start” (Tol, 269). One of Dooyeweerd’s distinct ways was his reliance on Kuyper’s idea of the religious heart center of man’s being. a) The supratemporal heart In his understanding of neo-Calvinism, Dooyeweerd relied on Kuyper’s Stone Lectures for the idea of the central point of our existence: …that point in our consciousness in which our life is still undivided and lies comprehended in its unity—not in the spreading vines but in the root from which the vines spring. This point, of course, lies in the antithesis between all that is finite in our human life and the infinite that lies beyond it. Here alone we find the common source from which the different streams of our human life spring and separate themselves. Personally it is our repeated experience that in the depths of our hearts, at the point where we disclose ourselves to the Eternal One, all the rays of our life converge as in one focus…(Kuyper 1898, 20). 4 Mietus argues that Kuyper’s later disagreement with the “ethical theologians” Gunning and de la Saussaye was political in that Kuyper’s new Free University was competing with Gunning at Utrecht (Mietus 2009). 5 Since it was Jan Woltjer who dissuaded Vollenhoven from these views, and since Woltjer died in 1917, Vollenhoven must have read Chantepie de la Saussaye before 1917. Vollenhoven’s student articles from 1914 to 1916 contain ideas that seem to derive from de la Saussaye. 12 This undivided point is our central heart. Tol points out that Dooyeweerd thought this passage was so important that it should be memorized (Tol, 269 fn77; Dooyeweerd 1939, 211). In 1935, Dooyeweerd opens his major philosophical work with a discussion of the importance of this central significance of the heart. Kant’s Copernican revolution was not central or radical (from ‘radix’), but only a revolution in the periphery, because rationality is only a peripheral function that finds its center in the heart. The central heart relativizes everything temporal, including reason; that is why there can be no autonomy of thought (WdW I, v-vii, poorly translated in NC I, v-vii). The Calvin scholar Josef 6 Bohatec could not find in Calvin any idea of the heart as meaning the whole of human existence (Verburg 191). That was also G.C. Berkouwer’s view (Stellingwerff 1987, 7 223). The idea of the supratemporal heart does not derive from Calvin, but from Baader, via Gunning and de la Saussaye, who also emphasize this idea, supporting it with the biblical view that “out of the heart are all the issues of life.” But Vollenhoven rejected the idea of a supratemporal heart center. He later spoke of the heart as a pre-functional and fully temporal center; later he even gave up the distinction between central and peripheral (Tol, 477 fn164) so it is hard to see how he could maintain the idea of even a pre- functional unity. In addition to this idea of the central heart, there are two other strands in Kuyper’s neo- Calvinism that Dooyeweerd says he relies on: (1) Kuyper’s lecture on sphere sovereignty (2) Kuyper’s works of a devotional or meditational nature (Dooyeweerd 1971b). b) Sphere sovereignty Although Kuyper used the idea of sphere sovereignty in a societal sense, giving separate authority to the institutions of state, church, and family (Tol, 44), he did not develop that idea to extend to the modalities or “law-spheres” (Tol, 54, 218; Dooyeweerd 1975b). 6 The word ‘autonomy’ therefore has two senses: (1) the idea that rationality can be elevated above our other functions, acting autonomously from them and (2) the idea that such an autonomous reason can create its own law instead of being subject to God’s law. An even more extreme version is that rational thought can create its own object (constructivism). See discussion below in relation to Dooyeweerd’s 1922 article. 7 But Bohatec’s idea that positive law is the synthesis of the essential and the peripheral, of equity [aequitas] and the constituive, should be researched further in relation to the distinction between central/peripheral and Idea/concept (Bohatec 1934, 129). 13 Calvin’s theology included the idea that God’s reign extends to every area of our life (Tol, 266). But that idea in itself does not necessarily imply that each area is sovereign. It does not give rise to the idea of sphere sovereignty even in a societal sense, but only a rejection of spiritualistic flight from the world. Instead of fleeing the world, we are to “work and pray” [from the medieval ‘ora et labora’] (Dooyeweerd 1916a). The idea of sphere sovereignty is already found in Baader, including the idea of a university free from state and church control. And Baader also used the idea to delimit areas of science from each other (Friesen 2003a). Baader’s idea is of the organic nature of science, where the separate limbs (or points on the periphery) are related to the head (or center). Each limb [Glied] is articulated [Zergliedert] from out of the Center. Vollenhoven used the idea of sphere sovereignty, but there are important differences from Dooyeweerd’s use (Appendix A). Vollenhoven even questioned whether the term should be used (Tol, 68 fn 82). c) Kuyper’s meditative works Kuyper’s meditative works did not interest Vollenhoven: “…de Kuyper van de meditaties heeft me nooit zo erg geboeid” (Vollenhoven 1968, 205). But for Dooyeweerd, they were very significant. In the video taken at his 80 birthday, Dooyeweerd says that as a student th he was not very interested in reading Kuyper, but when he started work at the Kuyper Foundation in 1922, he was obliged to do so (Dooyeweerd 1975b). He picked up Kuyper’s Pinkstermeditatie [Pentecost meditation] (Kuyper 1888a), and could not put it down. He also mentions Kuyper’s Stone Lectures, and its idea about that central point where our life is undivided. Dooyeweerd says that this is a very different Kuyper than in his theological and scholastic work. Note that in the Pentecost meditation, Kuyper says that we cannot understand Christ’s ascension using our human reason [vleeschelijk verstand]: But God has broken down the wall, and from that opening in the wall, divine light has fallen, allowing us to see things on earth in a very different way, and very different things in the heaven above. God’s majesty and power breaks into this life (Kuyper 1888, 8-9, my translation) 14 Dooyeweerd later said that when our heart center participates in Christ, the light of God’s eternity breaks through, illuminating our present world so that we see it differently (NC III, 29). As a student, Dooyeweerd referred to the same idea (Dooyeweerd 1915b). Is this the kind of realism where we look into God’s eternity to behold the thoughts of God? No, because Kuyper here says that God’s light of eternity allows us “to see things on earth in a very different way.” That is different from beholding God’s eternal ideas. What about “the heaven above”? Isn’t that a reference to eternal ideas? But Kuyper refers to a “created eternity” which is our true home. Kuyper says that it is our separation from Immanuel (Christ) that has made us unable to understand these heavenly things: Maar als gij in Hem u ingelijfd weet, en éen plante met Hem, en een levend lid aan zijn levend lichaam, door de mystieke, wondere levensverbonding des Geestes, o, dan is er geen afstand, maar dan is elk oogenblik uw gebed naar Hem opklimmende, en elk oogenblik van Hem een gave op u nederdalend. Dan staat er de Jakobsladder weer opgericht; en langs die opgerichte ladder snelt uw ziele Hem tegemoet en snellen zijn liefdeboden u tegen. Alles bezield, vol zaligen glans, en tintelend van goddelijk leven! Door Jezus’ Hemelvaart aard en hemel voor uw diepsten zielsblik éen (Ibid, p. 11). [But when you know yourself to be incorporated with Him, and a living member of his living body, through the mystical wonderful union of life given by the Spirit, O, then there is no distance, but in each moment your prayer ascends to Him and in each moment a gift descends from Him to you. Then Jacob’s ladder is again erected; and along that erected ladder, your soul speeds to meet Him, and his loving messengers speed to meet you. Everything ensouled, full of a blessed glory, and sparkling with divine life! Through Jesus’ ascension, earth and heaven are one in the deepest view of your soul. [my translation] 8 Kuyper says that Christ’s ascension was not a rejection of human nature. Instead, it was a higher ensouling of human nature. This elevation of human nature does not mean bringing something foreign to it, but brings to it everything that belongs to its true nature. 8 Antoine Faivre says that the theosophist “prefers to sojourn, to travel, on Jacob’s ladder, where the angels–the symbols, the mediations–are ascending and descending,” rather than attempt to go beyond like the mystic. He quotes Madame de Staël’s observation that theosophers attempt to penetrate the secrets of creation; mere mystics are content with their own hearts (Faivre 2000, xxiii, 25). 15 When Jesus rose, all rose with Him (Ibid, p. 21-24). Kuyper refers to the things that are 9 above, where Christ is (Ibid, p. 39, citing Col. 3:1). Our heart is really the temple of God, and Christ lives in its inner chamber (Ibid, p. 77, 151). There is a created heaven, which is not just purely spiritual, but more real than this world in which we live (Ibid. p. 124). He is the vine, we are the branches, without which he cannot show His glory; we must be the organ of the Mediator (Ibid. 164, 166). Dooyeweerd also mentions the “things that are above”; we would not be able to understand them if our heart were not supratemporal (Dooyeweerd 2007 and Discussion). The idea of a ‘created heaven’ corresponds to Dooyeweerd’s idea of an aevum, between eternity and temporal reality (Dooyeweerd 1936-39; 1940). This is the “heavens.” For “man in his true selfhood, transcends the temporal ‘earthly’ cosmos” (NC II 592). Dooyeweerd also emphasized the importance of our participation in Christ, the New Root of creation (WdW I, 496, NC I, 593) and that we are to become sons of God (NC I, 61). In contrast, Vollenhoven emphasized law as the boundary between God and creation, and he regarded any idea of participation in God as pantheism or Gnosticism. But because of the idea of a strict boundary, he had difficulties in affirming God’s immanence in the world. We will discuss this in more detail below, especially when we look at Schneckenburger’s comparison of Lutheranism and Calvinism. Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd therefore retained different parts Kuyper’s ideas. Both also criticized what they regarded as scholastic elements remaining in Kuyper’s thought (Dooyeweerd 1939). Tol says that Vollenhoven acknowledged Janse’s influence in 9 In Pro Rege, Kuyper says that even the miracles of Christ are not to be regarded as proofs of his divinity, but as examples of what humans can do in their redeemed and regenerated state: He [Christ] made the remarkable promise to the disciples that whoever believed in Him would do even greater works than His (John 14:12) […] While on earth, He neither ruled as the Son of God nor did He display the majesty of His divinity, but He appeared among us as a human being, as one of us, and He did not reveal any power other than that potentially available to all humanity (Kuyper 1911, tr. John H. Boer, p. 7). 16 coming to his own position, one that “comported better with the neo-Calvinist strain of the Reformed tradition he wished to emphasize” (Tol, 265, italics mine). 2. Failure to consider early student works by Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd Tol’s study of the emergence of reformational philosophy begins too late. He begins with Vollenhoven’s doctoral dissertation, and ignores Vollenhoven’s earlier student writings in the journal Opbouw. Several students, including Vollenhoven, who was also its editor, founded the journal in March 1914. The journal had as its subtitle ”Maandschrift in dienst der Christ. Levens-en wereldbeschouwing, van en voor jongeren” [Monthly periodical in the service of a Christian life-and-worldview for and by young people]. The intention of the journal was set out in the first pages of the first volume. Christianity is not just something from antiquity, but a living, wholesome power. And science is not to be feared as undermining our belief; rather, in all its expressions it can do nothing other than to confirm God’s Word in its length and breadth and its depth and height. The journal was intended both for those who believe that they know and those who seek to know. Vollenhoven published many articles in this journal during the few years that Opbouw was in existence. Vollenhoven sometimes used pseudonyms such as “Th. Voorthuizen,” “J.W.,” “C. Kampervoort,” and “J. Werkhoven” (Stellingwerff 1992, 17-19). Vollenhoven was 22 to 24 years of age when he wrote these articles. Tol mentions some of these articles (Tol, 263 fn 66), but he does mention all of them nor does he deal with their content. And yet these early writings provide significant information on Vollenhoven’s development. Such juvenilia are important in assessing a philosopher, even if the philosopher later changes his mind. Vollenhoven changed his mind on many ideas in his dissertation, too, and yet Tol considers it to be a significant part of his development. And these writings are not that much earlier than Vollenhoven’s dissertation. Some were written in 1916, two years before the dissertation was completed! a) “Henri Bergson” (1916) 17 Under the initials ‘Th.V.’ [for his pseudonym Th. Voorthuizen], Vollenhoven published a long article on Henri Bergson in Opbouw. It is most relevant in assessing his later ideas of time and intuition, for this article already refers to the relation between mathematics and philosophy (Stellingwerff 1992, 20). And this article was written in 1916, two years before he completed his dissertation. Vollenhoven begins by focusing on metaphysics, by which he means the penetration in the world of unseen, eternal things. He criticizes those philosophers who deny any world behind the phenomenal world (Vollenhoven 1916a, 145). Vollenhoven says that intuition is an in-sight [in-zien] into things that reason cannot fathom. Intuitively we see that motion is not a transition of rest from one point to rest in another point, but rather a force. In this article, Vollenhoven is already classifying philosophers. He distinguishes between realism, rationalism, and empiricism. He then shows how each differs in how and whether we can know God. Rationalism proceeds from reason, and regards belief as unnecessary. Empiricism proceeds from the senses and denies God’s existence. But realism (which he distinguishes from realism in art), says that we can know God from his revelation in nature, Scripture, church and conscience: En ‘t realisme zag in, dat, mochten de wijzen, waarop de dingen zich aan ons openbaarden, verschillen, toch ten slotte de mensch met zijn verstand en rede moest nadenken de gedachten Gods in dit alles als eenheid gelegd (Vollenhoven 1916a, 16). [And realism saw that, although the modes [wijzen] might differ by which things reveal themselves to us, yet in the end, man with his intellect and reason must think the thoughts of God after Him which are placed as a unity in all of this.] Now from where did he get these ideas? He refers to God’s thoughts as they are placed or set within things. Why does he not use these ideas in his dissertation? The ideas fit with de la Saussaye, whom his supervisor Woltjer later dissuaded him from adopting. He goes on to say that there was a fourth movement, that of Kant, which saw this idea of unity as an illusion. Kant said that our ability to know was limited. In this article, Vollenhoven already discusses Sigwart, Von Hartmann and Windelband. He would look at them again in 1921. 18 When he comes to Bergson, he says that nowhere has the relation between mathematics and philosophy been seen as in France. The Frenchman is less concerned with logical deduction than immediate evidence. And mathematics expressly proclaims the certainty and unproveability of its first principles (Vollenhoven 1916a, 154). Bergson fights all four directions of thought: rationalism, empiricism, realism and Kantian criticism. As a way of knowing the relation between self and world, Bergson uses intuition as well as reason. Intuition is insight and empathy [een in-zien, een in-voelen]. Bergson distinguishes between spirit and matter, time and space, motion and rest, the organic and the inorganic. Intuition deals with the first and reason with the second. Door de intuitie vinden we ‘t leven zelf; intuitief zien we in, dat de beweging één is en voortdurend, niet een overgang van rust in ‘t eene punt tot rust in ‘t andere punt van de richtingsbaan, maar een kracht. Intuitief beleeft men den tijd, doordat we elk oogenblik de ervaring in ons hebben opgenomen die vroegere momenten ons inprentten. Intuitief komen we niet alleen tot ‘t wezen van beweging en tijd, maar ook tot ‘t wezen van alle dingen die buiten ons staan. We voelen met hen mee, we verplaatsen ons door onze fantasie in hun plaats. [Through intuition we find life itself; we intuitively see that motion is one and continuous, not a transition from rest in one point to rest in another point of the trajectory, but a force. We intuitively currently experience time, in that every moment we take up in us the experience that previous moments have imprinted on us. Intuitively we arrive not only at the essence of motion and time, but also to the essence of all things that stand outside of us. We have empathy with them; in our fantasy we change places with them] Note that Vollenhoven is already using the word ‘beleven’ that Tol emphasizes in the dissertation. Vollenhoven says that the Christian also relies on intuition as a source of knowledge; belief and wisdom are largely intuitive (Vollenhoven 1916a, 179-80, 182). Wisdom does not argue but sees. Faith is not opposed to the reasoning of science, but precedes it and supports it. Faith is intuitive and rests on insight and empathy [in-zicht en in-voelen]. It should be pointed out that this use of ‘in-zicht’ or in-sight, especially in its hyphenated form, is already in de la Saussaye, as is the characterization of faith and its basis for science. So is the use of ‘beleven’ (see Appendix D). 19 But Vollenhoven criticizes Bergson’s view that intuition is a second faculty of knowing. Vollenhoven would prefer to say that our one faculty of thought works in two ways, discursive and intuitive thought. Christianity cannot accept two faculties. If it maintains the unity of thought, then it can also maintain the idea of the creation of man according to the image of God, acknowledging the difference between God’s thought and our own. God’s thought is purely intuitive; ours is discursive. But if there are two faculties of thought, then there would be two in God as well, and the distinction would be eternal. And if Bergson is right about one kind of thought being organic and the other inorganic, then this would deny the fact of creation, since Christians believe that God created both organic and inorganic along with time. And, says Vollenhoven, Bergson is trying to fill 10 the gap left by reason, much like Kant used practical reason to supplement pure reason. So Bergson has not overcome Kant. A third objection is that intuition itself can make mistakes. And finally, even intuition cannot create a relation between me and the world; that relation must already be there. I can only have in-sight [in-zien] into something that already exists. This contact with the given is only given by realism, which posits man as having one created nature, part material, part spiritual. God has expressed his thoughts in creation, and so God can be known from out of his created works. Only in this way can natural religion maintain contact with God, although it is purified by special revelation. And even though intuition, understood in this way, is darkened by sin, it can again obtain clarity by sharing in the gift of grace of the enlightenment of reason. In the third installment of this article on Bergson, Vollenhoven asks how we can know things outside of us. This is the problem of the relation of “being and thinking” (Vollenhoven 1916a, 216). The Christian seeks knowledge in God’s revelation, both in nature and in the Scriptures. Bergson needs to find it in the stream of life; his idea of 11 empathy [invoelen] is to lose oneself in the All. Vollenhoven says that Bergson is consistent [consequent] in this pantheistic view. Bergson, in saying we need intuition to see this, is giving the same value to intuition as does the Christian for the idea of rebirth 10 Vollenhoven’s reasoning here is obscure. The idea of embodiment in God would give a different view of what God’s unity means. 11 Vollenhoven repeats this in his Isagôgè. 20 as being necessary for knowledge of the Kingdom of God. When Bergson says we need logic to test our intuition, he is contradicting himself (Vollenhoven 1916a, 220). Vollenhoven says that the Christian idea of revelation is more consistent [meer consequenter]. Vollenhoven says that Bergson’s idea of self-creation and self-development is inconceivable. For development is only possible in relation to that which does not develop; movement only in relation to the unmoved. The idea of change presupposes that of durability [duurzaamheid] and movement presupposes rest (Vollenhoven 1916a, 221). 12 Vollenhoven then examines different ways of relating matter and spirit. There is materialism (which derives spirit from matter), idealism (which reduces matter to spirit; the object does not exist without subject; the object outside of us is the refraction of the beam of light on the mirror). Vollenhoven defends the position of parallelism, where matter and spirit both exist, independently of each other. b) “Abelard and Skepticism” (1914) Vollenhoven published this article under the pseudonym initials ‘J.W.’ He says that in Augustine, there was a harmony of head and heart, of rationalism and mysticism. But in the Middle Ages, these two lines split into rationalism on the one hand, and on the other into an unhealthy mysticism that wiped out the distinction between God and creation. This difference is seen in the conflict between Bernard of Clairvaux and Peter Abelard. Abelard could not identify with either realism or nominalism. Realism derived from Plato; the universal is not seen; it is the model according to which all separate examples of the same sort have been formed. The model has a separate existence in God; the universal exists before the particular. Nominalists thought that the universal was purely a concept obtained by abstracting particulars from things. We acquire the universal concept by thinking away what is characteristic of every example; what remains is an abstraction that does not exist in reality. Abelard opposed both views. He saw the universal as existing in things in which the universal is logically placed by God’s thoughts [logisch is ingelegd door de gedachte 12 This is Vollenhoven’s dialectical method in his Isagôgè. 21 Gods]. We don’t have to have a universal outside of things. Our concepts can later win the universal back from the thing (Vollenhoven 1914a, 105). What is interesting is that this is very similar to the position that Vollenhoven ultimately adopted in 1926 after he rejected Christian realism. He criticizes other ideas in Abelard, and says that we need to consistently [consequent] carry through his thoughts to see the contradictions (Vollenhoven 1914a, 120). This idea of looking at history in a consistent way would later be the basis for his problem- historical method. I suggest it also came from Woltjer, in whom we find this same emphasis on being consistent (consequent). 13 c) Opbouw articles by Dooyeweerd Opbouw contains numerous articles by Dooyeweerd, and many of these articles contain ideas that Dooyeweerd carried forward in his later work (Friesen 2010b). Dooyeweerd was clearly interested in the arts, such as music and opera; he wanted to find the unity of the arts, just like the unitary white light that is refracted by a prism. His romanticism is evident in these articles and in his earlier romantic poetry. Dooyeweerd’s Opbouw 14 articles, and his article on Van Eeden show that he was reading Van Eeden, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Eduard von Hartmann. Dooyeweerd also refers to the writings of mystics, to Plotinus, and to Leibniz. Some ideas that Tol attributes to Vollenhoven and Janse are already found in Dooyeweerd’s student articles. Here are some examples: (1) Tol incorrectly attributes the idea of immanent critique to Vollenhoven (Tol, 289 fn114). But Dooyeweerd already used the term ‘immanent critique’ in his 1915 critique of Richard Wagner (Dooyeweerd 1915b). This likely comes from Woltjer, who emphasized the need for philosophers to be consistent (‘consequent’). In later life, 13 I do not agree with Tol that Vollenhoven’s ‘consequent’ problem-historical method is to be translated ‘consequential,’ to show consequences in history (Tol, 270 fn78). There are historical consequences to our ideas, but Vollenhoven’s emphasis, like Woltjer’s, is on logical consistency or its lack within a system. This is evident even in these student articles. 14 For the link of romanticism in general to Franz von Baader, see Susini. 22 immanent critique formed an important part of Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique, where, like Baader, he turned Kant's arguments against himself. (2) Tol says that Janse was the first to critique the idea of an immortal soul (Tol, 236). If Tol means that Janse was the first to reject a mind/body dualism, he is wrong. Dooyeweerd rejected such a dualism of body and soul in 1916 (Dooyeweerd 1916a), although Dooyeweerd did not remain consistent until after he discovered (Baader’s) idea of cosmic time around 1928, which allowed him to put forth the idea of a supratemporal selfhood. (3) Tol makes a special issue of Dooyeweerd’s use of the term ‘schouwen’ [beholding] for intuition. Tol repeatedly claims that Dooyeweerd obtained this idea of intuition from Vollenhoven’s 1921 article on Hegel (Tol, 79 fn9, 205, 298, 301-2, 305, 501, 520). But Dooyeweerd emphasized intuition and used the word ‘schouwen’ even before Vollenhoven commenced his dissertation. Dooyeweerd already used term ‘schouwen’ in his 1914 article on Wagner in Opbouw (Dooyeweerd 1914). He there speaks of “intuitively beheld in an inner way” [schouwde innerlijk]. He also uses the word ‘geschouwd’ in his early romantic poetry (for example, the poem “Gebroken idealen,” or “Broken ideals,” Dooyeweerd 1912-13). And as we shall see, he was aware of Van Eeden’s use of the term, particularly the important idea of ‘zelfschouw’ [intuitive inner seeing of the self]. Van Eeden’s source was Boehme and the mystics. Van Tricht comments on Van Eeden’s idea of ‘schouwen’: Intuïtie en verstand wijzen daarbij, schouwend en scheidend, de weg....De intuïtie, bron der ware wijsheid, ziet vanzelf de Richting, als de ziel zuiver van structuur, harmonisch van organisatie is. Het verstand helpt door onderscheiding, tussen de velerhande strevingen, allereerst tusssen de werkelijke, soms onbewuste wil en de bewuste bedoeling... (Van Tricht, 72). [Intuition and understanding, intuiting and distinguishing, show the way...Intuition, source of true wisdom, sees by itself the true Direction, provided that the soul is pure in its structure and harmoniously organized. Understanding helps by distinguishing between the various strivings, especially between the actual, often unconscious will, and the conscious intention.] 23 Dooyeweerd was intensely interested in the work of Van Eeden, and even corresponded with him about the meaning of intuition. In a letter of November 14, 1914, Dooyeweerd asked van Eeden what he meant by “zien met de meest mogelijke helderheid, die iemand vergen kan” [“to see with the most clarity possible that one can obtain”]. This letter was written after publication of van Eeden's book about the death of his son, Paul's ontwaken. Van Eeden's son Paul had died in that year. In this “seeing,” van Eeden said he had come to a fixed certainty about eternal matters. Dooyeweerd writes, Ik voel, dat u hier onmogeliljk het “empirisch zintuigelijk waarnemen” kunt hebben bedoeld. Is het misschien bij u dat onmiddellijk gevoel geweest, dat men met den naam ‘intuitie’ pleegt aan te duiden en dat om met Schopenhauer te spreken, in de naar binnen gekeerde zijde van het bewustzijn zetelt? (Cited in Verburg 20, fn11). [It seems to me that it is not possible that you can have referred to “empirical sensory perception.” Is what occurred to you perhaps that immediate feeling that is often called ‘intuition’ and, to use Schopenhauer's words, is seated in the inwardly turned side of consciousness?] d) Vollenhoven’s Review of Van Eeden’s Paul’s Ontwaken (1914) Vollenhoven, too, published several articles about Van Eeden in Opbouw. He used the initials ‘Th.V.’ for his pseudonym ‘Th. Voorthuizen’ for a review of this same book by Van Eeden, Paul's ontwaken. Vollenhoven says that the book “lays hold on the ineffable.” Wie zich wapent tegen dat agnosticisme, wie kent de Waarheid Die gezien, getast en gehoord is, zal veel schoonheid zien beven ook in dit boek van den begaafden schrijver, dat in eenvoud is als de witte bloemen zonder geur, die stonden bij ‘t sterfbed van z’n zoon. (Vollenhoven 1914c) [Whoever arms himself against agnosticism, who knows the Truth That is seen, felt and heard, shall also see much trembling beauty in this book by a gifted author, which in its simplicity is like the unscented white flowers without scent, which stood by the deathbed of his son.] Note the reference to the “Truth That is seen, felt, and heard.” This is a reference to I John 1:1. And it was used in this sense by Chantepie de la Saussaye as a reference to the inner mystical knowledge of our inner self (See Appendix D). We know that Vollenhoven admired de la Saussaye, although Woltjer dissuaded him from this as well as from his admiration for A.H. de Hartog (Stellingwerff 1992, 10). Woltjer’s persuasion 24 must have occurred after the date of this review. And this influence by Woltjer must have been before 1916, when Vollenhoven published an article in Opbouw entitled “Gereformeerd blijven? Waarom niet?” [Remain Gereformeerd? Why Not?]. In that article, he criticized de Hartog. Shortly after that article, the journal Opbouw folded. In this connection, we should note that de la Saussaye emphasized intuition, and expressly used the word ‘schouwen’ in his views on science (Appendix D). So whether it was de la Saussaye, or Van Eeden, we know that this term was used long before Vollenhoven used it in 1921, and that Dooyeweerd was also aware of it. Tol’s failure to consider these sources is a serious methodological error. Just because Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven shared certain terms does not prove that Vollenhoven influenced Dooyeweerd, or that Dooyeweerd “consciously aligned himself to Vollenhoven” (Tol, 274). Instead, we need to investigate the sources used by both philosophers. e) “Sirius en Siderius” (1914) Under the pseudonym ‘J.W.,’ Vollenhoven also wrote a review in Opbouw of Van Eeden's book Sirius en Siderius. He says that the core of the book is the seeking of harmony, through something that is “both goal and norm.” Daar is iets in 't wezen van dat wonderkind, “achter zijn oogen” zooals hij 't zelf uitdrukt, dat niet zich leent voor analyse, maar dat zoekt 't hoogere, dat wil doordringen in de wereld buiten zich, dat juist systeem zoekt… De harmonie toch omvat voor Fr. v. Eeden eigenlijk alles, ze moet zijn de samenstelling van heel 't heelal in 'n wonderschoon accoord en daarnaar te luisteren is de hoogste top, waar de mensch kan klimmen.] (Vollenhoven 1914b) [There is something in the being of that wonder-child [Ananda], “behind his eyes” as he himself expresses it, that does not give itself to analysis, but which seeks that which is higher, that wants to penetrate into the world outside of him, that seeks the true system… For Frederik van Eeden, harmony really includes everything, it must be the coherence of the whole universe in a marvelous accord. And to thereafter listen to this harmony is the highest peak that man can climb.] Vollenhoven says that this goal of harmony is worked out better in a German work by Anne Schieber: Alle guten Geister. This is because for van Eeden, the goal is unreachable, whereas Anne Schieber allows us to see the beginning of its realization–the unity that exists between all created beings, and between the world and God 25 3. Tol ignores other relevant sources of influence Tol sometimes refers to neo-Kantian sources used by Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. But in general, Tol consciously restricts himself to Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, without looking at their sources, as in the case of the influence of Logos speculation: Because their development includes an important feature of self-criticism, it seems more advised to focus on the details of their own understanding rather than on the scarce attestations of affiliation with the older generation. Besides, one would still need to understand their own use to be able to appreciate the relevant affiliation (Tol, 124) Since Tol’s stated purpose is to show the history of the emergence of reformational philosophy, this is a serious methodological error. Here are some obvious examples of sources that he should have considered. a) Other Opbouw Articles (1) J.G. Ubbink: “Science and Philosophy” [Wetenschap en Wijsbegeerte] The other articles in Opbouw are also essential to understanding the development of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven. There is an article by J.G. Ubbink on reforming science. Ubbink distinguishes between knowing facts [weten] and knowing them in relation to the whole [kennen]. Ubbink mentions that our thinking seeks an ordered whole [geordend 15 geheel]. We know such wholeness by means of a faculty in our soul: En het is dus overeenkomstig de geaardheid van zijn eigen wezen en het orde-verband waarin hij staat met den geheelen kosmos, dat de menschelijke geest gelooft in de architectoniek der structuur en de wet- en doelmatigheid van de zich aan hem manifesteerende werkelijkheid. [And so in agreement with the nature of his own being and the ordered relation, in which he stands with the whole cosmos, that the human soul believes in the architectonic of the structure, and the lawful regularity and appropriateness of the reality manifested to him] Note the reference to “stands with the whole cosmos.” This is an insight to which Vollenhoven would return. Ubbink emphasizes that science must work methodically and systematically. He says that the cosmos itself has divided science into five groups (corresponding to the five faculties at the Free University at that time). We see this 15 Ubbink seems to use these terms in the reverse way from Vollenhoven. 26 division by our intuitive-creative ability: (1) natural science and mathematics: the material world, its existence, forces and relations (2) medicine: the human body as the material carrier of the human soul (3) law: legal relations between humans (4) the arts: spiritual development, culminating in language and (5) theology: man’s knowledge of God. (2) A.H. de Hartog (1869-1938) Other articles in Opbouw relate to the ideas of A.H. de Hartog. Vollenhoven was at one time attracted to de Hartog’s thought (Stellingwerff 1992, 10). Opbouw published a favourable review by Br. Elffers of Uren met Boehme [Hours with Boehme] by A.H. de Hartog (de Hartog 1915). Elffers says, Dit is een kostelijk boek Het zet ons te midden van het wereldrumoer stil met ons zelf. 't Heft ons uit boven den den sleurgang van dit aarde-leven, 't daalt met ons af in duistere diepten, waar eewigheids-glanzen ons toelichten. Inderdaad, dit is een boek van wijsheid en schoonheid. [This is a splendid book. In the midst of the world's uproar, it sets us at rest in our self. It raises us above the routine of earthly life, it descends with us into dark depths, where we are elucidated by beams of eternity. It is really a book of wisdom and beauty.] Elffers refers to the following lines in the book: Wien tijd geworden is als eeuwigheid En eeuwigheid als tijd, Hij is bevrijd van allen strijd. [For whom time has become as eternity And eternity as time, He is freed from all strife.] In de Hartog’s book itself (p. 8), de Hartog refers to the significant research on Boehme by Franz von Baader. On p. 50, de Hartog gives an annotation, where he says that Boehme sees all things vertically, “sub specie aeternitatis,” from the standpoint of the eternal now. Dooyeweerd’s later use of this term could derive from de Hartog, although there are other sources that he was aware of that also used this term. The phrase “Everything in God” [“Alles in God”] reminds de Hartog of Krause's idea of panentheism. 27 The Opbouw articles also made Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven aware of controversies regarding pantheism and panentheism. The theologian J.G. Ubbink attacked de Hartog, claiming that his views were pantheistic. De Hartog strongly denied this charge. He said that on Ubbink's reasoning, even Paul's reference in Acts to God “in whom we live and move and have our being” would be pantheistic. De Hartog said that pantheism asserts an identity with God – the pantheist “vereen-zelv-igt” God and world. But the theist distinguishes world and God and yet know them to be one. Wij toch hebben t.a.p. gezegd, dat de pantheïst God en wereld “vereen- zelf-igt” (let op het “zelf”), terwijl de theïst deze “twee onderscheidt en toch één weet.” “Eenheid bij onderscheidenheid” beteekent volstrekt nog niet “vereenzelviging” (al voert Dr. Ubbink zijn philosofisch woordenboek aan): de Heer wil in Zijn souvereine almacht en liefde Zich mededeelen aan het schepsel, waar Hij Goddelijke en menschelijke natuur aldus “vereenigt,” dat ze “ongedeeld en ongescheiden, onvermengd en onverandered” blijven; maar daarom heeft Hij de Goddelijke en menschelijjke natuur nog niet “vereenzelvigd” (de Hartog 1916). [We have said elsewhere that the pantheist “I-dentifies” God and world (pay attention to the “I”), while the theist “distinguishes the two and yet knows them to be one.” “Unity in diversity” certainly does not mean identity (whatever Dr. Ubbink's philosophical dictionary may say): The Lord, in His sovereign power and love wants to impart Himself to creation, where in this way he “unites” divine and human nature, so that they remain “undivided and inseparable, unmixed and unchanged”; but this does not mean that He has “identified” divine and human nature.] The idea that world and God are distinguished and yet “one” is neither pantheistic or monistic. Neither is it dualistic. It is what I have termed nondual. One of the editors of Opbouw, Br. Elffers defended de Hartog against Ubbink (“Dr. Ubbink's Aanval Getoetst,” Vol. 3, p. 1). Elffers says that Ubbink's attack was unreasonable and not well thought-out. Ubbink had raised the question whether the world is made out of God [uit God] or by God [door God]. Elffers says that both must be brought into a synthesis, that “uit, door en tot God all dingen zijn” [all things are from, through and towards God]. Now Dooyeweerd uses this same phrase “from, through and towards” [uit, door en tot] in reference to God as Origin (WdW 1, 1l; NC I, 9, 102). From the very controversial articles in Opbouw, Dooyeweerd was aware that these were contentious words. But he used them anyway. In contrast, Vollenhoven was much more concerned with drawing boundaries between God and the created world. 28 b) Dooyeweerd’s experience at the N.C.S.V. Dooyeweerd wrote about his early experience at a summer conference of the N.C.S.V [Nederlandse Christen-Studenten Vereniging]: Zie er is één allesomvattende kategorie in de schepping, waarin alle andere kategorieën momenten zijn, dat is die van het doel. Uit het doel is het wezen genomen en dit is daarbuiten niet te vinden. Van uw doelstelling hangt alles af, uw gansche levensbeschouwing, uw gansche philosophie van het zijnde. Want alles word belicht van binnen uit, de gansche wereld door het vuur, dat in ons brandt (cited in Verburg, 24). [See, there is a category in creation that includes everything, in which all other categories are moments; it is the category of the goal. Being comes from the goal, and outside of the goal it cannot be found. Everything depends on your goals, your whole view of life, your whole philosophy of being. For everything external is illuminated from within, the whole world by the fire that burns within us.] Tol does not refer to this important experience of Dooyeweerd. The idea of meaning, in the sense of goal [doel], to which all creation refers is here, as is the idea that all categories are “moments” of one all-inclusive category. In the NC, Dooyeweerd refers to the modalities as “moments.” The N.C.S.V. was considered a “hotbed” of ethical theology. Since the ethical theologians were Gunning and de la Saussaye, it is likely that they were the source of this inspiration. Only later would Dooyeweerd be able to return to this inspiration. c) Other works by Van Eeden In view of the intense interest in Van Eeden by both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, it is important to look at his other works. Van Eeden, a psychologist, was interested in the selfhood, and was the first one to write about lucid dreaming. He was strongly influenced by Boehme, whose writings were made well known by Baader. In 1914, Van Eeden founded a society dealing with the signification of language called De Significi; its members included Henri Borel, Max Scheler, Martin Buber, Erich Gutkind, Jacob Israël 16 de Haan, Gustav Landauer, and others. 16 Vollenhoven refers to Borel (Vollenhoven 1916a, 152). 29 Vollenhoven’s dissertation was on the mathematicians L.E.J. Brouwer (1881-1966) and G. Mannoury (1867-1956). It is important to note that both Brouwer and Mannoury were 17 close friends with Van Eeden. Brouwer was likely influenced by Van Eeden’s ideas of intuition; Brouwer himself also wrote about the mystics (Tol, 168 fn 103). Why did Tol not investigate this connection between Brouwer, Mannoury and Van Eeden? Brouwer met Van Eeden in 1915. Together they established the International School for Philosophy (ISVW) in Amersfoort. Dooyeweerd reviewed the first publication of the Mededelingen of the ISVW (Dooyeweerd 1916b). Brouwer also participated in a Walden type of community set up by Van Eeden. This community incorporated an idea of sphere sovereignty or at least of an organic unity. Van Eeden distinguished a society where there is just one governing center, and everything is subordinate to it, from a society where all parts consciously fulfill their function. In this second kind of society there is the greatest possible independence and equality of power (van Tricht 84). Both Van Eeden and Brouwer were interested in language; Brouwer believed that words themselves contain presuppositions that force a certain view of reality on the speaker (Van Driem, 41). This can be contrasted with mathematics: According to Brouwer, mathematics, in contrast to language and linguistically mediated thought, is a wordless and therefore not linguistically mediated, constructionist activity of the human mind which has its origins in our primordial intuitions about time. “De wiskunde is een vrije schepping, onafhankelijk van de ervaring; zij ontwikkelt zich uit een enkel aprioristische oer-intuïtie, die men zoowel kan noemen constantheid in wisseling en eenheid in veelheid. (1907: 179)” (Van Driel, 43). The quotation from Brouwer can be translated Mathematics is a free creation, independent of experience; it develops itself from a single a priori original intuition, which one can call ‘constancy in change and unity in diversity.’ Like Brouwer, Mannoury taught at the University of Amsterdam. And like Brouwer, Mannoury was also a close associate of Van Eeden. Mannoury was also a member of the 17 Tol does not discuss Mannoury’s work or Vollenhoven’s interpretation, but mentions him in a footnote (Tol, 98 fn37). 30 Significi, although at a later date than 1914. Mannoury praised Van Eeden’s 1898 book, De Redekunstige Grondslag van Verstandhouding (Koutsier 556). This is not surprising, since Van Eeden there emphasizes the importance of intuition and modes. Van Eeden follows the format of Spinoza’s Ethics, with numbered paragraphs. (1) De Redekunstige Grondslag van Verstandhouding [The Linguistic Basis of 18 Understanding] (See more details, Appendix B) Although he is critical of Spinoza, Van Eeden takes over his idea of modes. Spinoza says “Ens rationis nihil est praeter modum cogitandi” [something that is determined by reason is nothing other than a mode of thought] and “modos cogitandi non esse ideas rerum” [modes of thought are not ideas of things]. Van Eeden says that it does not make much sense to refer to God as ‘res cogitans’ [thinking Being], since that is only one attribute. ’Cogitatio’ is a dangerous term for the highest Being, since it leads to attempt to name the unnameable by a human mode of thinking. What Spinoza calls ‘Cogitatio,’ [thinking] Boehme calls ‘Mysterium Magnum,’ [Great Mystery] and Nicolas van Cusa, ‘Comprehensio incomprehensibilis’ [the incomprehensible concept]. In Descartes’ “dubito, cogito, ergo sum” [I doubt, I think, therefore I am], Descartes seeks the center of certainty in thought and not in being, thus in appearance and not in reality (#51). Van Eeden says that mathematics, space, time and movement are modes. We cannot make modes into things [van modus tot ens gemaakt] (#9, #104, #139, #41). Van Eeden mentions the importance of intuition [weten], the highest knowledge, where there can be no talk of perception or of reason (#27d, #109). Concepts are like a limit in mathematics; they approach, but can never reach the absolute (#54). All of higher mathematics is based on mystery (#113). Van Eeden speaks of the selfhood, which exists outside of time and seeks rest and unity (#61, #105). 18 ‘Redekunstige’ could be translated as ‘rhetorical,’ but I believe that ‘linguistic’ is the intended meaning. This was a developing science at the time. I am struck by the fact of how a few years earlier (1891), Jan Woltjer had given his inaugural talk on the theme of linguistics, or as he called it ‘philology.’ Some of Woltjer’s insights in “De wetenschap van de Logos” overlap with those of Van Eeden. 31 All rational thought is inseparable from movement, change and succession of time [tijdsverloop] (#78). Thus, Tol is much too simplistic in his argument that Dooyeweerd relies on Vollenhoven’s discussion of Brouwer for the idea of the Selfhood that views the succession of time (Tol, 500). The better view is that Brouwer’s ideas depend on Van Eeden, and that Dooyeweerd was aware of this idea before Vollenhoven even began his dissertation. Van Eeden speaks of abnormal awareness of time. The feeling of déjà vu is one of the evidences that our selfhood exists out of time (#105). Both science and mysticism show the desire for the Absolute, or, as Spinoza would say, amor Dei [love of God] (#83). Dooyeweerd said that he was attracted to van Eeden for the way that he combined science and mysticism: He [van Eeden] himself spoke of a certain preference for scientific mysticism, and science was for him not–as in the case of Bergson’s students–an inferior intrigue of barren spirits, slaves to books, toiling away in their stuffy studies. For Van Eeden, science also had value, provided that it did not pretend to be able to reduce the mysterious universe to numerals and mathematical formulas and pretend to thereby lay bare the true essence of things for all to see (Dooyeweerd 1915a, my translation). And Dooyeweerd prefaces his article on Van Eeden with a quotation from Spinoza about amor Dei! In the conclusion to Redekunstige Grondslag, Van Eeden gives an immanent critique of Kant’s philosophy. Kant uses words like ‘soul,’ ‘spirit,’ ‘consciousness,’ ‘understanding,’ ‘reason,’ ‘desire,’ ‘will,’ ‘cause,’ ‘direction,’ ‘goal,’ ‘origin,’ and freedom’ are often used in very imprecise ways (#116, #144-49). Kant’s critique itself leads to the rejection of 19 his method (thus, van Eeden applies immanent critique to Kant). For Kant’s way of speaking appears to be scientific and yet lacks all certainty of scientific expression, because almost none of the nouns that he uses has a well-defined, unchanging, value that remains the same in all times and languages. 19 Jan Woltjer wrote about the same problem of using words in multiple ways in his Ideëele en Reëele (Woltjer 1896). 32 (2) Het Lied van Schijn en Wezen [The Song of Appearance and Reality] (See more details, Appendix B) Dooyeweerd acknowledges reading Het Lied van Schijn en Wezen [The Song of Appearance and Reality] (Dooyeweerd 1915a). This is a long poem, written between 1892 and 1922, and shows the progression of Van Eeden’s thought from Hindu monism to Christian thought (he converted to Catholicism). At the time that Dooyeweerd wrote his article on Van Eeden, only the first two parts of this poem had been published. The entire poem was published by 1922, which is a critical year for Tol’s analysis. In this poem, there are some remarkable parallels to Dooyeweerd’s own thought: (1) The Self is a unity above time, a concentration of what is temporal (2) It is because our selfhood 20 stands outside of time that we can measure time (3) The Self is split into diversity like a 21 prism splitting white light into colours (4) Van Eeden speaks of a temporal cloak [Cf. the 22 idea of functiemantel] (5) We know our self by intuition, or ‘zelfschouw’ (6) Nothing 23 24 exists apart from the Selfhood (7) We make the not-I “our own” (8) Van Eeden even 25 26 has a law-Idea! (9) We are to “unfold the law” by God’s Spirit (10) And in his more 27 28 Christian period, Van Eeden includes the idea of our being ‘fitted’ [gezet] in the temporal 20 Dooyeweerd NC II, 53 fn1 (The ‘heavens’ means the “temporal world concentrated in man”). NC II, 52 (in man the whole temporal ‘earthly’ cosmos finds its religious root), 548-49 (‘earthly’ cosmos); 593 (man transcends the temporal ‘earthly’ cosmos in all its aspects; NC III, 88 (man as lord of the ‘earthly’ temporal world), 783 (man as “the personal religious creaturely centre of the whole earthly cosmos”). 21 Dooyeweerd NC I, 32. 22 Dooyeweerd uses the idea of a prism splitting unity into diversity NC I, 102. 23 Dooyeweerd uses the term ‘functiemantel’ (Dooyeweerd 1940, 4-5). 24 Dooyeweerd refers to “religious self-reflection” 25 Friesen 2009, Thesis 5 and references. Tol’s discussion of Vollenhoven’s distinction of I and not-I, and of making reality our 26 own (Tol, 501) fails to refer to these earlier sources. Van Eeden refers to “één vaste Wet in elke levenssfeer” [one fixed law in every sphere 27 of life] (Lied II, IX, 78) 28 Dooyeweerd speaks of unfolding the anticipations in the modal spheres (WdW I, 33, 61;II, 405,409, 410, 497). 33 order (11) In the One, there is a coincidence of individual laws and “a coherence of the 29 30 spheres of limitation”: Want in het Al bestaat geen ding alleenig, geen kracht, geen wet, geen wezen, geen verstand. Al ‘t enkle heeft zijn aard en deugd door ‘t menig, als klanken in ‘t symfonische verband zijn wat zij zijn,–daarbuiten zonder werking. Een eindloos wijder spreidend web omspant met samenhang de kringen van beperking. (Lied I, IX, 40) [For in the All nothing exists alone, no power, law, no intellect or being, the ground and virtue of the sole lies in the many They are as sounds within symphonic union what they are,–apart from this without effect. An infinitely wider web now comprehends in a coherence the spheres of limitation]. In this connection, we must remember that Dooyeweerd refers to the law as "limiting and determining" our selfhood (WdW I, 13). By the time he completed Het Lied van Schijn en Wezen in 1922, van Eeden had moved to his Catholic faith. He says, Laat mij Uw liefde in al wat leeft bemerken bestraal mijn weg met Uw drievoudig licht: Uw Vaderschap, Uw Geest, Uw Liefde-werken (Lied III, XII, 23) [Let me see your love in everything that lives Shine with your threefold light upon my way: Your Fatherhood, Your Spirit, and your works of Love]. Van Eeden speaks of "gravity" which is called love (Lied III, VIII, 37). This is one of Baader's views of gravity in the sciences, and the basis for attraction. For a more detailed examination of Van Eeden’s ideas, see Appendix B. 29 Dooyeweerd emphasizes our being “fitted” into the temporal order (WdW I, 6, 22, 36, 64; II, 395, 401 (ingevoegd, ingesteld); NC I, 24; II, 468, (translated as 'inherent' and 'fitted into'); 470-471, 473 (translated as ‘embedded’); Dooyeweerd 1946, 9). 30 In the fullness of meaning, the aspects coincide in a radical unity (NC I, 106). This coincidence is not a logical identity but a fullness (WdW I, 44, 71). 34 c) Norel’s 1920 article on Gunning and science Stemmen des Tijds was a journal edited by members associated with the Free University, including W.J.A. Aalders, A. Anema, H. Bavinck, H. Colijn, P.A. Diepenhorst and others. Its editors were from both the Hervormde Church and the Gereformeerde Church (Stellingwerff 1987, 66). Representatives of the ethical school also contributed. As 31 already mentioned, Vollenhoven submitted an article for publication in that journal, and parts of it were finally published in 1922, along with a second article. Bavinck published an article on the law in 1921, and Vollenhoven published a key article in 1926 in the same journal. He was therefore very familiar with the journal, and would have been aware of the 1920 article by Okke Norel, Jr.: “Prof. Gunning als wijsgeerig denker” [Prof. Gunning as philosophical thinker] (Norel 1920). Gunning, along with Chantepie 32 de la Saussaye, had introduced the ideas of Franz von Baader to Reformed theology in the Netherlands. Both Norel’s 1920 article and the work by Gunning it refers to, Blikken in de Openbaring, contain numerous ideas that Dooyeweerd later adopted, including the following ideas: (1) The reformation of science and the idea of a Christian religious thought, a Christian science. Gunning even used the term ‘New Critique.’ (2) This view of science is related to Christian theosophy, which concentrates on seeking God’s wisdom within temporal reality. (3) Our knowledge depends on faith. (4) We must theoretically “give an account” of this knowledge (4) The heart is the center of man’s existence; “out of the heart are the issues of life.” (5) The heart is supratemporal. Gunning introduces the word ‘boventijdelijk’ to Dutch reformed theology. God has “placed eternity in our heart” (6) Because the heart is the center of our being, the 31 Stellingwerff devotes an entire chapter of De VU na Kuyper to the journal Stemmen des Tijds (Stellingwerff 1987, 77-93). He believes that Dooyeweerd responded to a 1921 article by Bavinck in that journal. So my suggestion that Dooyeweerd relied on Norel’s article in that journal is not at all unusual. 32 Okke Norel (1882-1959) was a pastor in the Hervormd Church, and in 1921 became Director of the Centrale Bond voor Inwendige Zending en Christelijk Philanthropische Inrichtingen. He was also chief editor of the journal “Woord en Daad.” In addition to writing on J.H. Gunning, Jr. he wrote articles on G. Aulen, John Wesley’s Methodism, Schleiermacher, Hugo de Groot, Fechner, and Gabriel Marcel. 35 autonomy of thought is rejected; rationality is one part of our being (7) Because the heart is the center, a dualistic anthropology is rejected (8) Man as image of God, expresses or reveals himself in the temporal world just as God reveals Himself in creation (8) Man’s purpose was to use his imagination to send the Wisdom of God to repair the cosmos that had been disturbed in the fall of the angels. But man failed at this task (9) The temporal world was concentrated in man as the image of God; it fell and will be redeemed through man as he participates in Christ (10) The centrality of Christ (11) We are to see all things in God (12) We have immediate knowledge by beholding [aanschouwing] (13) Opposition to pantheism, but a belief that creation is out, from and towards God (panentheism). For a more detailed examination of Gunning’s ideas, and a comparison to Dooyeweerd, see Appendix C. I believe that Norel’s article is the “find” in 1922 reported by Vollenhoven. Even if it is not the “find,” it shows that there were ideas in the Reformed community that were easily available and that can account for Dooyeweerd’s philosophy without his reliance on Vollenhoven’s ideas. It also accounts for some changes in Vollenhoven’s ideas. And it makes sense of Dooyeweerd’s 1922 article, “Normative legal doctrine.” I will later discuss Norel’s article in more detail, and how Tol has misinterpreted Dooyeweerd’s 1922 article. d) Daniël Chantepie de la Saussaye (1818-1874) Vollenhoven was at one time attracted to the ideas of Chantepie de la Saussaye (Stellingwerff 1992, 10). De la Saussaye, together, with J.H. Gunning, Jr., introduced the ideas of Baader to Dutch reformed theology. Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd were not the first to want to remove the scholastic influences from Calvinism. De la Saussaye saw scholasticism even in Kuyper’s intellectual approach to truth (Brouwer 178). Like Gunning, de la Saussaye also wrote about the need to have a Christian understanding of science. I am not aware of any previous comparison of de la Saussaye and reformational philosophy. I have attached a summary of de la Saussaye’s ideas in Appendix D. There are a remarkable number of similarities to Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. Some of these are: (1) Science depends on intuition in the sense of beholding 36 [aanschouwen] and insight [in-zien]. Both terms are used by Dooyeweerd, and he hyphenates ‘in-zien’ in the same way. (2) The sources of life [bronnen des levens] are in the heart. (3) Reason is not the center of our existence, and those who say it is have abstracted it (4) Only after an object has been viewed intuitively is there room for the distinguishing and analytical work of reason (5) concepts of reason depend on there first being an idea where reality has been intuited (6) ‘liberalism’ elevates reason to a throne (7) Science is not without presuppositions. (8) what was regarded as supernaturalism should be regarded as what is completely human (9) True science looks for the laws of our existence and their coherence in which we stand to the whole, and the coherence in which the various parts of the whole mutually stand in relation to each other (10) Descartes’ cogito ergo sum led to the Hegelian identity of thought and being (11) It is the self that thinks; the existence of the self precedes all thinking (12) Our true point of departure [uitgangspunt] is in our relation to God (13) The sciences have analogies in the inquiring person himself (14) science works by way of hypothesis, based on intuition (15) In every area [gebied] of knowledge, intuition must bring phenomena into a relation. (16) It is the unity of human nature that unites philosophy and religion (17) Christ possessed the “key of knowledge” because of the communion with God in his heart; he testified of what he had seen and heard by the Father (18) In that, Christ was the second Adam (19) Christ knew what was in man and revealed to him his own heart (20) the reformational principle is realist and not nominalist (21) De la Saussaye distinguishes between God’s Word and Scripture as an expression of that Word. (22) Scripture is not infallible (23) Scripture makes a “total-impression” on us. (24) The purpose of theological science is to “give an account” of that total-impression (25) even now we can already begin to enjoy eternal life; that is what anticipation means ‘antecipatie’ (26) God does not reveal Himself through concepts, and Scripture is not to be seen as a textbook (27) Everything that the Christian experiences is out and from [uit en door] God. (28) There is a distinction between living dogma or doctrine, and that dogma as it is scientifically described in confessions (29) Science originates out of belief (30) We must read Scripture in its unbreakable coherence (31) There are motives [drijfveeren] of our acts. (32) We need to take away the scholastic-metaphysical forms of thought in Calvinistic doctrine; when we do that, religion and philosophy are reconciled (33) The encyclopedia 37 of sciences is the unity of the idea in the various sciences. (34) Man is not a dualism of body and soul. (35) Emphasis on current lived experience [beleving] (36) Theology works within the coherence with other sciences. (37) But theology itself studies faith (38) Jesus Christ is the ideal man who is yet historical. C. 1918 Vollenhoven’s Dissertation 1. Missing information and sources a) Background to choosing the topic 38 Why did Vollenhoven choose to work on the philosophy of mathematics? Why did he choose to center on the intuitive mathematics of Brouwer and Mannoury? Vollenhoven had no “workable command of the basics” of mathematics or the other exact sciences (Tol, 77). Tol does not give information on these points, nor does he explore the very useful information given by Stellingwerff that it was at the urging of his supervisor Jan Woltjer that Vollenhoven chose the subject of “the influence of philosophy on current representatives of mathematics and the natural sciences.” What were Woltjer’s influences? And why was he interested in the subject? Stellingwerff reports that the subject was chosen because of articles in De Heraut in 1913 by F.J.J. Buytendijk (1887- 1974), entitled, “Schets eener analyse der functies van organen en organismen” [Sketch of an analysis of the functions of organs and organisms]. The question was whether the stimuli for organisms were merely mechanical-material or whether there were also immaterial causes. Buytendijk considered the neo-vitalist ideas of Hans Driesch. This was long before Janse and Vollenhoven investigated Driesch’s ideas! 33 Buytendijk did not want to accept the idea of a soul in non-human organisms, but put forward the necessity of an external willing intelligence, as in Christian theism (Stellingwerff 1992, 23-24). But Buytendijk also believed in mysticism and was strongly influenced by Max Scheler (Stellingwerff 1987, 99). Scheler, relying on Baader’s ideas, also wrote about the difference between humans and animals. Dooyeweerd used this same work of Scheler’s without acknowledgement. Buytendijk continued to work in this same area, and in 1920 34 wrote Psychologie der Dieren [Psychology of Animals]. His dissertation in 1918 at Utrecht was on the habits of animals [Proeven over Gewoontevorming bij Dieren]. The Vollenhoven’s 1921 article “Einiges über die Logik in dem Vitalismus von Driesch” in 33 Biologisches Zentralblatt (Berlin) refers to Buytendijk’s experiments, but does not mention Woltjer. Vollenhoven is against Driesch’s “temporalizing” views that sacrifice Being to becoming (pp. 343, 345). Yet after his discussions with Janse in 1922 (see below), Vollenhoven accepted a temporalizing of the selfhood. 34 Dooyeweerd used Max Scheler’s idea of how animals differ from humans in that animals are ex-statically absorbed in their existence (WdW II, 415; NC II, 480). He repeated these many ideas years later (Dooyeweerd 1961, 48), and only then did he refer to Scheler’s Man’s Place in the World. 39 psychology of animals rejects mechanical explanations, and gives support to vitalistic theories. The soul is the immaterial principle of life, which gives the basis of perception, acting and learning for the animal. He believed that there were “supra-individual psychical entities,” which were demonstrated by phenomena of mutual unity encountered in animals. We should seek that supra-individual unity either in a world soul or in a personal God. There is a double reciprocity [wisselwerking] in his teaching: one reciprocity between soul and body in the individual and another reciprocity between the individual and his milieu, called ‘Gegenwelt.’ This supports a “Christian-theistic worldview” (Stellingwerff 1987, 85). In response to Buytendijk, Woltjer gave a talk in 1914 entitled “The essence of Matter” [Het Wezen der Materie]. This is the article that was the impetus for Vollenhoven’s dissertation topic. Woltjer believed that force was the essence of matter, and he distinguished between forces of the material world and forces of the soul [geest], which have a reciprocal effect on each other. Between matter and soul there is a diversity of forces, which organic beings construct [opbouwen] according to their differing natures. That allows room for vital forces. Stellingwerff says that Woltjer thereby gave up the old substance idea in favour of a new idea of functions. God is the only substance. Woltjer 35 replaced the old idea of two substances of body and soul with the idea of a diversity of forces, which he dualistically divided into forces of matter and forces of the spirit. Thus, Woltjer placed Buytendijk’s problem of the reciprocal working of body and soul in a new light (Stellingwerff 1992, 24). But elsewhere Stellingwerff shows that Woltjer still used the term ‘substance’ in this 1914 lecture. Woltjer refers to the matter of nature as ‘force- substance’ [krachtsubstantie] and he refers to soul as a different substance: De geest bestaat individueel, is bewust, denkt, voelt, wilt, en staat daardoor als substantie absoluut tegenover de materie, behalve in zóóver als beide door God geschapen zijn (Stellingwerff 1987, 78). [Soul exists individually, is conscious, thinks, feels, will, though this and stands as substance absolutely over against matter, except insofar as both are created by God]. 35 Kok makes the same mistake. He says that Woltjer does not refer to the soul as a substance (Kok 59). 40 There is an interactionism between soul and body because God made both. There are material forces and spiritual forces (to will, feel and think). In between there is a diversity of forces. How do we account for plants and animals? Woltjer’s talk was strongly opposed by Herman Bavinck, who saw all material things as a marriage of form and matter. Vollenhoven used Woltjer’s distinction between matter and spirit as the basis for his dissertation proposal. He distinguished between monists, who accept only matter, and dualists, who accept body and soul. In mathematics, he distinguished between empiricism, formalism and intuitionism (Stellingwerff 1992, 25). Already in his proposal, Vollenhoven was relying on ideas of Woltjer. In his 1914 speech, Woltjer discussed Henri Poincaré, whom Vollenhoven would in turn discuss in his dissertation. We need to look at Woltjer in more detail. b) Jan Woltjer (1849-1917) Jan Woltjer was Vollenhoven’s first thesis supervisor. Woltjer was also the rector of the classical high school [gymnasium] that both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd attended before university. So Woltjer also influenced Dooyeweerd in some ways. Tol acknowledges the importance of Woltjer’s influence on Vollenhoven, and of the “close proximity” of his ideas to those of the early Vollenhoven. As we shall see, Woltjer’s influence extended to the mature Vollenhoven; many of Woltjer’s ideas are repeated in the Isagôgè. Tol says that Woltjer gave “a strong and explicit defence of the harmony between subjective and objective rationality” (Tol, 442). But I find it astonishing that Tol says, The more precise similarity and difference with Woltjer need not be pursued here. However, a noticeable difference is Vollenhoven’s appeal to the intuition, which is not evident in Woltjer, as the means of acquiring certainty about the harmony of the subjective and the objective orders. Thus Vollenhoven was creative in working within his mentor’s framework (Tol, 443). If Tol wants to show the emergence of reformed philosophy, it is essential that he analyze the similarity and difference between Woltjer and Vollenhoven. Nor is Tol correct that Vollenhoven added the idea of intuition–it is already in Woltjer! John Kok refers to 41 Woltjer’s view that the soul possesses the intuitive ability of seeing Ideas beyond and in all things, by virtue of creative imagination (Kok 60, referring to a 1897 article by Woltjer). Poets in particular have this intuitive kind of knowledge. The poet sees analogies and similarities among ideas more quickly than do others. The “inner vision [aanschouwing] of the poet” beholds ideas. This is a “healthy mysticism” (Kok 59-61). For Woltjer, our idea of the whole also precedes every analysis into parts; this is the basis for ideas, as distinct from concepts, in that Ideas find “`the unity in the diversity of the relations that are given with everything” (Kok 53). And Woltjer distinguishes between what is inner and what is outer (Kok, 59-61). The connections between Woltjer and Vollenhoven are far more numerous than Tol acknowledges. This applies not only to the early Vollenhoven, but also to Vollenhoven’s mature work, the Isagôgè . 1.Vollenhoven and Woltjer (1) Christian Idealism. In the early Vollenhoven, Woltjer’s Christian Idealism was an important influence. (2) Logos/logos. As we shall see, in 1926, Vollenhoven uses Woltjer’s idea of the Divine Logos and the expressed logos. (3) Reading God’s Ideas in creation. In 1926, when Vollenhoven makes his shift to viewing the ideas as within the cosmos, he speaks of this in terms very much like Woltjer. Creation is a book of God’s thoughts (Woltjer 1896, 52; Kok, 49). (4) Thetical-critical method. Kok sees a similarity between Woltjer’s position on principles and critique as an anticipation of the thetical-critical method that Vollenhoven advocates in his Isagôgè (Kok, 58). (5) Thus/so [zus/zóó] distinction. Woltjer’s epistemology sets out things and their modes of being as two basic realities. This is very much like Vollenhoven’s later ‘intersection principle’ of things and modalities. The ideas that are objectified in the world are the qualities and properties, the ways or modes [wijzen] of being. They are described as being the thus and so of things [zus/zóó] (Woltjer 1896, 15, 32). (6) Properties of things. Woltjer says we search for the attributes and qualities [attributen, eigenschappen] of the thing in order to perceive what is real. We begin with the visible 42 and sensory, to the invisible and non-sensory. There is a transition of meaning not only from the concrete to the abstract but also in the other way, from the abstract to the concrete (Woltjer 1896, 11-12). This view of looking for attributes is related to Vollenhoven’s later use of abstraction to find qualities and relations of things. It is by such abstraction that we discover the modes. But Woltjer himself stressed that our innate Ideas come before any such abstraction. Vollenhoven gave up all use of the term ‘Ideas’ because his temporalized view of the self did not allow for any such innate Ideas. (7) Knowledge is of relations. Woltjer says that it is nonsense to speak of a thing in itself without relation to a knowing being (Woltjer 1896, 14, 29-30, 46). Vollenhoven emphasizes the same idea in his Isagôgè . (8) Adequate knowledge. Vollenhoven’s discussion of adequate concepts is already found in Woltjer (Woltjer 1896, 32). (9) Ideas/ideals. This distinction, which Vollenhoven uses in 1921 is already in Woltjer (Woltjer 1896, 18). (10) Consistent problem-historical method. Although Vollenhoven relied on Bavinck for many of his distinctions between monism and dualism, his method of looking at philosophical positions in a consistent [consequent] way can be found in Woltjer. See for example Woltjer’s discussion of Berkeley (Woltjer 1896 20). Stellingwerff refers to the way that Vollenhoven drew “strict logical conclusions” in his dissertation, and gives an example of his analytical approach to history (Stellingwerff 1987 91). And we see many examples of this use of ‘consequent’ in Vollenhoven’s early student articles. (11) The ‘organon’ of knowledge. In 1921, Vollenhoven uses ‘organon’ in a logical way. This is also how Woltjer uses it (Kok 47). The word was used in this way by Aristotle’s followers to refer to his six books on logic. (12) Inner/outer. Kok says that the way Vollenhoven used this contrast is related to Woltjer (Kok 62). Vollenhoven saw self and world as inner and outer being; analogy of structure, indicative of micro/macro structure(Tol, 314). (13) Revelation and knowledge. Vollenhoven’s view that knowledge is based on revelation (Scripture and nature) is linked to Woltjer’s views (Kok, 48, 63). 43 (14) Knowledge and information. Woltjer also says that our knowledge [kennen] is based on perception or by information and witness [bericht en getuigenis] (Woltjer 1896, 29). The idea that our everyday knowledge being based on information is part of Vollenhoven’s Isagôgè. (15) Functionalism. Woltjer’s 1914 “functionalistic” approach to reality (functions of body and soul) is taken over by Vollenhoven’s Isagôgè , although Vollenhoven no longer has two substances. (16) Ideas as thing-laws. Tol points out Woltjer’s reference to ideas as “thing-laws.” More real than the perceptible world is the world of ideas, of imperceptible things, that control the perceptible [things] (cited Tol 442) and this has cosmic implications: But the idea also controls the connections and relations of things mutually, each time in wider circles climbing up to the idea of the whole of the cosmos, which encloses the harmonious whole of all relations in what is creaturely. In that way, through ideas, that which is viewed becomes knowledge, and the knowledge elevates itself to science and science to wisdom.’ (Cited Tol 442) For a time, Vollenhoven believed that Ideas govern individual things (Tol, 214). In 1921 Vollenhoven said that Ideas denote the essence of the ‘thing-law’ of anything existent (Tol, 214). He later abandoned this, but criticized Dooyeweerd’s individuality structures for having the same view (Tol, 371 fn216). That is a misunderstanding of Dooyeweerd’s idea of individuality structures. They are not laws for things, but the things themselves. Even in naive experience, it is the individuality structures (and not Vollenhoven’s idea of “things’ that are subject to structural laws) that are grasped: Nu is in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee een der grondstellingen, dat de tijdelijke werkelijkheid zich in de naieve ervaring explicite slechts in haar individualiteits-structuren geeft en dat ook de individueele, aan deze ervaring vertrouwde, dingen door haar slechts in deze structuren worden gevat (Dooyeweerd 1943, 65-66). [Now one of the fundamental points of the Philosophy of the law-Idea is that temporal reality explicitly gives itself in naive experience only in its individuality-structures, and that therefore the individual who has been entrusted with this experience, grasps things only in these structures.] 44 Without these individuality structures, there is no thing. That is very different from Vollenhoven’s idea of a “most undefined thing” being the subject, to which we ascribe properties. Furthermore, things are composed of at least two individuality structures in an enkaptic interlacement, and individuality depends on the nature of such interlacements. Vollenhoven never accepted the ideas of enkapsis, either. (17) Openness for change in philosophy. Kok says that Vollenhoven’s view that philosophy be open to revision is related to Woltjer (Kok 63). 2. Dooyeweerd and Woltjer Dooyeweerd published a strong critique of Woltjer (Dooyeweerd 1939). Dooyeweerd does not object to the idea that creation depends on the thoughts of God. He praises a passage from Kuyper that states this. And in his New Critique, he does not deny God’s thoughts; he just says that God does not need to think in a temporal fashion (NC I, 144). Dooyeweerd’s critique is based on Woltjer’s idea that the logos is the deepest part of our being [“het diepste van ons wezen”] (Woltjer 1891, 25, 54). This is different from Kuyper’s view of the heart as the center of our being, out of which are all the issues of life, including our rationality. And Dooyeweerd criticizes Woltjer for his interpretation of Ecclesiastes 3:11. Woltjer interprets this merely as the soul’s ability to inquire into what is eternal and infinite. Dooyeweerd also criticizes Woltjer’s Logos speculation. The divine Logos is expressed in the human logos, and this is why man can see the Divine ideas that govern creation (Dooyeweerd 1939, 209). Kok has shown that Dooyeweerd’s criticism was unfair. Woltjer specifically attempts to avoid Logos speculation in that Adam’s pre-fall logos knowledge was creaturely and limited, and not the knowledge belonging to the Creator (Kok 48). Dooyeweerd does not mention Woltjer’s emphasis that we can know God’s Ideas by their expression in temporal reality. It also seems that Dooyeweerd is wrong in asserting that Woltjer did not give attention to the Fall in his discussion of the human logos (Dooyeweerd 1939 210). But Woltjer said that the image of God was lost in the Fall, and that it needs to be restored by belief in Christ. He restores the logos in those who are His (Woltjer 1891, 40). The power of sin clouds our reason (Woltjer 1896, 42, 54) 45 And Dooyeweerd’s criticism that Woltjer overestimated the value of science (Dooyeweerd 1939 208) is also unfair. Woltjer warned against overestimating the value of rational thought. It is not love of science that is the driving force but love of God, which arises because we are born from God. Our logos is there because we are the image of God, but it becomes an idol if seen apart from God. Woltjer expressly warns against viewing reason in a rationalistic way and treating it as sovereign (Woltjer 1896, 7, 15, 54). And yet Dooyeweerd says that there are parts of Woltjer that are compatible with his philosophy (Dooyeweerd 1939, 194). He does not say what these are. Further research is needed on whether these compatibilities result from Woltjer’s own knowledge of Chantepie de la Saussaye and Baader. For it is clear that Woltjer knew enough about de la Saussaye to be able to dissuade Vollenhoven from accepting his ideas. Woltjer met with de la Saussaye in 1874 or 1875 before commencing his studies. De la Saussaye wanted Woltjer to study theology. Woltjer says he was impressed by de la Saussaye, but saw him more as a philosopher than a theologian, but that may be because his discussion with him was philosophical (Brouwer, 349, fn3 citing to a letter from Woltjer to W. Geesink ). Woltjer chose to study philology. 36 Woltjer was also familiar with the work of a fellow philologist, Anton Lutterbeck. He refers to Lutterbeck’s view that philology needs regeneration [wedergeboorte]. He mentions that Lutterbeck was Roman Catholic (Woltjer 1891, 42). What Woltjer does not mention is that Lutterbeck was closely allied with Baader’s ideas; he was one of the editors of Baader’s Collected Works. The main editor was Franz Hoffman, but he was assisted by Lutterbeck, Julius Hamberger, Baron F. von Osten and Chistoph Schlüter. Lutterbeck compiled the index to Baader’s Collected Works, so he would have been very familiar with them (Baader, Werke vol 16). Here are a few ideas where there may be a relation between Woltjer’s thought and that of Dooyeweerd (although at least some of them are also in Baader, Gunning or de la Saussaye): Geesink became Vollenhoven’s dissertation supervisor when Woltjer died in 1917. 36 More research is needed as to Geesink’s influences. 46 (1) Archimedean point. Dooyeweerd says that he is surprised that Woltjer speaks of the self instead of just rationality (Dooyeweerd 1939, 210). Woltjer refers to our spiritual reality in relation to the diversity of things, and that this gives us the standpoint refered to by Archimedes (Woltjer 1896, 15, 41). This seems to relate to Dooyeweerd’s idea of an Archimedean point, although for Dooyeweerd this is our central heart (NC I, 8). (2) Rejection of thing-in-itself (WdW III, 45-46). Woltjer says that it is nonsense to speak of a thing in itself without relation to a knowing being (Woltjer 1896, 14, 29-30, 46). (3) Rejection of empiricism. Woltjer says that things possess the form, colour and properties that we perceive in them. The colour that I perceive in an apple is outside of me and comes from outside to me. We objectify the colours in our mind, from inside out. Our mind combines all impressions; we do not perceive anything as a whole (this perspectivalism was later emphasized in phenomenology). Colour is not just due to light, but to the various nature of things in relation to the working of light (Woltjer 1896, 19, 25-27, 33). Dooyeweerd also rejected the empiricistic distinction of primary and secondary qualities (Friesen 2009, Thesis 23 and references). (4) Naïve experience. Woltjer says that naïve realism does not view things as objects of thought (Woltjer 1896, 19 fn1). Dooyeweerd criticized naïve realism. But his own idea of naïve experience distinguished the Gegenstand of theoretical thought from the object of naïve experience. (5) Three faculties/directions. Woltjer says that the soul has three faculties: knowing, willing and imagination (Kok 59). Dooyeweerd is wrong when he refers to only two, knowing and willing. And Dooyeweerd, although his idea of the self is more than just logos, refers to three different intentional directions of our acts: the knowing, the volitional and the imaginative directions (NC III, 88). 37 (6) Idea and concept. Woltjer gives priority to the whole; our ideas relate to the “unity in the diversity of the relations that are given with everything, the whole that is in the parts” (Kok 53). This is similar to Dooyeweerd’s (and Baader’s) view of idea, although Dooyeweerd speaks of ‘totality’ and not ‘whole.’ 37 Baader has “knowing, willing and acting” (Baader 1831, 30, fn10). 47 (7) Imagination and Idea. Woltjer links our ability to see the Idea to our imagination. Creative imagination is the ability “to see, beyond things and in things, the idea in all its beauty and perfection” (Kok, 60) Dooyeweerd also links imagination and Idea (Friesen 2006b) (8) Anthropology. Although Woltjer does not share the idea of the heart, he does speak of our being one race of humans, sprung from one blood [uit éénen bloede gesproten]. The soul is created separately. Dooyeweerd uses very similar reasoning in his “32 Propositions on Anthropology” (Dooyeweerd 1942). Proposition XXXII refers to creation of man as body and soul (‘soul’ understood as ‘heart’). Dooyeweerd says that with respect to the body, humanity is generated of one blood [uit éénen bloede geworden]. With respect to the soul (understood as heart), there is a spiritual generation. The difference from Woltjer’s view is that for Dooyeweerd, creation of body and soul has been completed, but for (the body) this creation is worked out in time (Dooyeweerd 1942). (9) The unconscious. Woltjer refers the conscious and unconscious in the depths of our being (Woltjer 1908). Dooyeweerd later referred to the unconscious (Dooyeweerd 1986). (10) To set over-against [tegenoverstellen]. Dooyeweerd emphasizes that in the theoretical Gegenstand-relation, we set our act of knowing over-against the Gegenstand that we are investigating. ‘Tegenoverstellen’ has been improperly translated as ‘opposed to,’ which gives it an incorrect logical connotation. Woltjer emphasizes that our knowing consciousness stands within the world. And we set our whole knowing being, our selfhood, over against the world: Wij stellen echter ook geheel ons kennend wezen, ons ik met inbegrip onzer gewaarwordingsvoorstellingen en begrippen als subject tegenover de wereld buiten ons als object. Waar we zóó de tegenstelling nemen, kan de idee het subjectieve, het reëele het objectieve genoemd worden. (Woltjer 1896 45) [We rather set our whole knowing being, our self including our perceived representations and concepts as subject over-against the world outside of us as object. If we act in such an over-against way, the idea can be called subjective, and the real may be called objective.] 48 In support of this idea, he refers to Heinrich Rickert’s Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung (Freiburg 1896, 168ff). Rickert sees the whole man, both body and soul as the subject. Dooyeweerd said it was only our act of knowing, and not our entire Selfhood that is set over-against the Gegenstand. But it is fascinating that already in 1896, Woltjer discussed Rickert’s ideas. Tol assumes that this was a new area of investigation by Vollenhoven in 1921. (11) Not foreign. We have a connection to the world and can learn from it because our selfhood is not foreign to it (Woltjer 1896, 33). Dooyeweerd also emphasized this. The meaning-modalities are not foreign, but our own (WdW II, 409; NC II, 474-78). (12) Openness to truth in other traditions. Whereas Vollenhoven is usually “suspicious and antithetical” towards other traditions (Kok 42), Dooyeweerd did not draw the line of antithesis between groups of people, but acknowledged that he stood within a perennial philosophy, and that other traditions also had truths that could be used (Dooyeweerd 1939, 200). The religious antithesis does not draw a line between groups of people, but rather passes through every human existence (NC I 523, 524; WdW I, 492). This is more in line with Woltjer’s approach to incorporating other traditions. Woltjer was a classicist; he loved the classical tradition of the Greeks and Romans tradition. He wrote his dissertation in Latin in 1876, on the subject of Lucretius. Like Woltjer, who found this idea in Calvin, Dooyeweerd also speaks about “sparks” of divine light that are dispersed (Kok 51, Dooyeweerd 1939, 209; Dooyeweerd 1959, 36). But we also find this in de la Saussaye (Appendix D). Woltjer’s openness is reflected in his reference to many authors, including the Indologist Max Müller. Woltjer even quotes from the Hindu Rigveda. And Woltjer’s interest in Wilhelm Wundt, Hans Driesch, Heinrich Rickert, and other philosophers would later be taken up by both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. c) Background to the importance of intuitionism Tol fails to connect Brouwer’s intuitionism with Van Eeden’s ideas of intuition. But Tol does mention Brouwer’s 1905 book Life, Art, and Mysticism (Tol, 168 fn 103). Brouwer speaks about the self, and how one cannot get closer to the self by words or reasoning, but only by a “turning-into-yourself as it is given to you,” and he makes reference to mystical writers. But Vollenhoven did not take the book into account, and Tol does not 49 explore what this means for Vollenhoven’s analysis of Brouwer. If Brouwer had these mystical ideas, is it really fair to criticize his intuitionism as a constructivism? Vollenhoven relied on Henri Poincaré (1854-1912), and discusses his work (Tol, 79, 82) . But again there is no discussion of Poincaré’s experience of discovering new truths in a flash of intuitive insight (See Appendix E). Both Vollenhoven and Tol miss the importance of the entire issue of intuitionism. It is about the excitement of discovery! How do we account for this flash of discovery? d) Other philosophical issues Tol attempts to give the philosophical background of the ideas in Vollenhoven’s thesis. But the issues can be stated more simply: (1) When we intuit new ideas, how does this relate to philosophical anthropology? Does it require a dualistic belief in body and soul, where the soul is the source of the inspiration? And (2) is the intuition a discovery of truths that are already there, or is it an invention of new ideas, a construction of something entirely new? (1) Philosophical Anthropology In answer to the first question, Vollenhoven defends dualism. Or, to be more accurate, of what Vollenhoven later called ‘ennoëtism.’ This is Vollenhoven’s own term for an idea 38 he obtained from Poincaré (Tol, 492-96, Stellingwerff 1987, 27). But note that Woltjer already mentioned Poincaré in his 1914 Lecture. Vollenhoven says that there is a dualism 38 I find Bril’s explanation of ennoëtism to be helpful. The word ‘ennoëtism’ is derived from the Greek word ‘nous.’ It is the belief that from one origin (e.g. a fertilized egg), a higher soul diverges from a lower living body (Bril, 371). In his 1918 thesis, Vollenhoven regarded ennoëtism as dualistic. He later changed his classification of ennoëtism to monistic. But whether monistic or dualistic, ennoëtism regards the higher soul as supratemporal. 50 of body and soul (a bi-unity), but they are joined together by synthesis in a third, The Self (Tol, 232 fn24). This is not a Cartesian dualism where the elements are mutually incompatible. For Vollenhoven, it is in the Self that we distinguish soul and body. “Thought and what is foreign to thought [het denkvreemde] lie reconciled together in the life tension of the Self” (Tol, 100). This joining together occurs only in a current lived experience [beleving] (Tol, 96, 99). Although the body has “forms of sensibility,” including time, there is another sense of time in the intuition that holds soul and body together, and that is the experience of “time as succession in occurrent experience” (Tol, 101). The polarity between soul and body is a polarity of “thought and being,” which Vollenhoven understands as the distinction between the rational element and what is empirically given (Tol, 102). The bridging is done by intuition (Tol, 155). There is a 39 direct self-consciousness of the Self, in which the Self is grasped intuitively (from within itself) (Tol, 161). It is unclear whether Vollenhoven views intuition as in the Self or in the soul. And it is unclear whether the Self is itself a substance or whether it is only a temporary result of the current experience [beleving] of the two substances of soul and body (Tol, 165). In any event, there are two ways of perception: outer perception relates to the perception of the body or the world; inner perception relates to the intuitive awareness of the human being as substance (Self) (Tol, 213). What is also not clear is to what extent this differs from the ideas of Brouwer and Mannoury. What is their anthropology? What exactly is Vollenhoven fighting against? If he took the idea from Poincaré, then is this an anthropology that the other mathematicians also shared? These issues need far more exploration. The impression given is that Vollenhoven was not really engaged in understanding these mathematicians, but only40 using them as a foil in which to explore his ideas of materialism, psycho-monism and So later, when Vollenhoven holds that “knowing resorts under being,” he assumes that 39 being is the empirically given. But for Dooyeweerd, following the 1920 Norel article, being is higher than the empirical. It is the ontical Self and Christ, in whom the Self participates. 40 Vollenhoven’s lack of real engagement with his work would also explain why Brouwer, who was teaching in Amsterdam at the time, did not respond to Vollenhoven’s dissertation, but remained silent (Stellingwerff 1992, 27). 51 dualism (Tol, 77). Vollenhoven’s many distinctions of monism and dualism, and his desire to classify philosophers seems to be a result of the influence of Herman Bavinck, who also made many such distinctions (Bavinck 1908). Vollenhoven says that in non- dualistic systems, the normative element is merged with either the rationalistic or the empirical element. In contrast, Christian dualism was “a viable view.” He called his own position ‘theistic intuitionism.’ It combined a ‘dualistic metaphysics’ with theistic considerations (Tol, 78). And yet if Vollenhoven’s own view was derived from Poincaré, how can he criticize it? (2) Discovery or constructivism Vollenhoven says that for Poincaré and Brouwer, mathematics is a matter of human construction (Tol, 82). But that is not true. Another footnote cites Brouwer’s view that the continuum as a whole is given to us; a construction of it is “unthinkable and impossible” (Tol, 168 fn103). There is a contradiction here, either in Tol or in Vollenhoven. Vollenhoven says that because they believed that mathematics is only a matter of human construction, these mathematicians could only have a potential infinite and not an actual completed infinite. Again this is not true. Brouwer acknowledged the divine unity as the actual infinite (Tol, 168 fn103). Brouwer does say that our intuition of two-oneness, creates not only the numbers one and two, but also all finite ordinal numbers, since the process is repeated indefinitely (Tol, 83). But this relies on there first being given to us an “intuitive continuum.” Vollenhoven’s analysis is faulty. Vollenhoven says that Poincaré and Brouwer are not theistic intuitionists because they do not appeal to norms (Tol, 95). Again, is this true? Does mysticism deny all norms? This must be proved and not merely asserted. Vollenhoven appealed to norms that regulate psychical acts on which cognition of “the given” is based. Tol illustrates this by a triangle with norm at the top, joining ratio and empirie at the base. The given is the empirical element that stands in opposition to 41 41 This seems similar to de la Saussaye’s view that ethical norms join intuition and empiricism. But de la Saussaye emphasizes that by ‘ethical’ he does not mean morality, and that it is the heart that joins the two. 52 thought and to mental acts in general. It is what is foreign to thought [het denkvreemde]. The normative must not merge with either pole: to do so results in dominance of that pole, and a reductionism. Rationalism sees the given as its own construction (psycho- monism). Empiricism regards mind as epiphenomenon (materialism). But theism is dualistic, and for theism, all norms are divine (Tol, 95-6). This attempted reconciliation of rationalism and empiricism by theism is already in Vollenhoven’s student article on Bergson (Vollenhoven 1916a). Vollenhoven distinguishes between knowledge [kennen] and intuition [weten]. Intuition 42 includes “knowledge by acquaintance.” This is an idea that Tol says was popularized by Bertrand Russell in 1911. But William James already used the term in 1890, and we can find even earlier uses. Tol interprets ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ as “common sense.” But doesn’t that place Vollenhoven in Thomas Reid’s common sense tradition and not that of neo-Calvinism? And yet elsewhere, Tol denies a connection with Thomas Reid’s common sense (Tol, 61 fn72). There is an inconsistency in Tol’s analysis. In addition to knowledge by acquaintance, intuition is also a conscious state of the human Self, a kind of inner perception that “gives rise to a unique kind of objectivity, the Gegenstand or Gegenstände” (Tol, 122). Tol says that Vollenhoven obtained this use of ‘Gegenstand’ from Meinong (Tol, 126). Gegenstände are of two kinds: objects and objectives (of judgment). But here Tol’s explanation of Vollenhoven’s dissertation is obscure. He says that Vollenhoven regards the science of Gegenstände and metaphysics as analogous to the distinction between ratio and empirie, the rational element and the empirical, and that this distinction needs to be bridged. Vollenhoven finds this bridge in mathematics, which provides the synthetic a priori (Tol, 140). I do not propose to discuss this further; Tol’s argument is too compressed. Whatever it means, it did not influence Dooyeweerd, who strongly criticized the idea of the synthetic a priori (NC II, 546; III, 106). For Dooyeweerd, the only a priori is ontical, not logical. But Vollenhoven continued to believe in the importance of the synthetic a priori, as his Isagôgè shows. Tol believes that this idea of a synthetic a priori is the lesson to be learned from Vollenhoven (Tol, 62). From Dooyeweerd’s perspective, that is a logicistic way of understanding 42 As already mentioned, so did Van Eeden. 53 ontical conditions, which are prior to all theoretical presuppositons (Friesen 2009, Thesis 2 and references). Tol’s comparison of Dooyeweerd’s statements about modalities to the synthetic a priori is clearly incorrect, even within the context of the article he refers to (Tol, 330). Let us come back to the intra-mental things of the Gegenstand. For Vollenhoven, they are distinct from the extra-mental ideas that are known by metaphysical intuition (Tol, 136). The metaphysical ideas are in the mind of God. And God constantly realizes the general ideas—for example the general idea ‘human being’ in a particular way. Thus, ideas are “thing-laws” to regulate individuation (Tol, 146-7). By distinguishing between the intra-mental ideas and God’s ideas, Vollenhoven has to relate our human knowing to God’s Ideas. He says that is it not our task to see what God sees, for “that eradicates the distinction between God as norm giver, also for our thought, and the human being who is subject to his norms” (Tol, 167). So Vollenhoven concentrates on our knowledge in the here and now. “We grasp the essence of the species by an incomplete concept of the Idea (Tol, 153). This is done by intuition, and we have intuitions of things and thing-relations (Tol, 150). And both things and relations between them are given independently of our knowing. Vollenhoven calls this ‘metaphysical 43 intuitionism’ (Tol, 113). As a Christian, Vollenhoven believed that our knowing is a discovery of the given, something that is not invented but already there. Thus metaphysical intuitionism acknowledges that things and relations between these are given, independently of our knowing (cited, Tol, 132) This is a realist position. The number 4 ‘exists’ even before it is recognized in mathematics. The world’s structure is in virtue of ideas that are thoughts in the mind of God the Father (Tol, 214). d) Did Vollenhoven’s dissertation influence Dooyeweerd? (1) Tol argues that Dooyeweerd used the idea of immanent critique (Tol, 289 fn114). We have already seen that Dooyeweerd used the term as early as 1915 (Dooyeweerd 1915b). 43 This is a connection of Vollenhoven’s dissertation to his Isagôgè. According to his “intersection principle,” things and modes (in his use of the term ‘modes’ as properties or qualities) are basic to our knowledge. 54 Van Eeden also used the idea of immanent critique. And the idea of immanent critique is already in Baader, in the way that he uses Kant’s arguments to disprove Kant. (2) Tol says that Dooyeweerd’s notions of time have a “striking similarity” to 44 Vollenhoven’s early work (Tol, 79). In his dissertation, Vollenhoven discussed the idea of “time as succession” which he distinguished from “time as form of sensibility” (Tol, 32). But the idea of the Self’s experience of succession of time is already in Van Eeden. And Vollenhoven already referred to the idea in his student article on Bergson. (3) Tol argues that mathematical intuitionism depends on acknowledgement of the synthetic a priori (Tol, 94). That is certainly not Dooyeweerd’s view. He opposed the synthetic a priori. (4) Tol argues that Dooyeweerd used the idea of “Gegenstand” that Vollenhoven obtained from Meinong, and that this is the basis for the ‘metalogical Gegenstand-sphere and the modal order (Tol, 13, 123, 126-28). Meinong and Husserl were both students of Franz Brentano, but they disagreed with Brentano’s use of ‘Gegenstand,’ as well as the meaning of ‘intentionality,’ or how our thought directed to that Gegenstand. For Brentano, the content of our thought is immanent to the act of thought; he refers to the ‘intentional inexistence’ of such content. Meinong reacted against this, and held that an intentional act is always a relation between the mental act and an external object (See Huemer). Husserl also held that intentionality was directed towards an external object. Dooyeweerd uses ‘Gegenstand’ and ‘intentionality’ in Brentano’s sense, derived from Baader. Dooyeweerd specifically rejects Husserl’s meaning of ‘intentional.’ Dooyeweerd’s intentionliaty is an inner process directed to a non-ontical Gegenstand (Friesen 2003a and Friesen 2009, Thesis 88 and references). In 1955, Vollenhoven supervised a doctoral dissertation by J.A.L. Taljaard on Brentano, entitled “Franz Brentano as Wysgeer.” Taljaard says that it was Franz von Baader who converted Brentano to theism from Schelling’s pantheism (Taljaard, 107). And Taljaard discusses Brentano’s idea of intentional inexistence: things have a real existence, but also an ideal, inexistential or ‘objective’ existence in our spirit (Taljaard, 69). 44 Tol tries to avoid the term ‘ideas.’ 55 (5) Christian realism and the Logos Idea. Dooyeweerd would have been aware of these ideas from Woltjer and other sources. We do not have to see him as following Vollenhoven. D. Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, 1918 to 1922 1. Vollenhoven’s four months in Leipzig In 1920, Vollenhoven went to Leipzig to study under Felix Krüger, who was a student of the psychologist Wilhelm Wundt. Vollenhoven was interested to show that biology had a different basis from physics. 2. 1920 Article on Driesch In 1920, Vollenhoven wrote an article criticizing Driesch’s idea of wholeness because it denied the dualism of body and soul (Stellingwerff 1987, 109). This is not a new idea; we can already find this critique of Driesch in Buytendijk’s articles of 1914. 3. Vollenhoven’s 1921 article “Hegel in our elementary schools?” Tol calls the view expressed by Vollenhoven in this article ‘transcendental realism.’ Our thought uses “adequate concepts” to approach the idea; these adequate concepts are ideals 56 for our thought. But behind the ideal is the idea, or thing-law, which we already behold 45 intuitively [schouwen]. Neo-Kantians confuse ideal and idea, and deny that there is any idea behind their ideal. For Vollenhoven, ideas remain the thoughts of God, and therefore it is only theists who can speak of ideas in this sense (Tol, 206). Vollenhoven calls this distinction between ideal and idea ‘epistemological dualism.’ The Idea is the essence of the “thing-law” of anything existent. The adequate concept is the ideal of knowledge to strive for. Vollenhoven says that our thoughts do not impose their own law on the object. But once we acknowledge the object, we may speak of “a certain autonomy of thought in its own sphere.” This autonomy is the “sovereignty (of regulation, not of creation) in its own sphere.” (Tol, 207) Tol says that this is Vollenhoven first use of the Kuyperian phrase ‘sovereignty in its own sphere.’ Tol then contradicts himself by saying that this reference to sphere sovereignty is not linked to Kuyper’s understanding of ‘sphere sovereignty;’ Vollenhoven is not linking “diverse domains of validity of logical norms” to the notion of sphere sovereignty (Tol, 210 fn 160). Even if this is a use of Kuyper’s sphere sovereignty it is not a use that Dooyeweerd approved of. He denied that thought is self-sufficient, even in its own sphere (NC I, 41). Thought needs the Idea of the radical unity of the religious root of existence as well as the divine Origin. As we shall see when we discuss Dooyeweerd’s 1922 article, the radical unity relativizes thought. Nor is the idea in this article of “diverse domains of validity of logical norms” (Tol, 209) an early reference to the diverse modalities, at least not in Dooyeweerd’s sense. For Dooyeweerd, the modalities are not domains of validity of logical norms. Logic is just one of the modalities; to extend logic to the other norms would amount to logicism. This is not a minor point, for Vollenhoven’s mature work distinguishes the modal aspects by abstraction of predicates, and this what Dooyeweerd so sharply criticized as logicism (Dooyeweerd 1975a). In 1928, Dooyeweerd says The idea of adequate concepts is already in Woltjer, as is the distinction between ideal 45 and idea. 57 …there was a time, when I was myself of the opinion that the distinguished scientific terrains could be kept correctly separated without the help of a law-idea. Logical analysis…should alone be adequate here. But this was exactly the postulate of humanistic philosophy, wherein its rationalistic character so strongly reveals itself (cited in Tol, 313). Tol is correct that Dooyeweerd was applying this judgment not only to himself but also to Vollenhoven. But Vollenhoven did not accept the law-Idea, and continued to use logical analysis to try to distinguish the law-spheres. Dooyeweerd already broke with logicism in his 1922 article, where he says that Gegenstand-theory must come before epistemology. 4. Discussions with Zevenbergen Tol mentions Vollenhoven’s discussions with W. Zevenbergen regarding the foundations of law, and says that this influenced Dooyeweerd, particularly the ideas of Emil Lask (Tol, 275). But it was not just Vollenhoven and Zevenbergen who were reading Lask. In 1921, Bavinck published an article in 1921 in Stemmen des Tijds (again that same journal!). It was entitled “Ethiek en Politiek.” Bavinck referred to Emil Lask’s search for the foundations of natural law. Stellingwerff suggests that Dooyeweerd’s law-Idea was an answer to the problems posed by Bavinck’s article (Stellingwerff 1987, 79). Tol’s account also suggests friendly relations between Dooyeweerd and Zevenbergen. But Zevenbergen opposed Dooyeweerd being named as a professor at the Free University. In 1925, Zevenbergen was attacked by H.H. Kuyper because he opposed the death penalty; Zevenbergen died shortly afterwards at the age of 41. The position then became free for Dooyeweerd (Stellingwerff 1987, 121). Dooyeweerd gave his own account of the way he learned of the philosophy of law. He says that when he first directed his attention to the subject, he had no plan, and just wanted to see what others had said. The result was only confusion. Every jurist that he read, whether Stahl, Stammler, Radbruch, or others, had his own basis for law: morality, sociology, psychology, logic, or as an historical idea of culture (Stellingwerff 1987, 111- 12).. 5. The influence of Antheunis Janse on Vollenhoven Tol devotes a considerable portion of this volume (Tol, 224-263) to the discussion of this influence. Much of this information has been available before, but not in English. Tol 58 advances our knowledge of Janse’s influence, but it is not clear whether all the correspondence between Janse and Vollenhoven was reviewed; this correspondence is “to date largely virgin terrain” (Tol, 224). Antheunis Janse, the principal of an elementary school, corresponded with Vollenhoven from 1919. He liked the intuitionist view of counting described in Vollenhoven’s dissertation. He and Vollenhoven published several works on arithmetic and mathematics. Tol tends to downplay the influence of Janse, since Janse did not have academic credentials like Vollenhoven, but the influence was profound. a) Montessori Tol gives an interesting discussion of Janse’s views of the child psychology of Maria Montessori (226ff ). Janse thought her views were monistic; at that time he wanted to retain dualism. Tol notes that later, his views were more like those of Montessori (Tol, 232). b) Philosophical Anthropology At the end of 1922, Janse “quite suddenly” rejected the idea that the soul is immortal (Tol, 10). Janse had read Max Scheler, Hans Driesch, Herman Bavinck, and S.O. Los. Janse found in Driesch a beautiful view of be-souled body as one ‘Leib’ (Tol, 234). Leib 46 includes soul that belongs to body, and soul = life. But spirit is from above. The soul’s unity with body makes it incapable of being immortal (Tol, 232). The living being is a given whole (Tol, 237). 46 It is doubtful that Janse correctly understood Driesch’s Leib und Seele (Leipzig: Reinicke, 1916, 1923). Driesch distinguishes between I [Ich)], Self [Selbst] soul [Seele] and be-souled body [beseelter Leib]. Thus, even if we accept the idea of a be-souled body, there remains the further issue of I and Selfhood. Driesch’s idea that the Self [Selbst] has a discontinuous Dasein but stands in continuous time, and that the Self is the series of points in time ordered with a relation of earlier and later [der Reihe der Damalspunkte mit ihrer Beziehung früher-später, zugeordnet] needs to be researched further in relation to Dooyeweerd’s ideas of the modalities in relation to the Selfhood. See pp. 95, 97, 108 of the 1923 edition. 59 Janse wrote to Vollenhoven about these ideas and Vollenhoven replied on November 7, 1922, listing his objections to Janse’s “Aristotelian” ideas. Vollenhoven gave a proposed 47 solution that still focused on the idea of an immortal soul (Tol, 233). But Vollenhoven continued to wrestle with Janse’s idea, and on January 14, 1923, while preaching on the topic of “being childlike,” he collapsed in the pulpit. His mental 48 breakdown required hospitalization, and he did not recover for almost the whole of 1923. (Tol, 235). After his mental breakdown, Vollenhoven confirmed that he agreed with Janse; the soul is not immortal (Tol, 10). But Vollenhoven’s ideas were even more temporalizing than Janse’s. Janse said that after death, our life (the breath of animals) goes into the earth, but our spirit, which was given by God, returns to God, who gave it (Tol, 240). This “inward presence still has shape and figure and is able to think, awaits the resurrection when it will be clothed with a new body.” But Vollenhoven never adopted this idea of spirit (Tol, 262). For Vollenhoven, death is the dissolution of a complete substance by the becoming unusable of the organ of the soul. 49 c) Janse’s effect on Dooyeweerd Tol says that “Janse had no recognizable effect on Dooyeweerd whatsoever” (Tol, 265). Stellingwerff refers to a 1937 letter from Dooyeweerd to Janse where Dooyeweerd seemed to want to combine the idea of “man as a living soul” with Kuyper’s idea of a heart. I expect this is in the sense that Dooyeweerd believed that all of our temporal existence is gone at death, including our temporal function of rationality. Janse believed that our spirit survived death, and this is likely the connection to Dooyeweerd’s view of 47 This raises the question of how Aristotelian Vollenhoven became when he accepted Janse’s position. Tol says that Vollenhoven rejected the soul, but for different reasons than Janse (p. 244, fn44). If there were different reasons, they should be examined more closely. 48 The idea of being childlike itself comes from Janse. All of this indicates that Vollenhoven’s breakdown was directly related to his wrestling with these ideas of the nature of the self (p. 235 fn32). 49 Proposition XXV in his March, 1938 response to Curators. “Sterven is dissolutie van een substantia completa door het onbruikbaar worden van ‘t orgaan der ziel” (Friesen 2006c). 60 the heart, which also survives death. What Dooyeweerd completely rejected was Vollenhoven’s biblical interpretation, viewing man as fully temporal. 50 Later, Dooyeweerd denied that biblical exegesis could be used to determine the meaning of the heart as the religious centre of life, the root of man’s whole existence, or the fall into sin, rebirth, the incarnation of the Word, or the Christian Ground-motive of creation, fall and redemption (Friesen 2009, Thesis 42 and references). Dooyeweerd’s own view of the Scriptures was derived from de la Saussaye (Appendix D). Janse continued to publish his ideas, despite warnings from Vollenhoven. The result of these books, was a lengthy investigation of Vollenhoven by the Curators of the Free University. It lasted several years. Tol mentions this investigation (Tol, 224 fn1) but does not look at Vollenhoven’s responses to this investigation in any detail (For details, see Friesen 2006c). Dooyeweerd was also investigated, since the Curators associated him with these ideas. Dooyeweerd could distance himself from Janse and Vollenhoven, because Dooyeweerd believed in the supratemporal selfhood, which does not die and is not in need of resurrection. So his views did not meet the same response from the Curators. In fact Dooyeweerd was chosen to sit on a committee to investigate Vollenhoven’s theological ideas about whether or not Christ had a personal human nature. The theologians thought that Christ did not have a personal nature. 51 d) Other Issues involving Janse (1) Tol refers to Janse’s idea of our being “sub-jected” under God’s law, and that this was a result of denying the immortality of the soul (Tol, 219). But the idea of the subject as sub-jected was not a new idea; it is already in Baader, who even used the French ‘sujet’ as Dooyeweerd was later to do (Friesen 2003a). And the idea of sub-jection has nothing to do with a denial of immortality. For our supratemporal heart is immortal, and yet also 50 F.H. von Meyenfeldt complained that Dooyeweerd dismissed as “biblicistic” his interpretation the Old Testament use of ‘heart,’ the subject of von Meyenfeldt’s 1950 dissertation, “Het hart (leb, lebab) in het Oude Testament” (Stellingwerff 2006, 91 and personal communication from Harry van Dyke). 51 This fits with Schneckenburger’s analysis of Christology in Calvinism; it fails to recognize the truly human (see below). 61 sub-ject to God. Being sub-ject is related only to the rejection of an eternally existing substance, and not to the continuance after death of our created heart center. (2) Tol says that Janse gives the first statement of the ideal that is “the reformation of science”—a distinct psychology connecting with what the Scriptures understand by ‘soul’ (Tol, 240 fn 39). That is a vast over-simplification. Baader did that a hundred years earlier. It’s true that Janse moves in a different direction from Baader, Gunning, Chantepie de la Saussaye and Dooyeweerd, but that does not mean he was the first to want to reform science. Nor is this the only possible way that science can be reformed. We have already seen that Ubbink gave other ideas. (3) Janse says that the idea of man as living soul is a Semitic Idea as opposed to Indo- Germanic ideas (Tol, 246-249). He obtained this distinction from Paul Deussen (student 52 of Schopenhauer). Vollenhoven took over this distinction; he, too criticizes Indo-German mysticism (Tol, 247 fn 49). And he believed that his previous idea of ‘concrete intuition’ was like the Indo-German view of participation (Tol, 260). (4) During the war, Janse openly opposed resisting the German occupation (Tol, 224). In fact, Janse was punished for this collaboration (Stellingwerff 1987, 317). Tol’s dismissive remark that Janse’s actions were “on religious grounds” is an odd thing to say from a neo-Calvinist perspective. Religion is all-embracing, and not a private reason that can be disregarded. And if Janse’s actions were derived from his reading of Scripture, then what does this say with respect to his use of Scripture? 6. The “Find” In a letter of February 4, 1936, Vollenhoven refers to a “find” “in or about” the summer of 1922 that provided him and Dooyeweerd with a “more Scriptural way of thinking” (Tol, 367). For the following reasons, I believe that this is the 1920 Norel article on Gunning/Baader: a) It was easily available b) It satisfies Tol’s requirements for what the article must contain c) It explains Dooyeweerd’s 1922 article d) It explains 52 Contrast this with Chantepie de la Saussaye, who also made the distinction, but in a reverse way. For him, the Semitic view was of wholeness whereas the indo-Germanic view emphasized beginning with the particulars. See Appendix D. 62 Dooyeweerd’s reliance on Chantepie de la Saussaye, and the similarity of his philosophy to that of Baader e) It explains why the “find” was not disclosed. a) The Norel article was easily available As already mentioned, the Norel article was published in the journal Stemmen des Tijds, a journal whose editors included respected faculty from the Free University. Vollenhoven was already reading that journal in 1916 (Vollenhoven 1916, 14, 141). In 1919, Vollenhoven submitted an article for publication in 1919; part of that article was published in 1922 along with another article. Furthermore, Vollenhoven published his significant article in 1926 (Vollenhoven 1926a) in the same journal. Given Vollenhoven’s interest in the journal, Norel’s article in Stemmen des Tijds would certainly have come to Vollenhoven’s attention. b) The Norel article satisfies Tol’s requirements for what the “find” must contain Working backwards from what Vollenhoven wrote in 1926, Tol has analyzed certain ideas that he believes must have been in the “find.” Although this does not prove any influence of Vollenhoven on Dooyeweerd, Tol’s arguments regarding the content of the “find” are very persuasive. He says (Tol, 9) that the “find” must have included (1) the realization that “knowing resorts under being” (2) metalogical, cosmological and theistic implications (3) the Gegenstand-sphere being given for consciousness, as assessed in a modal viewing (4) the idea of the Logos as divine Giver, brought into closer relation with self and world (5) a tendency towards Christo-centric cosmism. The Norel article satisfies all of Tol’s requirements. Let us look at these issues in more detail. (1) The “find” influenced Vollenhoven to refer in 1926 to “knowing resorts under being” Tol uses the awkward phrase “knowing resorts under being” more than 20 times. It refers to the idea that our rational thinking is part of the temporal cosmos, one function among many. This placement of rationality within the cosmos is important because it allows for a shift from Christian realism, which regards rationality in terms of an eternal soul that stands outside of our temporal body, and outside the temporal cosmos. In Christian realism, the eternal soul compares what it observes about the cosmos to the eternal Ideas 63 of God, to which it has access. The other shift from Christian realism (discussed below) is that Ideas viewed by our rationality are not eternal, but also within the cosmos. Tol says that the phrase “knowing resorts under being” was used by Vollenhoven for the first time in his 1926 article “Enkele grondlijnen der kentheorie (Vollenhoven 1926a). 53 But the phrase is not used in that article, even in Dutch. The phrase seems to be Tol’s 54 own. I hope that it will not become standard usage in reformational philosophy. It is an incorrect use of English; the verb ‘resort’ means “to turn for aid, have recourse to.” Tol’s use is inappropriate. What Tol intends by the phrase is to deny the the “self-sufficiency” and “autonomy” of rational thought. We will discuss this usage in more detail below. 55 There is a further problem: the phrase “knowing resorts under being” is ambiguous. For Vollenhoven, who identifies being with the cosmos, being is fully temporal. But for those (like Dooyeweerd), who identify Being only with God, and who distinguish our selfhood from the temporal cosmos, the phrase is not adequate to describe how rational thought is a part of the temporal cosmos that is not Being, but only meaning, which refers to Being. Although it does not use the phrase that Tol attributes to it, Vollenhoven’s article does say: ...de geschapen logos en ‘t geschapen alogische zijn beide deelen van den éénen kosmos, die als zoodanig door den goddelijken Logos geschapen is (Vollenhoven 1926a, 388). […the created logos and the created a-logical are both parts of one cosmos, which as such was created by the divine Logos] and 53 Tol says 1925 at p. 204 fn153, but that is clearly a mistake. 54 Tol also cites a 1930 work by Vollenhoven on psychology, where Vollenhoven says “These laws are not hidden: they resort under the revealed part of [God’s] will of decision. . . .” Tol does not give the original of that text, but it cannot be read back into 1926. And it does not use the phrase “knowing resorts under being” either! 55 Vollenhoven’s 1963 recollection speaks of the necessity to “push through knowing to being, of which knowing is also a part” [achter het kennen door te stoten naar het zijn, waarvan het kennen een onderdeel is] (Cited Stellingwerff 1992, 40). That does not use the word ‘ressorteren,’ either. The real idea is that knowing is a part of being. In other words, Vollenhoven denies the autonomy of thought. 64 De geschapen logos behoort tot den kosmos (Vollenhoven 1925a, 389). [The created logos belongs to the cosmos] By putting both rationality (created logos) and its a-logical fields of view within the cosmos, Vollenhoven has rejected Christian realism’s idea of seeking the eternal Ideas of God by an eternal soul. Vollenhoven says that “both were created by the divine Logos, Who does the cosmic ordering.” We do not need to know the eternal thoughts of the divine Logos because we read God’s order from the cosmos: Zijn ordening kunnen we aflezen door nauwkeurig acht te geven op de orde der wetenschappen (Vollenhoven 1926a, 392) [We can read his ordering by paying close attention to the order of the sciences] This idea of reading God’s ordering in nature as opposed to reading them in God’s eternity is a theosophical idea going back to Boehme’s idea of the “signature” of God in creation. In reading Ideas in creation, we are still “reading the thoughts of God,” but now 56 this is restricted to how those thoughts are expressed in Creation. As de la Saussaye says, God does not think in concepts anyway; his thoughts are as expressed in creation (Appendix D). Vollenhoven still maintains a distinction between the divine Logos and His expression in nature; it is only the expression that we need to attend to. We cannot know the divine Logos in itself. So Vollenhoven still has a distinction of essence and phenomenon; he just says that we cannot look at the Logos in itself, except insofar as the Logos is revealed in Scripture. So Vollenhoven maintains the idea of God expressing Himself in discursive thought (Scripture) as well as in nature. So is this idea of rational thought being a part of the cosmos found in the Norel article? Yes. Norel says that philosophy that proceeds from independent thought [onafhankelijk denken] cannot explain the relation between thought and the visible world. Descartes’ cogito, the “I think” cannot be our point of departure. Our reason must itself be saved 56 Jacob Boehme (1912): The Signature of all Things (London: J.M. Dent; originally published as De Signatura Rerum in 1622). Of course it is also biblical, as Romans 8 indicates. But that thought had been lost in scholastic ways of viewing the world. See the quoation from Faivre above, where he says that theosophists were interested in seeing God’s ideas expressed in the world. In the literature we can find many works showing that the theosophical idea of nature gave the impetus to Western science. 65 from its autonomy [‘autonomie’]. Reason is a part of the whole of life [een onderdeel van het geheel des levens]. The center is not our reason, but our heart, out of which are all the issues of life. So thinking is a part of our entire being, which is rooted in the central heart (Norel 71-78). Norel emphasizes that reason must not be elevated, but must be seen in relation to the whole of our being: Het eenzijdig vooropstellen van het verstand is volgens Gunning de denkzonde bij uitnemendheid. Hij wordt niet moede er tegen te waarschuwen. In vroeger tijden was de wijsbegeerte meer zaak van den geheelen mensch. De latere wijsbegeerte heeft het abstracte denken vooropgesteld en heeft dit gemaakt tot een basis, waarop alles rusten moet. Maar wij, die in het christelijk geloof staan, “wij moeten tot dit oude concentratie van den mensch, tot de geheelheid, de eenheid van zijn wezen terug.” (Norel 75) [Gunning says that the one-sided elevation of reason is the preeminent sin of thinking. He never gets tired of warning against it. In earlier times, philosophy was more a matter of the whole person. Recent philosophy has elevated abstract thought and made it the basis on which everything else must rest. But we, who stand in Christian belief, “we must return to this old concentration of man, to wholeness and the unity of his being.”] The connection to Norel is very easy to see in Dooyeweerd, who uses this idea of this central heart, with rationality being merely one temporal expression of it. But it took some time for all the implications to be worked out by Dooyeweerd. He did not understand the significance of the supratemporal until about 1928. But as we shall see, even his 1922 article uses many of Norel’s ideas, taken from Gunning and Baader. (2) The “find” has metalogical, cosmological and theistic implications. Tol says that whatever is in the “find” has implications at various levels: metalogical, cosmological and theistic. All of these are in Norel. Norel specifically says in his article that Gunning’s “theosophical” philosophy has relevance to the nature of our knowledge, the nature of God, the nature of man and also our teaching about life [levensleer] (Norel 72). The Norel article has relevance to what Vollenhoven calls the ‘metalogical’ because the metalogical is now placed in the cosmos, as a result of the idea of creation [scheppingsidee] (see discussion below). And Vollenhoven’s switch to emphasizing Christian theism is also in Norel’s article: Norel seeks the possibility of a “Christian science,” a Christian religious thought, that is theistic in nature (Norel 159). 66 (3) The “find” results in the Gegenstand-sphere “given for consciousness” in the cosmos, as assessed in a “modal viewing.” There are several ideas here: (i) that what Tol calls the ‘Gegenstand-sphere’ is given as opposed to constructed (ii) that it is given in the cosmos (iii) that it is given for consciousness and (iv) that it is given as assessed in a “modal viewing.” All of these are in the Norel article. With respect to (i) given and not constructed. Norel emphasizes that the mistaken elevation of reason does not accept creation as given to us, but rather wants to itself create (Norel 75). (ii) given in the cosmos. Norel says that whoever proceeds from the Creator, stands within the temporal and factual: De afgetrokken redenereering wil zich telkens buiten het tijdelijke plaatsen, enkel denkende naar de eigen vormen en wetten van het denken, om eenigen van buiten gegeven inhoud zich niet bekommerend. Maar wie van den Schepper uitgaat, staat midden in het tijdelijke en feitelijke. Het heelal wordt historisch, niet abstract logisch opgevat (Norel 75) [Abstract reasoning frequently wants to place itself outside of the temporal, thinking only of its own forms and laws of thought. But whoever proceeds from the Creator, stands in the middle of the temporal and the factual. The universe is understood historically and not in an abstract logical way]. Norel is not saying that he agrees with the view that thought is outside of time, for he has already placed thought within the cosmos, as part of our whole being. He is contrasting this view with the Christian view that proceeds from the Idea of creation [scheppingsidee]. And for this we need to look at his view in more detail. Norel refers to the gap [kloof] between knowing and being (Norel 160). That is the issue that is addressed by what Tol calls ‘knowing resorts under being.’ Norel says that Spinoza derived thinking and extension from one substance. But Spinoza’s philosophy could not show the transition between thought and material being: Kan zij een transcendente, een buiten de sfeer van het bewustzijn liggende werkelijkheid handhaven? Kan zij eigenlijk wel boven het solipsisme uitkomen...? [Can philosophy maintain a transcendent reality, a reality that exists outside the sphere of consciousness? Can it really surpass solipsism...?] 67 Norel says we do not have to accept Spinoza’s idea of substance. For Gunning, this problem is resolved in God, who is the ground of both our spirit and of the world, and thus for the harmony between them (Norel 73-4). The ground of our knowledge is in God, and we cannot have true knowledge without contact with God and finding our self (Norel 75). He cites Boehme, who said that we must presuppose the Spirit of God “so that the light of reason can see by God’s light (Norel, 76, citing de Hartog 1915). We proceed from a being, the cause of which we can no longer ask about; God is the ground of the temporal (Norel, 138). This sounds like Christian Idealism, but there is an important shift. Instead of looking at Ideas in an eternal realm, we look at ideas as expressed in the cosmos. Whoever proceeds from the Creator stands in the middle of the temporal and the factual. Gunning’s/Baader’s Christian theosophical idea that we look for God’s wisdom within temporal reality is the decisive shift that makes sense of the move in both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd away from Christian realism (which emphasized Ideas in the mind of God) towards seeking God’s law within temporal reality. The basis for this move from eternal Ideas to their expression in the world is the idea of creation (Norel refers to ‘scheppingsidee’). Norel relates this to the theosophical idea that God expresses Himself in His nature. The personality of God is not just a rigid lifeless unity, but is revealed as “an infinite fullness of internal determinations [een oneindige volheid van inwendige bepaaldheden], as expressed in the confession (Norel 136). Norel says that the world is 57 part of God’s nature and that this is the reason we can look at the cosmos as an expression of the thoughts of God. God has an eternal nature and the temporal world has come into being from out of the nature in God. Nature is in and out of God [in en uit God] (Norel 140). Gunning speaks of the body of God [lichamelijkheid Gods]. Norel says that this is not pantheism; rather, “In God is the ground of the world” but God’s nature is more than being the ground of the world. It is independent of the world (Norel 140). Nature is God’s instrument [werktuig]. Through it he reveals His being [wezen], and through nature he sets the kingdom of His ideas into reality (Norel 141). A spirit needs a bodily ground in which he can demonstrate his power when he penetrates it (Norel 144). 57 The reference is proably to the Confession of Chalcedon. 68 As a result of this embodiment of God’s thoughts within His nature, and then within creation, we can turn our attention to creation. Terwijl een zuiver spiritualisme geen overgang kan vinden tusschen God en wereld, dus feitellijk akosmisme blijven moet, stelt de aanname van de natuur in God ons in staat de schepping te zien als de eeuwige daad van den heilige, die liefde is (Norel 142) [Whereas a pure spiritualism can find no bridge between God and world, and thus must in fact remain acosmism, the assumption of a nature in God puts us in a position to see creation as the eternal act of the Holy One, who is Love.] In this connection, it should be pointed out that Kuyper specifically praised Baader for this idea of embodiment in God. Kuyper wishes that modernism would have allowed itself to be led by Baader to the “Biblical realism” of the Incarnation, as expressed in the life-giving proverb “Embodiment is the goal of the ways of God.” But Kuyper says that Baader’s ideas only had effect in a limited domain, and so the one-sided spiritualistic idealism that he opposed was able to continue among academics, in the national literature and culture and even among the people themselves through such literature, lectures and preaching (cited in Friesen 2003b). Baader said that both rationalists and supernaturalists confuse the transcendent with something that is against nature or against reason. But instead of being separated from nature, they should rather acknowledge the importance of embodiment [Leibwerdung, Naturwerdung]. 58 Now Norel does not quite interpret Baader correctly. Baader distinguishes between God’s nature and the created nature. Not to make this distinction results in pantheism. But 59 Baader certainly agrees that the created world is “out, from and towards” God. Norel refers to this idea in de Hartog. This is the same idea that was the subject of controversy involving de Hartog in the journal Opbouw that I discussed earlier. So the idea of God expressing Himself in creation is not pantheistic. God has a center in which he expresses Himself in his own nature (Trinity); God expresses himself in a further periphery–the 58 See Baader: “Über die Begründung der Ethik durch die Physik,” (Werke V, 20, 49). 59 Baader criticized the identification of God’s nature with creation in Hegel and Schelling. The idea of embodiment was disputed by some Protestant theologians because they thought it implied pantheism (Benz, 185). But Baader’s distinction of God’s nature from the nature of creation avoids that problem. 69 periphery of creation. And in that creation, man’s selfhood is a center that further expresses itself in the temporal periphery. Dooyeweerd saw expression as basic to our being in the image of God (Friesen 2009, thesis 65 and references). To begin with the selfhood and to move out to the periphery is what Dooyeweerd calls the ‘transcendental direction’ of thought. If we begin in the other direction, we move in the transcendent direction. Beginning with temporal reality, we then see a concentration, a referring back to the previous centers, to man’s selfhood, participating in Christ the New Root, and finally referring all to the Archè or origin. And so this allows for what Tol calls the metalogical sphere, the not-I, to be within the cosmos. Norel explicitly says this. As our knowledge increases, the sphere of the not-I decreases. For example, before we know about X-rays, they belong to the not-I. When they are discovered, then they have been removed from the sphere of the not-I and brought to the realm of the self. That is how we must understanding the expansion of our self-consciousness (Norel 77). (iii) given for consciousness. For Norel, our heart is the center out of which are all the issues of life. God’s creation is given for that central consciousness. The way we view the world our worldview [wereldbeeld, wereldbeschouwing, levensbeschouwing] is dependent on the direction [gesteldheid] of our spirit or central being. Only by Christian belief can we come to a science that reflects our normal consciousness [normaal bewustzijn] (Norel 72). 60 (iv) in a modal viewing Norel says, Maar is het spreken over den grond der dingen eigenlijk niet hetzelfde als spreken over haar doel? Wij kunnen eenvoudig causaliteit en finaliteit niet scheiden–gelijk von Hartmann ze in zijn Kategorienlehre dan ook noemt: “…die verschiedenen Adspekte [sic] ein und derselben Sache, ein und dieselbe explicite Beziehung bald von vorn, bald von hinten gesehen, bald 60 Recall that this was the issue for Kuyper, who emphasized the abnormality of our present consciousness. Tol says that Kuyper did not provide a solution for how we move from this abnormal to a normal consciousness (Tol p. 54). 70 unter Betonung des einen, bald unter Hervorhebung des andern ihrer Momente.” (Norel 143) [But is not speaking about the ground of things the same as speaking about their goal? We simply cannot separate causality and finality–just as von Hartmann refers to them in his Kategorienlehre. 61 “…the different aspects of one and the same matter, one and the same explicit relation now seen from in front, now from behind, now under the emphasis of one of its moments, now drawing attention to another moment.”] So yes, Norel emphasizes viewing things within the cosmos in a modal. He does not use the word ‘modality,’ and we will discuss later where that word came from. But he does refer to ‘aspects’ and ‘moments,’ both of which are later used by Dooyeweerd to refer to the modalities. So there is a modal viewing. Norel’s point is not that we view the object from different sides (as in to phenomenology’s perspectivalism). His point is that our viewing from different sides is related to seeing their original cause and their final cause. Dooyeweerd does not use these terms, but he does speak of the foundational and the transcendental direction of our thought. Norel refers to Von Hartmann’s Kategorienlehre. According to Darnoi, Von Hartmann 62 also discusses how the unconscious applies to “every sphere of existence.” The conscious individual spirit appears as the collective receptacle of all psychic activities of the individual. Despite its complex aspect, it is a single unity due to the fact that all the partial activities of the comprehensive activity are related to a functional and final single organism. Furthermore, this organism relates all its partial activities to an ontological unity (Darnoi, 54). (4) The “find” refers to the Logos is looked on as the divine Giver, as the divine Word. In virtue of the Logos, the cosmos is knowable. This brings the Logos into closer rapport with the cosmos and its objective order of being. 61 The reference is to Eduard von Hartmann: Kategorienlehre (H. Haacke, 1896), 473. Also included in Eduard von Harmann: System der Philosophie im Grundriss, (H. Haacke, 1908), Vol. 4, 34. At p. 4 of the latter work, he speaks of three spheres, which are only three ‘sides’ of the same thing, according to varying one’s point of view. 62 Woltjer already referred to Von Hartmann (Woltjer 1896, 19 fn1; 21). So did Vollenhoven (Vollenhoven 1916a). 71 According to Gunning, reason is the ability, based on our relation with the Logos, the eternal Word, to recognize the Logos in the world, of which He is the ground (Norel 80). The Logos is “the ground of creation” (Norel 139 and again at 142). The Logos is also the goal of creation. In the glorification of creation, spirit will completely penetrate nature (Norel p. 143). (5) The “find” provides a more ‘Christo-centric cosmism.’ Norel’s article also meets Tol’s view that the “find” emphasized Christ’s role. Christ is the example of perfected humanity. Insofar as we participate in Christ, we regain that perfected humanity. It is not that we have to measure ourselves against some world of Ideas; it is our true humanity that is restored. Dooyeweerd later emphasized our own “sonship” with God (NC I, 61). Gunning’s “anthropological standpoint” means that we proceed not from how humanity is, but how humanity should be: we are to be like Jesus Christ (Norel 156). In contrast to philosophy, which proceeds from viewing the world, Gunning’s theosophy proceeds from God, who is revealed in Christ, and known in our heart, as the creative principle things of all things (Norel 71). Christ is the ground of all things; in Him is the fullness of Ideas, which by the word of creation became phenomena (Norel 78). Thus, Norel’s article meets Tol’s criteria for “the find.” But Norel’s article contains other ideas that are also important for understanding Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd: (6) The “find” emphasizes faith. Norel writes that for Gunning, knowing [weten] depends on faith [gelooven]. Christian theosophy joyfully sets faith as the ground for all true science. Without belief, which grasps unity, true knowledge is impossible. We participate in God’s knowing by faith (Norel 76, 79). Tol is incorrect in regarding this as fideism (Tol, 359) or that “faith supplements reason (Tol, 360). Dooyeweerd uses ‘faith’ in the sense of de la Saussaye and Baader (Appendix D). (7) The “find” emphasizes heart direction and worldview. Our science depends on the direction [gesteldheid] of our soul [heart]; this determines our worldview (Norel 72). 72 Through faith, our soul [geest] becomes normal, and it is only as believer that we can come to a normal consciousness (Norel, 71, 72). (8) The “find” emphasizes the distinction Center/periphery and Idea/concept. Tol does not mention this, because Vollenhoven ultimately rejected the distinction. Yet it is key to understanding most of the theosophical ideas that Dooyeweerd adopted: (i) the Logos, Who is central, expresses and reveals Himself in a peripheral creation, including his revelation in Scripture. (ii) Our central heart expresses/reveals itself in our peripheral nature, our body. (iii) The central heart expresses itself in the peripheral functions, one of which is rationality (iv) True knowledge never proceeds from the periphery to the center, but always from the center to the periphery. Our ideas come from the center; concepts come from the periphery. Norel quotes Gunning that we do not find principles by empirical expansion of knowledge, but rather the previously fixed principles must lead the empirical expansion (Norel, 76). Not from diversity to unity, but from unity to diversity. Dooyeweerd was to emphasize this same view that ideas are known in our center and that concepts then seek to approximate the idea (Dooyeweerd 1946). Vollenhoven eventually rejected the distinction of center and periphery, even when speaking of the direction determining heart (Tol, 477 fn164). Tol misunderstands the distinction center/periphery as denigrating or “disdaining” the periphery (Tol, 449). That is not so. Every center, including God, must have a periphery or nature in which to express itself/Himself. That is what ‘embodiment’ means. Dooyeweerd opposed any spirituality that tried to avoid a relation to nature. The reason that the temporal periphery is denigrated, and “the fallen earthly cosmos is only a sad shadow of God's original creation” (NC II, 34) is that it is fallen, not because it is a periphery. Afer the resurrection, we are given a new nature, a new periphery that is not fallen. Tol is also wrong to compare Dooyeweerd’s use of idea and concept to that of idea and adequate concept or limiting concept (Tol, 221). The difference is that for Dooyeweerd, we can have actual experience of the idea as we participate in Christ, the New Root. This 63 fullness is experienced in our heart, and Christ is the model of what man may become. When the Association for Calvinistic Philosophy drew up its constitution, Vollenhoven 63 opposed including this idea of the New Root (Stellingwerff 1987, 207-8). 73 The Idea is not something outside of man’s experience. Dooyeweerd denied that his view of “limiting concepts” was to be interpreted in a Kantian sense. He said, “And yet if you look at it, it [Idea] as I use it is totally non-Kantian in its purport and in its content” (Dooyeweerd 2007, Discussion p. 6). And Dooyeweerd criticizes the view of adequate ideas, which goes back to Aquinas (NC I, 566). (9) The “find” emphasizes creation, fall and redemption. The idea of “creation, fall and redemption” became a defining phrase for reformational philosophy, although Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd used the terms differently (Friesen 2005b; Appendix A). It is useful to see how these are set out in Norel. (i) The idea of creation [scheppingsidee] is essential to the Christian worldview (Norel 138). The fact that Norel refers to creation as an Idea and not just a doctrine shows its philosophical importance. The creation idea is the reconciliation of idealism and materialism. In het idealisme, “de vereering van het absolute in welke gestalte dan ook, logisch, aesthetisch of zedelijk”, zien we dit absolute gesteld buiten de wereld van het bestaande; de idee zweeft boven de stof en vindt haar niet. In het materialisme, “de erkenning van het stoffelijke als het alleen bestaande, de loochening van God en den geest,” zien we precies het tegendeel. Maar de verzoening en daarmede de betrekkelijke rechtvaardiging van beide ligt in de erkenning van Hem, die de eeuwige schepping uitdraagt (Norel, 139) [In idealism, we see the worship of the absolute in whatever form: logically, aesthetically or morally, set outside of the world of existing things; the idea floats above matter and doesn’t find it. In materialism, “the recognition of matter as all that exists, the denial of God and of spirit,” we see precisely the opposite. But the reconciliation and the relative justification of both ideas comes from the acknowledgment of Him, who carries out the eternal creation] The reconciliation of idealism and materialism is to see the embodiment of God’s thoughts in creation. We avoid idealism, since we read God’s thoughts in the cosmos. And we avoid materialism, because these are the expression of God’s thoughts (the Logos). (ii) The idea of the Fall: External creation is fallen. Created spirits were supposed to rule “nature” so that nature could be ‘organ’ of the spirit. But in the fall, nature began to rule 74 the spirit (Norel 139) The Norel article devotes a considerable amount of attention to the fall of cosmic reality, beginning with the angelic fall before man’s creation. Man’s 64 purpose was to help redeem that already fallen world, but man failed in that purpose, and so there was a second fall. Even our thought needs to be redeemed. Norel distinguishes between nature (which was created good), and matter (which was created to prevent a further fall) (Norel 140). (iii) The idea of Redemption. Christ shows us what our true nature is, and what we can achieve. This is similar to what Kuyper said in his Pentecost meditation, discussed above. Anticipations are evidence of what already is redeemed (Norel 146). As we participate in Christ, we can see the world correctly. Philosophy that proceeds from the independence of thought does not understand how the visible world and the spiritual world stand in relation. For we also need a Saviour for our thinking. Rational activity must be faithful within certain boundaries. It needs to be saved from its autonomy (Norel 78). c) The Norel article explains Dooyeweerd’s 1922 article Tol tries to demonstrate that Dooyeweerd’s 1922 article was influenced by the 1922 “find” as well as by discussions with Vollenhoven. A close reading of Dooyeweerd’s 1922 article does indeed show similarities with the Norel article. But in contrast to Tol's interpretation, Dooyeweerd’s 1922 article already shows great divergences from Vollenhoven. Because Tol wants to show Vollenhoven’s influence, he gives a biased and inaccurate interpretation. Tol sets out only a fragment of Dooyeweerd’s 1922 article, although he discusses other sections in later pages. I will rely on the lengthier fragments in Verburg 48 to 51. (1) Rejection of autonomy of thought. This is the key to this 1922 article: Wij ontkennen daarom het transcendentaal-logisch karakter van de Gegenstandssfeer, omdat wij het dogma van de autonomie van het denken verwerpen, omdat wij aan Kant’s Copernicus-daad niet een universeele, maar slechts een beperkte beteekenis toekennen, n.l. voor de relatie-logica. (cited Verburg 34) 64 In Isagôgè, Vollenhoven accepts a prior angelic fall. 75 [We therefore deny the transcendental-logical character of the Gegenstand-sphere because we reject the dogma of the autonomy of thought, because we do not recognize a universal meaning to Kant’s Copernican revolution, but only a limited meaning, i.e. for the logic of relations] Tol correctly says that Dooyeweerd introduces a new idea, that human rationality is a part of the cosmos (Tol, 365). And he correctly notes that Dooyeweerd has rejected the autonomy of thought (Tol, 296). But Tol fails to make the connection. Because Tol tries to interpret this passage by bringing in Vollenhoven’s ideas, he misses the point of what Dooyeweerd is saying. Tol says “The denial of the autonomy of thought lies in the denial of the Self being an autonomous source of knowledge.” The Self needs to submit to transcendent norms (Tol, 296). But Tol fails to recognize that Dooyeweerd uses autonomy in two senses that are nevertheless related, because the second is the foundation for the first: i) Setting up one’s own law as opposed to being sub-ject to God’s law (that is the meaning that Tol emphasizes). 65 ii) An even more basic meaning of ‘autonomy’ is the idea that our rational thought can be separated from the rest of our functions, or that it can be self-sufficient, autonomous from those other functions. Thus, Dooyeweerd uses ‘autonomy’ to also mean the idea of the self-sufficiency of rationality, its elevation above other functions. We might wish that for the sake of clarity he had distinguished between self-sufficiency and autonomy, but as we shall see, he uses the terms interchangeably. It is this second meaning of self-sufficiency that Dooyeweerd is stressing in his 1922 article. The rejection of autonomy in the first sense would not be sufficient to explain 65 Dooyeweerd denies the self-sufficiency of rational thought, and the idea of autonomy that flows from it. Both ideas are come from Baader. In this connection, it should be remembered that in 1892, Kuyper specifically praised Baader for opposing the idea of the autonomy of thought: In spite of his “practical reason” Praktisches Vernunft this impulse controlled even Immanuel Kant, of whom Baader rightly wrote: “The fundamental error of his philosophy is that it makes humanity autonomous, spontaneous; it derives reason from itself; by this procedure humanity makes itself God and becomes pantheistic (Kuyper, 1998, 377). 76 why the Gegenstand-sphere is not logical, or why Kant’s Copernican revolution was only limited. Dooyeweerd clearly obtained this second meaning of ‘autonomy’ from the Norel article, which stresses that our rationality is not self-sufficient. Our central selfhood or heart 66 includes all of our functions. Our reason is just a part of the whole of life (Norel 71-2). Because of the importance of our central heart, our knowledge proceeds from the center to the periphery (Norel 76). If our function of thinking is only one function on the periphery, then it cannot be elevated above the other functions in an autonomous way. (2) This is the real Copernican revolution. This is why Dooyeweerd says that he allows only a limited meaning to Kant’s Copernican revolution. Tol says he does not understand this. Tol says the limited success of Kant is to be explained by Vollenhoven’s ideas of knowledge by acquaintance, and the organizing subject and the given object (Tol, 296). Again, by reading Dooyeweerd through Vollenhoven’s later ideas, Tol misunderstands what Dooyeweerd intends. Dooyeweerd is here relying on ideas that Vollenhoven rejected: the idea of the central and the peripheral, and in particular the idea of a central selfhood of which rationality is just one mode. Dooyeweerd’s intention is clarified if we examine WdW I, v-vii, where he refers to the same ideas of Kant’s limited Copernican revolution. The idea of the centrality of the heart relativizes everything peripheral. It is a radical revolution (one that goes to the root, the radix) that makes Kant’s revolution one that is only in the periphery. He contrasts this central selfhood with the idea of self- sufficiency of thought. This was “great turning point in his thought”: ...beteekende het groote keerpunt in mijn denken de ontdekking van den religieuzen wortel van het denken zelve, waardoor mij een nieuw licht opging over de doorloopende mislukking van alle, aanvankelijk ook door mijzelf ondernomen, pogingen een innerlijke verbinding tot stand te brengentusschen het Christelijk geloof en een wijsbegeerte, die geworteld is in het geloof in de zelfgenoegzaamheid der menschelijke rede. Ik ging verstaan, welke centrale beteekenis toekomt aan het hart dat door de Heilige Schrift telkens weer als de religieuze wortel van heel het Tol gives no reference by Vollenhoven to ‘autonomy of thought’ prior to this usage by 66 Dooyeweerd apart from 1921 where he claimed a “certain autonomy for thought in its own sphere.” He did not use the idea for the basis for critique. Norel did, relying on Gunning and Baader. 77 menschelijk bestaan wordt in het licht gesteld. Vanuit dit centrale Christelijk gezichtspunt bleek mij een omwenteling in het wijsgeerig denken noodzakelijk van zoo radicaal karakter, dat KANT's ‘Copernicusdaad’ daartegenover slechts als een periphere kan worden gequalificeerd. Want hier is niet minder in het geding dan een relativeering van heel den tijdelijken kosmos zoowel in zijn zgn. ‘natuur’- zijden als in zijn zgn. ‘geestelijke’ zijden tegenover den religieuzen wortel der schepping in Christus. Wat beteekent tegenover deze Schriftuurlijke grondgedachte een omwenteling in de beschouwing der werkelijkheid, welke de ‘natuur’-zijden der tijdelijke realiteit relativeert ten opzichte van een theoretische abstractie als KANT's ‘homo noumenon’ of zijn ‘transcendentaal denksubject’?... Wanneer de tijdelijke werkelijkheid zelve zich niet neutraal kan verhouden ten aanzien van haar religieuzen wortel, wanneer m.a.w. de geheele gedachte aan een starre realiteit van een tijdelijken kosmos ‘an sich’ op een fundamenteele misvatting berust, hoe zal dan nog langer in ernst kunnen worden geloofd aan een religieuze neutraliteit van het theoretisch denken? I have given this full text, because it has not been accurately translated in the New Critique (that translation misses the point of central and peripheral, and the relativizing of all temporal reality). Here is my translation: The great turning point in my thought was the discovery of the religious root of thought itself. This discovery shed a new light on the continuing failure of all attempts, including my own, to bring an inner connection between Christian belief and a philosophy that is rooted in the belief of the self-sufficiency of human reason. I came to understand the central significance that Holy Scripture repeatedly places on the “heart” as the religious root of all human existence. From out of this central Christian viewpoint, it appeared to me that a revolution was necessary in philosophic thought, a revolution of so radical a character, that, compared with it, Kant’s “Copernican revolution” can only be qualified as a revolution in the periphery. For what is at stake here is no less than a relativizing of the whole temporal cosmos in what we refer to as both its “natural” sides as well as its “spiritual” sides, over against the religious root of creation in Christ. In comparison with this basic Scriptural idea, of what significance is a revolution in a view of reality that relativizes the “natural” sides of temporal reality with respect to a theoretical abstraction such as Kant’s “homo noumenon” or his “transcendental subject of thought?”.... Temporal reality cannot itself be regarded as neutral with respect to its religious root. In other words, the whole thought of a fixed temporal 78 reality “an sich” [in itself and unrelated to our human subjectivity] rests on a fundamental misconception. If temporal reality is not neutral, how can we continue to seriously believe in the religious neutrality of theoretical thought? It is not reason that is at the center of our life, but our selfhood, of which reason is only one part in the periphery. And if all of temporal reality is not neutral with respect to this center, how can thought be self-sufficient? The rejection of the autonomy of thought in this sense depends on the idea of a central selfhood where all our functions are rooted. As we shall see, in February, 1923, Dooyeweerd expressly links the idea that thinking is part of the cosmos to the rejection of the autonomy of thought. And he carried this view of autonomy into his mature work. There he says that the autonomy of thought is the idea that thought is elevated over the other functions, such as the sensory. That use of thought is an autonomous self-determination of our personality: Is eenmaal het persoonlijkheidsideaal als grondlegging van het wetenschapsideaal erkend, dan is ook de weg vrijgekomen voor de proclameering van de autonomie der theoretische denkfunctie tegenover alle empirische bepalingen van de zijde der bloot receptieve, der bloot ontvangende zinnelijkheid (WdW I, 315). Once the ideal of personality is recognized as the foundation of the ideal of science, the autonomy of the theoretical function of thought can be proclaimed over against the empirical determinations of the merely receptive, passive sensibility (NC I, 351, my italics). In the 1922 article, Dooyeweerd makes a second reference to Kant’s supposed Copernican revolution. He says that Emil Lask, whose ideas are otherwise so close, still misunderstood the meaning of Kant’s Copernican revolution because his Gegenstand- sphere still remained transcendental-logical. For Lask, the Gegenstand was still thought within the higher unity of logic. Vollenhoven will make the same mistake. We have already seen this in Vollenhoven’s 1921 article, where he spoke of the autonomy of thought in its own sphere. Vollenhoven continues to make this mistake in the Isagôgè, even after Dooyeweerd had introduced the idea of modalities. In the Isagôgè, Vollenhoven distinguishes the modalities by means of logic, abstracting the modalities by the process of abstraction of qualities. (3) The place of logic. Because of the rejection of the autonomy of thought, Dooyeweerd views thinking as part of the cosmic order. Dooyeweerd says in his 1922 article that it is 79 because he rejects the autonomy of thought that the Gegenstand-sphere [that which is foreign to thought] cannot itself be logical. That is why our thought cannot create the 67 Gegenstand-sphere (as the Marburg neo-Kantians supposed). And that is why the Gegenstand-sphere cannot itself be logical in nature. 68 The rejection of autonomy puts into question the place of logic. Dooyeweerd says that the rejection of the autonomy of thought brings with it the question of the boundaries between logic and epistemology. Epistemology is theory about the Gegenstand; logic is the system of judgments about the Gegenstand. Tol fails to recognize this difference between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd when he says that they surely share the same view of logic (Tol, 284 fn108). They do not, and this would continue to be the basis for the divergence of their philosophies. For how can Vollenhoven deny the autonomy of thought in this sense when he denies a selfhood? In September 1932, Vollenhoven introduced the idea of the heart as the direction-giving [richtings-bepalend] principle that allows us to choose between good and evil. But such a principle within time is not the same as Dooyeweerd’s/Gunning’s/de la Saussaye’s/Baader’s idea of a supratemporal heart, which expresses itself in time in many functions, of which rationality is just one. In any event, in 1941, Vollenhoven ceased 67 In his mature thought, Dooyeweerd no longer spoke of modalities being foreign. He emphasized that they are “our own.” The modal aspects are not foreign to our selfhood. They are cosmically our own, and have no meaning or existence apart from the religious root in which our selfhood participates: The modal aspects of temporal reality are not alien to us in the sense of transcending the human selfhood. They are cosmically our own. Apart from the religious root in which the creation finds its totality of meaning and in which our selfhood shares [deel heeft, participates], they have no meaning (NC II, 474). 68 This does not mean that logic cannot be the Gegenstand of thought. Dooyeweerd makes this point in the 1922 article, distinguishing between logic in general, and pure (formal) logic, which has for its Gegenstand the pure categories and the pure forms of judgment. Later, Dooyeweerd would describe formal logic differently, but he acknowledged that the Gegenstand-relation can also investigate the nature of the logical aspect itself (WdW II, 395-398, repeated later at NC II, 462-65). Analysis is not restricted to the non-logical aspects. His point in the 1922 article is that the modal distinctions in the Gegenstand- sphere are not of a logical nature. And that is very different from what Vollenhoven had said in 1921. 80 speaking in terms of the heart as center, but only as direction-determining (Tol, 477 fn164). And it is clear that from Dooyeweerd’s perspective, Vollenhoven continued to absolutize rationality, since he used abstraction to discover the modalities; Dooyeweerd later calls that viewpoint ‘logicism’ (Dooyeweerd 1975a). Thus Vollenhoven, too failed to make a radical Copernican revolution, but elevated logic to the center. It should be noted that Dooyeweerd was not the first to refer to this idea of the centrality of man’s heart as the real Copernican revolution. Baader’s editor, Franz Hoffman, makes this comparison of Baader and Kant: Weit richtiger konnte Baader seine Erkenntnisslehre mit der heliocentrischen Lehre des Copernicus vergleichen. Denn seine theocentrische Lehre lässt den geschaffenen Geist die absolute Gottessonne, die Natur den Geist und mit dem Geiste die Gottessonne umkreisen. (Hoffmann 1851, xxviii). [With much more justification can Baader’s epistemology be compared with the heliocentric teaching of Copernicus. For his theo-centric teaching allows the created spirit to circle round God as the Sun, and for nature to circle the spirit and with spirit to also circle God.] Hoffmann says that Kant could make only a regulative use of the Ideas, making them subject to reason; in so doing, he regarded regulative ideas as a necessary illusion. Kant failed to see that phenomena are expressions of something real [“die Erscheinungen setzen zwar etwas, was erscheine”]. This idea of the concentration of temporal reality in man’s spirit or heart, and man’s further concentrated relatedness to God as Origin, became the basis for Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique. Dooyeweerd said that the Jesuit Michael Marlet was one of the few who properly understood this (Friesen 2008a). And so Tol’s interpretation of Dooyeweerd’s 1922 article, working backwards from Vollenhoven’s ideas, completely misses the point about Copernicus. 81 (4) Life and worldview. Tol is wrong in seeing this reference as necessarily relating to what Vollenhoven has said (Tol, 293). The references to life and worldview are in the 69 Norel article! The Norel article refers to the way that the state of our heart affects our worldview [wereldbeschouwing]. Our lifeview [levensbeschouwing] depends on whether or not we want to see the reality of the higher, perfect world. It is a question of our will. Conscience: part of the activity of our heart; it is our selfhood in relation to God. We acknowledge that we stand under a power who commands us and to whom we must be obedient (Norel 72, 152-3). But the higher world that we see is one that we ourselves can participate in. And that makes it possible for us to see the temporal cosmos in a new way. We must learn to see things in God, and thus in principle understand all things, for under the glimmer of eternity, everything becomes light (Norel 158-9). This was already an idea that Dooyeweerd mentioned in his student article (Dooyeweerd 1915b), and one that he would emphasize later (NC III, 29). As Baader said, when we find our selfhood in true stasis, it is not that we see into a different world, but we see our present world in a new way (Friesen 2011). (5) Metaphysics. Because Tol is trying so hard to make connections to Vollenhoven, he fails to see how Dooyeweerd already differs strongly. Tol says that the emphasis on life- and worldview is similar to “Vollenhoven’s penchant for metaphysics” (Tol, 293). But Dooyeweerd’s article expressly rejects metaphysics! The foreignness to thought is controlled by “cosmic categories.” Dooyeweerd italicizes ‘cosmic’ and says that this idea is not commonly accepted by realism. Thus, it is not a continuation of the old Christian realism. Tol’s argument that this echoes Vollenhoven’s ideas of foreignness and of essences and thing-laws (Tol, 293 fn10) misses the point. It is that the control is by cosmic categories and not other-worldly categories. It is not just details that are original. The entire emphasis on the cosmos is something new, although Dooyeweerd obtained it from Norel. Thus, even if Dooyeweerd uses the term ‘metalogical’ to refer to the Gegenstand-sphere, he is not using the term ‘metalogical’ in Vollenhoven’s metaphysical sense. And Vollenhoven had never used the term ‘Gegenstand-sphere’ before Apart from Norel, the idea of a life and worldview was already in the subtitle to the 69 Opbouw journal: Opbouw: Maandschrift in dienst der Christ. Levens-en wereldbeschouwing, van en voor jongeren. 82 Dooyeweerd’s usage! (Tol, 295). Dooyeweerd says that this Gegenstand sphere must not only be a-logical, non-psychological, but also not metaphysical. This is the theosophical idea, which transforms Christian realism to thought that is interested in the cosmos. (6) Intuition. Tol says that Dooyeweerd’s use of ‘schouwen’ here must relate to Vollenhoven’s use of the term in his 1921 article on Hegel (Tol, 78 fn9, 205, 298, 301-2, 305, 501, 520). We have already seen how Dooyeweerd was well aware of this term as early as 1914, and obtained it from elsewhere. Apart from Van Eeden, we can point to de la Saussaye, who emphasizes the term (See Appendix D). Between 1914 and 1916, Vollenhoven was attracted to de la Saussaye’s ideas; he later rejected them. (7) Realism versus cosmonomic. Tol incorrectly says that Dooyeweerd’s 1922 article is still in the framework of Christian realism. If by that he means that it relies on having access to a realm of eternal Ideas, he is wrong. Dooyeweerd’s emphasis is on cosmic determinants of the Gegenstand of our thought. This is like the Norel article, which distinguishes between Ideas that are separate from the cosmos and those that are part of the cosmos. It is for this reason that Dooyeweerd later refers to his law-Idea as the ‘cosmonomic’ [law of the cosmos] Idea. Tol acknowledges that Dooyeweerd’s article brings the Gegenstand-sphere in connection with self and World (Tol, 365) and yet he says (inconsistently) that Dooyeweerd is maintaining the framework that believes in its separation. The confusion arises because Tol uses ‘realism’ in different ways. He uses it to refer to the Platonic Ideas referred to in Christian realism. But he also uses it in the sense of the ‘givenness’ of reality as opposed to its construction by the mind. In that sense, Vollenhoven remained a realist even after he gave up Christian realism. There is a “realism of the cosmos in its response to law” (Tol, 10). Janse’s idea of ‘living soul’ depends on “Semitic realism” (Tol, 239). And “Vollenhoven’s realism became a realism of law-spheres” (Tol, 374 fn 221). And Tol uses ‘realism’ in a temporal sense when he says that in the realist use of ‘idea’, the emphasis is with the make-up of a thing (Tol, 371). Tol is wrong when he finds in Dooyeweerd a “definitive cancellation of realism by accepting an ontology of meaning” (Tol, 378). Dooyeweerd continued to emphasize the 83 givenness of reality: Philosophic theory must enable us to give an account of the structure of temporal reality given in naive experience (NC II, 579). In the 1922 article, Dooyeweerd rejects naive realism. The Norel article already refers to its rejection (Norel 73). Dooyeweerd continued to reject naive realism in his mature thought. (8) Cosmic selfhood. Norel refers to the idea of the heart, out of which are the issues of life, as the central selfhood. In 1922, Dooyeweerd does not yet use the term ‘heart.’ This is perhaps because he has not yet found confirmation of the idea in Kuyper. But he does use the idea of a ‘cosmic selfhood.’ De eenheid van schouwen, denken en kennen is voor ons geworteld in de kosmische ikheid (cited in Verburg 36). [For us, the unity of beholding, thinking and knowing is rooted in the cosmic selfhood.] Despite Dooyeweerd’s use of the term ‘us,’ it is unlikely that Vollenhoven had adopted this view. His own writings show that he continued with the traditional dualistic idea of the selfhood until the end of 1922, when he was influenced by Janse to deny the traditional idea of soul. He did not follow Dooyeweerd in adopting the theosophical idea of the heart as center. Vollenhoven did adopt the idea of the heart as the principle of our moral direction towards good and evil, but denied that the heart was in any way supratemporal. (9) Modalities. Although he speaks of viewing temporal reality is different ways, in its ‘aspects’ and ‘moments,’ Norel does not use the word ‘modality.’ Dooyeweerd does use ‘modality’ in the 1922 article, and compares it to Lask’s area categories [gebiedskategorien]. Vollenhoven did not previously use the word ‘modality,’ so where did Dooyeweerd obtain the idea? Baader used the idea of a mode in the sense that Dooyeweerd was ultimately to use it, as a limb of an organism, or a sphere that refers to other spheres in the system; each sphere represents totality in is mode [Weise]. Baader’s editor Franz Hoffman summarizes this view in Weltalter: Jeder Theil einer solchen systematischen Erkenntniss–der Philosophie–ist somit, wie jedes Glied des Organismus, ein Ganzes, ein in sich sich- schliessender Kreis, oder die eine Idee ist darin in einer besondern 84 Bestimmtheit. Der einzelne Kreis durchbricht darum–wie dies jedes einzelne Glied des Organismus thut,–die Schranken seines Elementes oder seiner Sonderung, weil er, in sich Totalität ist und das Ganze auf seine Weise repräsentirt, und er begründet hiemit eine weitere Sphäre, d.h. er erstreckt sich virtuell in die Gesammtsphäre des organischen Systems, und dies stellt sich daher als ein Kreis dar von einander deckenden, obschon gradweise unter sich unterschiedenen, in einander begriffenen Kreisen, deren jeder ein nothwendiges bleibendes Moment is, so, dass das System ihrer eigenene Elemente oder Besonderheiten die ganze Idee ausmacht, die ebenso in jedem Einzelnen erscheint. ‘Totum in Toto, et totum in qualibet parte’ (Hoffmann 1868, 104). [Each part of such a systematic knowledge–philosophy–is, just like each limb of an organism, a whole, a sphere enclosed in itself; the one Idea is therein as a particular determination. Just like each individual limb of an organism, each individual sphere therefore breaks through the bounds of its elements or of its separation, because within it is Totality, and it represents the All in its mode, and in doing this it founds a further sphere, that is, it extends itself virtually in the combined spheres of the organic system. The system is arranged as a sphere comprised of other spheres congruent with each other, although distinguished by degrees among themselves and comprised in each other, of which each [sphere] is a necessary continuing moment. From its own elements or particularities, the system constitutes the whole Idea, which also appears in each individual part. ‘Everything in the whole, and the whole in each part.’] Kuyper specifically refers to this work Weltalter, which contains excerpts from Baader. But in 1922, Dooyeweerd had not yet begun to read Kuyper, so we must look for other sources for the term ‘modality.’ He had continued to read neo-Kantians and phenomenologists. His sudden use of the term ‘modality’ in 1922 is probably the result his famous walk in the dunes, where everything came together for him in a new flash of intuition, like the flash described by Poincaré (Verburg 47). Dooyeweerd says 70 During one such walk in the dunes, I obtained the inspiration that the various ways that we experience, which are related to various aspects of reality, are modal in character and that there must exist a structure of the modal aspects in which their mutual coherence is reflected. The discovery of what I have called ‘the modal aspects of our horizon of experience’ was 70 I agree with Tol that the walk in the dunes is not the same as the “find” (p 353, fn196). The walk in the dunes likely came after the find. Tol thinks it relates to the ‘law-Idea.’ But Dooyeweerd says it concerned the idea of modalities (Boeles, 1977). The law-Idea is found in Baader, although Dooyeweerd also used the ideas of Matthias Schneckenburger. See my discussion below of the origin of ‘law-Idea.’ 85 my starting point–also for my view of the encyclopedia of legal science. (Boeles, 38; my translation). Note that Dooyeweerd says he first used the term ‘aspects.’ That fits with his reading of Norel’s article. With the later intuitive idea of “modalities,” Dooyeweerd was able to retain those ideas that excited him in his early 20’s, such as Van Eeden’s ideas. More research is needed, but for now I can offer some possible sources that came together in this way. It may be sufficient that Van Eeden used the term ‘mode.’ The last part of Van Eeden’s poem Het Lied van Schijn en Wezen had been published in 1922. In his Redekunstige Grondslag, Van Eeden had emphasized modes, and even referred to phoronomy [movement], which is one of the modes that Dooyeweerd includes in the 1922 article. Van Eeden also relied on the same theosophical tradition, via Boehme. And if Van Eeden started with Spinoza, he ended with Christianity. Similarly, Norel’s article says that Gunning’s theosophy avoids Spinoza’s idea of substance. Dooyeweerd may have realized that Spinoza’s idea of mode could be used in reference to the central selfhood. Philosophers prior to Spinoza, like Descartes and Malebranche, had used the idea of modes with respect to the soul. Dooyeweerd did not accept that idea of soul, but adopted the theosophical idea of a central heart. Another very likely source for the idea of modality, especially as used in the sense of ‘mode of consciousness’ is the way it was used in Ernst Cassirer, whose works Dooyeweerd was familiar with. In 1921, Cassirer refers to a “universal modality of 71 consciousness and knowledge” (Cassirer 1921). Tol does not mention Cassirer. We could debate whether ‘modality’ was the best choice for the idea of ways of viewing the world. For Kant had already used the term in a very limited way as referring to the three “modalities of judgment,” namely reality, possibility and necessity. Dooyeweerd 72 71 Dooyeweerd refers to Cassirer’s Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriif (Berlin, 1910) (Stellingwerff 1992 323, fn3. Numerous references to Cassirer are also in Dooyeweerd’s New Critique. 72 Tol does not seem to appreciate that this is the kind of ‘modal relations’ that Christopher Sigwart referred to, and that Dooyeweerd criticized. Modal relations in the sense of reality, possibility or necessity express a relation to our knowing. That is a fully Kantian usage. Even in a Kantian usage, such modal relations indeed are subjective and 86 refers to Kant’s usage in the same 1922 article. But that usage has nothing to do with the way that Dooyeweerd used the term. (10) Science of the sciences. Dooyeweerd says that the special sciences would be arranged in an order according to the degree of Gegenständlichkeit of their modalities. Tol is helpful in showing that that idea came from Lask (Tol, 306 fn132). The idea of 73 degrees of Gegenstand may also go back to Cassirer. Another possible source would be 74 Van Eeden, who talks of grades of reality in his Redekunstige Grondslag. Van Eeden spoke of things become more real as more modes were involved. This is especially interesting since Dooyeweerd includes reality [het werkelijke] as a modality in 1922. In his later thought, Dooyeweerd did not use the idea of the degrees of Gegenständlichkeit. Nor did he use the idea thatreality is one of the modes. As for science being an ‘organism’ or an ‘encyclopedia,’ these ideas are already in de la Saussaye, relying on Baader. We do not have to suppose any influence of Vollenhoven on Dooyeweerd. 75 (11) Transcendental realism. Tol is wrong that the term ‘transcendental realism’ must derive from Vollenhoven (Tol, 5, 283). The term is also in the Norel article, and is ascribed to Eduard von Hartmann (Norel, 74 fn 1). Von Hartmann also uses the term ‘critical.’ This would explain why Woltjer also uses the term, since he also read and refers to Hartmann (Woltjer 1896. 19 fn1; 21). Dooyeweerd’s teacher Anema also used 76 have nothing to do with the empirical object. Tol is incorrect in comparing such modal relations to awareness of Gegenstände in general (p. 286 fn 110). And if Sigwart’s idea of ‘modal relations’ is similar to Vollenhoven’s earlier use of the intuitive awareness of Gegenstände (Tol 286 fn 220; 289 fn 114), then, in criticizing Sigwart, is not Dooyeweerd also criticizing Vollenhoven’s earlier ideas? 73 But Dooyeweerd criticized Lask’s idea of the Gegenstand-sphere as still dominated by logic. It was still a transcendental-logical sphere. (Verburg, 35). For Dooyeweerd, the study of the Gegenstand is prior to our logic! (Verburg 35). 74 Cassirer (1911), Vol. 2, 270: “Die Schätzung des Wissens hängt nicht von seinem Gegenstand, sondern von dem Grad und der Stufe objektiver Gewissheit ab, die es in sich trägt.” 75 Again, Tol tries too hard. Even though Dooyeweerd is the first to mention the value sciences as included in the organism of science, Tol tries to link this back to Vollenhoven (p. 280). Their inclusion was already proposed by de la Saussaye. 76 Tol’s view that we can ignore Woltjer since Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd don’t refer to him “in the written evidence of their discussions” is really stretching for a point. There 87 the term ‘transcendental realism’; Anema followed Kuyper in speaking of thinking God’s thoughts after Him, which are in creation (Stellingwerff 1987, 48).77 d) The Norel article explains Dooyeweerd’s reliance on Chantepie de la Saussaye, and Dooyeweerd’s later development Norel’s article on Gunning would have led Dooyeweerd to read Chantepie de la Saussaye (the other major ethical theologian), as well as to read Baader directly, since Gunning and de la Saussaye expressly acknowledge his influence. A review of Chantepie de la Saussaye leaves no doubt that Dooyeweerd adopted many of his ideas, which were in turn derived from Baader (Appendix D). The rudiments for Dooyeweerd’s philosophy were already in place before he went to the Kuyper Foundation, and once there, what he learned of Kuyper’s neo-Calvinism confirmed this direction, although it would take time to rid himself of the ideas that he and Vollenhoven had been discussing from the neo- Kantians. And all of this explains the deep similarity between Dooyeweerd’s philosophy and that of Baader. Several reformational scholars were doubtful of the comparisons I made in 2003 (Friesen 2003a). Why would Dooyeweerd rely on the ideas of a Catholic theosophist? I did not know of the Norel article at that time, and so my comparative philosophy began with Baader’s ideas. The Norel article shows how Dooyeweerd learned of Baader’s ideas from reformed sources (Norel, Gunning and de la Saussaye), from an article in a journal whose editors included prominent professors at the Free University, a journal in which Vollenhoven had published two articles, and in which Bavinck had also published an important article on the nature of law. are very few documents evidencing their discussions! In any true history of ideas, Woltjer’s views are essential to understanding the emergence of Vollenhoven’s views. 77 In Pro Rege, Kuyper speaks of the eternal thoughts of God that find their embodiment in all of creation, and also in the plant and animal world: De eeuwige gedachten Gods, die in heel de schepping en zoo ook in het planten- en dierenrijk haar belichaming vonden, zijn alleen door het eeuwige Woord in alle creaturen tot die belichaming gekomen. [The eternal thoughts of God, which found their embodiment in the whole of creationo and therefore also in the plant and animal realms, only obtainted their embodiment in all creatures by the eternal Word]. 88 e) The Norel article eliminates Tol’s speculative guesses Whether or not the Norel article is the “find,” it gives us a reasonable explanation of how Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is similar to Gunning/de la Saussaye/Baader, and it also shows how in 1922, Dooyeweerd’s writing already diverged from that of Vollenhoven. It also disproves Tol’s rather tortured attempts to show Vollenhoven’s influence on Dooyeweerd, working backwards from 1926 to 1922, and it eliminates the extensive guesswork in his dissertation. We do not have to assume that Dooyeweerd was being deferential to Vollenhoven in not publishing his early work (Tol, 315 “could be indicative”; Tol, 319 “my assumption that he felt an obligation towards Vollenhoven”; Tol, 366 “our surmise”). Nor do we have to “again surmise” that Dooyeweerd is referring to Vollenhoven’s metalogical outline (Tol, 301). We do not have to accept Tol’s contradictory assertions that Vollenhoven’s breakdown incapacitated him for most of 1923 (Tol, 76), that Vollenhoven “still convalescing in late 1923, would not have been able to plan his work” (Tol, 319) but that he must have had discussions with Dooyeweerd in 1923: “one tends to think that academic discussion could and would have resumed” (Tol, 311); “one assumes there must have been some exchange between the brothers-in- law” (Tol, 353) and that there is “the possibility of the relevance of Vollenhoven’s presence” at that time (Tol, 366). I am sure that after the “find,” Dooyeweerd hoped that he and Vollenhoven would both use it to reform philosophy in a common way. This explains the late 1922 plan to produce a work jointly with Vollenhoven and Bohatec, and the attempt to revive that plan in 1925 after Vollenhoven recovered from his illness (Tol, 316). The plan could not go through, not only because of Vollenhoven’s illness, but because Vollenhoven had been influenced by Janse. Vollenhoven ultimately denied the idea of a selfhood, whether an immortal soul or a heart in the sense used by Kuyper/Gunning/de la Saussaye/Baader. So Dooyeweerd’s hopes for a concerted effort were impossible. f) The Norel article explains why the “find” was not disclosed. Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd do not identify the “find.” Why not? The Norel article was written about Gunning, one of the “ethical theologians.” Ethical theology was not in favour in the Gereformeerde Church. We have already discussed Dooyeweerd’s report of 89 his early experience at a summer conference of the N.C.S.V [Nederlandse Christen- Studenten Vereniging]. The N.C.S.V. was considered such an “ethicalist hotbed” that Dooyeweerd announced he had cancelled his membership (Verburg 24). The Gereformeerde church “seriously discouraged” its students from attending; at one point, candidates for the ministry had to assure that they had never been a member of the organization! (van Deursen, 122) One of the members of N.C.S.V. was J.B. Netelenbos. Netelenbos tried to combine the two kinds of theology: ethical and Gereformeerd. Vollenhoven opposed Netelenbos, primarily with respect to his views of Scripture. Vollenhoven wrote an article in Opbouw criticizing Netelenbos. In 1919, while he was a pastor, Vollenhoven agreed to have a commission investigate Netelenbos; he was suspended. And in 1920, Vollenhoven wrote an article in De Heraut criticizing Netelenbos; they disagreed about the nature of reason and feeling; Netelenbos had a “sickly mysticism” (Stellingwerff 1992; 21, 34-36). So it is not surprising that Vollenhoven would keep quiet about this new interest in ethical theology. And Dooyeweerd was well aware of the animosity towards ethical theologians. Stellingwerff documents the nasty schisms, splits, and excommunications at that time in the Gereformeerde church. This is when J.G. Geelkerken was excommunicated for denying that the serpent in the Garden of Eden literally spoke (Stellingwerff 1987, 133; Stellingwerff 1992, 70). Even Kuyper’s idea of regeneration was controversial. So Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd had to be wary of referring to Gunning or de la Saussaye. Yet there was something so compelling about the view of science in the ethical theologians that both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd had to pay attention. Vollenhoven continued to reject the ethical theologians’ view of Scripture; Dooyeweerd adopted it (Appendix D). Vollenhoven tried to use the idea of heart direction without the idea of a supratemporal heart, and the idea of cosmic categories without the idea of expression from a center; I don’t think he was successful. Without the idea of a supratemporal selfhood, he could not critique the autonomy of thought except in the sense of failure to accept subjection to God’s law, and not in the sense that rationality was only one function 90 of our central selfhood. And Vollenhoven’s turn towards finding ideas within the 78 cosmos ended up being an Aristotelian kind of abstraction. Dooyeweerd followed the theosophical ideas much more closely. But both philosophers used some ideas from Norel, and without acknowledgment. However, sharing this secret also gave Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd a certain power over each other. We can see the uncomfortable way that they tried to maintain a facade of unity while still disagreeing with each other (e.g. in their Responses to the Curators). I find it a useful way of interpreting both philosophers to ask: When they polemicize against a position, are they in fact speaking out against each other? Vollenhoven certainly sensed that Dooyeweerd was speaking against his views in his 1964 Talk (Dooyeweerd 2007 and Discussion). 78 Dooyeweerd concludes his New Critique by saying that his anthropology is more than functionalism––the idea that human existence is no more than a complex of temporal functions centering in the “heart.” Dooyeweerd also had developed the idea of our temporal existence as an interlacement of enkaptic individuality. But at the root of his existence, man transcends all temporal structures (NC III, 783-4). And he sharply criticized Vollenhoven’s idea of a pre-functional but wholly temporal selfhood (NC I, 31 fn1). 91 E. Dooyeweerd’s articles in 1923 1. Dooyeweerd’s Feb/1923 article “Rooms-katholieke en Anti-revolutionaire Staatkunde [Roman Catholic and Anti-revolutionary policy of state” (see Verburg 48- 61). Dooyeweerd says that differences in life- and worldviews are determinative for thought and actions. They are also decisive for the way that we choose between idealism and realism. This idea is directly related to the 1920 Norel article, which makes the same point. Dooyeweerd again opposes the autonomy of thought. The Christian cannot agree with autonomy, but rather believes that thinking is itself a part of God’s creation: De Christen, die eenerzijds aan het feit der schepping en anderzijds aan het fundamenteel verschil van schepper en schepsel vasthoudt, kan met een universeel-logische wereldbeschouwing, de leuze van de autonomie van het denken, onmogelijk accoord gaan; omdat het denken zelve is een deel van God’s schepping en het denken zoowel zijn eigenaardig logische vormen, als zijn geheele stof moet putten uit de door god kosmisch –niet logisch geordende schepping (Cited Verburg 50). [The Christian, who holds firmly on the one hand to the fact of creation, and on the other hand to the fundamental difference between Creator and creation, cannot possibly agree with the slogan “autonomy of thought.” For thinking itself is a part of God’s creation, and thinking as well as particular logical forms, as well as all the content of thought must be derived from creation which has been ordered by God in a cosmic–and not logical–way]. Note the emphasis again on cosmic as opposed to logical ordering. And note how 79 Dooyeweerd critiques the idea of autonomy in how it refuses to see thinking itself as part 79 Because Tol is trying to interpret Dooyeweerd through Vollenhoven, he does not understand Dooyeweerd’s statement that creation is “cosmically not logically arranged” (Tol, 323 fn164). Tol cannot understand a cosmic order that is not logically arranged, except in terms of some aesthetic ‘harmony.’ But that would elevate the aesthetic aspect over the other aspects, so that cannot be what Dooyeweerd means, either. Nor is there any 92 of God’s creation. This is in reference to the basic idea of ‘autonomy of thought’ discussed above. Thinking forms just one part of the divine cosmos [waarvan het denken slechts een onderdeel uitmaakt] (cited in Verburg 48). Tol says of this idea: “It is difficult to exaggerate its importance for Reformed thought” (Tol, 323). Dooyeweerd uses the idea of a “divine cosmos” to oppose the autonomy of thought. ‘Divine cosmos’ is not a term used by Vollenhoven (Tol, 285 fn109), although we can find it in other writers. It refers to the way the cosmos itself contains an order given by 80 God. Tol is not correct in comparing this divine cosmos to Vollenhoven’s previous metaphysical views of extra-mental ideas in the mind (or ‘Counsel’) of God (Tol 284; 285 fn 109). Dooyeweerd’s focus is theosophically oriented to their expression within the cosmos. That is why he can say that thinking is just one part of the divine cosmos. That 81 idea would not make sense if ‘divine cosmos’ were intended to refer to the mind of God in a metaphysical sense. Tol is trying too hard to make comparisons to Vollenhoven. That does not mean that Dooyeweerd had fully worked out the implications of this theosophical way of thinking. He still refers to the ideas of other writers, and he continued to do so. In this article, he uses some phenomenological terms from Husserl like noema, noesis, and noumenon, which he later would reject. The reference to noumenon can be found in the Norel article (Norel 77), so this is another indication that Dooyeweerd used that article. I do not think that the idea of noumenon derives from Baader. Gunning used sources other than Baader, and perhaps Norel did too in his summary. Dooyeweerd was correct to later reject the term. But at this time, in 1922, merit to Tol’s suggestion that logic precedes Gegenstand-theory (p. 300). Dooyeweerd says just the reverse. Later, Dooyeweerd would explain that the cosmic order is one of time; the modalities are arranged in an order of before and after (NC I, 29, 106). 80 Stellingwerff refers to an article by Bavinck in Stemmen des Tijds in 1921, which refers to the idea of justice being rooted in a moral order that stands in relation to the cosmic and the divine order which governs all things [“”de rechtsorde is gebaseerd op de zedelijke orde en deze staat in verband met de kosmische en de goddelijke orde, die alle dingen beheerscht”]. This is yet another article in Stemmen des Tijds, the journal that contains so many influential articles. And Dooyeweerd used Friedrich Julius Stahl’s idea of a “divine, moral order of the world” [göttliche, sittliche Weltordnung] (Verburg 39). 81 As de la Saussaye said, God does not express himself in concepts, but in the way that the world is created (Appendix D). 81 93 Dooyeweerd tried to relate his new theosophical ideas to authors he (and Vollenhoven) had read. He makes reference to Cohen, Natorp, Cassirer, Kinkel, Simmel, Bergson, Husserl, Lask (Verburg 59). Note that Dooyeweerd calls this view ‘realism’ instead of idealism. But as already noted above, this kind of realism does not look for Ideas outside of the cosmos but in the cosmos. Dooyeweerd opposes this realism to ‘idealism’–which he interprets as the view that space and number are creations or constructions of thought (cited Verburg 49). This 1923 article contains a section “Kosmos en logos.” The cosmos is the whole well- ordered world of creation. It includes logos, which is the realm of meaning. The logos is cosmic in character and precedes every particular knowledge; logos gives meaning, and knowing involves being conscious of and beholding [schouwing] meaning. We view [schouwen] this meaning in definite forms, which each have a definite meaning, such as number, space, time, and reality. The modalities are modalities of the giving of meaning 82 [modaliteiten der zingeving]. Since Dooyeweerd emphasizes realism as the givenness of meaning, I do not believe that he intends to say that we create the modalities of meaning by logic. Logic, as one of the modalities, gives meaning when we apply it to the areas that we have already beheld in an a-logical way. What is important here is that he says that the viewing of the cosmic modalities is prior to our thinking. Dooyeweerd thus wants to unite beholding [schouwen] and thinking [denken]. As we have seen, that is the problem that the Norel article solved for him in the central unity of the selfhood. Dooyeweerd says that viewing [schouwen] is bound to areas of view; thought is bound to its categories. Objective meaning is the relation between the two. But both the areas of view and the logical categories are within the cosmos. The logical categories are within one field of view (the logical). Tol is incorrect that this objective meaning refers to Vollenhoven’s extra-mental ideas. There is a correspondence between modalities as a form of consciousness and as a form of relation within the world; Note that he still sees time as a modality. This did not change until his discovery of 82 Baader’s theory of time around 1928. He also stopped speaking of ‘reality’ as a modality. 94 Aan de modaliteit als primaire vorm van het schouwend bewustzijn moet dus iets anders beantwoorden in de wereld van den geschouwden zin, dan de concrete geeardheid van de zinvolle wezens zelve; dit analogon noemen wij het wezensverband van het gebied in de wereld van den geschouwden zin, of kortweg gebiedskategorie. De modaliteit is dus iets totaal anders dan het begrip. De modaliteit is subjectief vorm van de zingeving, objectief een vorm van het wezensverband van het gebied binnen de wereld van den geschouwden zin; het begrip daarentegen is vorm van het denken (Cited Verburg 53). [The modality is a primary form of our beholding consciousness; something must correspond to it other than the concrete nature of the meaningful beings themselves; we call this analogue the essential relation of the area in the world with the viewed meaning, or in short the ‘area category.’ The modality is thus something totally different from a concept. The modality is the subjective form of giving meaning; objectively it is a form of the essential relation of the area within the world with that of the viewed meaning; on the other hand, the concept is a form of thinking.] Later, Dooyeweerd emphasized the identity of modes of consciousness and the way things function in the external world (Friesen 2009, Thesis 20 and references). Dooyeweerd here says that the modalities in the sense of fields of view [gezichtsvelden] 83 must be distinguished from each other. If that does not happen, concepts from other sciences will be used.84 This article is also the first to relate everything existing to ‘meaning.’ Everything that exists is there only because of divine giving of meaning [goddelijke zingeving] (Verburg 60). Nothing exists in itself as a Ding-an-sich; nothing exists ‘apo-staat’ or separate from the divine giving of meaning. Dooyeweerd continued to use these ideas in his mature philosophy. Dooyeweerd distinguishes between this divine giving of meaning by the Logos, and our subjective logos or logic, which is fitted into [ingevoegd] this essential relation. It stands in an essential relation with what is beheld [den geschouwden]. There is essential relation between all that exists and our conscious self [ik-bewustzijn]. The whole cosmos, 83 Cf. Cassirer 1911, II, 742: “Er wird daher je nach diesem Gesichtsfeld selbst und je nach den Inhalten, die in ihm gegeben sind, einen verschiedenartigen Anblick gewähren müssen.” Cf. van Eeden’s idea that words are not used in a univocal sense (Appendix B). Woltjer 84 makes the same argument (Woltjer 1891). 95 including our logic [logos] is given by God’s Word (Verburg 60). This means that we cannot express the relation between the modalities in logical relations, because logical relations make sense only within that modality: Het verband tusschen de gezichtsvelden kunnen wij niet in logische relaties uitdrukken, want de relatie heeft slechts zin binnen het ingeklemde gezichtsveld. (Verburg 60) [The relation between the fields of view cannot be expressed in logical relations, for such a relation only has meaning within [its] walled-in field of view.] And yet that is what Vollenhoven attempted to do in 1921, and would attempt to do in the Isagôgè: derive the modalities by abstraction of qualities or preoprties of things, using our logic. But already in this 1923 article, Dooyeweerd says that modalities do not correspond with qualities of concrete things. Dooyeweerd gives the example: The modality of reality does not coincide with the reality of the tree that is viewed (Verburg 53). Dooyeweerd would repeat that with emphasis at the end of his career (Dooyeweerd 1975a). So isn’t the reference to Logos as the giver of meaning a reference to extra-mental ideas? No, because Christ, as Logos became incarnated. We do not have to look beyond our reality to see the Logos, but in Christ we see who we can be. That is what is emphasized in the Norel article, and that is why Dooyeweerd can now say: Door de bijzondere genade van de verlossing door Christus Jezus, wordt ons schouwen en ons denken weer naar de goddelijke zingeving gericht en schouwen wij weder de wereld “sub specie aeternitatis,” “in het licht der eeuwigheid. (cited Verburg 61) [By the special grace of salvation through Jesus Christ, our beholding and our thinking is again directed to the divine giving of meaning, and we behold the world again “sub specie aeternitas,” in the light of eternity]. Note that it is the world that we see differently. We are not viewing into another realm, such as God’s eternity or the mind of God. Norel made the same point: our thought is 85 fallen and in need of redemption; when it is redeemed, we see in the light of eternity 85 Tol is also wrong in his criticizing as fideism the idea of the self as “lookout tower” [uitzichtstoren] in Dooyeweerd’s later writings (Tol, 359). It is a view of the world that is given; it is only because we in our selfhood exist outside of time that we can perceive time and see the world correctly. This is an ontical participation, not a matter of beliefs. 96 (Norel 159). So this is another indication that Dooyeweerd is following Norel’s article. Dooyeweerd already had this idea in his student article in Opbouw (Dooyeweerd 1915b). Dooyeweerd says that if we give up the autonomy of thought, where consciousness posits [stelt], but instead take the view that everything is given and fitted [ingesteld] in a realm of objective meaning, then this gives rise to the idea of the law-giver, the Creator, the one who has done this ordering. (Cited Verburg 60). This contrast between ‘stellen’ and ‘gesteld’, which to the issue of the law is directly related to Baader’s theosophical thought, which criticizes the autonomous ‘Selbstsetzen’ with being ‘gesetzt’ or placed under God’s law [‘Gesetz’]. Baader relates the meaning of ‘fitted’ [setzen] to the word for law [Gesetz] (Werke II, 456). Each creature is set under its law, in a region or place in which it is to serve God. Our bliss is found only in fulfilling this law and serving God (Hoffmann 1868, 172; 178). Although Dooyeweerd does not specifically use the term ‘law-Idea’ in this article, the idea is already there. And it is dependent on his new theosophical ideas, where reason is not autonomous, but is fitted into [gesteld] a cosmic order given by God’s law. 2. Oct. 1923: Dooyeweerd’s “De leer der rechtssoevereiniteit in haar consequenties voor de verhouding van Overheid en onderdanen” In this article, Dooyeweerd says that the ethical and juridical norms are not posited [gesteld] by reason, but they are normative because of divine authority into which they were fitted [instelde]. Law is not derived from the state or on a consciousness of justice or on volunté générale [will of the people], nor on the sovereignty of thought, but only on the idea of divine authority [gezagsidee] (Verburg 62). Again we see the contrast between ‘gesteld’ and ‘ingesteld,’ positing and being fitted or placed. And the being fitted is on the basis of God’s law. 3. Dooyeweerd’s “De staatkundige tegenstelling tusschen Christelijk-Historische en Antirevolutionaire partij” a) the law-Idea This is the article where Dooyeweerd first uses the term law-Idea [wetsidee]. 97 As we have seen, the basis for the law-Idea was there already in Dooyeweerd previous articles with their contrast of stellen and ingesteld, setzen and Gesetzt. Dooyeweerd here says that this law-Idea is cosmological. That emphasis on cosmos is again in distinction 86 from that kind of Christian realism that seeks God’s Ideas outside of the cosmos. Alzoo is die wetsidee ook kosmologisch transcendentaal, daar ze niet slechts ons denken en willen, maar den kosmos, de in Gods scheppende zingeving (noesis) rustende schepping als geheel (den logos ingesloten) beheerscht, transcendental wijl ze de onoverkomelijke universeele grenslinie aanwijst tusschen den Allerhoogsten in Zijn oneindige Majesteit en het in alles van Hem afhankelijke schepsel. (Cited Verburg 65). [Thus the law-Idea is also cosmologically transcendental, for it rules not only our thinking and willing, but the cosmos, creation as a whole (including the logos), which rests in God’s creative giving of meaning (noesis). The law-Idea is transcendental because it points to the 87 unbridgeable universal boundary line between the Almighty in His infinite Majesty and creation that is dependent on Him in everything.] The ideal order is expressed in the cosmos as a cosmic non-rational unity [kosmische niet- rationele eenheid]. This cosmic non-rational unity expresses itself [uit zich] in the diversity of life- and world spheres (Verburg 66). This idea of a unity expressing itself in spheres is later explained by Dooyeweerd in the distinction of a supratemporal law of love that expresses itself in the temporal spheres (Friesen 2009, Thesis 57 and references). Or, as Dooyeweerd said in 1939, the religious unity of the law, and its central fullness of meaning, is a parallel to the idea of the heart as the religious concentration point of temporal functions of existence (Dooyeweerd 1939, 218). This idea of expression from a unity to diversity, from a higher to a lower level of ontical reality is theosophical. These spheres cannot be reduced to each other, but are sovereign in relation to each other. Dooyeweerd warned against a misinterpretation and said that 88 ‘Cosmological’ is also the term that Kuyper used to describe Baader’s thought. Kuyper 86 contrasted it with ‘theological’ (Friesen 2003b). 87 Dooyeweerd would later use ‘transcendent’ for concepts in a foundational direction that point towards the Origin; the word ‘transcendental’ was used for Ideas that begin from that that presupposition and move towards the temporal periphery in order to inform our concepts (Friesen 2009, Thesis 84 and references). 88 Dooyeweerd later said that the sovereignty arises because the nucleus of the modal law- sphere is supratemporal (Friesen 2009, Thesis 16 and references). 98 Kuyper’s views here had led to a misunderstanding. A given societal sphere, like the family, can have relations with other spheres, such as ethical, natural, legal and economic relations. And some relations within the family belong to the state. Sovereignty in its own sphere must not find its cosmic unity in the societal spheres, but only in the spheres of divine ordinances (Verburg 66). This is what Dooyeweerd means in distinguishing between the ideal law and the matter [kosmische stof] in which it is expressed. The expression of the law in society does not give the same sphere sovereignty, and this is Kuyper’s mistake Dooyeweerd describes the relation of law and creation: Voor Calvijn staat tusschen Schepper en redelijk schepsel de wet, door God als den soeverein op all terrein gesteld aan zijn redelijke schepselleven. God is alleen autonoom, de wetgever. Hij staat onder geen enkele norm, maar Hij alleen stelt de normen, die zonder voorbehoud voor de menschen gelden. Vandaar voor God geen plicht, geen verantwoordelijkheid, want dit alles ontstaat eerst door de wet, ligt op het gebied van het eindige, het gestelde. Voor den mensch daarentegen is het altijd weer de wet, die hem zijn diepe afhankelijkheid van God doet gevoelen. De wet is van zijn standpunt gezien heteronoom. Zij gaat nimmer over in zijn redelijke natuur, ook niet na de wedergeboorte. Adam stond ook voor zijn zondeval onder de wet en zelfs Christus, de onzondige, moest naar zijn menschelijke natuur de wet vervullen (Cited Verburg 64) [For Calvin, between the Creator and rational creation stands the law, placed by God as sovereign in every area for rational creaturely life. God only is autonomous, the lawgiver. He stands under no norm at all, but He alone sets the norms, which without exception hold for man. From this it follows that for God there is no duty, no responsibility, for everything first comes into existence through the law; it exists in the area of the finite, that which is placed [under the law, and placed in creation]. For man on the other hand, the law is always there, which makes him feel his dependence on God. From his standpoint, the law is heteronomous. It never turns into his rational nature, even after regeneration. Adam also stood under the law before his fall into sin and even Christ, the sinless one, had to fulfill the law according to his human nature. ] There are several emphases here. First, the law is not a punishment for sin, since it applies even to the sinless. The law is good. Second, it does not just apply to our ethics and to theology, but to every area of life. Even our rationality is subject to it. Third, law stands between Creator and creation, but instead of separation, the emphasis is on 99 dependence, and the fact that God is not subject to the law. And yet there is a hard edge to Dooyeweerd’s law-Idea as expressed here. Why does he insist so much on God not having no responsibility and no duty under the law? This does not fit with the idea of law as expression of God, creating humanity in His image. Why can we not see the law as an expression of God’s love? Although Calvin certainly emphasized that God is not arbitrary, these statements come very close to the idea of an arbitrary tyrant ruling by whim. This needs to be analyzed further in its relation to Matthias Schneckenburger’s 89 critique. b) Matthias Schneckenburger In this 1923 article, Dooyeweerd frequently refers to a work by the Lutheran theologian Matthias Schneckenburger (1804-1848): Vergleichende Darstellung des lutherischen und reformierten Lehrbegriffs [Comparative Description of Lutheran and Reformed Doctrinal Systems]. This book was used by Max Weber as a fundamental source for his work The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Ghosh, 171). Schneckenburg shows how the Reformed doctrine of predestination results in a work ethic, since certainty of election and salvation is achieved only in the believer’s visible works. But that was not Dooyeweerd’s point. So why does he refer to Schneckenburger? In a letter of January 16, 1924, Dooyeweerd said that his law idea is the criterion for judging a life- and worldview. The Reformed law-Idea is distinguished from the Lutheran and the Thomistic law-Idea (Verburg, 67). Does Schneckenburger say that? He does distinguish between different views of the law. The Reformed person sees the law as positive, whereas for the Lutheran it is something negative, always accompanied by a feeling of guilt, and law is opposed to Gospel. For the Lutheran, the promise of the Law, “Do this and live,” is threat and damnation, for he does not know how to do what the law wants. But the Reformed person views law and Gospel as a unity. Zwingli refers to Christ Himself as lawgiver [Gesetzgeber]; there is a law even Norel says that God is not subject to natural law as an explanation for miracles (Norel 89 145). De la Saussaye and Baader put it differently. The supernatural is our true nature. This is like what Kuyper says in Pro Rege, cited above, that miracles are evidence of what we may do according to our true nature. 100 for believers. Law has an evangelical side and is viewed as a mode of revelation of the covenant [ein Modus der Offenbarung des Gnadenbundes]. The Holy Spirit enables us to fulfill the law (Schneckenburger, 47, 127- 29). For the reformed, the law-Idea [die Idee des Gesetzes] is not just negative but positive, a norm for believers, which leads them to action to bring about perfected goodness (Schneckenburger, 158). And does this make a difference in worldview? Schneckenburger gives a survey of the previous literature, describing differences between Lutherans and Calvinists, and showing how certain dogmas affect worldview. But the Law-Idea is only one of many factors listed. He refers to F.C. Baur’s view that the difference in Reformed and Lutheran views of communion are reflected in their culture and science: Der Lutheraner lebt in einer gotterfüllten Welt, in welcher die gottmenschliche Persönlichkeit des Erlösers überall gegenwärtig ist und selbst im Materiellen genossen wird. Die Vorstellung dieses Dogmas freilich ist gefallen, aber die Idee ist geblieben und zur Weltanschauung geworden, zum System der absoluten Idee in welcher alle Gegensätze vereinigt sind. Ebenso hat sich der reformirte Verstand aus den Schranken des positiven Dogmas herausgerungen, oder vielmehr den auf Ein Dogma concentrirten Gegensatz von Himmel und Erde, Jenseits und Diesseits, Geist und Materie als allgemeinen Gegensatz constituirt. So ist der Eine allumfassende Gegensatz, welcher unsere Zeit erfüllt, der der alleinigen speculativen Idee und des trennenden Verstandes, und dieses ist nichts anderes als die Durchführung des Gegensatzes, der beide evangelische Kirchen bisher trennte. Man könnte sonach denselben Gegensatz auch in der Weise fassen, dass gesagt würde: die lutherische Doktrin ruht auf dem Principe der Idealität des Unendlichen und Endlichen oder der Immanenz des Unendlichen im Endlichen, die reformirte auf dem des Unterschiedes und der blossen Abhängigkeit des Endlichen vom Unendlichen. [aber]..auch in der reformirten Anschauung findet eine Einheit des Endlichen und Unendlichen Statt, allerdings, nicht wie bei der lutherischen in der objektiven, sondern in der subjektiven Sphäre, und hier nicht im elementen des Erkennens und Fühlens, sondern des Wollens, der sittlichen Selbsttat...(Scheckenburger, 23). [The Lutheran lives in a God-filled world, in which the Divine/human personality of the Redeemer is present everywhere, and from which nourishment is taken even materially. The holding of this dogma has decreased, but the Idea has remained and become a worldview, to a system of the absolute Idea in which all opposites are united. Just as the Reformed understanding has escaped from the bounds of its positive dogmas, or rather what was concentrated in One dogma: the opposition of Heaven and earth, the beyond and the here and now; Spirit and matter, all 101 in a universal opposition. And so the One all-inclusive opposition in our time is that of the [Lutheran] unifying speculative Idea on the one hand and [Reformed] separating Reason on the other, and this is the result of nothing other than the continuation of the oppositions that previously separated both evangelical churches. One may put the same opposition in this way, that is to say: Lutheran doctrine rests on the principle of the ideal nature of the Infinite and the finite, or the immanence of the Infinite in the finite. The Reformed doctrine rests on the principle of their distinction and the mere dependence of the finite on the Infinite. ...[But] the Reformed view also has a unity of the finite and the Infinite, although not as for the Lutherans in the objective sphere, but in the subjective sphere, and not in the elements of knowing and feeling, but of willing, one’s personal moral act.… (my translation and italics). Schneckenburger also refers to contrasts made by other theologians (Schneckenburger 18-35). Without entering into a discussion of whether or not these are accurate, complete, or even consistent, we may summarize these views in this table: Lutheran dogma and worldview Reformed dogma and worldview Law-Idea is negative; it is in opposition to Law-Idea is positive and a means of grace; Gospel the norm for all social relations God-filled world Opposition of Heaven and Earth, the beyond and the here and now, Spirit and matter Immanence of the Infinite in the finite Distinction; dependence of the finite on the Infinite Unifying Idea Separating Reason Unity in knowing and feeling Unity in willing, and in deeds Knowledge, science and accurate doctrine Life, disposition, piety and action Christ’s Kingship and mystical indwelling Imitation of Christ as prophet, priest, king Depth of the soul, directedness towards Man as rational being, energy of will, inner life, lack of concern for the outward movement towards a goal Old scholasticism overcome by German Reformers tend to scholastic nominalism theology Self-consciousness Self action God’s Fatherly love and grace; God created God is absolute Lord, holy and righteous in love, to give fullness of life Law-giver; slogan is “Give Glory to God” The Lutheran sees traces of God’s love Separates in an abstract way the finite from everywhere in all areas: science, art, state the Infinite, and places the world in absolute dependence on God 102 A Lutheran feels as a child of God and The Reformed person feels as a servant wants to expand his individual Christian (not a son), who is absolutely obedient consciousness to a universal consciousness without thought of pay. Communicatio Idiomatum: sharing of Distinction in the natures of Christ, the attributes in two natures of Christ. Christ as more distinction, the more Glory there is to the God-Man God. Christ as Mediator. Christ is not just Christ as Logos not as Mediator; even apart hypostasis of Logos, but shows true human from the incarnation, the Logos acts in nature (p. 225). The human nature of Christ redemption is a spiritual focus of life, consciousness and action (p. 257) Historical salvation Satisfaction theory: not historical but a manifestation of eternal Counsel of God Importance of human decision Predestination emphasizes God’s causality Relation of creature to Creator; mystical Protest against all deification of the union through participation in Christ creature Scripture as warning, negative Scripture as a positive norming principle Anthropological; subjective, consciousness God gives faith. One Principle, determining of self, immediate relation to God everything in an absolute way Empirical-practical theology Deductive theology from the Idea of God. Faith is not a quality established by acts, The Reformed person questions whether he but the most intense activity of self- has sufficient faith; certainty of salvation is consciousness itself; comes in objective proved by works. Works, though imperfect, form in sacrament; no need to question are still a positive good. whether they have faith; works are fruit of faith, but something negative in the work Substantial indwelling of the Trinity in Trinity is understood modally humans (p. 206) Jesus is fully human; his consciousness is Jesus’ self-consciousness is that of the not just that of the Logos (p. 287) Logos in human form (p. 195) Dooyeweerd, like Weber, assumes the superiority of the Calvinist view, and in particular the Calvinist view of law. But that is not what Schneckenburger says. Schneckenburger does not choose one side or another. Ghosh discusses the differences between Weber and Schneckenburger (Ghosh 171-200). Schneckenburger wanted a synthesis of the two views. He wanted to give an even-handed presentation of both views, without judging one or the other. Schneckenburger feels that the differences he cites in the literature are 103 misplaced, and he seeks the unity behind both views. For him, the differences arise from psychology. There is a basis on which both Lutherans and Reformed people agree; they just interpret it differently. Schneckenburger does not, like Weber, admire the Calvinist for persisting in the works/assurance cycle. He wants the Calvinist to reach the assurance of Lutheran faith. So although the law-Idea may be different, Schneckenburger is not advocating the adoption of the Calvinist law-Idea, but a synthesis of both Lutheran and Reformed. The Preface by Güder refers to the Kingdom of God in organic terms, with head and limbs [Glieder] (ix, xx). The two different denominations are different refractions and images of one and the same beam of light (xix). There is a desire to search for a way to view the diversity of these opposed moments in their organic unity, but one must be careful that any formulation might drive the viewpoints even further apart (xxxv). For although Schneckenburger contrasts Reformed and Lutheran viewpoints, both have their weakness, and he is looking for a way to bridge the difference based on what they truly agree on but merely see differently: the distinction finite/Infinite; God/man; Creator; creature (Schneckenburger 24). He is not stating a preference for the Reformed over the Lutheran viewpoint. There are different theoretical ways of presentation (xxxiii). But the root of the difference between Lutherans and Calvinists is psychological, a primary determination [Urbestimmtheit] of our self-consciousness applied to the Idea of saving grace (xxxv) So in advocating the Calvinist law-Idea, with its view of God as the Almighty, the one who is not bound by law, is not Dooyeweerd falling into the polarization that Schneckenburger criticizes? Does he really want to accept all the characteristics on the Reformed side of the comparison? His student articles showed his desire to integrate theater and music into the Calvinist worldview; Schneckenburger says that this indifference to culture is a part of the Reformed worldview. Surely the desire to participate in all areas of life, which Schneckenburger ascribes to the Lutheran, would appeal to Dooyeweerd. I think at this stage, although he is almost certainly familiar with Gunning, he is not fully aware that Gunning’s theosophy stems from non-Calvinistic sources. And yet he is aware that Kuyper had some other influences, for he says that he 104 relies on Kuyper’s neo-Calvinism and not the historical Calvin. And he says that the law- Idea does not depend on tradition alone, but recognizes the necessity of gradual reformation by growing insight into the nature of God’s revelation. That is why it is reformational. But later, Dooyeweerd seemed to distance himself from traditionally Calvinistic views. He said that the law as boundary does not mean a separation or “scheiding” between God and creation, but only creation’s dependence on God (Friesen 2009 Thesis 61 and references). But that seems to be a later view as he reconsidered the severe nature of the Reformed law-Idea as described by Schneckenburger. He does not even mention Schneckenburger in De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, so that is an indication of some second thoughts after emphasizing his work so strongly in 1923. I don’t see anything in Schneckenburger’s book that relates the law-Idea to modalities of consciousness. He does speak of how in some views, the whole world’s history has meaning only insofar as it is the mode of being loved by God from his eternal Counsel to the eternal present reality (96) of modes of revelation (129), and modes of the Logos (261); the Logos subsists in the mode of a human soul (257). But that is not the use of ‘mode’ that Dooyeweerd is using in the sense of modes of consciousness or fields of view. Nor is there a reference to being ‘gesetzt’ in relation to ‘Gesetz’ as there was in Dooyeweerd’s earlier 1923 articles. His reading of Schneckenburger is to some extent a regression from these earlier views of a central law in which temporal reality is fitted. Schneckenburger’s analysis is still helpful in showing the divisions within reformational philosophy. Ever since Woltjer had told him to reject de Hartog, Vollenhoven continued to hold to the strict division between Creator and creature, and to reject any panentheistic interpretation of our relation to God. Dooyeweerd shows a less absolute approach. His ideas of creation as “from, through and to God,” his Idea of revelation as an expression from one region to another, the meaning of Christ’s incarnation as the New Root, his idea of our helping to redeem creation, the idea that we become sons of God, his refusal to see predestination in causal terms, his belief that we ultimately meet God face to face all represent a spirituality that is quite different from traditional Calvinism. But Dooyeweerd was not consistent, and the Calvinistic terminology in his philosophy sometimes does not 105 do justice to his cosmonomic vision. As an example I would point to his use of the idea that the correct view is not that of freedom but that of being a slave to the law or order orders of his master (WdW I, 339). That is certainly not the image of a son related to a loving Father. And there are still far too many polemical passages in De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee directed against Lutherans and Catholics, criticizing them for their dualistic divisions between law and Gospel, nature and grace, body and soul. In my view, Dooyeweerd would have been better understood if he had criticized his own Calvinistic tradition more openly and not just the Lutheran and Catholic views. But, given the confrontational climate at the time, that was something that he could not do. As it was, he was already forced to defend his ideas before the Curators of the Free University. Only at the end of his career was Dooyeweerd able to express his vision in a more ecumenical way. He regretted that his philosophy was called ‘Calvinistic’ and expressed the wish that it be called only ‘Christian.’ And Dooyeweerd was surprised to find that the person who understood him best was a Roman Catholic priest, Michael Marlet. It was the theosophical background of Marlet that allowed him to understand Dooyeweerd, for the modern Catholic theology on which he relied was in that tradition. Henri de Lubac, Erich Przywara, and Hans Urs von Balthasar had come to reject scholastic dualisms based on their reading of Baader. As a result of Marlet’s sympathetic reading of his work, Dooyeweerd decided against publication of volume II of Reformation and Scholasticism, which was to be directed against the Roman Catholic tradition. He had clearly been won over by Marlet (Friesen 2008a). It was the theosophical tradition that allowed the overcoming of denominational differences. Baader himself had hoped to achieve a reconciliation of Protestants, Catholics and Greek Orthodox Christians. Baader also emphasized our subjected-ness to God’s law, and that God was not Himself under the law. Baader distinguishes between 90 Friesen 2003a. Baader says that God is not under His law. My quotation of Baader in 90 2003 was incomplete. It should read: Nur Gott setzt und wird nicht gesetzt, der Mensch (jede Intelligenz) wird gesetzt und setzt, und nur die nichtintlligente Natur wird gesetzt und setzt nicht (Werke II, 456). 106 “without law’ (Gesetzlos) and free from law (Gesetzfrei). The Christian does not see law as a curse, but that does not mean he regards himself as autonomous or without law (anomie) or against law, like the antinomians. Baader also emphasized that the law was given in love (Betanzos). This is the kind of ecumenism that Schneckenburger hoped for, but could not achieve, because he saw the basis of division as merely psychological, and did not find the theosophical starting point that could reconcile both views. c) Vollenhoven’s reaction to the law-Idea Dooyeweerd developed the law-Idea “while Vollenhoven is still out of reach.” Vollenhoven also never accepted the Law-Idea; he found it to be “unsuitable” (Tol, 10- 11, 341). Tol says that Dooyeweerd’s initial use of the law-Idea was realist, and that this means that Dooyeweerd had to show an agreement between law and cosmos. There are several errors here. Dooyeweerd was a realist in the sense that creation is given, but not in the sense of a belief in eternal Ideas that we need to seek. As we have already seen, he emphasized the cosmic place of the law. And it is not so much a matter of agreement but of ontical identity because the meaning given by the Logos is expressed in the temporal. Tol also says that Vollenhoven’s rejected the law-Idea because it undercuts the dynamism in the cosmos. If Vollenhoven’s point is that the Calvinistic law-Idea, as Schneckenburger describes it, is related to a static view, then I might agree. But in his 1926 articles, Vollenhoven himself uses very Calvinistic language to describe God as law-giver. So I don’t think he is referring to Schneckenburger’s desire to overcome Calvinism’s one-sidedness. On the contrary, Vollenhoven himself tried to reinforce traditional Calvinistic ideas, with the exception of the dualistic anthropology of [Only God places by law and is not placed; man (every intelligent being) is placed by law and places, and only nonintelligent nature is placed by law and does not place.] Baader plays on the words ‘Gesetz’ [law] and ‘setzen’ [placing]. If we regard ‘order’ as not merely meaning “to command,” but also “to place within a region or boundary,” then we can make a similar play on words in this way: Only God orders and is not ordered; man (every intelligent being) is ordered and orders, and only non intelligent nature is ordered and does not order. 107 body/soul. His Isagôgè contains a great deal of traditional theology, such as the Calvinistic understanding of covenant. In answer to this charge of lack of dynamism, we need to recognize that Dooyeweerd denied any static view of God (NC I, 31 fn1). There is a dynamic even in God. Second, God expresses or reveals himself in the same way that we express ourselves. This is the idea of embodiment in a nature, the denial of any spirituality without a nature. Third, God’s central law is that of love; that indicates the goodness of the law, and that it is not an impersonal static set of rules. Fourth, the normative spheres are given only in principle; we have to do the positivizing (Friesen 2008b). That is our “responsibility” to use Vollenhoven’s term by which he seeks to preserve the dynamism of the law (Tol, 425). But Dooyeweerd’s vision is far more dynamic than Vollenhoven’s, for he views even non-human created reality as fallen. Vollenhoven criticizes the view that there could be a fallen plant, animal or inorganic realm: Deze wet geldt primair slechts voor het menselijk leven: het heeft geen zin te spreken van Christelijke dieren, planten en fysische dingen (Divergentierapport 113). [This law primarily holds only for human life: it makes no sense to speak of Christian animals, plants and physical things.] (cited Friesen 2005b). 108 F. From 1924 onwards 1. Vollenhoven’s 1926 article ”Enkele Grondlijnen der kentheorie” (Vollenhoven 1926a) Tol says that this article, “Contours of the theory of knowledge,” is Vollenhoven’s first important publication on epistemology. We have already discussed it in relation what Tol calls “knowing resorts under being,” although it does not use that phrase. It does say that the created logos is part of the created world. Human rationality is structured by cosmic features and thus operates in the context of the ‘created logos’ (Tol, 366-67). This article was published in Stemmen des Tijds, the same journal that the Norel article appeared in, as well as several other articles we will discuss. Tol says it appeared in 1926 due to the “contingency of Vollenhoven’s illness.” But the more important reason for the delay is that Vollenhoven had since adopted Janse’s rejection of the body/soul dichotomy. He wanted to accept the idea that rationality is part of the cosmos, but did not accept the idea of a cosmic selfhood or heart. He had to seek for a way to state this insight in a different way. The Norel article refers to the ethical theologian Gunning. I believe that Vollenhoven remembered Woltjer’s critique of the ethical theologians and went back to Woltjer for ideas. His inaugural lecture later that year expressly acknowledged the influence of Woltjer (see below) It is interesting that in his 1926 article, Vollenhoven repeats some ideas that appeared in Dooyeweerd for the first time in 1922, such as his idea of cosmos and logos. Vollenhoven says that cosmos refers to the whole, and logos refers to the part (Vollenhoven 1926a, 389). He also uses the term ‘modality,’ but does not acknowledge Dooyeweerd’s use of it. In fact, he does not acknowledge Dooyeweerd’s previous work at all. In this article, we can see some of the influence of the Norel article, although Vollenhoven has taken some of these ideas in a different direction from Dooyeweerd. a) Ideas similar to the Norel article: (1) rationality is a part of the cosmos [“knowing resorts under being”]. We have already discussed this. The idea of creation prevents us from overestimating the role of thought (Vollenhoven 1926a, 401). That agrees with the Norel article on self-sufficiency of thought in relation to autonomy. But unlike Dooyeweerd’s 1922 article (Dooyeweerd 109 1922), which first made use of the Norel article, Vollenhoven does use the term ‘autonomy.’ Nor does he relate the idea to the Selfhood, of which thinking is only one function.91 (2) Metalogical implications: Both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd use the theosophical idea from Norel that the object of thought (the a-logical) is also in the cosmos. This idea derives from the idea of the Wisdom of God, expressed in creation. Vollenhoven does say that the area of unformulated truth is a part of creation. Vollenhoven says this area is not elevated above creation, but only a part of it. Both the ‘logical’ and what he used to call the ‘a-logical’ are part of the cosmos. The relation between them is a cosmic ordering (Vollenhoven 1926a, 388-89). This makes the sphere of not-I no longer outside the cosmos, but within the cosmos, so this is one area that he follows the Norel article (recall the discussion about discovery of X-rays in Norel). And he follows Norel and agrees with Dooyeweerd in saying that the relation between logical and a-logical is cosmic; this is the best reason to reject neo-Kantianism (Vollenhoven 1926a, 389). Vollenhoven distinguishes between cosmic order and order within the created logos, i.e. logic (Vollenhoven 1926a, 392). In other word, cosmic order is not the same as logical order. That would appear to be a rejection of logicism. But Vollenhoven does not remain 92 consistent, and in his his 1926 inaugural lecture, and in Isagôgè, he says that the modes are known by logical abstraction. Thus, he falls back into the logicism of his earlier 1921 article. And even in this article, his basis for knowing the cosmic order is that we can “read” God’s cosmic order by paying attention to the order of the sciences (Vollenhoven 91 Vollenhoven thus has only a collection of separate functions. He does refer to the subject in terms of ‘office’ (p. 396), but that is not the same emphasis on Self as center of functions. In 1926b he will take another term first used by Dooyeweerd, ‘cosmic unity.’ He will use that to refer to the person, and to things. Sometimes he uses the word ‘systasis.’ But that is not the same as Dooyeweerd’s/Norel’s/Baader’s idea of a Selfhood. 92 This appears to be what Tol is referring to when he says, “There are domains requiring acknowledgement by intuition before logic and scientific method can meaningfully be set to work” (Tol, 218). But Tol does not acknowledge that it is Dooyeweerd who first writes about this distinction (Dooyeweerd 1922). Vollenhoven’s approach in 1921 and in 1926 is that the domains are distinguished by logic. In Isagôgè, he says given diversity of things intersecting cosmic unities, but the diversity is only logically distinguished. That is not Dooyeweerd’s view, but what he calls ‘logicism.’ 110 1926a, 392). But that reading for Vollenhoven is not intuitive, but based on logic. He recognizes that this may be mistaken for a compromise between Aristotle and Kant. So Vollenhoven recognized that his way of approaching cosmic order could be interpreted by some as deriving from Aristotle (See Friesen 2009). Vollenhoven says he is saving the correct parts of both Kant and Aristotle. Kant’s mistake was to exclude the content of logic, things and how they are [“het zóó zijn” en het “dit”]; Kant viewed them outside of logic (Vollenhoven 1926a, 393). The idea of “het zóó zijn” is already found in Woltjer, and will form the basis for Vollenhoven’s Isagôgè. This is a way of doing philosophy that is foreign to Dooyeweerd’s terminology. Vollenhoven wants to bring forward the insight that our thinking belongs to the cosmos, which he obtained from the “find” but he is unable to follow the theosophical basis, since he agrees with Janse in rejecting a selfhood. So he combined these ideas of cosmic knowing with the ideas of Woltjer. (3) The Gegenstand-sphere is given for consciousness, as assessed in modal viewing. Vollenhoven continues to use the term ‘gezichtsveld’ (Vollenhoven 1926a, 387). He also uses the term ‘sphere’ [kring] to refer to logic (Vollenhoven 1926a, 395). The fact that he continues to use these terms indicates he has not yet adopted the prominence that Dooyeweerd gave to the term ‘modalities’ in 1922. Vollenhoven does use the term ‘modality’ near the end of the article, but in a different sense from Dooyeweerd’s usage. He starts by speaking about the general ‘system’ which is ‘modulated’ by the modality. The modality is distinguished from moments that are modulated by Gegenstände. Tol tries to explain this (Tol, 437), but I cannot follow either Vollenhoven’s compressed reasoning or Tol’s explanation. It does not match what Dooyeweerd means by ‘modality,’ ‘moment’ or ‘Gegenstand.’ Nor is it clear what he means by ‘system.’ Vollenhoven says that what “comes from outside” to the system is nevertheless also out of the logos [doch uit den logos]. He calls what comes from outside “states of affairs” and says that they are “unbreakable logical unities” [onverbreekbare logische eenheden]. (Vollenhoven 1926a, 398) 111 Now this use of “state of affairs” is very different from Dooyeweerd’s. For Dooyeweerd, a state of affairs is something or some event that participates in every modal sphere. 93 Vollenhoven here says that they are logical unities. This is another indication, that, however much he wants to distinguish cosmic and logical unity, his logicism prevents him from doing so. Vollenhoven says Denken is het niet-scheppend brengen van een modaliteit, haar wezensverbanden en haar Gegenstände als wel irrationeele maar toch logische inhouden in den vorm van systeem, relatie en relata (Vollenhoven 1926a, 400). [Thinking is the non-creative bringing of a modality, its essential relations and its Gegenstände, as irrational and yet logical contents into the form of a system, relation and relata] The idea of a system, with a unity of relations and relata (Vollenhoven 1926a, 397) will be used in his Isagôgè. But it is already in Woltjer. But Vollenhoven’s usage is different from Dooyeweerd’s. For Dooyeweerd, a modality does not have a Gegenstand. Only our act of knowing has a Gegenstand. Even in Dooyeweerd 1922, he refers to the Gegenstand-sphere of our knowledge. Where is Vollenhoven getting this new use of Gegenstand, to correspond merely with the object of everyday thought? Finally, Vollenhoven says Aanvaardend de Goddelijke gegevens niet alleen omtrent de modaliteiten, maar ook omtrent de genadige handhaving van deze, beginne men dus met te vertrouwen het zinvolle van de opgelegde taak (Vollenhoven 1926a, 400). [Accepting what is divinely given not only concerning the modalities but also concerning the gracious maintaining of them, one may begin to trust in the meaningfulness of the assigned task]. 93 For Dooyeweerd, “states of affairs” point to an inter-modal coherence of meaning; there are “undeniable states of affairs presenting themselves in the fundamental analogical concepts of scientific thought” (NC I, 57-58). “Every philosophy must be confronted with the states of affairs to which the analogical modal concepts are related” (NC I, 72) 112 But he has not previously shown any Divine revelation of the modalities. If he is referring to the givenness of the cosmic order, that might make sense, but it would not provide us with information of God’s gracious maintaining of them. For that, Vollenhoven needs special revelation in Scripture. (4) the idea of the Logos as divine giver, in closer relation to self and world. Vollenhoven emphasizes the creation of one cosmos by the divine Logos (Vollenhoven 1926a, 388). We can read God’s ordering of the cosmos by paying attention to the order of the sciences (Vollenhoven 1926a, 392). That idea is already in Woltjer, too. But Vollenhoven has a problem, both here and in the Isagôgè. He refers to the Logos as ordering the cosmos, but does not want to discuss the Logos, but only the expression in nature. The Logos order is like a thing-in-itself, or a law-in-itself, of which we observe only the phenomena. For knowledge of the Logos, he needs special revelation in Scripture. So it is not that Vollenhoven has done away with the distinction between a Divine order and the cosmic order. He has used Scripture to provide the basis for the harmony. Contrast this with Dooyeweerd, who gives an experiential basis to the identity of the central religious law, which is religious and supratemporal, with the cosmic law. We know the central law because we ourselves are supratemporal, and because we participate in Christ, Who is the Divine Logos. This accords with the witness of Scripture. And we know the cosmic order because we are also a part of that, and can know it “as our own.” (See Friesen 2009, Theses 5, 81, 83 and references) b) Ideas not in Norel or in Dooyeweerd (1) A good portion of Vollenhoven’s article deals with the subject-predicate relation in logic, and how that relates to truth. Dooyeweerd does not deal with this issue, and so it reflects an independent line of thought in Vollenhoven. Dooyeweerd later rejected all predicate logic as based on substance (Friesen 2010a). (2) Vollenhoven speaks of our knowledge being partially based on information that we are given, either by teaching or by revelation (Vollenhoven 1926a, 383) This would form a part of his Isagôgè. 113 (3) He speaks of knowledge [kennis] as knowledge of something. This idea is also in Woltjer. 2. Vollenhoven’s Inaugural address “Logos en Ratio” (Vollenhoven 1926b) This is Vollenhoven’s inaugural lecture, given October 26, 1926. Wolterstorff comments that the audience found it hard to understand since Vollenhoven relied on other work he had published, without giving a summary. His audience did not know what his terms meant (Stellingwerff 1987, 123). Vollenhoven gives a history of rationality from the Greeks to Augustine, neo-Platonism, the Renaissance, humanism, romanticism, neo- Kantianism and phenomenology. Only in passing does he express his own ideas. This is an indication of his problem-historical method, wanting to classify a problem in terms of its historical development. In the opening pages he begins with distinctions between monism and dualism, and how pantheism fails to distinguish God and cosmos. He refers to Bavinck for at least one of these distinctions (Vollenhoven 1926b, 7; 27 fn47). He does not refer to what Dooyeweerd has written, despite the fact that he takes over some of the terms that Dooyeweerd developed, like ‘law-sphere.’ He merely acknowledges at the end of the lecture that he is glad that Dooyeweerd is also being appointed to the university, since in this way their fruitful discussions will not be broken off (Vollenhoven 1926b, 67). In my view, this lack of acknowledgment signals a consciousness that he is already diverging from Dooyeweerd. They have used some common sources, including the “find.” But they are developing it in different ways. a) Ideas related to Norel (1) The realization that “knowing resorts under being” The idea that our thinking is itself a part of the cosmos is not set out as clearly as in Vollenhoven’s previous 1926a article. (2) Implications at various levels: metalogical, cosmological and theistic In this article, the implications are set out more in his problem-historical method. (3) The Gegenstand-sphere being given for consciousness, as assessed in a modal viewing 114 Vollenhoven does not refer to ‘modalities’ but to ‘law-spheres’ or ‘spheres.’ He illustrates this. The biotic is not a being and the physical is not a phenomenon. They are fields, or intersections [doorsneden] of the cosmos. So a cosmic unity [kosmische eenheid] appears in various fields (Vollenhoven 1926b, 13). Vollenhoven places the logical as the most fundamental sphere [kring]. All the independent law-spheres [wetssferen] rest on the logical, and show analogies with it (Vollenhoven 1926b, 22). Both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven later moved the logical sphere in the order of the modalities. Other law-spheres were those of number, space, time, movement and energy. He refers to what would later be called ‘normative law- spheres’ as ‘fields of view’ [gezichtsvelden]. The creation of the law-spheres is compared to a well-ordered book, with the later chapters depending on the earlier ones. For Dooyeweerd, this order would later be an order of time, of earlier and later. For Vollenhoven, they would remain an order of increasing (logical) complexity. Here he says that this reflects an a priori in the mind of God [in mente Dei] (Vollenhoven 1926b, 22). The fact that Vollenhoven does not use the word ‘modalities’ is surprising, since he used them in the earlier 1926 article. (4) the idea of the Logos as divine giver, brought into closer relation with self and world Vollenhoven distinguishes the divine Logos and the logical (Vollenhoven 1926b, 18). Plato confused the logical in the cosmos with the logos in God’s plan (Vollenhoven 1926b, 22). (5) a tendency towards Christo-centric cosmism This is not as clear as in Vollenhoven 1926a. b) Other ideas similar to Dooyeweerd (1) Vollenhoven follows Calvin rather than Luther. Calvin’s thought process begins with God, creating by His will. The cosmos is only his work [werkstuk]. In contrast, Luther begins with an anthropological standpoint (Vollenhoven 1926b, 31). These contrasts seem to be derived from Schneckenburger, although like Dooyeweerd, Vollenhoven does 115 not follow Schneckenburger’s desire to transcend the denominational differences. But Vollenhoven’s use of the term ‘werkstuk’ derives from Woltjer. Vollenhoven emphasizes Woltjer’s idea that God’s revelation is known from his work. And he acknowledges that Woltjer related this to epistemology, and that he developed a program in 1895 for epistemology that displays his signature of Vollenhoven’s own “immediate predecessor and teacher” [m’n onmiddelijken voorganger en leermeester]. Vollenhoven says that not to acknowledge this would be an historical injustice (Vollenhoven 1926b, 65-66). (2) Vollenhoven says that Kuyper did not apply the term ‘sovereignty in its own sphere’ either to cosmic unities or to law-spheres (Vollenhoven 1926b, 65). c) Ideas not in Dooyeweerd Apart from the fact that Dooyeweerd did not use Vollenhoven’s problem-historical method, Vollenhoven brings in ideas here that are not found in Dooyeweerd. (1) Vollenhoven refers to the spheres in which “cosmic unities,” for example man, make their appearance insofar as they are subject to their laws (Tol, 8). Dooyeweerd sees modes as modes of consciousness applying to everything, and not just for certain things that are subject to these modes. Unlike Vollenhoven’s view, he does not see them as intersections of things or ‘cosmic unities.’ Vollenhoven’s view is worked out further in his Isagôgè , where he denies sphere universality, except as it is exemplified in actual things, “mediation in cosmic creatures” (Tol, 375 fn 222). (2) Metaphysical truths concern the being of “cosmic unities” (Vollenhoven 1926b, 10). (3) Non-metaphysical truths depend on intersections [‘doorsnede’] of entities (Vollenhoven 1926b, 10). This would become the basis of Vollenhoven’s ‘intersection principle’ in the Isagôgè. Hij schiep kosmische eenheden zóó, dat ze doorsneden werden door verschillende wetssferen. Deze zijn zóó gefundeerd, dat op het logische alles rust, waardoor de menscheid ook haar wetenschappelijke roeping het analogische in de verschillende velden op te sporen, kan vervullen. (Vollenhoven 1926b, 43) [He [God] created cosmic unities in such a way that they were intersected by various law-spheres. These are founded in such a way that everything 116 rests on the logical, by which humans could fulfill their calling to find the analogical in the various fields.] This is a much weaker calling for humans than that of helping to redeem an already fallen world, which we find in the later Dooyeweerd (Friesen 2009, Thesis 75 and references). (4) Vollenhoven divides knowledge into knowledge by intuition and knowledge by concepts. This is not the same as Dooyeweerd’s use, because Vollenhoven sees the role of intuition in existential judgments (“S is”) and judgments of relation (“S is P”). The judgments of relation depend on two judgments of existence (“S is” and “P is”) (Tol, 14) Vollenhoven acknowledges that he obtained this view from Franz Brentano (Vollenhoven 1926b, 60 and 60 fn141). Insofar as the existential judgments relate to existing things, this is different from Brentano’s idea of intentional inexistence referred to above. It seems that Brentano may have changed his views over time. In his introduction to the 1924 edition of Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Krause says, Besides abandoning the theory of “the mental inexistence of the object,” Brentano demonstrated in the Appendix to The Classification of Mental Phenomena that consciousness should not be called a relation in the normal sense of that term. For example, “comparative relations,” such as those of size )”A is larger than B”) are said to presuppose the existence of their two terms, or “bases” (A nd B). (Brentano, 374). Brentano came to hold that only one term need exist. For example, if I think of the God Jupiter, there exists only the person who has the God Jupiter before his mind; Jupiter does not exist. It is clear that Vollenhoven was relying on Brentano’s earlier idea of comparative relations. But Brentano changed his views, so it is not surprising that Vollenhoven later supervised a doctoral dissertation on Brentano (see Taljaard). (5) He refers to the Stoic distinction between ‘signify’ [beteekenen] and ‘represent’ [vertegenwoordigen]. This may explain his reference to ‘representation’ in the earlier article from 1926. (6) Knowledge [weten] is a “knowledge that [weten dat]; this is the same as “kennen van’]. Augustine failed to distinguish knowledge that from knowledge of (Vollenhoven 1926b, 11). This would become important in Vollenhoven’s Isagôgè. He acknowledges that obtained the distinction from Woltjer (Vollenhoven 1926b, 25 and see discussion of Woltjer above). 117 (7) As in the earlier article of 1926, Vollenhoven refers to information that we receive, either directly or indirectly. Since he places this in the context of “believing that” [gelooven dat], this indicates that this also comes from Woltjer (Vollenhoven 1926b, 26). He refers to the idea of the revelation in words, which Woltjer, as a philologist, wrote about (Kok 54). For Vollenhoven, information we get in words can be referred to as revelation, since it reveals what would otherwise be hidden. This word ‘revelation’ [woordopenbaring] views created things as cosmic unities (Vollenhoven 1926b, 26). (8) Vollenhoven; refers to the ‘organon,’ which is the use of the logical schema to search for analogies of the logical in a field of view [gezichtsveld] that is not itself logical. It is in this way that concepts arise (Vollenhoven 1926b, 23). The ‘organon’ is formed by logic (Vollenhoven 1926b, 18). This is an indication of his incipient logicism. 94 Dooyeweerd emphasizes the idea of a science of sciences as an ‘organism,’ and as ‘encyclopedia,’ but that is different from a logical ‘organon.’ In this article, Vollenhoven refers again to the intersection with cosmic unities. He says that it is only by our forming of concepts [begripsvorming] that we obtain the ‘moment’ and later the ‘system’ with its distinguished sub-moments (Vollenhoven 1926b, 23). Contrast this with Dooyeweerd’s emphasis that the distinction between the modalities is not done by means of logic; to believe that it is by logic is evidence of logicism (Dooyeweerd 1975a). (9) Vollenhoven says that a priori has a conceptual-theoretical meaning (Vollenhoven 1926b, 45). Contrast this with Dooyeweerd’s view that the a priori relates only to ontical conditions, and not to theoretical uses (see discussion above). 3. Vollenhoven’s further development Tol says that by 1926, the organism of the sciences is said to consist of “fields of inquiry of distinct modality” (Tol, 210). Tol does not give a citation for that quotation. It is not in the two articles we have looked at. I find it unfortunate that Tol summarizes Vollenhoven in ways that do not reflect exact quotations. As we have seen, Vollenhoven does speak of the organon as the logical schema to search for logical analogies in other fields of view This use of ‘organon’ in a logical way is similar to the way that Woltjer used it (Kok 94 47). Because of this logical connotation, ‘organon’ should not be used to describe Dooyeweerd’s law-Idea, as John Kraay suggested and as adopted by Tol (p. 343). 118 (Vollenhoven 1926b, 23). But there are also problems with this idea of organon, since it is based in logic. Tol acknowledges that the idea of cosmological organon was already in Dooyeweerd’s 1923 article, which captured …how the cosmos it itself law-bounded in spheres of law, but at the same time organized in a way that evidences God’s providential upholding of the cosmos. This law-idea is presented as the cosmological organon of the Calvinistic life- and worldview (Tol, 222). If anything, this shows a dependence of Vollenhoven on Dooyeweerd. But ‘organon’ is the wrong term. For Dooyeweerd, the cosmos can be described in ‘organic’ terms. Tol wants to avoid Vollenhoven’s dependence on Dooyeweerd. He admits that on Vollenhoven’s side “there is a lack of direct documentation” for the development of this idea. But he points to Vollenhoven working with law as boundary between God and cosmos, and the cosmos “evidenced in spheres of subjection to law” (Tol, 222). As we have seen, Vollenhoven does refer to ‘spheres.’ Instead of dependence of Vollenhoven on Dooyeweerd or vice versa, I would prefer to say that neither was original. Both used the “find” in different ways. By 1926 Vollenhoven had agreed with Janse that the soul is not immortal. But he never resolved the issues of philosophical anthropology; these issues “haunted Vollenhoven even in old age” (Tol, 237 fn35). He decided that “Soul is the “direction-determining principle” for good or evil; soul is pre-functional” (Tol, 262). But he could not explain how a principle, or something that is pre-functional but not supratemporal, could survive death. Tol makes the intriguing reference to Driesch’s idea of entelechy, which is an “immanent teleology. It is “direction not thing” (Tol, 243 fn 42). He suggests a connection to Vollenhoven’s idea of direction, but this is not explored. It would be interesting to pursue, in view of Vollenhoven’s previous criticism of Driesch’s idea of entelechy (Vollenhoven 1921). However, I think a better explanation is that Vollenhoven took over the idea of heart direction from Norel’s 1920 article, although he did not take the idea of the supratemporal selfhood on which it depends. Furthermore, Vollenhoven’s nebulous idea of a heart seems to be similar to his ennoetism, where this center or 119 synthesis only arises as a result of a current experience of polarity, but does not exist in itself. 4. Dooyeweerd’s 1926 Inaugural Lecture Dooyeweerd refers to an organic or cosmic coherence of law-spheres, each with its own modality, and two kinds of analogies. On the one hand, analogies refer to the substrates, or previous law-spheres. On the other hand, anticipations refer to the succeeding law- spheres. He named the first four law-spheres as number, space, movement and energy. He did not include a law-sphere for the logical or for time, as Vollenhoven did. Time could not be a modality because there was no special science devoted to it. Dooyeweerd did say that absolute time could not be of a mathematical nature, since it also appeared in the historical, psychological, sociological, juridical and political fields of view (Stellingwerff 1987, 122, 124). It is also significant that Dooyeweerd uses the term ‘modality’ whereas Vollenhoven did not use it in his inaugural lecture. Most of this lecture is devoted to the history of philosophy, showing antinomies resulting from autonomy of thought. Antinomies result from absolutizing one law-sphere over another. 5. Dooyeweerd from 1928 Even though the “find” had shown how to avoid this in 1922, and even though Dooyeweerd had developed a law-Idea in 1923, it took time to work out the implications for their different philosophies. Why did it take until 1928 to 1930 for Dooyeweerd to put these ideas together in the mature form that would be used in his 1931 book De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer and his major work from 1935-36, De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee? I believe it is because of at least five issues: a) Anthropology. Dooyeweerd could not use all of the ideas of Christian theosophy regarding the central nature of man’s being until he discovered the same ideas in Kuyper’s Stone Lectures (Kuyper 1898). He did not do that until after he started at the Kuyper Foundation. 120 b) The Logos-Idea. Christian realism believed that God’s Ideas were in an eternal realm; it then had the issue of finding how the rational soul, with its subjective rationality, could agree with that objective rationality of the Logos, which existed in an otherworldly realm. Christian theosophy solved the issue by the idea that God’s thoughts are expressed and revealed within temporal reality. So although theosophy still speaks of “thinking God’s thoughts after Him,” it looked for those thoughts within created reality. Chantepie de la Saussaye said that God does not express Himself in concepts, but in creation. Boehme already talked about the “signature” of God in creation. This theosophical tradition fit with Dooyeweerd’s philosophy; it did not fit with Vollenhoven’s. In particular, it did not fit with Vollenhoven’s idea of the way that law forms a boundary between God and creation. And Vollenhoven could not have the same idea of revelation as the expression of God; for him, revelation was still related to a propositional Logos-revelation within Scripture. c) Substance. Christian realism viewed soul and body as two distinct substances. Even when Dooyeweerd challenged the body/soul dualism, the idea of substance remained. This was overcome by the idea that created reality exists as meaning, insofar as created reality refers beyond itself to the Creator. This idea of referring is also derived from theosophy. A higher reality expresses and reveals itself in a lower reality, but a lower reality refers to a higher reality. (Friesen 2009, Theses 50, 51, 65 and references). d) Cosmic time. It is not until about 1928 that Dooyeweerd begins speaking of the supratemporality of man’s central being. Dooyeweerd distinguished supratemporal from temporal. Only the temporal is called ‘cosmic.’ Christian Idealism worked with a contrast only between eternity and time. Dooyeweerd needed the theosophical idea of an intermediate realm for the Selfhood, the aevum. From where did he obtain that idea of 95 time? Some reformational scholars believe it was Heidegger, whose Sein und Zeit appeared in 1927. But that cannot be the case; Heidegger does not have that view of time, and Dooyeweerd explicitly criticizes Heidegger, who did not have “real insight into cosmic time” (NC II, 531). The only theory of time that I know of that fits is Franz von Baader, whose work was experiencing a renaissance. Baader’s distinguishes between 95 Recall that Kuyper had also spoken of a “created eternity” (Kuyper 1888a). 121 God’s eternity, the intermediate supratemporal, and cosmic time. In 1925, the Herdflamme series of books published a volume entitled Franz von Baaders Schriften zur Gesellschaftsphilosophie. Othmar Spann edited the series as a whole, but Johann Sauter edited this specific volume. The book is over 900 pages, and includes many of Baader’s writings on social philosophy. It also includes some philosophical works, including Baader’s work on time, “Elementarbegriffe über die Zeit” (Baader 1831). Dooyeweerd was familiar with the Herdflamme series, and owned some of the volumes and referred to others; he also cross-references at least one reference to Baader. Vollenhoven was also aware of this book by Baader (Friesen 2005a). Dooyeweerd also relied on Gunn’s book on time, which mentions the idea of aevum (Gunn, 1929). And somewhere in this time period, Dooyeweerd must have also read Chantepie de la Saussaye, since so many terms come into use that can only have been derived from de la Saussaye’s transmission of Baader. So although the “rudiments” of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy were in place in 1922, it took many years for him to read the sources to which he was directed by Norel’s article, and to assimilate those ideas in contrast to Christian realism. e) Neo-Kantianism and phenomenology. Dooyeweerd said that he was ready to publish his work in 1935 only after much hesitation and many detours (WdW I, v). These detours included neo-Kantianism and Husserl’s phenomenology, to which he was initially attracted. His discovery of Gunning and Chantepie de la Saussaye, and through them the 96 works of Baader allowed him to return to what initially attracted him in the ideas of Van Eeden, but now in the Christian context of neo-Calvinism. But Dooyeweerd also continued to read in these other areas. For example, he used ideas of Othmar Spann, Felix Krueger and Max Wundt (Friesen 2005a). 97 96 Vollenhoven did not object to the method phenomenology as long as it is used in a descriptive way (Tol 25 fn29). Dooyeweerd thought phenomenology to be “a much more dangerous adversary of a Christian philosophy than classical Humanistic idealism or naturalism” (NC II, 487). 97 Dooyeweerd failed to acknowledge Felix Krueger (student of Hans Driesch), and Max Wundt (son of Wilhelm Wundt), as the source for his knowledge of Rudolf Haidenhain’s idea of enkapsis (Friesen 2005c). Dooyeweerd did not mention Krueger at all in the 122 What needs to be done is to examine how these other influences on Dooyeweerd (neo- Kantianism, phenomenology, and neo-Idealism) are related to the theosophical tradition that forms the backbone of Dooyeweerd’s mature philosophy. Even in De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee and the New Critique, Dooyeweerd praises some of these other philosophers for some insights and then critiques them from his new standpoint of the central selfhood. Many readers of Dooyeweerd find that their eyes glaze over with Dooyeweerd’s numerous references to Driesch, Liebert, Litt, Lask, Scheler, Spann, Windelband, and so on. Why can’t he just set out his own philosophy without polemical attacks on others? It must be because he believed in the importance of the history of ideas. The interesting thing for me is how many of these other sources were themselves influenced by Baader. We know that Litt discusses Baader, and that this caused Dooyeweerd to cross-reference a work by Baader. We also know that Othmar Spann transmitted many ideas of Baader, both in his own work and through the Herdflamme series of books (Friesen 2005a). Scheler’s ideas were often drawn from Baader, including the idea of extasis in relation to animals. Dooyeweerd also discusses Johannes Immanuel Volkelt and criticizes his view of intuition. Sauter, in a book published in 1928, says this about Volkelt: Man vgl. dazu jetzt das Buch des Leipziger Philosophen Johannes Volkelt: “Phänomenologie und Metaphysik der Zeit” (1925) das man als eine Entfaltung des Baaderschen Zentralgedankens betrachten kann. Auch er erhebt sich mit intuitiver Gewissheit über dies beschränkte Welt des zeitlichen Werdens, in ein Reich zeitlosen–Baader würde sagen: “zeitfreien”–Geschehens und Wirkens, in dessen Ordnung unser zeitliches Dasein mit seinen undurchschaubaren Verkettungen und absurden Abhängigkeiten wurzelhaft eingegliedert ist und seinen sinnvollen Zusammenhang erhält (Sauter, 64). [One should compare the book of the Leipzig philosopher Johannes Volkelt: “Phänomenologie und Metaphysik der Zeit” (1925), which we can view as an unfolding of Baader’s central thoughts. He also elevates himself with intuitive certainty above the narrowed world of temporal becoming in a realm of the timeless–Baader would say “time-free”–events WdW, adding his name for the first time in 1953 in NC II, 111-112, but then only to criticize him. Although Vollenhoven spent several months studying under Krueger in 1920, Vollenhoven never adopted these ideas of enkapsis. 123 and acts, in whose ordering our temporal existence, with its inscrutable linkings and absurd dependencies is rooted and in which [its temporal limbs] are incorporated, and which maintains its meaningful coherence.] Sauter discusses Baader’s views of time and eternity in some detail. Sauter also refers to many of the other philosophers that Dooyeweerd discusses, including Ernst Cassirer, Herman Cohen, Wilhelm Dilthey, Hans Driesch, Eduard von Hartmann, Fichte, Kant, Emil Lask, Herman Lotze, Paul Natorp, Heinrich Rickert, W. Windelband and many others, and tries to relate them to Baader’s thought. The difficulty is that Sauter’s interpretation is still too neo-Kantian; he sees Baader as the fulfiller of Kant instead of acknowledging Baader’s strong criticism of Kant, (which Dooyeweerd took over in his transcendental critique, using much the same arguments as Baader). My point is not that Sauter has understood Baader correctly, but rather that Dooyeweerd was not the only one in the late 1920’s to try to integrate neo-Kantianism into the ideas of Baader. Dooyeweerd had the advantage of being able to refer to Reformed theologians like Gunning and de la Saussaye who pre-dated the neo-Kantians. Since Dooyeweerd was following the Herdflamme series of books, it might even have been Sauter’s book that caused him to reconsider his view of time in terms of Baader’s. The date 1928 is certainly the date that Dooyeweerd begins speaking of the supratemporal. G. Other misunderstandings 1. Concept and Idea. After 1923, Vollenhoven does not speak of Ideas; human beings can’t read God’s mind (Tol, 218). Tol asks whether Dooyeweerd may be using the terminology of concept and idea in a different way from Vollenhoven (Tol, 268), but he 124 does not follow this up except to say that their agreement is “hard to miss.” Tol is wrong. Vollenhoven used ‘Idea’ in the sense of idea being “an extra-mental essence” and he used ‘concept’ as representing “the knowledge of the idea, in process of becoming adequate with respect to it” (Tol, 288). Modalities are then “the intuition of the highest unity of the adequate concept” of the Gegenstand within a science (Tol, 221). But this is to miss 98 Dooyeweerd’s view of both Ideas and modalities. Tol is wrong in his view that after 1928, Dooyeweerd regarded the law-Idea as a “limiting concept” and that Dooyeweerd’s use of these terms is “closer to a neo-Kantian use than ever before” (Tol, 11, 352). Dooyeweerd discusses this in the Discussion of his 1964 Talk (Dooyeweerd 2007). It is not a limiting concept in Kant’s sense. Ideas are known only because they express the fullness of temporal reality; we know fullness not from the periphery, but from out of our center, our supratemporal selfhood. Dooyeweerd already stated this in his idea of ‘encyclopedia’: it is learning in a circle, the way our thought moves in a circle, from out of the center and then back (Dooyeweerd, 1946). Again, to understand this use of ‘Idea,’ we need to look at the theosophical tradition. The distinction between concept and Idea is already in Baader, and he does not use the terms in a Kantian sense (Friesen 2003a). Ideas do not come from the periphery and try to reach the center; they come from out of the center (Dooyeweerd, 1946). 2. “Modalization of time.” Tol is wrong in his view that Dooyeweerd modalized time (Tol 11, 500). For Dooyeweerd, time is what refracts totality into modalities, but it is not itself modalized. Time expresses itself in each of the modes, but it is not itself a mode. Time gives the order of the modes, in an order of before and after. 3. Inner experience. Vollenhoven, following Janse, gave up the idea of inner experience. Tol interprets this as giving up the “self-security of “inner experience” (Tol, 252). But Dooyeweerd, who continues to emphasize inner experience and religious self-reflection (Friesen 2011), certainly did not see this in terms of self-security. Everything, including our selfhood, is dependent on God, and we have no knowledge of self without knowledge of God. Vollenhoven’s real objection is that unity of consciousness of Self and of God is 98 In any event, a discussion of adequate concepts, as well as the contrast between ideal and idea is already in Woltjer (Woltjer 1896 18, 21). 125 mystical, and incompatible with the idea of boundary (Tol 269-70, 270 fn77a). This is to ignore the idea of panentheism in de Hartog. It also ignores the spirituality of Kuyper in his meditations. Stellingwerff criticizes Kuyper here for his ‘Gnosticism’ and ‘mysticism.’ By ‘Gnosticism,’ Stellingwerff means the view that the Divine descends to us; by ‘mysticism’ he means that we can ascend to God (Stellingwerff 1987, 50, 53). Both views are wrong. This is not a Gnosticism, for Gnosticism denies the importance of temporal reality. Dooyeweerd, like Baader, wants to redeem temporal reality. Nor is it mysticism in Stellingwerff’s sense. It is not a spirituality that denies the temporal, but an embodied spirituality. And in ascending, we are reaching our true being in supratemporality, the created eternity. That is not the same as becoming God. 4. Ontologized meaning. Tol says that in 1928, Dooyeweerd “ontologizes meaning” in his view that “meaning is the being of all creaturely beings.” Tol says that this makes the acceptance of a “reality that bears meaning redundant” (Tol, 11). This is a misunderstanding. Dooyeweerd rejects any idea that he had hypostatized meaning. That was Hendrik Stoker’s criticism (NC I, 96; III, 67). And to say that creaturely beings are meaning is not to say that they do not bear meaning; on the contrary, all of creation is meaning in the sense that it refers beyond itself. Temporal being refers beyond itself to the supratemporal Root, and the Root refers beyond itself to the Archè or Origin. But created reality is still ontical. It is not just meaning, but has meaning in the sense of referring beyond itself. Dooyeweerd’s primary purpose here is to undercut the idea of substance, or things that exist in themselves, with no reference to a transcendent. 5. Dooyeweerd’s 1940 article on time. Tol says that Dooyeweerd’s idea of the Self’s spiritual center, and its involvement “with time that is modalized” echoes important traits of Vollenhoven’s Self in his 1918 dissertation (Tol, 11). Tol makes these claims in reference to Dooyeweerd’s 1940 article on time. But Tol is wrong in many respects here. First, Vollenhoven’s thesis did not have this view of time as cosmic time/aevum/eternity. Nor did he have a view of the Self as within the supratemporal as distinct from either cosmic time or eternity. And Tol is wrong in referring to the modalization of time. It is not time that is modalized; time is what breaks up the unity of our supratemporal consciousness into temporal modes; it acts as the prism. And just because within our 126 experience of cosmic time there is an experience of the succession of time, that does not mean that this idea is from Vollenhoven. It is already in Van Eeden. And although Dooyeweerd speaks of a Self, that certainly does not mean he is adopting Vollenhoven’s ennoetistic anthropology. Dooyeweerd’s idea of ‘soul’ is always identical with ‘heart’ and not with a part of temporal reality that needs to be united with another part called ‘body.’ For Dooyeweerd, all functions, material as well as spiritual [geestelijk] form part of the body. And it is only this body and the supratemporal heart that form the two-unity [twee-eenheid] (Friesen 2009, Thesis 70 and references). Tol’s arguments are not based on a careful reading of Dooyeweerd, but show a bias in trying to show the influence of Vollenhoven where there is none. II. Isagôgè Philosophiae 1930-1945 This is a text-critical edition of Vollenhoven’s major work in systematic philosophy, Isagôgè Philosophiae. All first-year students entering the Free University were required 99 to take this introductory course in philosophy (Tol, 20). It was never published, except in syllabus form for students, although as Tol points out (Isagôgè, 14 fn6), it forms the background for other work that Vollenhoven did publish. As Tol points out, Vollenhoven’s historical studies, and in particular his works dealing 99 with the problem-historical method have been edited by K.A. Bril. 127 Working from Vollenhoven’s 1945 revision, Tol has edited this work, showing the changes made to the text in 10 different versions since it was first written in 1930. The result is a valuable tool for scholars of Vollenhoven’s philosophy, since it helps to show changes in his ideas over time. I would like to see a similar critical edition of Dooyeweerd’s New Critique, showing the changes from De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee. But that would be a much longer and more complicated project, since Dooyeweerd’s work is in three volumes, and apart from issues of changes, additions and deletions to the text, there is the issue of several translators involved for different volumes, with the same words being translated in different ways. The text-critical edition of Isagôgè Philosophiae is not an easy text to read since the apparatus for showing revisions frequently gets in the way of the text. There are variant readings within the text, references in footnotes, and appendices. The book is also entirely in Dutch, and most English students of Vollenhoven’s philosophy will likely be better served by the English translation of the 1945 definitive text published by Dordt Press in 2005. Tol says that there are four stages in Vollenhoven’s development of the Isagôgè Philosophiae. There is always a danger in dividing a philosopher’s work into stages. An example of such a misguided use of changes in a text is Cornelius Van Til’s allegation that Dooyeweerd’s New Critique developed a new transcendental approach. Dooyeweerd vigorously denied that this was a change; the transcendental approach can already be found in De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, and the later changes were only a “sharpening” of what was already there. In Vollenhoven’s case, the stages may be justified, since he himself acknowledged making changes. Indeed, one of the reasons that he did not publish this work is that he intentionally left it open for further development. Even the 1945 “definitive” edition cannot be said to represent his final thoughts. In 1967, Vollenhoven said that the revisions that would be required would amount to an entire reworking of the book (Isagôgè 12 fn5). Although Tol has shown what changes Vollenhoven made, his reasons for making these changes are not always clear. And some changes that one would expect to find are not there. For example, Vollenhoven’s philosophy was the subject of an intense investigation 128 by the Curators of the Free University (Friesen 2006c). They required a change to Het Calvinisme en de reformatie van de wijsbegeerte, a book that Vollenhoven published in 1933 based on the Isagôgè Philosophiae. The Curators, who believed that Christ’s human nature was impersonal, took exception to a statement on page 47 of that book as being in conflict with the Dutch Confession of Faith: Het Woord, dat Zich op geheel enige wijze verbond met hem, die, ontvangen uit de Heiligen Geest en geboren uit de maagd Maria, de tweede Adam is..." [The Word, which in a wholly unique way was bound with Him, who was the second Adam, and who was conceived by the Holy Ghost and born of the virgin Mary] Vollenhoven agreed to make the change. Yet we find similar words unchanged in paragraph 134.A.1. of Isagôgè Philosophiae. However, the reference to Het Calvinisme en de reformatie van de wijsbegeerte was deleted (Isagôgè, 200, 414). The Curators were also critical of Vollenhoven’s denial of an immortal soul. In contrast to Dooyeweerd, who said that the soul (as central heart) survived death and that only the body awaited the resurrection, Vollenhoven denied the immortality of the soul. The final version of Isagôgè does not address this issue in any way that would meet the objections of the Curators. This issue of philosophical anthropology was one that Vollenhoven never resolved. When we look at the actual text of Isagôgè Philosophiae, it is striking how different Vollenhoven’s approach to philosophy is from that of Dooyeweerd. There is a lot of theology. And the philosophy, from the opening page, does not look that different from non-Christian philosophy. Vollenhoven writes about analysis and synthesis and abstraction of properties from things, and of making distinctions and connections. It is 100 not at all like Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, which announces a revolution in philosophy, a “New Critique.” Tol says that Vollenhoven did not wish to establish a specific religious 100 In 1923 Dooyeweerd already limited that idea of thesis, distinction and synthesis [stelling, onderscheiding en synthese] to the realm of logic, which forms just one part of the Gegenstand-sphere (cited Verburg 36). To begin with these ideas, as Vollenhoven does, is evidence of a logicism that fails to do Gegenstands-theory before logical analysis. 129 philosophy; he wanted a ‘scientific,’ academic philosophy (Tol, 55). Vollenhoven believed that a reformation of philosophy is not for the sake of the Christian faith but for the current state of philosophy (Isagôgè, 58). But then what is it that makes it specifically a Christian philosophy? And how can it have anything to say to current philosophy? Vollenhoven’s philosophy is based on the method of abstraction of properties from things; in that it is representative of the modern tradition that it would like to criticize. Even those philosophers who have attempted to use Vollenhoven’s ideas have said that his philosophy is rather boring (Olthuis 2006). Vollenhoven emphasizes the making of distinctions in philosophy, but says that every distinction requires that there also be something in common, and that there is a “dialectic” between similarity and identity. The basic methodological rule that he “applies throughout his work” is that “In every case where two things are different, we can ask about the relationship between the two (Tol, 38). If we emphasize the unity of God and creation, we end up with monism and pantheism, but if we emphasize the distinction, we end up with dualism. Both must be rejected and held in balance by this dialectic. Similarly, in discussions about the soul and the body: if we emphasize the unity, we end up in an anthropological monism, and if we emphasize the distinction, we end up with a dualism of soul and body. Dooyeweerd never speaks this way, and this kind of polar dialectic is for Dooyeweerd a sign that there is something wrong with a philosophy (Friesen 2009, Thesis 45 and references). With respect to the modal aspects, Vollenhoven begins with things and their modes as basic ideas that intersect each other. Individual things and modalities are primary and cannot be analyzed further. Both these primary determinants (things and modes) are in a 101 dialectical relationship of difference and connection [verschil en verband]. Both exist together. He calls this the ‘intersection principle’ [doorsnede princip] (Isagôgè, 26). I have previously pointed out the similarity with what Van Eeden says in Redekunstige 101 Grondslag. But Van Eeden also had an idea of the Selfhood, which Vollenhoven rejects.We also find the same idea in Woltjer (see above). 130 For Vollenhoven, individuals are this or that [dit of dat] and modalities are one way or the other [zus of zo]. 102 There are modal determinants and individual determinants (Isagôgè, 23). Vollenhoven speaks of things as determinants. A determinant [bepaaldheid] is “a fitting togetherness of difference and relationship.” He gives as an example, the difference and relation between natural numbers, or the difference and relationship between heaven and earth (Tol, 35, 38). For Vollenhoven, modes are the determinations [bepalingen] of things. They are qualities or predicates, which can be bracketed, abstracted or thought away, “let go of.” Beginning with accidental qualities, and proceeding to more general determinations, we bracket all qualities in order to arrive at the bare minimum determined thing–the “point of greatest indeterminacy,” which is what is subject to law (Isagôgè, 24: “Vandaar dat het bestaan in z’n meest onbepaalde gedaante, onderworpen blijft aan een wet”). “Every predication in this sense, adds a conditioning determination on the existent something” (Tol, p. 35). Vollenhoven speaks in terms of polarities: between the abstract/concrete and the universal/specific, or the universal/individual. In analysis [resolvering, resolution, Isagôgè, 12], we proceed from what is general to what is specific: from the universe to realms and kinds of things and finally to what cannot be further analyzed, individual things and the modalities [modale bepaaldheid]. Late in life, Dooyeweerd criticized reformational philosophers who followed this kind of approach as being “logicistic” (Dooyeweerd 1975a). The modes cannot be determined by progressive abstraction. Dooyeweerd rejected the polar opposition of universal and individual. It derives from Christian Scholasticism, which speaks of universals in the mind of God and also in things (NC I, 387). Vollenhoven’s idea of a law-sphere (as distinct from modal law) is of an area of being subjected to a modal law, and includes all things of the same mode of being (Isagôgè, 28- 29). This is very different from Dooyeweerd’s idea of a law sphere, by which he means the modal nucleus and analogies. For Dooyeweerd, a law-sphere does not include things; things function in all law-spheres. 102 This also comes from Woltjer. 131 Vollenhoven says that different things, whether in the same law-sphere or not, have relations of a certain modality with each other (Isagôgè, 29). Our knowledge is always a knowledge of something that stands in relation. This is another idea that Vollenhoven obtained from Woltjer. Vollenhoven uses predicate logic to explain judgments that we make about these relations. In the idea of simple judgments and how they are combined, we can see the clear influence of Franz Brentano (Isagôgè 243-248 and discussion above). He does not acknowledge this source in the Isagôgè, just as he fails to acknowledge other sources, such as Woltjer. Dooyeweerd criticized the use of predicate logic as depending on an idea of substance (Friesen 2010a). The Isagôgè contains a great deal of theology. His discussion of creation, fall and redemption is not in terms of philosophical Idea, but is based on the exegesis of various Biblical texts. He devotes considerable attention to the doctrine of the covenant as the basis for religion, distinguishing the various kinds of covenant in the Bible (with Adam, with Noah before the Fall, with Abraham, etc.), the kinds of Logos-revelation, the promised Messiah, the Incarnation, Virgin Birth (Isagôgè 177-201, 293-295) It would be interesting to compare how many doctrinal points compare with those Reformed ideas summarized by Schneckenburger. The Isagôgè has the hard doctrinal edge in the comparisons noted in our discussion of these comparisons, especially in the emphasis on boundary between Creator and creature. Whereas Dooyeweerd’s philosophy begins with our experience (Friesen 2009, Thesis 1 and references), Vollenhoven’s The Isagôgè proceeds deductively from theological doctrines that he applies to philosophy. Dooyeweerd regarded Vollenhoven’s philosophy as too theological (Friesen 2005b). Vollenhoven uses theology to try to establish law as boundary between God and creation. But that law is itself unknown to humans; only the phenomenal, expressed law is known (unlike for Dooyeweerd, where we know the supratemporal central law because we ourselves are supratemporal and participate in Christ the New Root). Vollenhoven needs theology to explain the Divine law as boundary, but he cannot philosophically account for the nature of revelation or for its experience by the writers of Scripture. 132 Dooyeweerd follows Chantepie de la Saussaye in his view of Scripture and revelation (Scripture is a revelation of God’s Word, but they are distinct). His idea of expression 103 from out of a center allows philosophy to give an account of the experience of revelation in our heart. But Vollenhoven says that true word revelation is found in the Scriptures, and this means that all other revelation coming from the human heart must be rejected, and regarded as ‘unbelief’ (Isagôgè 88, s. 12). This is certainly related to his fear of mysticism and his giving up of the idea of inner experience (Tol, 252). Vollenhoven uses Scripture as one of the sources for knowledge; Dooyeweerd rejects such a propositional use of Scripture, but says that it speaks to our heart. For Dooyeweerd, exegesis of Scripture is not to be used for determining our Ideas of creation, fall and redemption, the nature of our central religious being, its regeneration, the nature of revelation and the understanding of the incarnation (Friesen 2009, Thesis 42 and references). Although Vollenhoven uses theology to anchor his philosophy, his theology cannot give any rationale for why the modalities, as properties of things that are logically distinguished, have sphere sovereignty and are irreducible to each other. This was Roy Clouser’s difficulty in his dissertation. If logic is the criterion to distinguish the modes, then we cannot prove their irreducibility (Friesen 2010a). The most that Vollenhoven can do with his theological basis is to argue that God created different kinds of things (Isagôgè p. 101, s. 22). Even if that is so, that does not get to Dooyeweerd’s Idea of 104 modal sphere sovereignty, which relies on the temporal expression from out of a supratemporal totality of both a central law and a central subject.105 I have said that this volume is a fine technical achievement. It is. But it is unlikely to win any new adherents to Vollenhoven’s philosophy; those who do not already share his 103 Vollenhoven also refers to Logos revelation in distinction from Scripture, to certain people, animals or angels. There is no idea of revelation from a center to a periphery, as in Dooyewerd (Isagôgè 284 s. 74; Friesen 2009, Theses 65, 66 and references). 104 That may provide a certain defence for creationist science, and Vollenhoven’s philosophy is frequently used that way. Dooyeweerd expressly repudiated creationist science as relying on temporal principles to explain a supratemporal creation. Dooyeweerd has both a law-Idea and a subject-Idea Sphere sovereignty arises because 105 the kernel of a modal law-sphere is supratemporal, as opposed to its temporal analogies. (Friesen 2009, Theses 16, 59 and references). 133 theology will not likely be convinced. And some who are presently committed to his philosophy may be discouraged by the provisional status of even his mature work as well as by its inability to give a philosophical account of our spiritual goals and experience. IV. Conclusion Tol has raised some important issues in reformational philosophy. I am grateful for his review of the early writings of both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. These documents show changes in Vollenhoven’s thought, and they also help us to see ideas that Dooyeweerd rejected in developing his own philosophy. They do not show the influence of Vollenhoven that Tol is so eager to prove. And they show that Vollenhoven’s own philosophy is highly derivative from others. And although Tol asks many of the right questions, his methodology does not permit him to arrive at a true understanding of the emergence of the philosophies of either Vollenhoven or Dooyeweerd. Tol has incorrectly assumed that common terminology 134 indicates a dependence of Dooyeweerd on Vollenhoven. But these terms derive from other sources that Tol has failed to examine. Some terms used by both philosophers, such as ‘gezichtsveld’ or ‘Gegenstand-sphere’ were later abandoned by both. Other terms 106 were used in different senses by Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven; these include terms like ‘Gegenstand,’ or ‘concept and Idea,’ and even ‘modality.’ Neither Vollenhoven nor Dooyeweerd was original. Instead of seeking to establish which philosopher influenced the other, we need to look for the sources on which each of them relied for their very different philosophies. Due primarily to theological disputes at the time, neither philosopher properly documented or acknowledged the sources for his own ideas. But a close examination of his works in comparison to other sources shows that Dooyeweerd’s philosophy was influenced by Frederik van Eeden, A.H. de Hartog, J.H. Gunning, Jr, Chantepie de la Saussaye, and Franz von Baader. Vollenhoven was influenced by Jan Woltjer in his systematic philosophy and by Herman Bavinck in his approach to the history of philosophy. In his philosophical anthropology, Vollenhoven was influenced by Antheunis Janse, who persuaded him to reject the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. As a result, although Vollenhoven adopted the idea that our rationality is only a part of our being, he could not adopt the other theosophical ideas that Dooyeweerd included in his philosophy. Although he had at one time admired the works of de Hartog and de la Saussaye, Woltjer persuaded him to reject those ideas. When viewed in terms of these other sources, the same facts that Tol relies on are given a very different interpretation that is also more consistent than Tol’s interpretation as well as richer in its relation to the history of ideas. Verburg is correct that Dooyeweerd replaced the idea of the Gegenstand-sphere with 106 the theoretical attitude and its Gegenstand-relation (Verburg 38). But even when Dooyeweerd used the term ‘Gegenstand-sphere’ in 1922, it was not with the same meaning as Vollenhoven’s Gegenstand-sphere with eternal ideas of God, but rather a Gegenstand-sphere governed by cosmic categories, or modalities. 135 Both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd wanted to reform philosophy from its scholastic ideas, particularly the dualism of body and soul. They were not original in this desire; Chantepie de la Saussaye already expressed this goal in the 19 century. But Vollenhoven th and Dooyeweerd rejected the body/soul dualism in opposite ways. Due to the influence of Janse, Vollenhoven temporalized man; Dooyeweerd acknowledged man’s center as supratemporal, expressing itself in a temporal periphery. Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd followed different ideas of Kuyper’s neo-Calvinism. The parts that Dooyeweerd chose were Kuyper’s lecture on sphere sovereignty, his Stone Lectures, and his works of a meditative nature. These ideas fit with the ideas of Gunning, de la Saussaye and Baader. Dooyeweerd’s views of time, intuition, the supratemporal selfhood or heart, the heart as religious root, Christ as the New Root, sphere sovereignty, the distinction between central/peripheral, the distinction between concept/idea, modes of experience, analogies, theory as a Gegenstand-relation, the rejection of the autonomy of thought and of the self- sufficiency of thought in relation to our other functions, and his understanding of the Christian ideas of creation, fall and redemption are all remarkably similar to those of Baader (Friesen 2003a). These ideas fit with those parts of Kuyper’s neo-Calvinism that Dooyeweerd embraced because that is where Baader, via Gunning and De la Saussaye, had influenced Kuyper himself. Vollenhoven had an opportunity to adopt the same ideas when Norel’s 1920 article summarized the relation of these ideas to a reformation of science. But because of Vollenhoven’s rejection of the immortality of the soul (Janse’s influence), and Vollenhoven’s inability to accept de Hartog’s panentheistic relation of God and creation, Vollenhoven could not adopt this Christian theosophical alternative to Christian realism. Vollenhoven attempted to still retain the theosophical ideas of rationality being only a part of our being, and of looking at God’s thoughts within creation instead of Christian Realism’s attempt to see God’s eternal Ideas. But because he had no idea of a center expressing itself in a periphery, Vollenhoven fell back on the ideas of his mentor, Jan Woltjer. His Isagôgè reflects many ideas that were derived from Woltjer, including the following: (1) the idea that things and their modes [wijzen] of being are fundamental assumption (2) That modes are by ways of being thus/so [zus/zoo] (3) Modes are characteristics, or properties that define things (4) Knowledge always involves relations 136 (5) The thetical-critical approach to philosophy, asserting and criticizing (6) the sources of our knowledge are nature and Scripture (7) Our everyday experience includes information from others, including their theoretical work. But Vollenhoven differed from Woltjer in two important ways: (1) His philosophical anthropology, which denied the body/soul distinction. Vollenhoven’s philosophical anthropology is not scholastic, but neither is it Calvinistic; it is thoroughly temporalized. This gives difficulties in explaining the afterlife, the idea of revelation, the immanence of God and our present spiritual experience (2) His epistemology, based on abstraction of properties from things, is Aristotelian, and does not differ from the modernism that he wishes to critique (Friesen 2010a). Woltjer emphasized that we have knowledge by our soul’s intuition before any abstraction. Dooyeweerd characterized this viewpoint as logicism (Dooyeweerd 1975a). We cannot decide between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd on the basis of which is more ‘biblical,’ because each philosophy has its own view of the nature of Scripture and revelation. Both philosophies claim to be biblical. And both claim to follow a neo- Calvinist worldview, but they appropriate different parts of Kuyper’s neo-Calvinism. By looking at the sources that influenced both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, we obtain more clarity about their ideas, how they fit into neo-Calvinism and where they differ from it, and how their philosophies diverge from each other as two ways of reforming philosophy. For future studies, I suggest it is important to distinguish between traditional Calvinism, neo-Calvinism, Vollenhoven’s philosophy, and Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. And we need to open up our scholarship to examine all influences on both philosophers. 137 Bibliography Baader, Franz Xavier von: Sämtliche Werke, ed. Franz Hoffmann, (Leipzig, 1851-1860) [‘Werke’]. Baader, Franz von (1818): “Über den Begriff der Zeit,” [Concerning the Concept of Time] Werke 1, 47-94. See my translation online [http://www.members.shaw.ca/ baader/Zeit.html]. Baader, Franz von (1831): “Elementarbegriffe über die Zeit,” (1831).Werke 14, 29-54. See my translation online [http://www.members.shaw.ca/baader/Elementar.html]. Baader, Franz von (1865): Grundzüge der Societätsphilosophie: Ideen über Recht, Staat, Gesellschaft und Kirche, ed. Franz Hoffmann, (Würzburg). 138 Baader, Franz Xavier von (1925): Baaders Schriften zur Gesellschaftsphilosophie, ed. Johann Sauter (Jena: Gustav Fischer). Bavinck, Herman (1908): The Philosophy of Revelation (Longmans, Green). Benz, Ernst (1965), Schöpfungsglaube und Endzeiterwartung. Antwort auf Teilhard de Chardins Theologie der Evolution (Munich). Betanzos, Ramón J. (1998): Franz von Baader’s Philosophy of Love, ed. Martin M. Herman (Passagen Verlag). Boeles, Pieter (1977) 1975 Interview of Dooyeweerd by Pieter Boeles, in Acht civilisten in burger, ed. J.M. van Dunné, P. Boeles and A.J. Heerma van Voss (Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 1977). See my translation online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Interview.html]. Boehme, Jacob (1912): The Signature of all Things (London: J.M. Dent; originally published as De Signatura Rerum in 1622). Bohatec, Josef (1934): Calvin und das Recht (Graz: Verlag Hermann Böhlaus) Brentano, Franz (1995): Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (London: Routledge; originally published as Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte, Leipzig, 1874). Bril, K.A. (2000): D.H.Th. Vollenhoven: Schematische Kaarten. Filosofische concepties in probleemhistorishc verband (Amstelveen: De Zaak Haes). Brown, Stuart C. (1981): Conceptions of Inquiry: A Reader (Open University; Methuen) Brouwer, Anneus Marinus (1905): Daniël Chantepie de la Saussaye: Eene Historisch- Dogmatische Studie (Groningen: J.B. Wolters). Cassirer, Ernst (1911): Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit (Berlin: B. Cassierer). Cassirer, Ernst (1921): Zur Einsteinschen Relativitätstheorie. Erkenntnistheoretische Betrachtungen (Berlin: B. Cassirer). Darnoi, Dennis N. Kenedy (1968): The Unconscious and Eduard von Hartmann: A historico-critical monograph (Martinus Nijhoff). Deursen, Arie van; Morton, Herbert Donald (2005): The Distinctive Character of the Free University in Amsterdam 1880-2005 (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker). Dooyeweerd, Herman (1912-13): Flores Mystici: The Romantic Poetry of Herman Dooyeweerd, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/aevum/Poetry.html] Dooyeweerd, Herman (1914): “Leekengedachten over Richard Wagner en zijn Tristan,” [A Lay Person's Thoughts on Richard Wagner and his Tristan], Opbouw: Maandschrift in dienst der Christ. Levens-en wereldbeschouwing, van en voor jongeren (1914) 5-10; 66-68. See my translation online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/wagner.html] 139 Dooyeweerd, Herman (1915a): “Neo-Mysticism and Frederik van Eeden,” (Almanak van het studenten corps van de Vrije Universiteit, 1915). See my translation online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Mainheadings/Neo-mystiek.html]. Dooyeweerd, Herman (1915b): “De Troosteloosheid van het Wagnerianisme,” [The Disconsolateness of Wagnerianism], Opbouw: Maandschrift in dienst der Christ. Levens- en wereldbeschouwing, van en voor jongeren (1915) 97-112. See my translation online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/ wagnerianism.html]. Dooyeweerd, Herman (1916a): “Een oude schuld aan een paria” [An Old Debt to a Pariah], Opbouw: Maandschrift in dienst der Christ. Levens- en wereldbeschouwing, van en voor jongeren (1916) 161-180. See my translation online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/theater.html]. Dooyeweerd, Herman (1916b): Review of the first publication of the Mededelingen van de Internationale School voor Wijsbegeerte te Amersfoort, Oct 15, 1916, Fraternitas cited Verburg 24). Dooyeweerd, Herman (1922): “Normatieve rechtsleeer. Een kritisch-methodologische onderzoeking naar Kelsen’s normatieve rechtsbeschouwing,” (fragments cited cited in Verburg, 34-38. Dooyeweerd, Herman (1923): “De staatkundige tegenstelling tusschen Christelijk- Historische en Antirevolutionaire partij,” February, 1923; fragments cited by Verburg, 63. Dooyeweerd, Herman (1928): “Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in het licht der wetsidee,” Anti-revolutionaire Staatkunde 2 (1928) 21-124. Dooyeweerd, Herman (1931): De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer (Amsterdam: W. Ten Have). Dooyeweerd, Herman (1935-36), De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, (Amsterdam: H.J. Paris) [‘WdW’], excerpts translated by J. Glenn Friesen, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Mainheadings/Prolegomena1.html]. Dooyeweerd, Herman (1939): “Kuyper’s Wetenschapsleer,” Philosophia Reformata 4, 193-232 Dooyeweerd, Herman (1936-1939), “Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieën op het immantiestandpunt,” Philosophia Reformata 1 (1936), 64-83; 4 (1939), 1-28. Dooyeweerd, Herman (1940), "Het tijdsprobleem in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee', Philosophia Reformata 5, 160-192, 193-234. Partially translated by J. Glenn Friesen at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/ Tijdsprobleem.html]. Dooyeweerd, Herman (1942): “De leer van den mensch in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee”, Correspondentie-Bladen VII (Dec. 1942), first translated as “The Theory of Man: Thirty-two Propositions on Anthropology” (mimeo, Institute for Christian Studies) [http://www.members.shaw.ca/aevum/32Propositions.html]. 140 Dooyeweerd, Herman (1943): "De idee der individualitieteitsstructuur en het thomistisch substantiebegrip" Philosophia Reformata 8 (1943), 65–99; 9 (1944) 1–41, 10(1945) 25ff, 11(1946) 22ff, partially translated by J. Glenn Friesen at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/aevum/Substance.html]. Dooyeweerd, Herman (1946): Encylopedia of Legal Science (Amsterdam: Drukkerij D.A.V.I.D.); partially translated online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/ hermandooyeweerd/Encyclopedia.html]. Dooyeweerd, Herman (1953): A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed) [‘NC’]. Dooyeweerd, Herman (1959): Vernieuwing en Bezinning (Zutphen: J.B. van den Brink). Dooyeweerd, Herman (1961): “De taak eener Wijsgerige Anthropologie,” 26 Philosophia Reformata. Dooyeweerd, Herman (1971a), “Cornelius van Til and the Transcendental Critique of Theoretical Thought,” Jerusalem and Athens (Presbyterian & Reformed). Dooyeweerd, Herman (1971b): “Na vijf en dertig jaren,” 36 Philosophia Reformata, 1- 10. Dooyeweerd, Herman (1975a): De Kentheoretische Gegenstandsrelatie en de Logische Subject-Objectrelatie, Philosophia Reformata 40 (1975) 83-101, translated by J. Glenn Friesen, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Mainheadings/ Kentheoretische.html]. Dooyeweerd, Herman (1975b): Video interview on his 80 th birthday, online at [http://www.filmpjes.nl/v/41684-Dooyeweerd-02]. Dooyeweerd, Herman (1986): Grenzen van het theoretisch denken (Baarn: Ambo), Dooyeweerd, Herman (2007): “Centrum en Omtrek: De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee in een veranderende wereld,” Philosophia Reformata 72 (2007) 1-20. Translation by J. Glenn Friesen, including following discussion following the talk, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/1964Lecture.html]. Driem, George van (2001): Languages of the Himalayas (Brill). Driesch, Hans (1916): Leib und Seele (Leipzig: Reinicke, reprinted 1923). Eeden, Frederik van (1897): De Redekunstige Grondslag van Verstandhouding (Utrecht: Spectrum, 1975, first published 1897). Eeden, Frederik van: Het Lied van Schijn en Wezen, ed. H. W. van Tricht, Zwolle, W.E.J. Tjeenk, 1954, originally published 1892-1922). Eeden, Frederik van (1913): Paul’s Ontwaken (Amsterdam). Faivre, Antoine (1996): Philosophie de la Nature: Physique sacrée et théosophie XVIII- XIX siècle (Paris: Albin Michel). Faivre, Antoine (2000): Theosophy, Imagination, Tradition: Studies in Western Esotericism (Albany: State University of New York). 141 Friesen, J. Glenn (2003a): “The Mystical Dooyeweerd: The Relation of his Thought to Franz von Baader,” Ars Disputandi 3 (2003) [http://www.arsdisputandi.org/ publish/articles/000088/index.html]. Friesen, J. Glenn (2003b): “The Mystical Dooyeweerd Once Again: Kuyper’s Use of Franz von Baader,” Ars Disputandi 3 (2003) [http://www.arsdisputandi.org/ publish/articles/000130/index.html]. Friesen, J. Glenn (2005a), “Dooyeweerd, Spann, and the Philosophy of Totality,” Philosophia Reformata 70, 2-22, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/ hermandooyeweerd/Totality.html]. Friesen, J. Glenn (2005b), “Dooyeweerd versus Vollenhoven: The religious dialectic within reformational philosophy,” Philosophia Reformata 70, 102-132, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Dialectic.html]. Friesen, J. Glenn (2005c), Individuality Structures and Enkapsis: Individuation from Totality in Dooyeweerd and German Idealism, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Enkapsis.html] Friesen, J. Glenn (2006a): “Studies relating to Frederik van Eeden,” online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/jgfriesen/Notes/VanEeden.html]. Friesen, J. Glenn (2006b): “Imagination, Image of God and Wisdom of God: Theosophical Themes in Dooyeweerd’s Philosophy,” [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Imagination.html]. Friesen, J. Glenn (2006c): “The Investigation of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven by the Curators of the Free University,” online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/ hermandooyeweerd/Curators.html]. Friesen, J. Glenn (2007): “J.H. Gunning, Christian Theosophy and Reformational Philosophy” Philosophia Reformata 86-91, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/aevum/Gunning.html]. Friesen, J. Glenn (2008a), “Dooyeweerd, Marlet and the New Catholic Theology: from Baader to Pope Benedict,” (2008), online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/ aevum/Marlet.html]. Friesen, J. Glenn (2008b), “Principles and Positivization: Dooyeweerd and Rational Autonomy. A Response to Michael J. DeMoor,” (2008), online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/aevum/DeMoor.html]. Friesen, J. Glenn (2009): “95 Theses on Herman Dooyeweerd,” Philosophia Reformata 74 (2009), 78-104, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/ 95Theses.html]. Friesen, J. Glenn (2010a): “A Response to Roy Clouser’s Aristotelian Interpretation of Dooyeweerd,” Philosophia Reformata 75, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Clouser.html]. Friesen, J. Glenn (2010b): “Dooyeweerd: The Opbouw Papers,” translated and online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Opbouw.html] 142 Friesen, J. 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Bratt (Eerdmans), originally published as “De Verflauwing der Grenzen,” (Wormser, 1892). Mietus, Lieuwe (2006): Gunning en de theosofie: Een onderzoek naar de receptie van de christelijke theosofie in het werk van J.H. Gunning Jr. van 1863-1876, (Gorinchem: Narratio), reviewed by J. Glenn Friesen, 72 Philosophia Reformata (2007) 86-91, extended version online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/ aevum/Gunning.html]. Mietus, Leo (2009): Gunning en Kuyper in 1978: A. Kuypers polemiek tegen Het Leven van Jezus van J.H. Gunning Jr. (Brochurereeks nr. 28, Velp: Bond van Vrije Evangelische Gemeenten in Nederland). Norel, Okke (1920): “Prof. Gunning als wijsgeerig denker,” Stemmen des Tijds: Maandschrift voor Christendom en Cultuur 9 (1920) 69-80; 139-160. Olthuis, James (2006): “Spiritual Convergence, Philosophical Differences: Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd,” from a conference at Redeemer university College, online at [www.plantinga.ca/rr/dv-olth.pdf]. Plantinga, Theodore (2009): “Understanding Dooyeweerd Better Than He Understood Himself,” Philosophia Reformata 74, 105-114. Saussaye, D. Chantepie de la (1857): “Antwoord aan Ds. J.H. Gunning, Jr.,” Ernst en Vrede 5, 433-449, in Verzameld Werk I, 442-454. Saussaye, D. Chantepie de la (1858): “Empirisch of Ethisch,” Ernst en Vrede 6, 193-247; in Verzameld Werk I, 442-454. Saussaye, D. Chantepie de la (1863): De godsdienstige bewegingen van dezen tijd in haren oorsprong geschetst (Rotterdam: E.H. Tassemeijer). Saussaye, D. Chantepie de la (1870): “Tijd en Eeuwigheid,” in Het Eeuwig Evangelie (Amsterdam: W.H. Kirberger). Sauter, Johannes (1928): Baader und Kant (Jena: Gustav Fischer). Susini, Eugène (1942): Franz von Baader et le romantisme mystique (Paris: J. Vrin). Scheler, Max: Man’s Place in Nature (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1962; originally published as Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, 1928). Schneckenburger, Matthias (1855): Vergleichende Darstellung des lutherischen und reformierten Lehrbegriffs, ed. Eduard Güder (Stuttgart: Metler’schen Buchhandlung). 144 Schoonhoven, Evert Jansen (1945): Natuur en genade bij J.G. Hamann: den Magus van het noorden (1730-1788) (G. F. Callenbach). Schram, P.L. (1978): Entry for “Okke Norel (1882-1959) in Biografisch lexicon voor de geschiedenis van het Nederlands protestantisme (Kampen), Vol. 1, 224. Stellingwerff, Johan (1987): De VU na Kuyper (Kampen: J.H. Kok). Stellingwerff, Johan (1992): D.H.Th. Vollenhoven (1892-1978): Reformator der Wijsbegeerte (Baarn: Ten Have). Stellingwerff, Johan (2006): Geschiedenis van de reformatorische Wijsbegeerte (Stichting voor Reformatorische Wijsbegeerte). Susini, Eugène (1942): Franz von Baader et le romantisme mystique (Paris: J. Vrin). Taljaard, J.A.L. (1955): Franz Brentano as Wysgeeer (Franeker: T. Wever). Tol, Anthony (2010): Philosophy in the Making: D.H.Th. Vollenhoven and the Emergence of Reformed Philosophy (Dordt Press) Tricht, H.W. van: Frederik van Eeden: Denker en Strijder (Amsterdam: Lankamp & Brinkman, undated) Ubbink, J.G. “Wetenschap en Wijsbegeeerte,” Opbouw: Maandschrift in dienst der Christ. Levens-en wereldbeschouwing, van en voor jongeren 1, 25-32. Verburg, Marcel (1989): Herman Dooyeweerd: Leven en werk van een Nederlands christen-wijsgeer (Baarn: Ten Have) Vollenhoven:, D.H.Th. (1914a): “Abelard en het scepticisme,” Opbouw: Maandschrift in dienst der Christ. Levens-en wereldbeschouwing, van en voor jongeren 1, 102- 106. Vollenhoven:, D.H.Th. (1914b): “Sirius en Siderius,” Opbouw: Maandschrift in dienst der Christ. Levens-en wereldbeschouwing, van en voor jongeren 1, 129-132. Vollenhoven:, D.H.Th. (1914c): Review of Frederik van Eeden’s Paul’s Ontwaken Opbouw: Maandschrift in dienst der Christ. Levens-en wereldbeschouwing, van en voor jongeren ______ Vollenhoven:, D.H.Th. (1916): “Henri Bergson,” Opbouw: Maandschrift in dienst der Christ. Levens-en wereldbeschouwing, van en voor jongeren 2, 145-55,175-85, 217-23. Vollenhoven:, D.H.Th. (1916): “Gereformeerd Blijven?—Waarom Niet,” Opbouw: Maandschrift in dienst der Christ. Levens-en wereldbeschouwing, van en voor jongeren ,___-245. Vollenhoven:, D.H.Th. (1921): “Einiges über die Logik in dem Vitalismus von Driesch,” Biologisches Zentralblatt 41 (no. 08, August), 337-358. Vollenhoven:, D.H.Th. (1926a): “Enkele grondlijnen der kentheorie,” Stemmen des Tijds 15 (April) 380-401. Vollenhoven:, D.H.Th. (1926b): Logos en Ratio (Kampen: Kok). 145 Vollenhoven, D.H.Th. (1968): “De Problemen van de tijd in onze kring,” in A. Tol and K.A. Bril: Vollenhoven als Wijsgeer (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1992), 199-211. See my translation online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/ hermandooyeweerd/Tijd.html]. Vollenhoven, D.H.Th. (2000): Schematische Kaarten: Filsosofische concepties in probleemhistorisch verband, ed. K.A. Bril and P.J. Boonstra (Amstelveen: De Zaak Haes) Vollenhoven, D.H.Th. (2010): Isagôgè Philosophiae 1930-1945, ed. Anthony Tol (VU Uitgeverij). Woltjer, J. (1891): “De Wetenschap van den Logos,” (Amsterdam: J.A. Wormser). Woltjer, J. (1896): Ideëel en reëel (Höveker). Appendix A Differences between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd disagreed on almost every major point, whether in ontology, epistemology or theology (Friesen 2005b). I will not repeat my arguments here, but will show Tol’s references to these differences, which are scattered throughout his dissertation. Tol refers to my article (Tol, 19) and acknowledges many of these differences, and even adds some others. A discussion of their internal differences was 146 long kept under cover and private (Tol, 19, 264). Tol speaks of “two founders” of reformational philosophy, and that Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd should not be understood primarily through the other. (Tol, 3) A difference remained between Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven (Tol, 12). The fact that these philosophers differed on such essential points makes irrelevant the issue of whether either influenced the other in the early period of their work. Ontology 1. Dualism, Monism, Nondualism. Tol’s dissertation shows how Vollenhoven wrestled with the meaning of monism and dualism. His meanings of ‘monism’ and ‘dualism’ shifted (Tol, 101). There is no indication of any understanding of Dooyeweerd’s nondualism. 2. Being and Meaning For Dooyeweerd, God alone is Being. He distinguishes between “the Being of God and the meaning of His creation” (NC I, 99). For Dooyeweerd, even our selfhood is not being, but refers to the true being of God, the Origin. Tol acknowledges that for Vollenhoven, being is “this being itself, a this-worldly life- with God” (p. 222). Tol misunderstands Dooyeweerd as ontologizing meaning, an interpretation that Dooyeweerd rejected when it was raised by Stoker. Tol does not discuss Vollenhoven’s view that creation does not refer beyond itself. 3. Place of the Law Vollenhoven’s basic idea is the triad God–law–cosmos. Vollenhoven wants to maintain a strict separation between God and cosmos to avoid pantheism and yet he also wants to allow for God’s immanence in the world. The law is the boundary between God and creation. Tol shows Vollenhoven’s problems with this idea. Vollenhoven’s initial formulation was that there is a duality between God and world, a sharp dividing line between God and creation. Tol says that Vollenhoven’s view in 1927 was that “The 147 divine being is the origin of law, and the divine being, in determining cosmic reality, has nothing in common with the latter” (Tol 36). Tol comments: One misses a sense of God’s continuous presence here. But were one to offset this with an emphasis of God’s immanence, then the balance might be tipped towards pantheism, which makes the status of the world, in its difference from God, problematic (Tol, 170). Tol wants to show that Vollenhoven’s understanding became less dualistic (Tol, 21 fn15); he wants to show “an immanence that matches transcendence.” But Tol sees immanence as the “correlation of norms to what they norm.” God’s immanence consists in maintaining these laws for our knowing. God’s immanence is also shown by the way that he creates each individual by a thing-law, an individualized idea, which controls the actions and appearances of that thing (Tol, 175-6). But that is very different from God’s active involvement in our lives and our mystical participation in Christ, as both Kuyper and Dooyeweerd emphasized. And it is different from Dooyeweerd’s view of creation being “out, from and towards” [uit, door en tot] God. Tol says that the idea of Law as boundary between God and the cosmos became central for Vollenhoven, and it was interpreted in a way to make the scholastic use of ‘concept and idea’ entirely ineffectual. What was previously ‘subjective rationality’ became part of the logical law-sphere. It did not have to seek harmony with ‘objective rationality’, because it is already part of that structure (Tol, 10). Thus, Vollenhoven gave up Christian realism. This is confusing, because Tol says on the same page that central to Vollenhoven’s philosophy at that time is the notion that God’s law is boundary between God and the cosmos. The law is not a part of the cosmos. So this seems to view the law as above cosmos after all. Isn’t this the realist position? Why would not our subjective rationality have to agree with such a transcendent law even if our rationality is within the cosmos? Vollenhoven’s solution is that we know such an identity by virtue of special revelation (Scripture). But if the law is boundary, how is that law still part of our everyday reality? There is a conflict here in the place of the law that Vollenhoven never resolved because he did not have the theosophical idea of a higher reality expressing itself in a lower. 4. Totality and individuality 148 Tol does not discuss Dooyeweerd’s idea of totality, and individuation from out of totality. The early Vollenhoven did believed that God particularized general Ideas into individuals. But that is not the same as the Idea of totality, and especially not the idea of a created totality. Tol says that Vollenhoven has no use for ‘wholes’ or ‘things’ in the special sciences at all. When Vollenhoven looks at ‘fields of inquiry’ or 'law-spheres’, things or wholes are not the primary data, but rather the functioning that becomes discernible when considering the “intersection” of law-spheres and wholes/things (Tol, 245-6). 5. Cosmic time Dooyeweerd emphasizes that the idea of cosmic time is the basis of his philosophical theory of reality (NC I, 28). Dooyeweerd says that Vollenhoven had raised objections to his understanding of time, but that Vollenhoven had not completely thought through his critique. Tol tries to make comparisons between Dooyeweerd’s idea of cosmic time and what Vollenhoven says in his dissertation about the experience of the succession of time. But the experience of the succession of time is already found in Van Eeden. And Vollenhoven was not using the idea of time that Dooyeweerd obtained from Baader with the distinctions eternal/supratemporal/temporal. 6. Supratemporal heart Vollenhoven rejected that line of Kuyper’s neo-Calvinism that relies on a supratemporal central unity of man’s existence, which is also found in Gunning, de la Saussaye and Baader. In his thesis, Vollenhoven says that the soul is a supratemporal substance. He refers to his views as “theistic, dualistic intuitionism.” Influenced by Janse, Vollenhoven later rejected any idea of the immortality of the soul. He substituted a temporalized view of the heart as a pre-functional unity. It is the principle of our directedness either towards or away from 107 God. As discussed, it is unclear how a principle can survive death. Vollenhoven’s 107 Added in 1941. See Isagôgè, 159 s. 92). Criticized by Dooyeweerd (NC I, 31 fn1). 149 philosophical anthropology is therefore even more problematic than that of Janse. Janse at least allowed that our spirit survives death. 7. Man as image of God The clarification of the reformational principles of the Free University stated that these principles were based on “the human being’s being created according to God’s image.” Vollenhoven did not accept such a metaphysical use of ‘image of God.’ (Tol, 49 fn51). He said there was a danger of identifying the image with only a group of functions. Dooyeweerd used ‘image of God’ in the sense of how we, like God, express or reveal ourselves from a higher sphere to a lower (Friesen 2009, Theses 64-66 and references) He [God] has expressed His image in man by concentrating its entire temporal existence in the radical religious unity of an ego in which the totality of meaning of the temporal cosmos was to be focused upon its Origin (NC I, 55). 9. Self and ego Vollenhoven does not discuss any such distinction, and rejects even the idea of a selfhood. A recent article by Gerrit Glas expresses interest in looking at this distinction (Glas 2010). I suggest that Dooyeweerd’s idea of our act structure, with its enkaptic intertwinement of other bodily individuality structures (Dooyeweerd 1942), might be the basis for Dooyeweerd’s idea of the ego as opposed to the selfhood. 10. Enkapsis Dooyeweerd’s idea of enkapsis depends on his idea of individuality structures, which Vollenhoven rejected (Tol, 371 fn216). So Vollenhoven did not accept enkapsis, either. There is no discussion of enkapsis in Tol’s dissertation. 11. Modalities Vollenhoven did not agree that modes are modes of consciousness (Tol, 409, 501). But if that is so, then Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd are not talking about the same idea. Vollenhoven’s view of the modes or aspects became one of describing the functions or properties of things, which we know by abstraction. Dooyeweerd criticized this view as 150 based on logicism (Dooyeweerd 1975a). In avoiding the Platonic world of Ideas used in Christian realism, Vollenhoven has incorporated an Aristotelian view (Friesen 2010a). 108 For Dooyeweerd, the modes are given in an order of time; there is an earlier and a later mode; for Vollenhoven, the order is not one of time, but of ever-greater complexity (p. 25 fn19, 29). Tol does not seem to undersand how this order could be anything other than logical, unless we see them in an order of aesthetic harmony (Tol, 323 fn164). In Isagôgè, Vollenhoven (following Woltjer) says that modalities are one of two fundamental determinants. This is not Dooyeweerd’s view, which gives an ontical priority to the modes over individuality structures (Friesen 2009, Thesis 21 and references). 12. Sphere sovereignty Vollenhoven did not like the term ‘sphere sovereignty.’ He thought that it was “too easily confused with the sovereignty that belongs to God alone” (p. 68, fn82). In any event, he uses the term in a different way from Dooyeweerd. In his last article Gegenstandsrelatie, Dooyeweerd says that not even the aspects can be understood apart from the supratemporal selfhood. The idea of the irreducibility of the modal spheres “cannot be separated from the transcendental idea of their root-unity in the religious center of human existence” (Dooyeweerd 1975a, 100). He says on the same page that the “meaning-kernels cannot be interpreted in an intra-modal logical sense without canceling their irreducibility.” For Dooyeweerd, sovereignty operates from out of the center. Thus, the central nuclear moment of the modal sphere is what guarantees its sovereignty. The center is supratemporal, thus in a higher region. Similarly, God’s sovereignty is also from out of the center, from a higher region to a lower region. Vollenhoven’s logicism extends to his approach to his problem-historical approach to 108 the history of philosophy. Dooyeweerd criticizes Vollenhoven for “overestimating the part that logic is to play in historical research.” Tol says that this is a result of mistranslation of Vollenhoven’s word ‘consequent’ (Tol, 270 fn78), but this ignores Vollenhoven’s early usage of ‘consequent’ to mean logically consistent, following the usage of Woltjer. 151 Without the idea of supratemporality and the root-unity, and the distinction between center and periphery, Vollenhoven cannot have this same understanding of sphere sovereignty insofar as it relates to the modalities. The first use of ‘sphere sovereignty’ by Vollenhoven appears to be in his 1921 article. But even Tol admits this is not used in Kuyper’s sense. And it is certainly not the same as Dooyeweerd’s understanding of sphere sovereignty, since it is related to different domains of logic. It is a logicistic use of sphere sovereignty. Contrary to Tol (Tol 45), the idea of sphere sovereignty is not the same as the societal pillars or zuilen, at least as ‘sphere sovereignty’ is used in Dooyeweerd (Dooyeweerd 1959, 47-48). Sphere sovereignty does not apply to authority from the state ot other bodies. 13. Sphere universality Stellingwerff says that Dooyeweerd first introducded this idea in 1928 (Stellingwerff 1987, 125). Vollenhoven did not accept the idea of sphere universality, at least as used by Dooyeweerd (Tol 375 fn 222). Vollenhoven denies anticipations in modes except as exemplified in things. Sphere universality is the basis for Dooyeweerd saying that our act of theoretical unfolds our understanding of the modal spheres. The act of knowing is qualified by the analytical aspect, and this modal sphere contains within itself analogies to all the other modal spheres. These analogies are opened up when we place our act of knowing over against [tegenovergesteld] the other modes of consciousness, which are identified and distinguished only in theory. Only in this way do we understand the modal sphere (nuclear moment and its analogies). But the nuclear moment of the modality stays in the supratemporal realm, where it coincides with the other modes. It is this nuclear moment that provides the “sovereignty” in the sphere. This is just as God’s sovereignty is given from a more central sphere than the temporal world. Tol thinks that this is the scholastic need for agreement between subjective reason and objective reason all over again (Tol 375). But Tol’s argument mistakenly assumes (again!) that the cosmic order is logical, that it is “objective reason.” That is precisely what Dooyeweerd denies. The cosmic order is given by cosmic time, an order of before and after. Nor is this a “hermeneutical circle” 152 (Tol. 376). Totality, which includes the sovereign nuclear moment, is expressed in the law-sphere as analogies. The expression is from out of the center into the periphery; this is not the part/whole distinction that Tol claims. In our Ideas and concepts, there is a circular reasoning; that is what ‘encyclopedia’ means (Dooyeweerd 1946). But it is not a vicious circle. Our Ideas are from out of the center to the periphery and our concepts are from the periphery to the center. 14. Specific modalities Apart from disagreeing as to what modalities are, Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd disagreed as to the nature of specific modalities like the historical. This is not discussed. Epistemology 15. Subject-object relation Tol does not discuss Vollenhoven’s disagreement with Dooyeweerd’s subject-object relation. 16. Theoretical and pre-theoretical Vollenhoven’s view of pre-theoretical experience is also different from Dooyeweerd in that he includes under it the information given in Scripture as well as information we receive from others, even if that information was a result of their theoretical work (Tol 21; 61 fn72). Neither of these are included in Dooyeweerd’s idea of naive experience. 109 For one thing, Dooyeweerd did not regard Scripture as a source of information; he regarded Vollenhoven’s work as much too theological rather than philosophical. And Dooyeweerd did not agree that what we are told of theory is non-theoretical. For Dooyeweerd, our pre-theoretical knowledge does not even have implied knowledge of matters that are first raised in theory (Dooyeweerd 1975a). 109 This idea of information comes from Woltjer. It is already in Vollenhoven’s 1926 article (Vollenhoven 1926a), 383. He warns that we have to distinguish between Divine and human information. 153 Tol says that Vollenhoven viewed pre-theoretical experience in terms of “common sense.” But that places Vollenhoven in the tradition of Thomas Reid, and not Kuyper’s neo-Calvinism, which is where he wants to place Vollenhoven (Tol, 61 fn 72). 17. Gegenstand-relation and abstraction Vollenhoven’s idea of theory as abstraction is not the same as Dooyeweerd’s idea of the Gegenstand-relation. Tol mistakenly assumes that Dooyeweerd is using the same idea of ‘Gegenstand’ as in Meinong, which Vollenhoven used (Tol, 13) But ‘Gegenstand’ is already found in Baader, and in a sense that corresponds to Dooyeweerd’s use of setting it “over-against our thought” [tegenoverstellen, gegenüberstellen] (Friesen 2003a). To the extent that Vollenhoven continued to use the term ‘Gegenstand,’ he confuses it with object. Tol says The Gegenstand is then no longer ‘formed’, but is already there for the sake of consciousness and given with the world. It only needs to be focussed on (in an act) and attended to (as content) (Tol, 327). Dooyeweerd’s idea of intentionality is very different from Husserl’s idea of directeness towards an object, and he insisted on a distinction between the naïve subject-object relation and the Gegenstand-relation in theory. 18. Intuition Insofar as Dooyeweerd uses the idea of intuition, he is not indebted to Vollenhoven. It is used by Van Eeden, de la Saussaye, and Baader. For Dooyeweerd, there is both a pre-theoretical as well as a theoretical use of intuition. In theory, once we have split temporal reality apart into a dis-stasis, we need to bring it together again into a synthesis. We do this by means of our intuition. Our intuition is required for the inter-modal meaning synthesis. This intuition is “necessarily related to the transcendent selfhood” (NC II, 478). Our intuition relates this synthesis to our religious root (supratemporal selfhood). Vollenhoven cannot have this idea of intuition without the idea of a supratemporal selfhood. Janse’s influence also caused Vollenhoven to change his idea of intuition. It is no longer to be understood as monadic and solipsistic in the concrete intuition (Tol, 219- 154 220). There is a warning against substituting childlike faith with inner experience [innerlijke ervaring], or mystical experience (Tol, 242). 19. Concept/Idea For Dooyeweerd, this distinction is based on the distinction between central and peripheral (Dooyeweerd 1946; Dooyeweerd 2007). Vollenhoven did not refer to ‘ideas’ after 1923 (Tol 370 fn216). Theology 20. Use of Scripture for philosophy Dooyeweerd did not use Scripture as a source for his philosophy, although he did sometimes show that his philosophy accorded with Scripture. Dooyeweerd’s philosophy begins with experience, and he is critical of a propositional use of Scripture (Friesen 2009, Thesis 1 and references). Dooyeweerd denied that issues concerning the nature of the soul, or of creation, fall and redemption, regeneration, revelation or even incarnation could be settled by exegesis of Scripture (Dooyeweerd 2007 and Discussion). Vollenhoven does not have that view of revelation, and can only say that Scriptures are a result of Logos-revelation (Tol, 257 fn58). Dooyeweerd’s use of Scripture is in many ways similar to that of de la Saussaye, on whom he obviously relied (See Appendix D). Vollenhoven does use Scripture as a source for knowing. “Scripture is a ‘means that informs,’ i.e., conveys truths about realities, truths the human being would not have surmised without speculation or adequate control (Tol, 40-41). Vollenhoven used Scripture not only for what it says of the angelic realm of the “heavens” (Tol, 29 fn23, 259; Isagôgè 23), but also for what it says of the covenant with God (Isagôgè 177-201, 293-295). Heaven is the abode of angels and spirits, and they influence conduct on earth. But Tol is right that Vollenhoven does not say how this occurs, and so “he failed to indicate how this illuminates the human condition” (Tol, 259). 21. Creation, fall and redemption 155 The move from Christian Idealism to a view of modalities depends on the idea of creation [‘scheppingsidee’ in Gunning]. Vollenhoven cannot understand creation in the same way since he does not have the idea of supratemporality and temporality. Nor can he explain (or even agree with) the fall of temporal reality in the fall of mankind. And with respect to redemption, he does not have the same idea of Christ as the New Root, and our participation in Him. Indeed, when the Association for Calvinistic Philosophy was being set up, Vollenhoven objected to the idea of New Root (Stellingwerff 1987, 207-8). For Dooyeweerd, the cosmos is only the temporal, earthly part of creation. The “heavens” include man’s central heart as well as the angelic realm: it is a “created eternity” that is intermediate between God and temporal reality, and man was created so that he might rule the “earthly” realm. But it is interesting that Vollenhoven does believe in the prior fall of angels (Isagôgè, 100 s. 21)., and the influence of those angels on man. Tol correctly points out that he does not explain how that influence is possible (Tol, 259). 22. Religious philosophy Vollenhoven wanted academic philosophy: The sounding board for academic philosophy is cosmology insofar as this concerns the referent of the realities in connection with which distinctions are made, connections are laid, and a general understanding is pursued of ‘how things are and develop‘ in a network of determinants (Tol, 56). Vollenhoven says that where ”philosophy is the channel of religious meaning, cognition is expected to be the modus that answers to religious need” (Tol, 64). Philosophy ought to respect worldview reflection, and refrain from imposing its more general categories on real life (Tol, 67). Spiritualism, Gnosticism, Neo-Platonism, etc. tend to interpret the experience of knowing as indicative of an illumination by divinity, or at least an involving of deity (Tol, 71). Tol says that Vollenhoven, the Reformed understanding of 110 Stellingwerff defines Gnosticism as the descent of the Divine to man and mysticism as 110 the ascent to God, and finds both in Kuyper (Stellingwerff 1987, 50, 53). In my view, both are an over-simplification. Gnosticism viewed the temporal world as something we need to escape from; Dooyeweerd (and Baader) opposed any such spiritualistic flight. Koslowski has shown how Baader’s theosophy was not Gnostic (Koslowski 2001). Nor 156 philosophy is delimited by a three-fold polarity: sovereignty-subservience duality, freedom-responsibility duality and knowing agent-known referent duality (Tol, 73). Dooyeweerd is not Gnostic or neo-Platonic, but he would question what is wrong with involving God in our knowing. I would also point out that one of the clarifications of the reformational principles was that it deal with how God’s regeneration affects our illumination. And Dooyeweerd does not just speak of cognition, but of our participation [deelneming] in Christ the New Root. And Dooyeweerd would certainly not accept that our rebirth is a matter of conceptual or propositional understanding. 23. Spirituality: Vollenhoven believed we could have knowledge of God, but that such depends on revelation (Tol, 71). Dooyeweerd agrees that revelation is required, but his idea of revelation is much broader. Revelation or ‘openbaring’ is the expression of a being from a higher ontical level to a lower. God reveals Himself from eternity to the created levels; humans reveal (openbaar) themselves by expression into the temporal realm. (Friesen 2009, Thesis 65 and references). Without the idea of the supratemporal heart, we cannot understand God’s revelation or Christ’s incarnation (Dooyeweerd 2007, Discussion). And we certainly cannot have the kind of spirituality that Kuyper describes in his meditations. 24. Central Peripheral. In 1941, Vollenhoven ceased speaking in terms of the heart as center, but only as direction-determining (Tol, 477 fn164). This is very helpful information, as is Tol’s comment that Vollenhoven believed that this denigrated the periphery. But that is a misunderstanding. The principle of embodiment requires that every center has a nature or periphery in order to express itself, and the fact that the periphery is denigrated is not due to its being the periphery, but because it is fallen from the center. Dooyeweerd says we fell from our central selfhood. The temporal world was already fallen when man was created. did Dooyeweerd believe in an identity with God; his mysdticism was that of panentheism, and participation in God. 157 Appendix B Frederik van Eeden (1860-1932) 1. De Redekunstige Grondslag van Verstandhouding [The Linguistic Basis of Understanding] Although he is critical of Spinoza, Van Eeden adopts his idea of modes. Spinoza says “Ens rationis nihil esst prater modum cognitandi” [something that is determined by reason is nothing other than a mode of thought] and “modos cogitandi non esse ideas rerum” [modes of thought are not ideas of things]. Van Eeden says that it does not make much sense to refer to God as ‘res cogitans’ [thinking Being], since that is only one attribute. ’Cogitatio’ is a dangerous term for the highest Being, since it leads to attempt to name the unnameable in human modes of thinking. What Spinoza calls ‘Cogitatio,’ [thinking] Boehme calls ‘Mysterium Magnum,’ [Great Mystery] and Nicolas van Cusa, ‘Comprehensio incomprehensibilis’ [the incomprehensible concept]. In Descartes’ “dubito, cogito, ergo sum” [I doubt, I think, therefore I am], he seeks the center of certain in thought and not in being, thus in appearance and not in reality (#51). Van Eeden says that mathematics is a mode [wijze (modus)] of reality, imaged in our thoughts represented by symbols (#9). Space and time are also modes [#104). So is movement (#139). In our thought, we make comparisons by images or representations; these are appearances, modes. We cannot make modes into things [van modus tot ens gemaakt] (#41). Van Eeden mentions the importance of intuition. Whatever is highest and best in us is known by us independently of philosophy or science. We know existence by intuition, feeling and inner sense. We express this directly in art, music and poetry (#27d). The highest knowledge is where there can be no talk of perception or of reason. It is intuitive knowledge [weten]. It is the ‘veritas sicuti se habet’ [the truth as it really is] of Thomas à Kempis, the incomprehensible understanding, the ‘Visio sine Comprehensione’ [vision without concept], Boehme’s ‘Mysterium Magnum.’ But Spinoza, who granted this same certainty to thoughts and arithmetical concepts, was not sufficiently mindful of the distinction between imagination and being, or else he did not reflect on the fact that imaging and comparison already begins in all thinking, every concept, every word; in 158 such thoughts, one can merely speak of a limit, and not of absolute knowledge. The distinction between such weten, this highest absolute knowledge and the everyday more 111 or less relative knowledge that thinks, represents and images, is emphasized by all mystics and by the most philosophically inclined. St. John of the Cross speaks of “le dénouement de toutes images, même les plus sublimes’ [the denuding of all images, even of the most sublime]. Jacob Boehme says, “Wer mysterium magnum findet, der findet alles darinnen; es darf keinen Buchstaben-beweis.” [Whoever finds mysterium magnum will find everything within it; it needs no verbal proof (#109). Vollenhoven’s later idea of a matrix or “intersection principle” of concrete things and modes that are abstracted from it (Tol, 14) is similar to Van Eeden’s idea that what is concrete and what is abstract are two streams that do not cross over into each other, but remain in constant coherence (#15). We find the same idea in Woltjer. Van Eeden says that our thoughts are like what is called a limit in mathematics; they approach, but can never reach the absolute (#54). Reason is restricted to its area [gebied]. Both science and mysticism show the desire for the Absolute, or, as Spinoza would say, amor Dei [love of God] (#83). To deny science is just as godless as to deny mysticism (#96). Some of the greatest mathematicians are mystics (#89). All of higher mathematics is based on Mystery (#113). Van Eeden also speaks of the selfhood, which seeks rest and unity (#61). The selfhood exists outside of time (#105). To free oneself from the idea of time is the most important and difficult work of thought. It is the key to all higher wisdom. As Emerson says, in the manner in which someone speaks about this, one can always tell whether he is a true enlightened person, a truly wise person, or someone who talks about things of which he knows nothing. Jesus said, “Before Abraham was, I am,” not “I was.” Schleiermacher says that we incorrectly seek immortality after time instead of within and above time (#124a). Whoever understands ‘soul’ as something other than the Self cannot say that the soul is immortal. But it is certain that everything that immediately and wholly depends on Note: Van Eeden seems to equate the Dutch ‘weten’ not with German ‘wissen’ but with 111 the German ‘kennen.’ 159 our body must end with death. That does not mean that there can be no sensation without the body (#129). He distinguishes between the selfhood that perceives and that which is perceived, the not- I [niet-ik]. (#64). Vollenhoven devotes considerable discussion to the not-I. Mystics are included to seek the absolute in what affects the circumstances of their soul, the immediately known reality (#90). All rational thought is inseparable from movement, change and succession of time [tijdsverloop] (#78). This idea of succession of time appears not only in Brouwer, but also in both Vollenhoven’s and Dooyeweerd’s thought. Van Eeden speaks of abnormal awareness of time. The feeling of déjà vu is one of the evidences that our selfhood exists out of time (#105). If one wants to speak of a direction of life and a goal, then one can name only one goal: God, the absolute, the One and unchanging (#156). And in the conclusion to Redekunstige Grondslag, Van Eeden gives an immanent critique of Kant’s philosophy. Words like soul, spirit, consciousness, understanding, reason, desire, will, cause, direction, goal, origin, freedom are often used in very imprecise ways (*#116, #144-49). It is the consequence of Kant’s critique that leads to the rejection of his method. For his way of speaking appears to be scientific and yet lacks all certainty of scientific expression, because almost none of the nouns that he uses has a well-defined, unchanging, value that remains the same in all times and languages. 2. Het Lied van Schijn en Wezen [The Song of Appearance and Reality] Dooyeweerd acknowledges reading Het Lied van Schijn en Wezen [The Song of Appearance and Reality] (Dooyeweerd 1915a). This is a long poem, written between 1892 and 1922, and shows the progression of Van Eeden’s thought from Hindu monism to Christian thought (he converted to Catholicism). At the time that Dooyeweerd wrote his article on Van Eeden, only the first two parts of this poem had been published. By 1922, a significant date for Tol’s analysis, all of this book would have been published. There are some remarkable parallels to Dooyeweerd’s own thought. 160 The Self For Van Eeden, the Self is a unity above time, a concentration of what is temporal. maar zie toch, geen is eenzaam, allen houën te zamen in één Zelf, dat verre blijft boven gescheidenheid, brandpunt der lijnen die ‘t leven aller enkelen beschrijft (Lied I, V 80) [But see, none is alone, all hold together in one Self, that far endures above diversity, the focus of all lines that life de-scribes for individuals]. This Idea of the Self as the focus of the individual lines is the converse of the image of the prism that splits the Self into diversity: want alles wat bestaat wordt ook beschouwd door die oneindig fijne spleet, die ‘t Leeven splitst als wit licht, in kleuren meenigvoud (Lied, III, II, 43) [for all existence can be contemplated through the prism, infinitely fine, which splits our Life in colours manifold, from the white light]. and ‘t prisma, waardoor haar diadeem van kleuren ‘t simpelte wit ontvouwt, (Lied, III, III, 13) [The prism by which her diadem of colours from simple white unfolds, ] The self is above time, and both van Eeden and Dooyeweerd say that it is because our selfhood stands outside of time that we can measure time. der vluchtige seconden wordt beseft door ‘t Zelf, dat op de wieken der gedachte zich aldus uit den stroom des tijds verheft Wat acht geeft weet zich boven het beachte, en wie den tijd als een beweging ziet moet vaster staan dan ‘t ding dat hij betrachtte en drijft niet mee in der seconden vliet. Wie eens den top der heldre zelfbezinning verrukt besteeg, vreest in die ruimten niet de macht des tijds (Lied II, X 37) 161 [the passing seconds are perceived by the Self, that elevates itself from out the stream of time upon the wings of thought What gives attention knows itself above what is attended to and if as movement we perceive the time we must stand surer than the things we practice, and with the passing seconds cannot move. Whoever once the top of self-reflection clear ec-static climbs, no longer fears within his space the power of time]. Even the idea of our body as a cloak [functiemantel] is at least somewhat related to the idea of a temporal cloak: God’s aandacht waakt, en uit het tijdlijk kleed redt Hij de schoone en werkelijke dingen en niets vergaat wat van Zijn Wezen weet (Lied II, VI 28). [God attentively watches, and from the temporal cloak he saves the real and beautiful and nothing is lost that knows of His Being] Intuition (‘Schouwen’) We know our Self by intuition, ‘zelfschouw’: Maar diepe zelfschouw voert ons onvermijdlijk tot aan der zoom waar in een wijder Al vervloeit de schijnbare eenheid van ons tijdlijk persoonlijk zelf, als beekje in Oceaan, waar vele in één versmolten onafscheidelijk in andre ruimte en ander licht bestaan (Lied, II, X, 50) [Deep self-reflection drives us ever on towards the border of a wider All wherein our self, a seeming unity of personality and time flows like a brook into the sea, the manifold now melted into One, inseparate, existing in another space, another light.] Again, it is too simplistic for Tol to argue that Dooyeweerd’s use of ‘schouwen’ comes from Vollenhoven’s use of the term (Tol, 78 fn9, 205, 298, 301-2, 305, 501, 520). Dooyeweerd was aware of it long before, and its source is in Baader [schauen], and in Boehme and the mystics. It is also in Chantepie de la Saussaye (Appendix D). Van Tricht comments on Van Eeden’s idea of ‘schouwen’: 162 Intuïtie en verstand wijzen daarbij, schouwen en scheidend, de weg....De intuïtie, bron der ware wijsheid, ziet vanzelf de Richting, als de ziel zuiver van structuur, harmonisch van organisatie is. Het verstand helpt door onderscheiding, tussen de velerhande strevingen, allereerst tusssen de werkelijke, soms onbewuste wil en de bewuste bedoeling...(Van Tricht, 72). [Intuition and understanding, intuiting and distinguishing, show the way...Intuition, source of true wisdom, sees by itself the true Direction, provided that the soul is pure in its structure and harmoniously organized. Understanding helps by distinguishing between the many various strivings, especially between the actual, often unconscious will and the conscious intention.] Direction Van Eeden says that our acting can be in two directions: the direction of Being and that of non-being. The directions of those of life and death. Het Ik, dat doet de keuze, ‘t leidend weten, dat Richting geeft (Lied I, XII, 55) [The Self, that makes the choice, a knowing that leads and gives direction] Van Eeden emphasizes that nothing exists apart from the Selfhood, and that we make the not-I are own: Geen ding bestaat, zoo niet het Ik ‘t beleeft, zich voelend, denkend, teegenwoordig weetend, schoon het al schijnbaar door ‘t on-eig’ne zweeft en zoekt een weg, herinn’rend, tastend, meetend in wat een onbekende waereld schijnt. Oneigen wordt tot eigen, want gekeetend blijkt alle Zijn, hoe men ‘t begrip verfijnt, aan Zelfbesef in altijdduurend Heeden, en alle zin van ‘t woord “niet-ik” verdwijnt (Lied, III, II, 55). [Nothing exists except as it is lived by Self, as feeling, thinking, knowing in the present, although the seeming real is in not-I suspended, and seeks a way, in memory, taste and measure in what seems to be a world unknown. Not-mine becomes my own, for all of Being is attached to consciousness of self, in the forever resting present (however we refine this thought), and all the sense of "not-I" disappears]. 163 Dooyeweerd also speaks of the importance of making temporal reality “our own” including our temporal body, and he also says that the temporal world does not exist except in so far as it is rooted in the Selfhood. Law-Idea Van Eeden even has a law-Idea. één vaste Wet in elke levenssfeer (Lied II, IX, 78) [one fixed law in every sphere of life] That reference is more to the fact that one law applies to every person, whatever his or her social status; it speaks more of justice. But elsewhere he refers to the law in more general terms–as the power in the distant stars and the near tiny cells, and says it is the same law that holds for all: Eenzelfde kracht, op eender wijs, houdt tevens de verste vaste sterren in hun baan en dwingt der cellen kleinste deeltjes nevens elkander den bestemden weg te gaan. De soorten aller plante’ en dieren strijden ieder voor zich, als waar van elk ‘t bestaan der schepping éénig doel. Allen benijden elkander ruimte en levensduur en macht, toch zijn ze in schijn slechts, en nooit scherp gescheiden Eén Gods-wet geldt voor allen en de kracht der Almacht houdt hen feilloos strak verbonden als kind’ren van één éénig Gods-geslacht (Lied II, VIII, 79) [The one same power in different ways holds for the orbits of the distant stars and also forces smallest parts enclosed by cells to in succession go their own determined way. The animals and plants of every kind fight for themselves, as if creation's goal were but their life. They all desire space and length of life and power, But they are maya only, not distinct. God's law is One, and holds for all. His mighty power holds them and connects them now as children of one single race of God.] 164 Fitted And in his later more Christian period, Van Eeden includes the idea of our being ‘fitted’ [gezet] in the temporal order. This is remarkable similar to what Dooyeweerd says when he introduced the law-Idea, with its idea of being gezet. ‘t Groeyen mijns Weezens laat zich niet gebieden, maar vergt zijn tijd en volgt verheev’ner Wet. Niet mijne, maar Gods wilkeur moet geschieden. Ik ben in dit rampzalig oord gezet tot kwijting van mij niet bewuste schulden (Lied III, VI, 16) [My being's growth cannot be commanded, but needs its time and follows Law above, Not mine but God's will here must come to pass. I 'm fitted here within this wretched order to pay my still unknown unconscious deeds] Unfolding We are to “unfold the law” by God's Spirit Geen levend wezen bleef er gansch ontbloot dier grootste gaaf. Zij is ‘t, die doet in flauwe daging de celletjes in jong loot, vereend en stil, uit lucht en water bouwen hun wondre bloemen en ‘t belooverd hout, maar zij ook wekt den mensch tot diep zelf-schouwen en tot ontvouwen van Gods wet, die houdt de pracht te samen met standvastig glanzen, door Zijn hand in der heemlen leeg gebouwd (Lied I, XII, 58) [No living being is completely bare of this your greatest gift. For in the faintness of the dawn, alone and still, cells of young shoots are built by her from air and water wondrous flowers and the promised wood; she also wakes us up to introspection deep and to unfolding of God's law, that holds the glory with its steadfast beams, built in the empty heavens by His hand]. 165 Coincidence of laws and Coherence In the One, there is a coincidence of individual laws and “a coherence of the spheres of limitation”: Want in het Al bestaat geen ding alleenig, geen kracht, geen wet, geen wezen, geen verstand. Al ‘t enkle heeft zijn aard en deugd door ‘t menig, als klanken in ‘t symfonische verband zijn wat zij zijn,–daarbuiten zonder werking. Een eindloos wijder spreiden web omspant met samenhang de kringen van beperking. (Lied I, IX, 40) [For in the All nothing exists alone, no power, law, no intellect or being, the ground and virtue of the sole lies in the many they are as sounds within symphonic unio what they are,–apart from this without effect. An infinitely wider web now comprehends in a coherence of the spheres of limitation]. In this connection, we must remember that Dooyeweerd refers to the law as “limiting and determining” our selfhood (WdW I, 13). Love By the end of Het Lied van Schijn en Wezen, van Eeden has moved to his Catholic faith. He says, Laat mij Uw liefde in al wat leeft bemerken bestraal mijn weg met Uw drievoudig licht: Uw Vaderschap, Uw Geest, Uw Liefde-werken (Lied III, XII, 23) [Let me see your love in everything that lives Shine with your threefold light upon my way: Your Fatherhood, Your Spirit, and your works of Love]. Van Eeden speaks of "gravity" which is called love (Lied III, VIII, 37). This is one of Baader's views of gravity in the sciences, and the basis for attraction. 166 Appendix C J. H. Gunning, Jr. (1829-1905) J.H. Gunning, Jr. and Chantepie de la Saussaye introduced the Christian theosophy of Franz von Baader (1765-1841) to Reformed theology in the Netherlands. The term ‘Christian theosophy’ will sound strange to many reformational philosophers. The word ‘theosophy’ literally means “the Wisdom of God.” Christian theosophy emphasizes the 112 role of God’s Wisdom, or Sophia. Wisdom is not a Person distinct from the Trinity, but it is the mirror of God. Christian theosophy is a tradition that extends from Jacob Boehme 113 (1575-1624) to William Law (1686-1761), Friedrich Christian Oetinger (1702-1782), Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin (1743-1803), and Franz von Baader (1765-1841), and from Baader to others, including Gunning and Kuyper. Mietus is careful to emphasize the orthodox nature of Christian theosophy, as found in Gunning and Baader. Christian theosophy is theistic, and holds firmly to the Christian ideas of creation and redemption of the world and of men by God. Relying on the previous work of Antoine Faivre and Peter Koslowski, Mietus contrasts Christian theosophy with the later theosophy of Madame Blavatsky (Mietus 2006,11-17). Abraham Kuyper showed great admiration for Baader’s ideas, which he acknowledges learning from Gunning and Chantepie de la Saussaye: Franz von Baader, wiens persoon en werk vooral door Ds. Gunning en Dr. d.l. Saussaye ten onzent wierd ingeleid, vindt daarin zijn hoofdbeteekenis, dat hij de realiteit van het geestelijke tegenover het spiritualistische vervluchtigen van den geest in zijn afgetrokken gedachtenvorm handhaaft, en ten andere, het dualisme, tweelingbroeder van het spiritualisme, in beginsel opheft. Hij is een reusachtige persoonlijkheid, uit wiens geest een eigen denkstroom gevloeid is, die nu reeds elk gebied van wetenschap met zijn bevruchtende wateren besproeit. Zijn school is geen theologische, maar een wereldschool. Zijn beginsel is kosmologisch meer dan 112 Dooyeweerd speaks of God’s creation Wisdom (Schepperswijsheid). See Dooyeweerd’s Second Response to Curators, 24, online at [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Response2.html]. Also WdW II, 490. “For she is the brightness of the everlasting light, the unspotted mirror of the power of 113 God, and the image of his goodness” (Wisdom 7:26). 167 theologisch. Al misken ik de gevaarlijke zij[de] niet, die zijn optreden heeft, in de richting van Rome, toch houd ik vol, dat tegenover de ijlheid van het modernisme, zich geen beter tegenwicht denken laat. Reeds Hoffmann, Die Weltalter. Lichtstrahlen aus F. von Baaders Werke, Erlangen 1868, geeft die signatuur van zijn persoonlijkheid vrij juist terug. 114 [Franz von Baader, whose person and work was introduced to us especially by Ds. Gunning and Dr. de la Saussaye, finds his main significance in this [idea of embodiment]. He maintains the reality of the spiritual over against merely spiritualistic flights of the spirit in abstracted forms of thought. And on the other hand, he abolishes in principle all dualism, the twin brother of spiritualism. He is a powerful personality, from whose spirit his own special stream of thought has flowed, which has already sprinkled each area of science with its fructifying waters. His school is not a theological one, but rather a world school. His principle is more cosmological than theological. Although I am not unaware of the dangers that his ideas have in the direction of Rome, I nevertheless maintain that we can conceive of no better counterweight against the ravings of modernism. Hoffmann, [who edited] Die Weltalter, Lichtstrahlen aus F. von Baaders Werke, (Erlangen, 1968), has already fairly accurately reflected the signature of his personality]. (As translated in Friesen 2003b). Kuyper therefore appreciated Baader’s rejection of pietistic spirituality, and his emphasis on the necessity of “embodiment”—the expression of a center within its nature or periphery. Kuyper says that modernism had attempted to bridge idealism with the world, 115 and how it could have achieved a glorious if it had only accepted Baader’s idea of embodiment (an idea that Baader obtained from Oetinger). He quotes Baader, “daß Leiblichkeit das Ende der Wege Gottes ist,” [“embodiment is the goal of the ways of God”]. Gunning emphasizes this same idea of embodiment (Blikken I, 62, 65, 309). Kuyper expressly acknowledges the importance of Baader’s opposition to the dogma of the autonomy of thought. He also appreciates Baader’s opposition to dualism, and his Abraham Kuyper, Het Modernisme: een Fata morgana op Christelijk gebied, 114 (Amsterdam, H. de Hoogh, 1871). [http://www.neocalvinisme.nl/ak/broch/akfatam.html]. The term ‘Fata Morgana’ was likely derived from Gunning (Blikken I, 226; II, x). Dooyeweerd emphasized the center/periphery distinction in the opening pages of his 115 major work (WdW I, v-vii). And towards the end of his career, it was the subject of a talk that he gave (Dooyeweerd 2007). The distinction is essential to understanding the central importance of the heart as opposed to the temporal peripheral body, and the central nature of Ideas as opposed to concepts, and even the nature of revelation (both in God and in man), as an expression from out of their respective centers. 168 desire to reform the special sciences. In asethetics, Kuyper uses Baader’s idea of the ‘Silberblick’—an anticipatory intuition of wholeness, which allows the eternal to be seen in time. Baader even anticipated Kuyper’s idea of a university free from state or church control (Friesen 2003b). Lieuwe Mietus has explored the influence of Gunning on Kuyper (Mietus 2006; 2009). In 1878, Kuyper had a serious disagreement with Gunning. Gunning denied Biblical infallibility; he said that the stories of Christ’s birth were pious legends, mythological accounts of basic ideas about man as the image bearer of God. Kuyper attacked Gunning’s ideas in various articles. Gunning thought that Kuyper had misunderstood his position as a kind of modernism (Mietus 2006, 215-217). Although Kuyper had praised Baader’s opposition to dualism, he later criticized Baader for not maintaining a dualism between body (matter) and (spirit). In 1888, Kuyper said that the denial of this dualism leads to pantheism (Kuyper 1888b at 10, 61 fn19, and 72 fn65). Yet in his Lectures on Calvinism (1898), Kuyper held to the nondualistic idea of the heart as the center of man’s existence: …that point in our consciousness in which our life is still undivided and lies comprehended in its unity—not in the spreading vines but in the root from which the vines spring. This point, of course, lies in the antithesis between all that is finite in our human life and the infinite that lies beyond it. Here alone we find the common source from which the different streams of our human life spring and separate themselves. Personally it is our repeated experience that in the depths of our hearts, at the point where we disclose ourselves to the Eternal One, all the rays of our life converge as in one focus…(Kuyper 1898, 20). Dooyeweerd later criticized Kuyper for not being consistent, and for continuing to hold to the scholastic dualism of body and soul. Dooyeweerd chose to follow the (theosophical) strand in Kuyper referring to man’s central heart (Dooyeweerd 1939). 116 116 Stellingwerff tries to combine both ideas in Kuyper by arguing that for Kuyper, the heart is the unity of the two substances of soul and body (Stellingwerff 1987, 53). If that is true, it would make Kuyper’s viewpoint similar to that of Poincaré. Woltjer, and the early Vollenhoven, although Stellingwerff sees Kuyper’s usage as indicating the selfhood as an even deeper center than heart. But Dooyeweerd emphasized the central heart as combining both the ‘natural’ and the ‘spiritual’ [geestelijk] modes of consciousness, but 169 In the 1920’s, there was a revival of interest in Gunning, as well as Baader. I will begin by reviewing Okke Norel’s article on Gunning that I believe influenced Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven in 1922. I will then examine specific passages from two of Gunning’s works. Okke Norel’s 1920 article: “Prof. Gunning as Philosophical Thinker” In 1919, after completing his dissertation, Vollenhoven submitted one of his first articles to Stemmen des Tijds. This was a journal edited by members associated with the Free University, including W.J. A. Aalders, A. Anema, H. Bavinck, H. Colijn, P.A. Diepenhorst and others. The article was rejected; Vollenhoven had a chance to publish this in the journal Synthese, but Vollenhoven preferred the editorial stance of Stemmen des Tijds. A portion of Vollenhoven’s article was published in Stemmen des Tijds in 1922 (Stellingwerff 1992, 29-32). A second article by Vollenhoven was also published. And in 1926, Vollenhoven published an article in Stemmen des Tijds that Tol sees as a turning point with the idea of “knowing resorts under being” (see discussion above). So it is evident that Vollenhoven was keenly interested in that journal and in its editorial stance. He would certainly have been aware of other articles published, including the 1920 article in the same journal by O. Norel, Jr.: “Prof. Gunning als wijsgeerig denker” [Prof. Gunning as philosophical thinker] (Norel 1920). Gunning’s ideas included the reformation of science from a Christian perspective. Norel’s article refers to Gunning’s idea (from Baader) that knowledge [weten] is based on faith [gelooven] (Norel, 71). Philosophy is distinguished from Gunning’s (Baader’s) Christian theosophy. Whereas philosophy proceeds as an inductive science from particular phenomena to universal laws, theosophy begins with God, revealed in Christ and known in our heart, as the creative principle of all things, and it explains the world from this perspective of faith (Norel 71). And Norel emphasizes the idea that man is a unity: De geest des menschen is immers één. Verstand en hart zijn nooit in de werkelijkheid, slechts in het afgetrokken van eklander te scheiden. En dan Dooyeweerd rejected the idea that the natural and the spiritual were to be viewed as body and soul. 170 is het hart het diepste van ‘s menschen wezen, het centrum van zijn geestelijk bestaan. “De bronnen des levens, en dus ook van het verstand, dat een onderdeel van het geheel des levens is, liggen in het hart.” Bij onze wetenschap zal dus alles afhangen van de gesteldheid des geestes. Zooals het beeld, dat wij aan de tijdelijke dingen ons vormen, bepaald is door de gesteldheid van ons oog, zoo zal ons wereldbeeld bepaald zijn door de gesteldheid van onzen geest. En omdat alleen door het Christelijk geloof onze geest normaal wordt, darrom kunnen wij enkel als ware geloovigen tot een wetenschap van het normaal-bewustzijn komen. (Norel, 71-72). [Man’s spirit is always one. Reason [verstand] and the heart are never separated in reality, but only in abstraction. And in the heart is the deepest part of man’s being, the center of his spiritual existence. “Out of the heart are the issues of life, and therefore also of reason, which is part of the whole of life.” Therefore in our science, everything depends on the condition of the spirit. Just as the image that we form of temporal things is determined by the condition of our eye, so is our worldview determined by the condition of our spirit. And because our spirit becomes normal only by Christian faith, it is only as true believers that we can come to a science of normal consciousness.] Norel also refers to Gunning’s statement that …des menschen geloof, zijn bewust wonen in de zedelijke, geestelijke wereld, is één met zijn wetenschap, zijn bewust wonen in de natuurlijke werld. [Faith is consciously living in the spiritual world, but it is one with our conscious living in the natural world.] Tol should have looked at this source in reference to Vollenhoven’s use of ‘beleven,’ which he translates as “intuitive awareness” or “occurrent experience” (Tol, 99, 103 fn44, 117, 122, 123, 165, 204, 500, 501). Dooyeweerd also speaks of ‘wetend beleven’ in connection with the enstatic relation of our supratemporal selfhood to our temporal body, and it is far more likely that this comes from Gunning and Baader (Friesen 2011). Such a philosophy, says Norel, has relevance for our knowledge. He refers to Baader’s criticism of Descartes’ cogito; it assumes that thinking is independent (Norel 73). Norel cites Gunning’s criticism of Spinoza’s monadology (Norel 73). Thus, when Tol devotes a chapter to Vollenhoven’s transition from monadology to modes (Tol pp. 217- 373), he ignores the fact that a publication associated with the Free University has 117 Tol says that Vollenhoven’s insistence that intuitionism treats relations as consisting of 117 two predicates puts his intuitionism within the monadistic camp [of Russell] (Tol, 108). 171 already made a similar argument. According to Norel, we avoid Gunning’s solipsism by resolving the problem of knowledge in God: God is the basis both for the world and for our spirit and therefore the basis for harmony between them. This is not the same as Spinoza’s idea of substance. Our knowledge of the temporal rests in the eternal. And here he refers to the “transcendental realism” of Eduard von Hartmann 118 (who was also influenced by Baader) (Norel 74). Our thought is not relative, but rather the thinking of 119 God’s thoughts after Him (Norel 75). While this sounds like a Platonic realism, Norel emphasizes that what is at issue is not seeing a higher realm, but seeing into a lower realm from out of a higher: Door het geloof is de mensch opgenomen in de hoogere sfeer der gemeenschap met God en van uit die hoogere sfeer doorgrondt hij ook de lagere, waarin hij zich bevindt (Norel 77) [By faith, man is taken up into the higher sphere of community with God and form out of that higher sphere he also sees into the lower sphere in which he finds himself] 120 Gunning warns against setting up reason in an autonomous way. Instead, we are to see the wholeness and unity of man (Norel 75, 78). Norel says that we do not reach the Infinite by searching in the finite in all directions. Norel refers to the influence of Boehme, whom Gunning cites. And Norel refers to A.H. de Hartog’s book on Boehme, that the light of reason sees by means of God’s light. True knowledge does not proceed from the periphery to the center, but always from the center towards the periphery (Norel 76). This is alsoDooyeweerd’s emphasis, relating to his discovery of the centrality of the self, and an idea that he reaffirmed in his 1964 Lecture Tol does not mention that Vollenhoven himself gives Franz Brentano as the source (Vollenhoven 1926b, 60 and 60 fn141). 118 Thus Tol is wrong that Dooyeweerd necessarily relies on Vollenhoven for this term ‘transcendental realism.’ Von Hartmann also speaks in terms of being critical, so ‘critical realism’ is also likely derived from a reading of his work. Kant himself had contrasted transcendental realism to his own transcendental idealism. 119 It regards time and space as given in themselves, independently of our sensibility (Critique of Pure Reason A369). Baader also says that in our true state, we do not see into another world, but we see our 120 present world differently (Friesen 2011). 172 the year before his retirement. (Dooyeweerd 2007). Tol points out that Vollenhoven gave up this distinction of periphery and Center (p. 477 fn164). He does not mention that Vollenhoven at one time was attracted to the ideas of both de la Saussaye and de Hartog (Stellingwerff 1992, 10). Norel says that a Christian view of science does not create ideas, but discovers facts that were there all along. For example, X-rays were there before their discovery, but they were “niet-ik.” By their discovery, they have come to the sphere of the self (Norel 76). Both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, although they gave up a Platonic realism in the form of Christian realism, nevertheless remained realists in this sense of affirming the givenness of the world, that theory is based on discovery and not construction. With respect to the problem of essence and appearance, Norel says that behind the phenomenon there is something, and that something is Someone. In other words, it is not Kant’s Ding-an-sich, but a Person. And Norel refers to Gunning’s idea of knowledge within us, a kind of knowledge that dwells within (inwonende kennis). We think by participating in God’s life and thoughts, and this is not to be taken in a pantheistic sense (Norel 79). Pantheism looks for unity between God and world in the wrong way, allowing God to dissolve into nature. And he distinguishes this from mere ‘doorwonen’ [living through something]. These terms are derived from Baader, who distinguished between einwohnen and durchwohnen (Friesen 2011). And this is the relation to the Logos. In this way our thinking and our intuition [denken en kennen] become one. God’s act of creation is eternal—creation is an eternal act of God–it is not in time. And that means that the world does not belong to God’s being (Norel 139). Gunning then speaks of external creation as fallen. The created spirits were to rule “nature” so that it could become the organ of spirit. But in the fall, nature began to rule the spirits, and thereby nature became matter. Nature is not the same as matter. Nature is in and from out of God, but matter cannot be thought of in relation to God. The material world is a fall. The material world is not God’s immediate creation, but a fallen reality, a result of misuse of freedom, not only by man, but also by other spiritual beings. But matter prevents a further fall (Norel 140). 173 He opposes pure spiritualism and acosmism. Even God has a nature: he cites Baader that embodiment is the end of all God’s ways (Norel 142). 121 Logos is the goal of creation, and creation must be led to its glorification, of which the resurrection and glorification of Christ is the type. In this glorification, spirit will totally penetrate nature. Christ shows us this; his resurrection was the breaking through of the 122 higher life through the lower, in order to raise up the lower, to save it, to glorify it (Norel 146). There is also anticipation here [antecipatie], the already making present of what God’s acts shall be in the glorification (Norel 146). When we stand in community with God, who through the resurrection of Christ has broken through the fatalism of nature, then a new spiritual life is possible. Then man will act in time, but not from out of time [in den tijd, maar niet uit den tijd] (Norel 148). Through Christ’s person [persoonlijkheid] we meet the person of God. By sinking into our deepest being, we come to the notion of being surrounded by infinity. We arrive at the Infinite. That is the truth that is called eternal predestination: that our being is necessarily bound up with God. “met dezelfe daad waarmee de mensch zich zelf stelt, stelt hij ook God. [With the same act in which man asserts himself, he also asserts God.” Gunning cites Meister Eckhart: “God is nearer to me than I am to myself.” This 123 121 Dooyeweerd emphasizes that spirituality must have a relation to temporal reality: This means that in the Christian experience the religious fulness of meaning remains bound up with temporal reality. Every spiritualistic view which wants to separate self-knowledge and the knowledge of God from all that is temporal, runs counter to the Divine order of the creation. Such spiritualism inevitably leads to an internally empty idealism, or to a confused kind of mysticism, in spite of its own will or intentions (NC II, 567). 122 Cf. Dooyeweerd: unfolding of the modal spheres is an active inspiration [doorgeestelijking] of them (Dooyeweerd 1928, 61). We illuminate from within [doorlichten] the givenness of naive experience by articulating the modes, so that the supratemporal fullness of meaning shines through [doorlichte] (Dooyeweerd 1946, 28, 35). The very idea of anticipation [antecipatie] is also derived from Gunning. Dooyeweerd: “Self-knowledge in the last analysis appears to be dependent upon 123 knowledge of God, which, however, is quite different from a theoretical theology” (NC I, 55). 174 necessarily being bound to God is what Norel and Gunning understand by predestination (Norel 149). Supernatural: If we call what is really natural ‘supranatural’ we show that we have sunk below the level of the natural (Norel 150). In other words, what is called supernatural is 124 our true state. 125 Anticipation [antecipatie] is making present already what God shall do in this glorification (Norel 146). By participating in Christ, Man acts in time, but not from out 126 of time (148). [Dan handelt hij in den tijd, maar niet uit den tijd”]. Man’s nature is 127 necessarily bound up with God, and when we descend in our deepest being, we come to the Infinite. And Norel cites the mysticism of Meister Eckhart, that God is closer to me than my own selfhood. What is often called supernatural is the truly natural. Dooyeweerd is opposed to any mysticism that assumes some kind of supernatural 124 cognition (NC II, 562, 563). I believe that his opposition is based on the fact that this would involve a dualism. Cf. Kuyper’s Pro Rege, cited above: the miracles of Christ as indications of what we 125 may do (Kuyper 1911). 126 Dooyeweerd (1928) at 61: De “ontsluiting der anticipatiesferen,” als actieve “door-geestelijking” van de wetskringen, is een religieus thema in de Calvinistische levens- en wereldbeschouwing, een thema, dat zijn hoogste spanning verkrijjgt door de onmetelijke kracht der in universeelen zin genomen allesbeheerschende praedestinatiegedachte. Overal, in alle wetskringen moet de religieuze zin doordringen en den zin der wetsgedachte “voleindigen,” al wordt in deze zondige bedeeling dit ideaal nimmer vervuld, tenzij dan door Christus! [The “unfolding of the anticipatory spheres,” as an active “in-spiration" [lit. “spiritualizing-through”] of the law-spheres, is a religious theme in the Calvinistic life and worldview, a theme that reaches its highest tension through the immeasurable power of the all-ruling idea of predestination, taken in its universal meaning. Religious meaning must penetrate everywhere, in all law-spheres, and it must “complete” the meaning of the law-idea, although in this sinful dispensation this ideal is never fulfilled, except through Christ!] Cf. Dooyeweerd’s emphasis that we are simultaneously in time and out of time (Friesen 127 2009, Thesis 7 and references). 175 Wie het natuurlijke van de wereld Gods altijd boven-natuurlijk noemt, toont daarmee zelf beneden het natuuirlijke gezonken te zijn. Wij moeten wezen als de bergbewander die het leven op de hoogvlakte zijn eigenlijk leven vindt, en niet als de dalbewoner, die altijd met het oog op de hoogvlakte van “daar boven” spreekt (Norel 150) [Whoever uses the word ‘supernatural’ for what is natural in God’s world shows thereby that he himself has sunk below the natural. We must be like the mountain-dweller who finds his true life in the higher levels, and not like the valley-dweller, who always keeps his eye on the upper level and speaks of “there above.”] It is a question of our will whether we will accept [aannemen] this higher, perfect world. We are to see all things in God: En dan is de eenheid des levens gevonden! Eigenlijk een dubbele eenheid: de eenheid in ons van verstand en wil, van kennis en leven. En de eenheid van ons met de wereld door gemeenschap met God. In die eenheid ligt des menschen bestemming. Hij ziet alles in God en zal dus in beginsel alle dingenverstaan,want onder het schijnsel der eeuwigheid wordt alles licht. [And then we have found the unity of life! It is really a double unity: the unity in us of understanding and will, of knowledge and life. And the unity of us with the world through communion with God. That unity is what humans were intended for, for in the light of eternity, everything becomes illuminated.] 128 Gunning is clear in showing how the centrality of the heart does not allow for the idea of a self-sufficient reason: Het hart nu is niet een afzonderlijk vermogen, als het ware op ééne lijn met het verstand staande, gelijk men zoo dikwerf hoogest oppervlakkig van “hart en verstand” hoort spreken. Het hart is het diepse van ‘s menschen wezen, het middelpunt van zijn geestelijk bestaan. Als dus het hart het verstand en alle andere vermogens beheerscht, dan is er in den geest niet een eenzijdigheid, niet een onrechtmatige heerschappi van één vermogen boven alle andere met welke het behoorde broederlijk op één zelfde hoogte te staan. Neen, maar dan is de gest regelmatig werkende, en alles staat op zijn plaats, en ordelijk loopen alle draden van elk punt van den omtrek door de eigen banen in het middelpunt te zamen. Daarentegen 128 See Dooyeweerd : In the Biblical attitude of naïve experience the transcendent, religious dimension of its horizon is opened. The light of eternity radiates perspectively through all the temporal dimensions of this horizon and even illuminates seemingly trivial things and events in our sinful world (NC III, 29). 176 is er wanorde en verstoring wanneer een afzonderlijk vermogen, hetzij het gevoel of het verstand, zich zelfstandig maakt en den band met het gemeenschappelijk meiddelpunt verbreekt. Dit nu geschiedt wanneer het verstand wordt vooropgesteld in afgetrokken zelfstandigheid (Gunning ‘Blikken,’I, 26). [The heart is now not a separate power or ability standing on the same level as reason, as one often hears it referred to in the most superficial way as “heart and mind.” The heart is the deepest part of human existence, the central point of his spiritual existence. So if the heart rules reason and all other powers, then there is no one-sidedness in the soul, no unlawful dominance of one faculty above all the others with which it should belong fraternally at the same level. No, then the soul acts with regularity, and everything stands in its place, and all threads run in an orderly way from each point in the circumerference by their own paths to meet together in the center. In contrast, there is disorder and disturbance whenever a separate power, whether that of feeling or rationality, makes itself self- suficient and breaks its relation with the common center point. This happens whenever reason is elevated in abstracted self-sufficiency]. and Descartes: “Ik denk, derhalve besta ik.” Hier wordt het denken als het wezen, het eigenlijke hoofdwerk des geestes, uit den samenhang met het middelpunt afgetrokken en vooropgesteld. De groote, alles beslissende vraag: “wie is die ik, welke denkt?” wordt niet gesteld, veelmin beantwoord. (Gunning ‘Blikken,’I, 27) [Descartes: “I think, therefore I am.” Here thinking is abstracted as the essence, really the principal faculty of the soul, from out of its coherence with the center, and elevated. The great and decisive question, “who is “I” who thinks?” is not asked, much less answered] Gunning also follows Baader in showing how the idea of self-sufficiency of thought leads to the idea of autonomy, or man setting his own laws by that self-sufficient reason. And Gunning shows how making our own law is not just in relation to God, but that we then make our own law in respect to the world: Men vergeet dat men, gelijk wij aanwezen, slechts datgene waarlijk kennen kan waarmeê men to voren in levensgemeenschap is getreden. Van buiten tot de dingen toetredende, beoordeelt men ze niet naar de eigen wetten volgens welke ze bestaan, maar volgens afgetrokken verstands- bepalingen, en verklaart voor onwaar en onwezenlijk al wat op dit Prokrustes-bed niet past. (Gunning ‘Blikken,’I, 26) [One forgets that humans, as we have shown, can only truly know that with which they have previously entered into a living relationship. If we approach things from the outside, we do not understand them according to 177 the particular laws by which they exist, but according to abstracted definitions of reason, and we then hold as untrue and unreal everything that does not fit this Procrustean bed]. Gunning disclaims originality, and refers to teachers like de la Saussaye, Boehme, and Baader. Summary of Gunning’s Blikken in de Openbaring The following is a summary of some of Gunning’s important ideas, most of which can be shown to derive from Baader. In footnotes, I have shown some similarities to Dooyeweerd. There are other obvious similarities that that I have not footnoted. (1) Gunning’s idea of a Christian religious thought, a Christian science. Mietus says that Gunning discovered this idea in 1856 in a work by F. Fabri, a student of E.A. von Schaden, the publisher of Baader’s diaries (Mietus 2006, 65, 198; Blikken I, 1, 40— “gelovige wetenschap”; Norel 159). Chantepie de la Saussaye also helped Gunning to develop this idea (Mietus 2006, 52, 60). (2) Our knowledge depends on faith. Faith is the ground of all true science, and it gives certainty to knowledge (Norel 71; Blikken I, 218; II, xii). (3) We must theoretically “give an account” of this knowledge (Blikken I, 23, 230). 129 Philosophy “gives an account” of experience (NC I, 83). Already in 1928, Dooyeweerd 129 says that only the law-Idea gives an account of the coherence of law-spheres and subject functions: Op de vraag: hoe is kennis der wetskringen mogelijk? luidt het antwoord: door dien dieperen goddelijken samenhang aller wetskringen en subjectsfuncties, waarvan alleen de wetsidee "rekenschap aflegt" (het logon didonai in Platonischen zin). De ware kritische methode eischt dus de erkentenis, dat niet de logos, doch de wetsidee de Platonische hupothesis en het anhupotheton beide is van alle synthetisch begrip ("Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in 't licht der wetsidee," cited by Verburg 114). [To the question, “How is knowledge of the law-spheres possible?” the answer is: by the deeper divine coherence of all law-spheres and subject functions, of which only the law-Idea “gives an account” (the logon didonai in the Platonic meaning). The true critical method therefore demands the acknowledgement that it is not the logos but rather the law- 178 (4) Focus on the temporal world. Unlike a world-denying kind of mysticism or pietism, which seeks to flee the temporal world, Christian theosophy concentrates on seeking God’s wisdom within temporal reality, of learning its true structure, and elevating it to its true nature. Theosophy is a world-affirming mysticism, which does not seek to avoid or to destroy nature, but to redeem and to glorify it (Mietus 2006, 99). Gunning does not view ‘nature’ and ‘matter’ [stoffelijkheid] as synonymous. Following Fabri and Baader, Gunning regards nature in terms of spiritual embodiment, and he emphasizes the importance of nature being penetrated by central spirit. God dwells in nature as its original King, glorifying everything, and everything must be subjected to Him. ‘Matter’ is nature as a result of the fall. True nature is supra-material [bovenstoffelijk] (Mietus 2006, 65-66, 71, 101-102, 217). (5) We are not to fear theoretical critique, but we should engage in it in a Christian way. Gunning even uses the term ‘New Critique,’ a term that Dooyeweerd later used to describe his own philosophy (Blikken, I, 7, ‘een nieuwe kritiek, een nieuwe wijsbegeerte’). Like Baader before him, and Dooyeweerd after him, Gunning turned Kant’s arguments against Kant’s own philosophy. (6) The heart is “the center of man’s existence”; man is not to be understood in any dualistic way, but as a unity in the wholeness of his existence. Gunning (like Baader), even uses the idea of white light refracted through a prism to refer to an existence above 130 time and space, shown especially to us in Christ’s glorified body (Norel 71, 75; Blikken II, 235). Gunning refers to the heart on every other page of Blikken. For example, “De 131 Idea that is both the Platonic hypothesis and the anhypotheton of all synthetic concepts] The law-Idea is both the hypothesis and the “anhypotheton”–the unpostulated principle– of all synthetic concepts. He relates this to the “logon didonai” in the Platonic sense. I am not sure what he means by this comment. “Logon didonai” has been interpreted as “giving a reckoning.” It appears in Acts 1:1. It is interesting that Dooyeweerd does not seem to mind referring favourably to Plato. 130 Cf. Dooyeweerd: NC I, 99-102. 131 In Blikken II, 235, Gunning says: In Zijn [Christus’] verheerlijking is gegrond een toestand, waarin de Idee en de krachten der lichamelijkheid geheel met elkaar verzoend zijn, de 179 bronnen des levens zijn in het hart” [Out of the heart are the issues of life”] (Blikken, 1929 edition, I, 24, 52). 132 Our heart is the central source of our acts of life (“de centraalbron der levensverrichtingen”), (Mietus 2006, 151 fn12; Blikken I, 24). It is the 133 deepest point of man’s being, the central point of his spiritual existence (“Het hart is het diepste van 's menschen wezen, het middelpunt van zijn geestelijk bestaan”) (Blikken, I, 26). Our heart is our very self (Blikken I, 52). The temporal body is the organ of man’s 134 spiritual heart (Mietus 2006 161; Blikken III, 162). 135 (7) Supratemporal heart. Gunning emphasizes that God has placed a sense of eternity in our hearts. Gunning follows F. Fabri in citing Ecclesiastes 3:11 in support of that idea (Mietus 2006, 152, 156; Blikken III, 23-24, 29). Gunning sometimes uses the word 136 ‘eternity’ in a creaturely sense, but he also uses the word ‘supratemporal’ [boventijdelijk], which he admits is an unfamiliar word (Blikken I, 317, 349; II, 233, 235, 237). Baader 137 had also used the word ‘supratemporal’ (überzeitlich). Gunning says that man, especially laatste geheel tot openbaringswerktuig der eerste dienen, gelijk het licht onafgebroken en geheel door het kristal heen schijnt. Een eeuwig, boven tijd en ruimte verheven bestaan. Of, zoo men wil, er is een hoogere tijd dáár, het zaligheden der eeuwigheid. Cf. Dooyeweerd NC I, 298. Verburg says that the first time Dooyeweerd cites Proverbs 132 4:23 [“Keep thy heart with all due diligence, for out of it are the issues of life”] is in his 1932 article “De Zin der Geschiedenis en de ‘Leiding Gods’ in de Historische Ontwikeeling,” (Verburg 150). Cf. Dooyeweerd: The supratemporal is “the central sphere of occurrence” (NC I, 32). 133 All of our acts come out of our supratemporal center. They are expressed in our temporal functions. 134 Cf. Dooyeweerd: The heart is a central reality–the fullness of our central selfhood (NC I, 20). Cf. Dooyeweerd: “…the human body is the free plastic instrument of the I-ness, as the 135 spiritual centre of human existence” (NC III, 88). Baader makes many references to this type of reasoning. He distinguishes among principle, organ and instrument. God is the principle of revelation, man is the organ; nature is the instrument (Werke 4,81; 7,90 ff). We should not confuse organ and instrument. Dooyeweerd relies on the same interpretation of Ecclesiastes 3:11: “For God has placed 136 eternity in our hearts.” NC I, 31 fn1. “How could man direct himself toward eternal things, if eternity were not “set in his heart”? 137 Cf. Dooyeweerd’s use of ‘boventijdelijk’ or ‘supratemporal.’ (WdW II, 51, ‘boventijdelijk; ’ NC II, 41, 53). 180 the genius, is always influenced by both the higher world of God and the lower world of Satan. Our temporal world occupies a twilight-position between the higher and lower world. But man does not merely have sensitivity to the eternal. Rather, even now, man exists both as a supratemporal and a temporal being. 138 (8) The Holy Spirit works in our hearts (Blikken III, 112).139 (9) Man was created in the image of God. As the image of God, man also reflects God’s Wisdom, and man can image or imagine God’s Wisdom for the temporal world. Just as God expresses Himself in His divine nature, so man’s heart center expresses itself in his temporal body, and in the temporal world, the created cosmos. Especially in the third 140 volume of Blikken, Gunning focused on the idea that man was created “in and to” the image of God. Using the work of Culmann and others, Gunning elaborated an anthropology in which man has an “historical task” to fulfill—to overcome by his spirit the dark forces in the ground of his nature. Here again, Gunning was following Baader’s opposition to modernism. Modernism regards man not as the image of God, but as a product of nature. And in such a naturalistic view, there can be neither a rebirth into a higher life and resurrection, nor any final spiritual destination for mankind and the world. (10) Man’s task. Christian theosophy holds that man’s purpose was to use his imagination to send the Wisdom of God into nature in order to repair the cosmos that had been Friesen 2009, Thesis 7 and references. Dooyeweerd: “…it is just this possession of a 138 supratemporal root of life, with the simultaneous subjectedness to time of all its earthly expressions, that together belong to the essence [wezen] of man, to the “image of God” in him…” (Second Response to the Curators). 139 Dooyeweerd 2007 and Discussion. 140 Dooyeweerd says that just as God expresses and reveals himself in creation, so man expresses himself in the temporal world. (Friesen 2009, theses 50, 51, 65 and references). Like Gunning and Baader, Dooyeweerd uses the terms ‘expression’ [uitdrukking] and ‘revelation’ [openbaring] synonymously. Dooyeweerd specifically relates being created in the image of God with man’s being able to express his supratemporal selfhood within the temporal. Faivre says that just as God expresses Himself in the divine nature, so man expresses himself in his body (Faivre 1996, 109). The relation in both divine and human expression is that of a center relating to its periphery. 181 disturbed in the fall of the angels. The fall of the angels is distinguished from Adam’s 141 subsequent fall, and Genesis 1 and 2 describe different creations (Mietus 2006, 97, 113, 115-120). Man was to bring the powers within creation to realization, and to spiritualize 142 temporal nature (Mietus 2006, 121 fn135; Blikken, I, 341; III, 121). 143 (11) The Fall. But man failed at this task. The temporal world was concentrated in man as the image of God, and that is why the temporal world fell along with man in his fall into sin. The present world is thus not the expression of God’s perfected will (Mietus 2006, 144 113). 145 That is also why the temporal world will be redeemed through man, as he participates in Christ. Man must repeat what Christ did, in order to overcome sin and 146 darkness. Such self-sacrifice leads to openness and honesty in science and in public life, and it is the ultimate form of love. Gunning finds the basis for this in God’s self- limitation (zelfbeperking). The idea of self-sacrifice is a central notion in ethical Friesen 2009, Thesis 75 and references. It is interesting that Vollenhoven also 141 emphasizes the prior fall of the angels (Isagôgè, 100 s. 21). Kuyper was aware of this view (Friesen 2003b). Dooyeweerd expressly distinguished 142 between the creation narratives in Genesis 1 and Genesis 2. Man was first created as a supratemporal being and then “fitted into” [ingesteld] the temporal world (Dooyeweerd 1971b, 9; Dooyeweerd 1942, Proposition XXIX). 143 Friesen 2009, Thesis 74 and references. Dooyeweerd says that the powers and potentials, which God had enclosed within creation, were to be disclosed by man in his service of love to God and neighbour. 144 Friesen, 2009, Theses 76 -77 and references. The Divine Word revelation gives the Christian as little a detailed life- and worldview as a Christian philosophy, yet it gives to both simply their direction from the starting-point in their central basic motive (NC I, 128). Cf. Dooyeweerd: “the fallen earthly cosmos is only a sad shadow of God's original 145 creation” (NC II, 34). Friesen 2009, Thesis 75 and references. The temporal world is concentrated in man. It 146 therefore fell with man, and it needs to be redeemed by man as he participates in Christ, the New Root. Like Gunning, Dooyeweerd also speaks about man recovering the powers of God in creation, and of spiritualizing [doorgeestlijking] the temporal world. Dooyeweerd cites Kuyper’s Stone Lectures: “Just as the whole creation culminates in man, its glorification can only first find its fulfillment in man, who was created as God's image” (Dooyeweerd 1939). 182 theology; Gunning was influenced here both by Chantepie de la Saussaye as well as by Baader, who also developed a theory of sacrifice. 147 (12) Our worldview is determined by our spiritual direction (Norel 72; Blikken I, 355; II, v, “christelijke Gods-en wereldbeschouwing”; III, v). 148 (13) True knowledge is from the center to the periphery (Norel 71). 149 (14) The rejection of autonomy of thought 150 [onafhankelijk denken, autonomie]— autonomy is the idea that “I think” is the basis of our existence. Autonomy is the proton pseudos, the primordial lie (Norel 72, 78, Blikken I, 26). 151 (15) Our thought also requires redemption, an inner reformation (Norel 78; Blikken I, xiv). 152 (16) Our temporal knowledge must find rest in the Eternal, in the living God (Blikken I, 3 citing Augustine; III, 115). 153 Cf. Dooyeweerd: “the sacrifices demanded by love with respect to the different moral 147 duties (NC I, 161 fn1). Friesen 2009, Thesis 37 and references regarding the direction of our supratemporal 148 heart. Dooyeweerd opposes beginning with things and then attempting to abstract properties 149 from those things (Friesen 2005b; Friesen 2010a). In Dooyeweerd’s 1964 lecture, he deals with the relation between religious center and temporal periphery (Dooyeweerd 2007). And in his 1946 Encyclopedia of Legal Science, he relates Ideas to the center and concepts to the periphery. We can obtain Ideas that transcend temporal knowledge only by means of our supratemporal selfhood (Dooyeweerd 1946). 150 Friesen 2009, Theses 5, 44 and 93, and references. Dooyeweerd refers to the primary lie (proton pseudos)–this “radical lie” is our fallen 151 belief in the autonomy of absolutized theoretical thought (NC II, 561-563). De la Saussaye got this from Baader. It is the original lie of Lucifer, the proton pseudos (Baader 1818, 25, 41 ft. 21). 152 See Dooyeweerd WdW I, 27; 132; NC II, 563. Dooyeweerd cites Augustine regarding finding rest in God. See Dooyeweerd NC I, 11. 153 Expanding on Augustine, Dooyeweerd says, “Inquietum est cor nostrum et mundus in corde nostro!” The Latin phrase is not translated. It means that our heart is restless, and that the world is restless in our heart! So the phrase includes the fact that the temporal world has its meaning and existence in our heart, the supratemporal center or totality. 183 (17) Created nature is fallen; 154 it must be dominated (beheerst) and made spiritual (vergeestelijkt) by man (Norel 139, 148). 155 (18) The rejection of naïve realism (Norel 73). 156 (19) ‘Supernatural’ is not to be interpreted dualistically. Gunning frequently refers to the ‘supernatural.’ But he does not use the term in a dualistic sense. Gunning says that most people who call themselves ‘supernaturalists’ are really ‘infranaturalists,’ failing to recognize how God dwells in nature. We must be like those who live in the mountains, who regard that level as their true life, and not like those who dwell in the valley and who always speak about “there above us.” But the supernatural is not suprahuman, because man was created in the image of God. The supernatural is really the truly natural (Blikken, III, xi). 157 (20) Centrality of Christ. Gunning says that God’s greatest revelation is in Christ’s incarnation, the turning point in human history. The incarnation is an embodiment, and an expression of God. He humanizes Christology by stressing that Christ himself had to 158 struggle against evil and was ever more spiritualizing himself. The divinity in Christ’s humanity was not at the outset already a fulfilled fact, but had to be gained in real human life by Christ’s will. At the cross and by His resurrection, Christ restored the rule of the spirit over the flesh, and he restored fallen nature as the organ for man’s spirit. Gunning relies here on Oetinger’s theosophical notion “Christ for us and Christ in us.” In Christ we see our true nature, and as we participate in this true nature, the image of God is 159 restored in us. 154 Creation fell with man. See discussion above. 155 See Dooyeweerd doorgeestelijking, discussion above. 156 See Dooyeweerd NC I, 43. 157 See discussion above. See Dooyeweerd, who emphasizes that the doctrine of the incarnation cannot be 158 understood apart from the idea of our own supratemporal heart, which is the center of our existence (Dooyeweerd 2007 and Discussion). The reasoning is related to the distinction between central and peripheral. Dooyeweerd also speaks of our participating [deelhebben] in Christ. In order to have 159 insight into the full horizon of our experience, we must participate in Christ as the New 184 (21) Immediate knowledge. Gunning uses the term ‘aanschouwing’ for this immediate knowledge (Blikken III, 23-24). 160 Following G.H. von Schubert and others, Gunning emphasizes that our conscience is a remnant of the higher spiritual-life, by which we can awake from sin and darkness. Man’s self-conscious awakening includes deep-rooted emotions of terror and repentance about sin. (22) Opposition to pantheism. Creation is “in God.” This is not pantheism, but might be 161 regarded as panentheism (Blikken I, 35, 44, 198, 301; III, 11, 29, 142). God’s divine 162 nature must not be confused with the nature of created reality. Baader introduced the philosopher Schelling to the ideas of Boehme. But Baader criticized both Schelling and Hegel for failing to distinguish between these two “natures”–the natura non creata creans and the temporal natura creata. Schelling and Hegel confused the non-creaturely process that exists in God with the processes that occur within creation as an image or copy (Abbild) of the divine process. Baader disagreed with their pantheistic and Gnostic views, and in particular with their view that God was required to create the world in order Root of creation (WdW II, 496). The Archimedean point of philosophy is chosen in the new root of mankind in Christ, in which by regeneration we have part in our reborn selfhood (NC I, 99). 160 This emphasis on immediate knowledge of supratemporal matters is in both Kuyper and Dooyeweerd. Kuyper speaks of this in To Be Near Unto God (Kuyper 1979). And see Dooyeweerd 2007. See also NC I, 15, 33; II, 473, where Dooyeweerd speaks of the immediacy of our heart experience. And Dooyeweerd speaks of our being able to see the invisible things as well as the visible. Dooyeweerd also uses the term ‘aanschouwing’ for this immediate knowledge. See WdW II, 228 (“de volle religieuze aanschouwing”). See Dooyeweerd: “uit, door en tot.” (WdW I, 11). All meaning is from, through, and to 161 an origin, which cannot itself be related to a higher Archè (NC I, 9). NC I, 102 ("through whom and to whom it has been created"). And see De Hartog 1915. Dooyeweerd also emphasizes that creation is “from, through and to" God as Origin (NC 162 I, 9, 102). Dooyeweerd criticizes those views of creatio ex nihilo that suppose ‘nothingness’ to be outside of God: But it is well known that the words ex nihilo have turned out to be not entirely harmless in Augustine's theological exposition of the doctrine of creation, since they foster the idea that nothingness would be a second origin of creaturely being bringing about a metaphysical defect in the latter (Dooyeweerd 1971a, 460 fn15). 185 to fulfill Himself (a view also found in today’s “process theology”). W.J. Hanegraaff maintains that Baader did not interpret Boehme correctly, and that Boehme was in fact pantheistic. But Mietus emphasizes that Baader and Hamberger interpreted Boehme in an anti-pantheistic way, rejecting any pantheistic identification of the two natures (Mietus 2006, 114 fn104, referring to Hanegraaf. It is this interpretation that is of importance in understanding Gunning, especially his most important works Blikken in de Openbaring (1866-1869) and Spinoza en de Idee der Persoonlijkheid (1876) (Mietus 2006, 71-74, 89- 95, 122). Thus, it was not necessary for God to create; God is independent of His creation. But God creates in order to let “other beings” share in His Glory, and for His own self-revelation, to “open” His eternal nature (Mietus 2006 96, 112). By an act of love, God freely creates and reveals Himself by the expression of His Wisdom. This was a central idea for Gunning, and it is related to Baader’s idea of a nature in God. Gunning believed that this was the only way to overcome the depersonalization of the idea of God, and the devaluation of Christianity by modernist thinkers of his time. In emphasizing God’s freedom of creation, Gunning opposed the ideas of Spinoza, whose philosophy was at that time experiencing a revival in the Netherlands. Gunning also followed Baader in rejecting Hegel’s idea of a dualistic opposition within God. Evil is not to be sought outside of God, since that would result in Manichaeism or dualism. But neither is evil to be found within God. God’s nature gives only the possibility of evil, and God eternally overcomes any such tendencies in His divine nature. Evil was therefore not necessary; it was only revealed in the fall of the angels (Mietus 2006, 90-93, 96-97). Gunning’s book Spinoza en de Idee der Persoonlijkheid (1876) Gunning wants to “complete” Spinoza’s ideas (p. ii). He wants to understand Spinoza’s idea that “each thing tries to persist in its own being” in a new sense: that one’s “own being” is not that given in this temporal, fallen world, but that which is hidden in it, its eternal center [eeuwige kern] that is covered by its transitory form. (p. 2) Whereas Spinoza says that God and world are one, revelation says that they should be one, but that they are not unified now because of sin (p. 17). 186 Spinoza depends on Descartes, but in Descartes’ cogito the “I” is implicit and unexpressed (p. 11). Philosophy is based on faith. Faith is not just the concern of theology (pp. 12, 14). The heart out of which are the issues of life (pp. 14, 107) A worldview that denies miracles and incarnation has hidden presuppositions (p. 16). Gunning refers to Malebranche for the idea that we see all things in God (p. 23). In Spinoza there is an adequate knowledge that explains the individual from out of the whole, seeing things under the view of eternity (sub specie aeternitatis) (p. 26). He refers to Spinoza’s famous assertion that “the order and coherence of idea is the same as that of the order and coherence of things” (p. 29). True knowledge shows things not as separate but in coherence (p. 31). True knowledge relies on intuition (p. 37) In Spinoza, the modes (modi) are the ways that existing things come from substance. Bodies come from the attribute of extension and ideas come from the attribute of thinking or spirit [geest] (p. 30). The world in comparison to God has no independent existence (p. 30). Not everything is God, but God is everything. This does not mean pantheism. But Spinoza is definitely pantheistic, because for him he finite is swallowed up in the infinite. Things for him have no being [zijn] but only a dependent existence [aanzijn]. Gunning contrasts this with the idea of creation (p. 54). Spinoza ascribes complete being only to God. 163 God has placed eternity in our hearts (p. 45). In our heart, our most inner center, there is a power that attracts what is related to it. The idea that “out of the heart are the issues of life” agrees with our experience. Onze verstandelijke werkzaamheid is een middlebare, aan ‘t uitwendige gebonden. Maar zij wordt beheerscht door een centrale werkzaamheid des menschen, die niet von zijn peripherie, het verstandelijk denken, tot de peripherie der dingen gaat, maar van ‘s menschen middlepunt uit tot het middlepunt, het wezen der dingen. Ieder kent in het dagelikschleven de ervaring dat b.v. het oordeel over een persoon niet alleen, niet 163 Dooyeweerd also ascribes Being only to God (See Appendix A) 187 hoofdzaaklijk, uit verstandelijke waarneming wordt opgemaakt, maar uit den onmiddellijken indruk dien de persoon in zijn geheel op ons binnenste maakt. Door dezen indruk grijpen wij zijn wezen als één geheel aan, omdat het ons heeft aangegrepen. Onze logische werkzaamheid, die begrippen vomt, doet ons door aftrekking uit de empirisch waargenomen bijzonderhedenkomen tot het algemeene: maar de genoemde centrale werkzaamheid, die de idee ontvangt en aanvat, doet ons van het onmiddelilijk aanschouwde wezenlijke der dingen komen tot de bijzonderheden waarin dat algemeene zich ontvouwt. ...Wanneer ik eene menigte gewassen en boomen tot het begrip “plant” heb teruggebracht door het gemeenschaplijke uit de waarneming af te zonderen, zoo heb ik iets anders gedaan dan wanneer ik, het leven der plant in zijn karakteristiek onderscheid van dat der dieren en der menschen onmiddellijk aanschouwende, van deze idee uit mij tot de bijzonderheden begeef. De begripsvormende, analyseerende werkzaamheid is zeer zeker noodig om tot kennis te komen: maar eerst op den grondslag der aanschouwenden synthetische werkzaamheid kan zij waarlijk vruchtbaar zijn (pp. 127-8). [Our rational activity is secondary, bound to the external. But it is ruled by man’s central activity, which does not proceed from the periphery, rational thought, to the periphery of things, but from man’s center outwards to the center, the essence of things. Everyone knows how in daily life we have 164 the experience of, for example, that our judgment about a person does not arise merely–or even primarily–from our rational perception, but rather from the immediate impression which the person makes on us inwardly. By means of this impression we grasp his essence as a whole, because it has grasped us. Our logical activity, which forms concepts, allows us to come to the universal by abstraction from the empirically perceived particulars: but the said central activity, which receives and grasps the idea, allows us to get from the immediately beheld essence of things to the particulars in which the universal unfolds itself. ...Whenever I have categorized crops and trees under the concept “plant” by abstracting the universal in what is perceived, I have then done something different than when I in immediate intuition am able to distinguish the characteristic life of plants from that of animals and humans, proceeding from this idea outwards to the particulars. Concept formation and analytical activity is certainly very necessary in order to arrive at knowledge: but they can only be really fruitful when based on the foundation of our intuiting synthetic activity.] Cf. Dooyeweerd’s idea of ‘naive experience.’ Dooyeweerd also sees naïve experience 164 as able to distinguish inorganic, organic, animal and human realms. 188 The religious area is not, as empiricism supposes, a separate area in humans of which we can form judgments. Rather, it is the ensouling, purifying principle of all faculties, including that of our reason (p. 133). Man is the crown of creation. Therefore it is from out of man that nature is to be explained. Nature is not an area where different laws rule than for the Spirit, the invisible world. For nature is subject to Spirit. So when God performs a miracle, this is not an action from outside of the world. On the contrary, miracles are proofs of God’s immanence. We defend the idea of God’s immanence more than that of pantheism. Nature is not God Himself, but nature is in God. Nature is the instrument or organ in which Spirit reveals itself (p. 159-60). Without this idea of a nature or embodiment of god, creation is seen as merely a purely arbitrary act of the Almighty (p. 163). Pantheism sets forward the idea of an eternal impersonal Idea that reveals itself in finite, transitory modi; but the experience of faith knows a personal existence, the Logos. (p. 169). 189 Appendix D Daniël Chantepie de la Saussaye (1818-1874) Chantepie de la Saussaye was the founding father of “ethical theology.” Ethical theology emphasized that God is a living, holy and loving Person, as well as the idea of man’s rebirth, which restores man’s personality from its distortions caused by the fall into sin. Abraham Kuyper says that Chantepie de la Saussaye, together with J.H. Gunning, Jr. (1829-1905), introduced him to the thought of Franz von Baader (1765-1841) (see Appendix C). De la Saussaye should not be confused with his son, Pierre Daniel Chantepie de la Saussaye (1848-1920), a philosopher and theologian who taught the history of religion at the University of Amsterdam and later at the university of Leiden. He was the first to use the phrase “phenomenology of religion.” He also wrote a book on time and eternity. 165 Although it was Gunning who first introduced Kuyper to Baader’s theosophy, it was de la Saussaye who influenced Gunning to read Baader. Baader was tremendously important to de la Saussaye. His son reports that he saw de la Saussaye go about every day with the writings of Oetinger, Hamann and Baader. 166 A summary of some of de la Saussaye’s articles relating to science. (1) “Intuïtie en Empirie” [Intuition and Empiricism] De la Saussaye wrote this article in 1858, in response to a letter by a Dr. A. Pierson regarding the path of science. Unlike Pierson, he does not want to contrast intuition and empiricism; rather, intuition is required for a “true empiricism.” De la Saussaye is not against all empirical science, but only that kind which tries to separate reason from the heart. He emphasizes that true science requires intuition, and that this comes from the heart. He says at p. 493 that the word ‘intuition’ cannot be expressed except by two verbs, aanschouwen and inzien [intuitive beholding and in-sight]. Intuition presupposes 167 165 P.D. Chantepie de la Saussaye: Tijd en eeuwigheid (Haarlem: Bohn, 1908). Evert Jansen Schoonhoven: Natuur en genade bij J.G. Hamann: den Magus van het 166 noorden (1730-1788) (G. F. Callenbach, 1945), 4. 167 Dooyeweerd uses both these terms. See Friesen 2011. 190 a world of experience [ervaringswereld] in whose essence [wezen] we obtain in-sight on the basis of this intuitive beholding. Whoever beholds [aanschouwt] the Son has eternal life; de la Saussaye uses that reference to beholding in relation to our knowledge (279) And unlike Pierson, he does not use the word ‘posit’ [poneren] to describe intuition: This in-sight is to be contrasted with the idea of ‘poneren’—to posit, or state or suppose. To posit requires a denial of an experiential world. In other words, positing is not in reference to the given world. To understand the given world, intuition is required. Intuition is in turn just one faculty of our heart or ‘geweten.’ 168 Intueren toch beteekent …iets dat wij niet anders dan door zamenstelling van twee werkwoorden kunnen uitdrukken (en daarom blijve het vreemde woord bestaan), namelijk: aanschouwen en inzien. Het onderstelt dus een voorwerp, of een geheel van voorwerpen, eene ervaringswereld die aanschouwd wordt en in welker wezen, op grond dier aanschouwing, inzigt verkregen wordt. Poneren daarentegen beteekent stellen, en onderstelt dus, onafhankelijk van de vraag of men eene ervarings-wereld aanneemt of niet, eene, voor de daad van het poneren noodzakelijke, ontkenning van deze ervarings-wereld, een niets, waarin geponeeerd wordt (Verzameld Werk 493). [To intuit really means …something that cannot be expressed other than by putting two verbs together (and for that reason may we continue to allow these strange words), namely a beholding [aanschouwen] and an in- sight [inzien]. It therefore presupposes an object, or a whole that is made up of objects, an experiential world that is beheld and into which we obtain insight as to its nature by means of such beholding. In contrast, to state [poneren] means to ‘posit’ or to suppose. Whether or not we assume an experiential world, the act of positing necessarily requires a denial of this experiential world, of a nothing [een niets] in which we posit.] Not that this intuition is of objects in the world. De la Saussaye says that without the act of intuition, the objectively given world cannot be understood. He speaks of intuition as 169 De la Saussaye identifies the terms ‘heart’ and ‘geweten’ (Brouwer 267). ‘Geweten’ is 168 often translated ‘conscience,’ but de la Saussaye sees that as an act of the heart in its relation to God. See Dooyeweerd. Theoretical intuition in its subjective subjectedness to the cosmic law 169 order is the complete transcendental condition of the synthesis of meaning by which we obtain knowledge (translation of WdW II, 414, italics Dooyeweerd's). In addition to a theoretical intuition, there is also our pre-theoretical intuition. Only in intuition do I experience the coherence of a psychical impression with the pre-psychical aspects of empirical reality, in which the sensory subject-object relation is founded (NC II, 478). 191 a ‘faculty’ [vermogen], but not as the original faculty. It is derived and rests on our conscience [geweten] of which it is only one of several revelations [openbaringen]. 170 In contrast to intuition, reason is the purely formal ability to distinguish representations and to form concepts. It is the faculty, on the basis of our natural relation to the Logos, to be able to recognize the Logos in the world (De La Saussaye 1858, 494 fn1). Following Baader, De la Saussaye criticizes the “liberal” view that abstract reason [Verstand, which liberals wrongly refer to as ‘reason’] is the center of man’s life. Het abstracte verstand, zeggen wij, omdat het verstand alzoo wordt afgescheiden gedacht van de overige vermogens en als die allen beheerschende wordt voorgesteld, terwijl het integendeel door deze beheerscht wordt. In de werkelijkheid, volgens eene ware, de bijbelsche psychologie, zijn de bronnen des levens in het hart, en wordt het verstand alzoo door het hart beheerscht, dat eerst datgene regt wordt verstaan waarmede wij te voren in levensgemeenschap zijn getreden en dat de kennis niet het aan de liefde voorafgaande is, maar het op de liefde volgende. De ware kennis is daarom ook in den grond een aanschouwen; het is de geheimzinnige zamentreffing van het object en het subject. Eerst waar die zamentreffing heeft plaats gegrepen en het object aanschouwd wordt, is er ruimte voor de onderscheidende, ontledende werkzaamheden van het verstand; de verstandbegrippen ontstaan eerst daar waar de idee gevormd, met anderee woorden waar de werkelijkheid aanschouwd is. Dit verstand, dat dus in den zamenhang onzer vermogens sltechts een zeer ondergeschikte plaats bekleedt, wordt door het liberalismus ten troon verheven. Het wil niet zien, het wil bewizjen, het wil niet de orde den logischen zamenhang der dingen opmerken, de gedachte Gods nadenken; het wil de gedachte scheppen, de werkelijkheid afhangkelijk maken van de a priori betoogde noodzekelijkheid; niet de verstandsbegrippen doen rigten door de objectieve wereld, maar de objectieve wereld door de verstandsbegrippen; niet gelooven (het gelooven toch is een zien) om te begripen, maar begrijpen om te gelooven (Verzameld Werk I, 497). [We say ‘abstract reason’ because reason is in this way thought of as 171 separated from the remaining faculties, and put forward as ruling all of the faculties, whereas it is itself ruled by that which is all-ruling. In reality, Like De la Saussaye, Dooyeweerd uses revelation [openbaring] to refer to the temporal 170 expressions of our supratemporal heart. (Friesen 2009, Thesis 65 and references). 171 Dooyeweerd emphasizes that the idea of autonomy of thought relies on rationality in its abstracted from our act of knowing. Kant’s ‘transcendental subject’ is an abstraction (NC I, v, 6-7). 192 according to true biblical psychology, the sources of life are in the heart, 172 and reason is therefore ruled by the heart. This is only correctly understood when we have first entered into living communion; knowledge does not precede love, but is based on love. True knowledge is therefore based on an inner intuition; it is the secret coming together of the object and the subject. Only after this coming together has taken place and the object has been viewed intuitively can there be room for the distinguishing and analytical work of reason; concepts of reason originate first where the idea is formed, or in other words, where reality has been intuited. This 173 reason, which has only a subordinated place in our faculties, is elevated by liberals to a throne. Liberalism does not want to see, it wants to prove; it does not want to notice the logical coherence of things, nor to think the thoughts of God after him; it wants to create the thought, and to make 174 reality dependent on a necessity that is argued for a priori. It does not want to direct the concepts of reason by the objective world, but wants to direct the objective world by these concepts of reason. It does not want to believe (believing is really a seeing) in order to understand, but it wants to understand in order to believe.] But reason itself cannot see; it is merely the eye or hand of the soul, a tool of the spirit to sort and to order matter that is brought from elsewhere. A false psychology results from man’s displacement from this eternal central point. If he finds the center in reason, which should be subordinate to his heart, it is because he himself is displaced in the middle point of his life, and thereby estranged from God. For whoever has communion with God beholds all things from out of eternity (I John 2:22) (498). 175 For man needs a center. He may seek this in himself, trying to find his ground within himself. He declares reason to be the guideline of his existence, making it his god, and subjecting God, world and his own heart to this god. Science then becomes an idol, as a result of deifying oneself (497). But science then becomes negatively critical: 176 172 Cf. Dooyeweerd’s use of the biblical text from Proverbs, “Out of the heart are the issues of life.” 173 See Dooyeweerd on concept and idea. Concepts depend first on the idea, which is intuited. Dooyeweerd 2007 and Discussion; Friesen 2009, Theses 84, 92 and references). Dooyeweerd argued for the givenness of reality as opposed to the creation by self- 174 sufficient thought. (Friesen 2009, Thesis 2 and references). 175 Note that this viewing ‘sub specie aeternitatis’ is of the world. 176 See Dooyeweerd on idol-ideas (WdW I, 68, 86), and on deifying thought (NC I, 13). 193 Haar uitgangspunt zoekt zij altijd buiten den cirkel des levens, uit het niets tracht zij het iets te verklaren. Doch op dezen weg, in dezen Tantalus- arbeid van altijd te trachten tot iets te komen waar niets ten grondslag ligt, stoot zij gedurig tegen de werkelijkheiden van het leven aan. (498) [It seeks its point of departure outside of the circle of life; it tries to explain something out of nothing. And in this way, in this work of Tantalus, always striving to arrive at something where there is nothing at its foundation, it continually bumps up against the realities of life.] Idealism sees reason, the faculty of knowing, as the highest, and conscience [het geweten] as dependent on it. It then sees conscience in terms of feelings of responsibility and guilt. But conscience is not just a matter of knowing, as if knowledge were virtue and sin were unknowing. (500) Ware het uitgangspunt niet geweest het abstracte denken, dat nooit het mysterium der persoonlijkheid begrijpt, maar het zoo concrete willen van den mensch, niet de rede, maar het geweten, ware men zich bewust geweet dat het ik, dat in het ik denk ligt opgesloten, een feit is, dat alle werkzaamheid van dat ik, hetzij denken of handelen, voorafgaat, de eenvoudige analyse van dat feit zou geleid hebben, niet alleen tot de onderscheiding van zelfbewustzijn en wereldbewustzijn, het ik en niet –ik van Fichte, maar tot hetgeen waarin beide zich vereeinigen, het godsbewustzijn, de erkenning van den persoonlijken God als middenpunt, beide van den mikrokosmos en den makrokosmos. (502) [If the point of departure had not been abstract thought, which can never understand the mystery of personality, but the concrete will of man–not reason but the heart [geweten], one would have become conscious of the knowledge that the “I” within the phrase “I think”, is a fact that precedes all activities of that I, whether thinking or acting. The simple analysis of that fact would have led, not only to the distinction between consciousness of self and consciousness of world, the I and the not-I of Fichte, but to that in which both are united, the consciousness of God, the recognition of the personal God as the center of both the microcosm and the macrocosm.] [Descartes’] cogito ergo sum has lead to the Hegelian identity of thought and being, where God is the thought process itself. This leads to pantheism (502). Instead of emphasis on the cogito, the thinking, we must emphasize the self that thinks; the existence of the self precedes all thinking (502). 177 177 See Dooyeweerd WdW I, 15. The transcendental cogito misses the fact that it is I myself transcend all modal diversity including that of thought (WdW I, 20). Het ‘cogito’ is immers niet anders dan de zelfheid in haar logische denk-activiteit (WdW I, 108). If we 194 The point of unity of philosophy and theology is to be found in a healthy anthropology (505).178 De la Saussaye says that the periodical in which this article appears, Ernst en Vrede, was founded in order to oppose the reigning supposition that science has no presuppositions (495).179 The editorial policy of the journal is to bear witness to the supernatural truth, which should no longer be regarded as suprahuman [bovenmenschelijk], but as completely human. He says that true science looks for the laws of existence and their 180 coherence. …datgene waardoor de denkende geest tot kennis komt van de wetten, waarnaar hij bestaat, en van den zamenhang waarin hij tot het geheel en het geheel tot hem en de verschillende deelen van het geheel onderling tot elkander staan. (495) [that by which the thinking soul obtains knowledge of the laws governing his existence, and the coherence in which he stands to the whole, and the 181 whole towards him, and the coherence in which the various parts of the whole mutually stand in relation to each other]. The “ethical” is the direction that has as its point of departure [uitgangspunt] man in his 182 relation to God; contrast this with the rationalistic or supranaturalistic directions, both of which isolate man from God (504). Pearson saw intuition as subjectivistic and asked, through whose intuition should the spiritual world be beheld [aanschouwd]? De la Saussaye responded by saying that the fail to recognize the selfhood as the basis for the cogito, the selfhood is dissolved in the supposed logical unity of thought (NC II, 431). Dooyeweerd says that the whole aim of his philosophy is to reach the philosophical 178 anthropology of the supratemporal heart.” Who is man? means both the beginning and the end of philosophical reflection” (NC III, 783). Dooyeweerd emphasizes that there are both subjective theoretical presuppositions and 179 supra-theoretical ontical presuppositions. (Friesen 2009, Thesis 2 and references). See discussion above of Kuyper’s views in Pro Rege that Christ’s miracles are a 180 demonstration of what we may be and do. Dooyeweerd emphasizes the way that coherence stands in relation to Totality, and 181 Totality in turn refers to the Origin. Friesen 2009, Thesis 39 and references. Dooyeweerd’s use of ‘uitgangspunt.’ For some examples see WdW I, 31, 34, 83, 85, 182 490. 195 same question could be asked about perception: through whose perception should the world be seen? An individual’s? Humanity’s perception? (507). We cannot see the spiritual world where it is not within us. Where two people stand before the same object, and the one sees it differently from the other, then either one eye has been clouded, or perhaps both. In order to see who is wrong, we must determine what one sees in common, and then come to a judgment of probability. But where one sees something and the other sees completely nothing of that, then there is no common point of departure [uitgangspunt]; then the one will say to the other, “You are blind.” And the other may reply to the first, “Your eye is diseased.” Just as it is not possible to talk with a blind person about colours, it is impossible to view the spiritual world where one does not have it within himself (507). If someone says he does not see a spiritual world, you must say, “Open your eyes.” And if he says, “I don’t want to, unless you first prove that I have an eye that I have to open,” well then, there is nothing to say except, “Keep them closed then and don’t see.” (509). For we have both a bodily eye and a spiritual eye: Er bestaat eene ervaringswereld, d.i. eene objectief gegevene, onafhankeliijk of zij al of niet erkend worde; deze wereld is zoowel geestelijk als stoffelijk. Om haar te kennen behooren er in den mensch vermogens, die met haar corresponderen. [There exists an experiential world, i.e. an objectively given world, independent of whether or not it is known; this world is both spiritual and material. In order to know it, man has faculties that correspond with it.] De la Saussaye then has a remarkable passage about analogies: Het wezenlijke voordeel der geestelijke wetenschappen boven de natuurlijke bestaat darrin dat de eerste feiten aan de hand geven, die doorgaans hun analogon hebbe in den onderzoekenden mensch zelven, weshalve het criterium voor de kritiek hier des te onmiddellijker is; terwijl de feiten der laatste zeer geringe analogiën hebben in den mensch, waarom ook de kritiek alhier moeijelijker is, de proefnemingen ingewikkelder. Deze kritiek nu wordt uitgeoefend door middel van een inwendig criterium door middel namelijk van het vermogen, dat de mensch heeft om hypothesen te scheppen. Iedere verklaring van een reeks van verschijnselen, in de stoffelijke en geestelijke wereld beide, gaat uit van eene hypothese... (510) 196 [The essential advantage of the moral sciences above the natural sciences is that they present facts that have their analogies in the inquiring person183 himself, and so the criterion for critique is more immediate; but in the natural sciences there are fewer analogies in man, so the critique is more difficult and experimentation is more complicated. Such critique must be done by means of an inner criterion, which man has in order to create hypotheses. Every explanation of a series of phenomena, whether in the material or the spiritual world, proceeds by way of an hypothesis ...] 184 This hypothesis is the result of knowledge that has been acquired; the hypothesis is not itself experience, but based on it. It is an activity of the soul [geest] applied to the world of experience. A hypothesis is based on intuition. It is a seeing into [inzien] the order that exists in the world of phenomena. That’s the key; if the key does not fit, then its use has been wrong. If it fits, then we have the greatest possibility that the explanation is correct. We can’t get higher than probability in this knowledge. Intuition is not a summing up of facts or events; a summing up does not lead to the knowledge of any motive [beweegreden] of the heart (511). Intuition is in-sight [in-zien, in-zicht]. It is 185 …het inzien van de orde, die in de wereld der verschijnselven bestaat, en zij vindt dus in die wereld der verschijnselen haar eigenardige contrôle. Zij is de sleutel daartoe. Past de sleutel niet, dan is hare werkzaamheid verkeerd geweest. Maar blijkt het dat er volkomene zamentreffing bestaat tusschen de reeks van verschijnselen, die men verklaren wil, en de verklaring zelve, dan bestaat de grootste waarschijnlijkheid (en hooger kunnen wij het niet brengen in de kennis der waarheid) dat zoo wel de This explains the use of the term ‘analogy’ in Dooyeweerd in reference to the 183 modalities. 184 See Dooyeweerd’s emphasis on hypothesis. Dooyeweerd says that the foundation [grondlegging] for philosophy is its hypothesis (WdW I, 51). Cf. Dooyeweerd: WdW II, 231: “in-zicht bij de theoretische analyse;” II, 410; 11, 411: 185 “Alle theoretische kennis rust op wetend in-zicht.” NC II, 472 translated this as ‘conscious insight’ but ‘wetend’ means ‘knowing.’ And WdW II, 412: Ik kan den modalen zin van een wetskring niet in het theoretisch begrip gearticuleerd vatten, wanneer mij het tijdelijk theoretisch in-zicht in de aan de analyse tegenovergestelde zin-zijde ontbreekt. In de heen- en weder schouwende intuitie, waarin ik mij mijn theoretische denkvrijheid bewust wordt, komen de verdiepte analyse en haar ‘Gegenstand’ in het actueele kennis-contact, in de actueele zin-synthesis, die van uit de geïsoleerde bewustzijnsfuncties nimmer is te verklaren. 197 verschijnselen zelve juist zóó zijn, als zij ons zijn medegedeeld of wij ze hebben waargenomen, als dat de verklaring de juiste is. (511) […the insight of the order that exists in the world of phenomena, and it therefore finds its own verification in the world of phenomena. It is the key. If the key does not fit, then something has gone wrong in its activity. But if there is a complete correspondence between the series of phenomena that one wants to explain and the explanation itself, then there is the highest probability (and we cannot get higher than probability in our knowledge of truth) that the phenomena are exactly as they have been communicated to us or perceived by us, and that our explanation is the correct one] In every area [gebied] of human knowledge, perception does not help if there is no intuition that knows how to bring the phenomena into a relation. This intuition that brings phenomena into relation to explain them is not something arbitrary, but a flash [blik] of insight, as if a light has suddenly been turned on. There can be no discovery without such a flash. To support this, he cites Baader: Treffend zegt Baader, door Rothe aangehaald (St. u. Kr., S 17): “Mann besinne sich genau jener lichten, seltenen Momente, in denen—eine Wahrheit wie ein neurer Stern näher oder ferner den Horizont unserer Geistessehe heraufstieg oder emporflammte! Da ist sie nun, fremd und doch innig erkannt, lange oft im Dunklen gesucht, geahnet, aber doch so ganz neu, so ganz unerwartet”…enz. en verder: “So gewisz es ist, dasz diese Inspiration ohne unser Zuthun kommt und wieder schwindet, so deutlich unser Geist fühlt und erkennt, dasz ihm auch diese Gabe, die ihm das is, was der Odem dem Kindesleben, gegeben wird, so gewisz ist es, dasz alles Wahre, Große und Schöne, was die Menschenkinder dachten und thaten, nicht dem was gewöhnlich Fleisz und Nachforschen heißt, sonder ähnlichen Inspirationen sein Daseyn zu danken hat.” (511, Citing Baader, Werke 11, 154). [In a striking remark cited by Rothe (St. u. Kr., S 17), Baader says “One 186 should carefully call to mind those luminous, infrequent moments in which a truth, like a new star, climbs higher or blazes aloft, either closer or further from the horizon of our spiritual vision! There it is now, strange and yet known within, long sought for in the darkness, of which we had a presentiment, and yet still so completely new, so completely unexpected” and so on, and further, “Just as it is certain that this inspiration comes and then disappears without our doing anything, so that our spirit feels and discerns that this gift, which is like the inspired breath of childhood, is given to it, so is it certain that all that is true, great and beautiful in the R. Rothe: Zur Dogmatik (Zweiter Arikel) in Theologische Studien und Kritiken, 31 186 (1858) 3-49). At 17-18 he cites Baader, Werke XI, 154 v.ff (1850) 198 thoughts and deeds of humanity has its basis for existence in such inspiration, and is not due to what is called diligence and research.” (citing Baader Werke 11, 154). De la Saussaye doubts that anything can be found in nature except by intuition. Periods of progress in the natural sciences depend not on better seeing, but on different paths for perception. (511). Even to come to belief in Jesus Christ requires intuition. Belief is not based on mere approval of his words and deeds. To approve of Jesus in comparison to something external is not belief. Het geloof in J.C., volgens de voorbeelden der eerste geloovigen, is een zien van iets onzigtbaars in hem, eene waardigheid, eene hoogere natuur, wat dan ook, op grond van hetgeen zijn van hem zagen en hoorden in de wereld der vershijnselen. Dat nu het zien en hooren van Hem hiertoe niet toereikend was, is klaarblijkelijk. Dan hadden toch alle oog – en oorgetuigen het zelfde omtrent hem moeten denken en gevoelen…nature of belief: “Is deze iets anders, kan zij iets anders zijn dan intuîtie, een aanschouwen des geestes, een aanschouwen, te midden der zigtbare, waarneembare werkelijkheid, van iets dat niet meer zigtbaar en waarneembaar is? Op deze intuîtie welke het geloof is steunt de gansche theologie.” Haar bestand, haar raison d’etre is weggenomen, waar haar het geloof, als haar object, is ontnomen.. . . . Dat geloof is, ik zeg niet, die gave zelve, het oog waarmede men ziet, maar toch het middle om dat oog gezond te maken en de nevels te doen wegtrekken, die het verhinderden juist te zien. Door het licht van buiten wordt het licht van het oog gewekt en geleid. De geestelijke wereld namelijk, waar van ieder mensch de Ahnung heeft, is in Christus zoo na gekomen tot den zinnelijken mensch, heeft zoo diep ingegrepen in de zigtbare ervaringswereld, dat de feiten van dat leven gelijkelijk tot beider gebied behooren en wij nu, naar aanleiding van dit in de ervaringswereld gegeven leven de leiddraad hebben om den geestelijken grond ook van de overige deelen dier wereld op te sporen. Het Woord is vleesch geworden opdat wij nu in de wereld des vleesches, de wereld der verschijnselen, het Woord, den Logos, zouden kunnen opsporen en vinden. (513) [Belief in Jesus Christ, according to the examples of the first believers, is seeing something invisible in him, a worthiness, a higher nature, or whatever, on the basis of which his disciples saw and heard in the world of phenomena. It is clear that merely seeing and hearing Him was not sufficient for that. If that were so, then all eyewitnesses and oral witnesses would have had to think and feel the same way about him...nature of belief: “Is this anything else, can it be anything other than intuition, a beholding of the spirit, a beholding in the middle of the visible, perceptible reality, of something that is no longer visible and perceptible? All of 199 theology rests on this intuition which is belief.” Its existence, its raison d’être is taken away where belief, as its object, is removed. . . . 187 I am not saying that belief is the gift itself, the eye itself by which we see, but it is rather the means to make the healthy again and to take away the fog that hinders proper seeing. Through light from outside is the light of the eye awakened and led. The spiritual world, of which every man has a presentiment [Ahnung] has in Christ come so near to the sensory man, and has reached so deeply into the visible world of experience, that the facts of that life belong equally to both areas. And now, motivated by this life given in the world of experience, we have the guideline to also seek the spiritual ground of the remaining parts of this world. The Word became flesh so that we might be able to seek and to find the Word, the Logos, in the world of flesh, the world of phenomena.] Note again that we find the Logos in the world of phenomena. In Jesus Christ, we recognize the unity of the visible and the invisible world (514). Christ is the center of the moral world order, just as in nature the sun is the center of light, and subjectively our heart is our center. (516) Liberalism’s contradiction is that it believes that reason is both the eye that sees as well as the instrument for obtaining knowledge. Both expressions are mutually exclusive. (515) What drives one to do research? The desire to find order, coherence and unity in the diversity of things, and to know the ground and essence of things. It is the love of truth. (516). (2) Book review “J.H. Gunning Jr., Het Evangelie en de Litteratur” What is empiricistic is experience that does not perceive things in the correct order: e.g. explains the spiritual world from the material and not the reverse (359) Gunning wants to show that Christian belief contains the necessary premises of all science. We should not offend the man of science by leaving him in the belief that he can find the treasures of knowledge and science [de schatten van kennis en wetenschap] other than in Christ (360). Dooyeweerd emphasizes faith as the object of theology. He says that theology is “a 187 theoretical knowledge obtained in a synthesis of the logical function of thought and the temporal function of faith.” (NC II, 562). 200 (3) “Het Christendom, de verzoening van wijsbegeerte en godsdienst” The split between philosophy and religion is not necessary. A higher unity unifies them: the unity of human nature (364). Philosophy seeks the unity of the manifold and diverse phenomena, whose coherence we call ‘world’; it is search for the ground, and the essence of things. There are two ways of doing this. The first is taking the world, in the diversity of its phenomena, of which I am one phenomenon, and regarding human nature as just one kind of phenomena, as the point of departure [uitgangspunt]. Or it can take the investigating subject in his truth, in his consciousness of God as point of departure, in a synthetic path, turning to the idea of God in the explanation of phenomena, and in this way intuiting [beschouwen] and describing the world in the light of that Idea. The first method is empirical, the second more speculative, although both methods exclude each other so little that without the speculative element, empiricism becomes a false empiricism, and speculation has its guideline and guarantee only in empiricism (367). Christ’s obedience rested on his knowledge of beholding: he testified of what he had seen and heard by the Father. In this communion of God and man, in this common carrying of God and man in his own heart, which is the essence of salvation, he possessed the key of knowledge [sleutel der kennis ]; he saw the Father working and worked with him and 188 knew what was in man and revealed to him his own heart. Nothing was hidden from 189 him: the spiritual world, which is the basis for the material, lay disclosed before his eyes...His eye of faith was always open, and never dimmed, because there was no sin, which darkens everything, and he saw the invisible things of God through the veil of 190 nature, the things that no eye has seen, no ear has heard and which had not appeared in the hearts of men. In that he was the second, the true Adam, the true original man, the ideal. (382) Dooyeweerd links “key of knowledge” with both Christ and our own supratemporal 188 heart. See Friesen 2009, Thesis 43 and references). Cf. Dooyeweerd: In an indissoluble connection with this self-revelation as Creator, God 189 has revealed man to himself (Friesen 2009, Thesis 66 and references). Dooyeweerd speaks of seeing the invisible things of God (Dooyeweerd 2007 and 190 Discussion) 201 The reformational principle, from which philosophy has received a new life, of which in our time the nature and extent appears to be able to be defined, does not hold to the nominalistic principle, but instead, via the mystics, to the realist principle. The Reformers were the spiritual followers, not of Duns Scotus, Abelard and Roscelinus, but, via the channel of “German Theology,” of Tauler, Gerson, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Albertus Magnus, Anselm. Modern speculative philosophy in the line of Descartes can be seen as the fruit of a nominalism that sought its standpoint in Descartes’ cogito ergo sum (391 fn13). It is well known that the Reformers did not look favourable on philosophy. Luther applied to philosophy the maxim Mulier taceat in ecclesia [women must be silent in the church], and Calvin allowed philosophy at the most certain remaining sparks of eternal truth, and these in an impure state. (392) (4) Antwoord aan Ds. J.H. Gunning, Jr. De la Saussaye writes again about the Scylla and Charybdis of empiricism and speculation. This article was written before Gunning adopted de la Saussaye’s views. At that time, Gunning had some objections to Christians calling themselves ‘scientific’ and de la Saussaye is responding to these concerns. Gunning talks about Scripture making a total-impression [Total-eindruck] on a person; 191 de la Saussaye agrees, but says that it is the task of science to explain and justify, to give an account of that effect of Scripture. To do that explaining will not decrease the power 192 of Scripture any more than a scientific explanation of nature’s laws would diminish the aesthetic enjoyment of nature. The joy would be even greater for someone who has been released from the painful yoke of a dualistic situation of the soul. Whereas Gunning awaits for the salvation of the future world, de la Saussaye wants it to be sought even now, so that we can already enjoy eternal life. And any critique of Scripture does not take away from the “belief of the heart” and of its inspiration by God [theopneustie] (446). Cf Dooyeweerd on how Scripture speaks to the heart (Dooyeweerd 2007 and 191 Discussion). 192 Cf. Dooyeweerd on the nature of theory as “giving an account.” 202 Gunning thought that Christians should avoid calling themselves scientific. He argued that our faith experience is witness to the fact that the life of Holy Scripture is a unity that is not comprehended from out of its separate parts, as little as the physical life of a body can be understood by dissecting its members. But de la Saussaye counters this argument by saying, is anatomy the only science? Does anatomy become any less scientific if the parts that become “dead” under the scalpel are viewed as parts of one body? It is dangerous for a theologian to make analogies to other sciences. But other medical sciences, like physiology and pathology look at the organism as a whole; does that mean they are less of a science? There are many kinds of theology, too; some look at Scripture as a whole, like hermeneutics and others criticize books of the Bible. (448) If any science begins only with perception of the separate parts, and not of the whole in its parts, then it becomes impossible. (449) The object of study for theology is the Church as the whole of the revelations of the Spirit of Christ (451). De la Saussaye says that his disagreement with Gunning is not over faith but rather the nature of science; by taking away the speculative and spiritual element, Gunning is destroying science. [Gunning later changed his views] (5) De godsdienstige bewegingen van dezen tijd in haren oorsprong geschetst (1863) In this book, de la Saussaye says that eternity is not a time before time, but the ground of time. The Reformers, including Calvin, did not see this in the way that they spoke of predestination. They were children of their time, and the idea that eternity is the ground of time was developed in philosophy only after the sixteenth century. …de voorstelling dat dit werk Gods eene altijd durende, eeuwige daad Gods is, en verder, dat de eeuwigheid niet een tijd is vóór den tijd, maar de grond van den tijd, deze voorstelling, zeg ik, lag geheel buiten den gezigtseinder van de zestiende eeuw en is eerst door de latere wijsbegeerte onstaan. De eeuwigheid werd als één tijdpunt gedacht; eene eeuwig daad Gods was dus een daad op dat tijdpunt volbragt. Hieruit nu ontstond natuurlijk en noodzakelijk, vooral daar waar aan de kerk zelve, in het sacrament beligchaamd, geene kracht ter bekeering werd toegreschreven, dat de verkiezing Gods als een besluit ter verkiezing, vóór de scheppinig der wereld volbragt, werd gedacht. Uitgaande, aan de eene zijde, van het geopenbaarde feit, dat niet all menschen zalig worden, en aan de andere, van de voorstelling des geloofs als gave Gods, zoo kwam men er natuurlijk toe, daar men zich God uitsluitend dacht als buiten den tijd en 203 buiten de wereld bestaande, en niet ook in den tijd en in de wereld, om de verkiezing Gods als eene daad voortestellen geschied buiten den tijd en buiten de wereld (p. 49). [the view that this work of God is a forever continuing, eternal act of God, and further that eternity is not a time before time, but the ground of time– this view I say was wholly outside horizon of the sixteenth century and first originated in later philosophy. Eternity was [in the 16 cenury] thought of as a point in time; an eternal act of God was thus an act completed at that point of [eternal] time. From this [incorrect view] it naturally and necessarily followed that in the church, (1) no power of conversion was ascribed to the embodiment in the sacrament, (2) God’s predestination was thought of as a decision of election, completed before the creation of the world. Proceeding on the one hand form the revealed fact that not all men will be saved and on the other of the idea of faith as a gift of God, the conclusion naturally followed that, because God was thought of as exclusively outside of time and outside the world, and not also in time and in the world, the election by God was seen as an act outside of time and outside of the world]. Failure to see Eternity as the ground of time thus has consequences for doctrines of predestination, the sacraments, and God’s immanence. Kuyper also seemed to share that 193 idea of predestination. This view of predestination avoids some of trhe polarities noted 194 by Schneckenburger. 193 See Dooyeweerd’s emphasis on predestination: the eternal penetrates the temporal: The “unfolding of the anticipatory spheres,” as an active “in-spiration" [lit. “spiritualizing-through”] of the law-spheres, is a religious theme in the Calvinistic life and worldview, a theme that reaches its highest tension through the immeasurable power of the all-ruling idea of predestination, taken in its universal meaning. Religious meaning must penetrate everywhere, in all law-spheres, and it must “complete” the meaning of the law-idea, although in this sinful dispensation this ideal is never fulfilled, except through Christ! (Dooyeweerd 1928, 61). Dooyeweerd emphasized that nothing of God’s creation can be lost (NC III, 524-525). Nothing in our apostate world can get lost in Christ (NC II, 34; I, 101). There is a sense in which redemption has already occurred in the religious root and is only being worked out in time (NC II, 33). Kuyper understood predestination in terms of the immediate relationship of our heart 194 with God. He says that the direct and immediate communion of our inner self with God is “the heart and kernel of the Calvinistic confession of predestination." God enters into immediate fellowship with the creature, as God the Holy Spirit. This is even the heart and kernel of the Calvinistic confession of 204 (5) “Tijd en Eeuwigheid,” in Het Eeuwig Evangelie (1870) This was an article published by de la Saussaye in a journal in which Abraham Kuyper was also involved (but in which Kuyper did not publish an article of his own De la Saussaye prefaces the article with the quotation from Ecclesiastes 3:11 about God making everything in its time, and laying eternity in our hearts). It is because we know 195 eternity that we can speak of time: Wij spreken van tijd, niet omdat wij den tijd kennen, maar omdat wij zijn tegenbeeld kennen, de eeuwigheid. De eeuwigheid is in ons hart en daarom spreken wij van tijd. (p. 4) [We speak of time, not because we know it but because we know its opposite image, eternity. Eternity is in our heart and that is why we can speak of time].196 predestination. There is communion with God, but only in entire accord with his counsel of peace from all eternity. Thus there is no grace but such as comes to us immediately from God. At every moment of our existence, our entire spiritual life rests in God Himself. The “Deo Soli Gloria” was not the starting-point but the result, and predestination was inexorably maintained, not for the sake of separating man from man, nor in the interest of personal pride, but in order to guarantee from eternity to eternity, to our inner self, a direct and immediate communion with the Living God (Kuyper 1898, p. 21). Dooyeweerd refers to this same verse in support of the idea that in our selfhood, we 195 really transcend time: According to my modest opinion, and in the light of the whole Scriptural revelation concerning human nature it is just this possession of a supratemporal root of life, with the simultaneous subjectedness to time of all its earthly expressions, that together belong to the essence [wezen] of man, to the image of God in him by means of which he is able to not only relatively but radically go out [uitgaan] above all temporal things. And that is how I also understand Ecclesiastes 3:11. [Dooyeweerd’s Second Response to Curators, Oct. 12, 1937, 34] 196 See Dooyeweerd: Now it is indeed correct that we could have no true sense of time unless we did not go above time in the deepest part of our being. All merely temporal creatures lack a sense of time (Dooyeweerd 1940, my translation) 205 De la Saussaye says that because eternity is in our heart, we are restless. We seek eternity because we have no peace in time. This eternity in our heart is the stimulus for thought. We seek eternity in the world, in that which corresponds to it outside of us (p. 8). There is a duality of time outside of us and eternity within us, but that separation is not eternal (p. 9). Prophecy is linked to seeking eternity in time. De blik in de toekkomst is de wijsheid geworden van het heden, de eeuwigheid wordt gezien in den tijd (p. 10) [The view into the future is the present transformed by Wisdom, it is eternity seen within time]. With eternity in our heart, our life is become eternal. We see the eternal in the world and live in Him (p. 16). Anneus Marinus Brouwer: Daniël Chantepie de la Saussaye: Eene Historisch- Dogmatische Studie Anneus Marinus Brouwer (not to be confused with the mathematician Brouwer!) wrote this book about de la Saussaye in 1905. There are remarkable similarities with Dooyeweerd’s mature philosophy. It is not clear whether Dooyeweerd is using Brouwer’s summary of what de la Saussaye says, or direct quotations from de la Saussaye. It does not really matter; the importance is the confirmation in a very clear way of Dooyeweerd’s dependence on de la Saussaye, and on the ideas of Franz von Baader that influenced de la Saussaye. Here is some information in Brouwer’s book. De la Saussaye says that Baader was orthodox. The word ‘theosophy’ should not scare us away from his work. He sought the reconciliation of Knowing and Believing [Wissen und Glauben]. His themes of the Fall into sin and Salvation are not just inner events, but World events (Brouwer 67-9). He says that Methodism has the advantage that it places the center of religion in the will and not in understanding (as the rationalists do) or in feeling (as the pietists do). But it also has serious errors: spiritual individualism that often leads to egotism. The expectation of conversion according to a set model often leads to hypocrisy. It has a defective psychology, it fails to distinguish between demonic and human sin, it does not 206 see the relation between nature and grace, and it makes an absolute antithesis between the Word of God and the word of men. And it does not allow the development of God’s Kingdom on earth. It is therefore unfruitful for science (87-88). As for critique of the Bible, we must acknowledge that there are errors in it, just as we 197 must acknowledge that the writers were under the power of the Spirit, who was greater than them and who inspired them, even without them knowing this was happening. So in all these different men with their various differences in all kinds of tones, God himself spoke to man. The desire for an infallible Bible must be given up; only the one who participates in the same Spirit’s life as lives in the Scriptures can exercise the proper critique on the Scriptures. Scripture should not be seen as a textbook, but as the only 198 authentic source of knowledge of the series of events in which revelation was given. But Scripture is itself not the power, and the book itself is not the Word of God. The Word is given expression in Scripture, and God’s power has Scripture as its organ (Brouwer 223- 5). 199 The first moment of consciousness of God is the relation of dependence. The second is 200 the recognition that we seek to realize being the image of God, and that there is an uncreated image which was the model for creation, and our ideal. The model is Christ. And the third moment is our awareness of a power, which proceeds from God and leads to God and yet acts in and on the world (Brouwer 263-4). The word ‘geweten’ is not conscience, but can be translated ‘heart.’ God does not reveal himself through concepts; his thoughts are facts, pure reality (Brouwer 273). 197 Dooyeweerd accepted errors in the Bible (Boeles 1977). Dooyeweerd opposed Cornelius van Til’s propositional use of Scripture (Friesen 2009, 198 Thesis 42 and references). Dooyeweerd also distinguished between Word and Scripture (Friesen 2009, Thesis 42 199 and references). 200 Dooyeweerd emphasized that the idea of boundary between god and creation is not meant as a separation [scheiding] but as dependence (Friesen 2009, Thesis 61 and references). 207 There is a direction that man must take as his point of departure [uitgangspunt] in his relation to God. De la Saussaye calls it ‘ethical’ in distinction from ‘rationalistic’ or ‘supranatural.’ It is not an individualistic way of seeing [zienswijze] (274). De la Saussaye prefers to call his work ‘ethical theology’ instead of mysticism, because ‘mysticism’ refers to the being and ground of experience that is in the Infinite, but ‘ethical’ includes the in-sight [inzien] 201 into the essence and ground of Christian experience, including everything that the Christian possesses, experiences [beleefd] and 202 confesses is from God and through God’s [uit God en door Gods ] personal working is 203 achieved [gewerkt] in Him. But in 1863, the Hervormde Church referred to de la Saussaye’s work as ‘ethical- mystical,’ and he gladly adopted the term. De mystiek is onze grond: wij zijn geworteld in een niet waarneembaar [niet uiterlijk waarneembaar] object...in God. Wij gelooven het althans. De ethiek is de openbaring van het in Hem verborgene leven. Wij meenen dat dit leven niet besloten blijft in het gemoed, maar zijn woord heeft en zijn kracht uitoefent op ieder gebied van menschelijk denken en streven..Wat er bedenkelijk kon zijn in het enkele woord mystisch, alsof wij toegaven aan bevindingen, visioenen, extasen, aan de Grübeleien van het ongebondene gemoed, wordt weggenomen door het correctief ethisch, dat ons aan de vaste wetten, waaraan dat leven gebonden is, doet denken. Wat er in dit woord [ethisch] problematiek mocht zijn alsof wij ons eene ethiek konden denken buiten het verborgene leven in God, eene ethiek uitgaande van een bloot transcendenten, en niet ook immanenten God, wordt weggenomen door het woord mystisch, waaruit het blijkt dat wij met onze ethiek niet onder de wet staan, maar onder het evangelie. (Brouwer pp. 275-6) [Mysticism is our basis: we are rooted in a non-perceivable [not externally perceivable] object...in God. At least we believe that. Ethics are the revelation of the life that is hidden in Him. We believe that this life does not remain closed up in the soul, but it expresses itself and it exercises its power in every area of human thought and endeavor. What might be suspect in the word ‘mystical’–as if we gave in to the experiences, visions, ecstasies, to the Grübeleien [futile speculations] of the unbound soul–is 201 This hyphenated use of ‘in-zien’ is also found in Dooyeweerd Note the use of this word ‘beleven,’ which Tol seems to want to make exceptional in 202 Vollenhoven’s thesis. 203 Note again, this uit en door that we saw in De Hartog and Dooyeweerd. 208 taken away by the corrective word ‘ethical,’ which makes us think of the fixed laws to which life is bound. What is problematic in this word ‘ethical’ is the idea that we might be able to think of an ethic outside of our hidden life in God, an ethic that proceeds from a purely transcendent and not immanent God. But this objection is taken away by the word ‘mystical,’ from which we see that our ethic does not stand under the law, but under the Gospel]. The supernatural is given with human nature itself and we can inseparably behold [onafscheidelijk beschouwen] it. To deny the supernatural is to deny what is human in man. The supernatural is not a means to religion, but the essence itself of religion (Brouwer 276). This standpoint, that the Word of God is not just a dead object that is viewed [beschouwen] externally and then described (as dogmatism supposes), but the inspiring [bezielende] and fructifying seed [kiem] of the inner life. 204 It is not opposed to the supernatural, for it acknowledges supernaturalism’s partial truth. It is opposed to an empiricism that wrongly believes that the objective world can be perceived outside the perceiving subject (p. 277). The Holy Ghost is actually the personal life of God in the person, and faith is the direction of [man’s] spirit, based on the power of that personal act in which God reveals 205 and shares himself with man, man feels connected to God, knows that he is determined [bepaald] by him and serves him with free will (p. 278) Science originates out of belief; belief does not originate from science. Belief originates not through external authority, but through experience. The way is shown by John’s words: That which we have heard, that which we have seen, which we have beheld and our hands have touched (p. 279). 206 He continues (my translation): 204 Dooyeweerd makes this distinction in his Second Response to Curators [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Response2.html]. 1 John 1:1. The idea of heart direction is crucial for both Dooyeweerd and 205 Vollenhoven. 206 Similar words by Vollenhoven in his Opbouw article on Van Eeden. 209 When you see the picture of the Son in the four forms of the four Gospels, don’t try to harmonize them; don’t try to hide the contradictions. Let them stand. But let that image work in you. First through the words that are said about him. The word expresses man’s most inner being. Words have that by which your inner being is grasped. You feel a heart in them. They are not laws, nor dogma. In admonition and punishment, comfort and teaching, it is always the heart that is outpoured [ontboezemt]. In that heart is the personality. See, feel something of the personality in those words and you will begin to see your acts—your works as he called them—in the unbreakable coherence [onbrekelijke samenhang] with 207 those words. Hearing becomes a seeing [zien]. Gradually, the unity of that personality will become clearer in this coherence of word and work. You begin to understand the motives [drijfveeren ] of your acts and the 208 suffering of your heart, you discover the hidden ground of its being: your seeing [zien] becomes a beholding [aanschouwen]. And when you see him, so that the divine basis of his being is revealed to you, the divine nature comes to meet you everywhere the human [nature], and you understand the words: “Who has seen me has seen the Father.” Then your beholding, your wondering an reverence [eerbied] become faith [geloof], 207 Dooyeweerd often refers to the unbreakable coherence of our pre-theoretical experience. And he advocated a non=theoretical reading of Scripture, to allow it to speak to our hearts. Dooyeweerd uses the word motive [drijfkracht] for Ground-motives in our heart. An 208 early use of the word ‘drijfkracht’ is in the journal Opbouw, to which Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven contributed articles as students, and of which Vollenhoven was one of the editors (under the pseudonym Th. Voorthuizen). In the introductory issue, the editors give their goals [“Ons Bedoelen”]. Waar de mensch opwaakt niet naar zijn stoffelijk maar naar zijn geestelijk begeeren, daar openbaart zich een zucht tot “kennen”, tot “onderzoeken”, tot “weten” willen. 't Zij dan dat hij door Gods genade staat in de vastheid die wijsheid noch wetenschap hem bieden kan, 't zij hij slechts in beginsel, verstandelijk zich bewust geworden is van de geestelijke drijfkracht achter alle wereldgebeuren, in beide gevallen tracht hij door te dringen tot hooger wijsheidslicht. [Where one awakens not to his material but to his spiritual desires, then is revealed a desire for “knowledge by acquaintance,” for “inquiry,” for “knowing.” Whether he then through God's grace stands in the certainty that neither wisdom nor science can offer him or whether, even if only in principle, he becomes intellectually aware of the spiritual driving force behind all events in the world, in both cases he attempts to penetrate to the light of higher wisdom.] 210 that is, you trust in him, in his promises, in his and your future. You risk it with him, throughout life and in eternity. You live from your faith; you have the word of life, just like the disciples after the resurrection, as if you had touched with your hands (Brouwer, 279-80) When we proceed from out of this center, we become aware of the glorious harmony of the theological sciences (p. 281). The ethical principle is certainly not the ethical [zedelijke] in a moral sense. No, it is the principle that is related to the center of life [levenskern] in humans. And Christ is the exceptional Person, out and through whom [uit en door] both God and man can be known, and thereby all the riddles of human existence. But to know Him as such we require rebirth and the illumination of the Holy Spirit, through which man recognizes the God-inspired [theopneustie] nature of Holy Scripture, which God has given as a means to learn about Christ (281). Church doctrine [kerkleeer] is acknowledged by the church as the expression of truth—is for the purpose of conscious mature life [bewustheid gerijpt leven]. If any doctrine has no living relation to God, no reality at its basis, then it is a philosopheme and not a religious truth, not a dogma...A dogma is not a rational speculation, but the expression of a reality...We have to distinguish the reality and the rational formulation of the reality. The first is essential and the second is accidental. We cannot remain with one formulation set down for all time (281). 209 Philosophy and religion stand in a necessary relation to each other because of the unity of human nature (290). The separation occurred in the Eleatic school, and it became clear in Socrates. Here there was a demand for complete autonomy, which prepared the way for skepticism (291). In the Calvinistic doctrine, when we take away its scholastic-metaphysical forms of thought, are the seeds for the ethical understanding of Christianity, in which religion and philosophy are not only reconciled, but are revealed in their original and ultimate unity 209 See Dooyeweerd in his Second Response to the Curators [http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Response2.html], where he distinguished between the doctrines and dogma of the believer, and the theoretical descriptions ot that dogma in confessions, which he did not regard as binding. For example, he did not consider himself bound by the Westminster Confession of Faith. 211 (295). De la Saussaye saw scholasticism even in Kuyper’s intellectual approach to truth 210 (178). The world, as it is given, is the great object of philosophical viewing [beschouwing]: from the periphery in inward circles to the microcosmos (296). Philosophy proceeds form the given in order to view it [beschouwen] It is therefore empirical-speculative. The highest that it can achieve is such viewing [beschouwing], the analysis and the synthesis of human consciousness in all its phenomena. (297) De la Saussaye distinguishes the encyclopedia of the sciences from the university; the encyclopedia is like the soul of the body. ‘Encyclopedia’ refers to the unity of the idea in the various sciences. The university refers to the ‘universitas personarum” which science represents. To maintain this encyclopedic idea is the main goal of the university (298).211 Science may for the moment think that it can explain self-consciousness form nature, and if those who hold that spirit is the original assert that even matter can be explained from spirit, then [in both cases], a dualism is temporarily evident in science. But in the existence of man, who is no double being, the dualism of spirit and matter is in principle abolished (299). 212 Theology proceeds from revelation, but not in the sense of an arcane discipline, but rather as the becoming revealed of that which is hidden; it is eternal truth, but received by man, taken up by him, thought about by him, experienced [beleefd] by him and confessed. Theology that proceeds from this view of revelation is human through and through and therefore progressive. It seeks the points of contact with all human science and therefore can also not be thought outside the coherence of every other science. 213 Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven both want to remove the scholastic-metaphysical forms 210 of thought. De la Saussaye here refers to Kant’s practical reason as an approach to the ethical way. Dooyeweerd did not accept the idea of practical reason (nor does Baader), but the rest of de la Saussaye’s reasoning is certainly applicable. 211 See Dooyeweerd’s emphasis on encyclopedia (Dooyeweerd 1946). 212 Both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven wanted to avoid that body/soul dualism. 213 Dooyeweerd also said theology depends on the coherence with other sciences. 212 But the principle of theological science is not to be sought in religious consciousness. For it does not yet know its object. It is known by faith. Only pistis forms a gnosis. Faith presupposes such an object in which all the original affections [bewegingen], feelings [voorgevoelens], expectations [verwachtingen] , hopes [behoeften] of man’s religious nature have found their satisfaction, and that have been demonstrated by the sought ideal being historically shown, and purified by the beholding of it (301).214 Humanity is to be explained from out of the humanity of Jesus Christ (301). The point of departure [uitgangspunt] for theology is the man Jesus Christ, the ideal man who is yet historical (304). The task of theological science can be more accurately described as the description of all of the moments of which the life of revelation [openbaringsleven] consists both in its objective factor (the Word of God) as in its subjective (the life of faith) and the product of both (the Church). (305) This exposition of faith explains Dooyeweerd’s use of it as the final modality. It is not 214 just an assertion of propositions. 213 Appendix E Notes on Henri Poincaré’s flash of Intuition Henri Poincaré describes the role of intuition, and “what happens in the very soul of the mathematician.” He was working on proving a theory in Fuchsian functions in mathematics. Every day he worked on a great number of combinations, with no result. One night he took black coffee, and was unable to sleep. His flash of intuition is described: “A host of ideas kept surging in my head; I could almost feel them jostling one another, until two of them coalesced, so to speak, to form a stable combination. When morning came, I had established the existence of one class of Fuchsian functions...” He then left Caen, where he was living, to take part in a geological conference. The journey made him forget his mathematical work. “When we arrived at Coutances, we got into a break to go for a drive, and, just as I put my foot on the step, the idea came to me, though nothing in my former thoughts seemed to have prepared me for it, that the transformations I had used to define Fuchsian functions were identical with those of non-Euclidian geometry. I made no verification, and had no time to do so, since I took up the conversation again as soon as I had sat down in the break, but I felt absolute certainty at once. When I got back to Caen I verified the result at my leisure to satisfy my conscience.” (cited by Brown, 17). Poincaré describes how in the following days, the same thing happened for two other results. One day, as I was walking on the cliff, the idea came to me, again with the same characteristics of conciseness, suddenness, and immediate certainty, that arithmetical transformations of indefinite ternary quadratic forms are identical with those of non-Euclidian geometry...One day, as I was crossing the street, the solution of the difficulty which had brought me to a standstill came to me all at once. I did not try to fathom it immediately, and it was only after my service was finished that I returned to the question. I had all the elements, and had only to assemble and arrange them....One is at once struck by these appearances of sudden illumination, obvious indications of a long course of previous unconscious work. The part played by this unconscious work in mathematical discovery seems to me indisputable, and we shall find traces of it in other cases where it is less evident. 214 This kind of sudden illumination is surely what is of interest in intuitionist mathematics, and yet I see nothing of it in Tol’s exposition of Vollenhoven’s dissertation. It sounds like the sudden illumination of the modalities that Dooyeweerd describes while walking along the dunes. If there is a sudden intuition, that may be a wholly new invention, or it may be a discovery of something that was there all along but not known. The flash of inspiration can exist in both cases. 215 Appendix F Jan Woltjer (1849-1917) Here is a summary of some of Woltjer’s articles. “De wetenschap van de logos” [The science of the Logos] (1891) Woltjer’s inaugural address concerns the Reformed principles at the foundation of the Free university. He says that these principles are not derived from research of details, but instead they light our path from on high. Without these ordering principles, we would just see a disordered mass or chaos. Woltjer relates these principles to his specialty, philology. Curiously, it raises some of the same linguistic issues of multivalent use of terms that concerned Frederik van Eeden in his Redekunstige Grondslag written a few years later. The human logos is distinguished from the divine Logos. The human logos is a mirror of the divine Logos, since we were created in the image of God. Before the fall, the created logos was an “organon” by which humans could have knowledge of the Creator and of creation. They could know the essence of things and the connection of their concepts in an “ascending and descending order.” The logos in Adam “was like a pure light;” he knew immediately and with pure certainty (Kok 47). But the logos should not be seen as a possession of man that he can use independently. Rather, the logos is maintained by Him in whom we live, move and have our being (Woltjer 1891, 36). Woltjer sees the human logos as a part, or an organ or a function of the soul; the soul lives in the body; that body is a part of the cosmos. The logos is the deepest part of our being [“het diepste van ons wezen”] (Woltjer 1891, 25, 54). That is not the same as saying that rationality is a part of the cosmos. And this is not Kuyper’s idea of the heart as the center, from which are all the issues of life, including reason. Woltjer also cites Ecclesiastes 3:11, that God has placed eternity in our heart (Woltjer 1891, 67). He uses this to support his assertion that our soul has the ability to inquire into 216 what is eternal and infinite, but without being able to discover the beginning and end of God’s work. And so our knowledge is always an approximation. Dooyeweerd criticized Woltjer’s “logos speculation” (Dooyeweerd 1939; Kok 50). Kok has shown that Dooyeweerd’s criticism was unfair. Woltjer specifically attempts to avoid logos speculation in that Adam’s pre-fall logos knowledge was still creaturely and limited, and not the knowledge belonging to the Creator (Kok 48). Woltjer refers to Calvin’s idea that humans are God’s offspring, given gifts of reason and understanding, referred to as ‘logos’ and compared to ‘sparks’ of divine light, “signs of divinity” (Kok 51). Our ability to know God is created in man just as much as our rationality (Woltjer 1981, citing Braekl). The image of God was lost in the fall, but restored by belief in Christ, for he is the Logos through Whom all things were made, and in Him are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. He restores the logos in those who are His (Woltjer 1891,40). Woltjer refers to Lutterbeck’s view that philology needs regeneration [wedergeboorte]. He mentions that Lutterbeck was Roman Catholic (Woltjer 1891, 42). Lutterbeck was professor of philology at the University of Giessen. Philology was of course Woltjer’s interest. What Woltjer does not mention is that Lutterbeck was closely allied with Baader’s ideas; he was one of the editors of Baader’s Collected Works. The main editor was Franz Hoffman, but he was assisted by Lutterbeck, Julius Hamberger, Baron F. von Osten and Chistoph Schlüter. Lutterbeck compiled the index to Baader’s Collected Works, so he would have been very familiar with them (Baader, Werke vol 16). And Woltjer criticizes Lutterbeck for not recognizes a distinction between universal and particular grace. But of course that represents a dualism that Baader did not accept. Woltjer says that the Church, its doctrine, its sacraments rest entirely on the reality of spiritual things. Citing Kuyper, he affirms that church dogma is an expression in the form of our human consciousness of the revealed truth; revealed truth is real in a higher way. The Christian church has at all times confessed the higher reality of Ideas. They are not, as nominalists assert, mere fictions of the human spirit. Nominalism necessarily leads to sensualism and rationalism (Woltjer 1891, 68-69). 217 The ideas of things and their relations were in the mind of God before they existed. But the Ideas also are found in the things and can be known by us from these things. He cites Romans 1:20, that the invisible things can be seen and understood from creation. But all temporal things change; they are only images. He cites the “mystical chorus” in Goethe’s Faust: “Alles Vergängliche ist nur ein Gleichniss” [Everything transitory is merely an image” (Woltjer 1891 71-3). “Ideëel en reëel” (1896) This article by Woltjer also discusses the reformational principles on which the Free University was based; as we have seen, Kuyper was also involved in these discussions. He says that these principles concern the root of all things, and that professors at the university need to bring these principles to light in science (Woltjer 1896, 7). Philosophy, the “mother of sciences,” carries in itself the danger that it teaches one to lean on reason [het verstand], which it tries to explain in a rationalistic way, viewing reason as sovereign. This is a warning against the autonomy of thought, although he does not use the word ‘autonomy.’ 215 In this article, Woltjer speaks of the harmony between subjective an objective rationality. Ideas are also expressed in things: The idea, expressed in the things, is the unity in the plurality of relations, given with each thing, the whole in the parts (cited Tol 442) Woltjer says that ideas are also real. Not only the material world, but also the spiritual 216 world is real. It is the ideas in things that make them knowable for us. Ideas are expressed in nature as a substrate; this is the relation between the archetypal Idea as the eternal thoughts of God and their ectypical expression or objectification in nature and in humans 215 Kuyper had already praised Baader for his rejection of the autonomy of thought. 216 This makes it sound as if Woltjer is starting with material things as real instead of, as with Platonism, asserting that only the eternal Ideas are real, and that the material world is a phenomenon. He asserts the Platonic view on p. 10. But later on p. 15 he says that we call the world the real world. He wants to show that both are real, but the world is real as image. 218 (Woltjer 1896, 44, 53). These ideas in the material world explain the agreement between 217 it and our spirit. God, the Father of spirits of all creatures is the same as the one through whom all things are and are created. He created man according to His image, and man originally had true knowledge and lordship over everything. Working from his interest in philology, where letters only represent what is real, so the material world just represents 218 the idea of which it is the carrier. Through these ideas, carried in the material world, we can behold the invisible things of God. And that is the task of science—to learn to know the reality of the idea within things. Representations, concepts and images are beheld [aanschouwd] in our thought; ideas are beheld as images of our spirit (Woltjer 1896, 9- 10; 17-18, 45). Woltjer asks, if the idea is in the thing, then is everything identical–both what the material thing and what we call ideal? Woltjer says that the question of being identical [gelijkzijn] answers this question, for we are speaking not only of being [zijn] but of a how or a way of being [een hoe-zijn, eene wijze van zijn]. This is the way that Vollenhoven would later understand ‘modality’–not as a mode of consciousness as in Dooyeweerd’s view, but a mode or way of how things are. Vollenhoven will refer to this idea of modes as “thus-so” [zus-zoo]. And that same term is used by Woltjer, in relation to the being of an image in a mirror: “het is zus en het is zoo, maar gij kunt niet zeggen dat het niet is” (Woltjer 1896, 15). To be sure, Woltjer relates this to his Platonic Ideas, and says that the world is an image of the real Ideas. But in that image, there is a mode, a way of being that is thus-so. But Woltjer shows that this applies not just to an image in the mirror, but to things generally, and he asks whether we can have “adequate” knowledge of the objective nature of things. 217 There may be a connection here with Baader in speaking of the Ideas of God as archetypes that are expressed. For Baader, all created, formed and made beings have their spiritual root (geistige Wurzel) in the archetypal world. The archetypal world is God’s sheinah. From it are expressed the created, formed and made worlds. Man is an emanated being and not a created being, because God breathed into him His Spirit. Man is closer to the archetypal world than the created world of the angels (Baader 1816, 40). Woltjer says that words are only the symbolic sounds of concepts that have already 218 been formed (Woltjer 1896, 37). 219 Wat voor het eene soort van wezens zus, voor een ander zóó, voor een derde weer anders is, heeft dat wel eenigen vasten kenbaren aard in zich zelf? (Woltjer 1896 32). [What for one kind of being is thus, and for another kind so, for a third kind something else is: does that have any certain knowable nature in itself?] Woltjer’s answer is that we ourselves stand in close connection with the world, and we can learn it because our own selfhood is not foreign [vreemd] to it: Wij staan door geheel het organisme van ons kenvermogen, door onze zenuwen en hersenen en alle krachten die daarin werken, met die wereld in het nauste verband, zoodat we haar niet alleen door de dingen buiten ons, maar door ons eigen lichaam, dat we, krachtens ons zelbewustzijn, niet als iets dat ons vreemd is kunnen beschouwen, leeren kennen (Woltjer 1896, 33). [By means of the whole organism of our faculty of knowing, by our nerves and brain and all powers that work therein, we stand in the closest connection to the world, so that we do not only know it through the things outside of us but by means of our own body, which we learn to know, and as a result of our self-consciousness, cannot regard as something that is foreign to us.] (my translation] And before any experience, we already have concepts of being, identity, equivalence, time, and space (Woltjer 1896 51). Woltjer clarifies that the God created things according to their own nature, independent from our perception. So the world by God’s Word (Logos) has been brought into an order and given those characteristics that are displayed to us, and man is placed within creation as a unity of matter and spirit. As matter we are subject to those same laws, and as soul, the offspring of our Creator, we are able to know things according to their nature. He cites Rudolf Heinmann that our knowing consciousness itself stands within the World [“Steht denn nicht unser erkennendes Bewusstsein mitten in der Welt?”]. En eindelijk: het ideëele bestaat in den geest van den mensch of van het menschelijk geslacht, daar hij, als naar Gods beeld geschapen, krachtens dezen geestelijken aanleg, de ideéen, in den kosmos geobjectiveerd, daaruit kan kennen, en alzoo een eigen wereld van ideeén in zich dragen, die, voor zoover zijn geworteld zijn in het wezen, het verband en de orde van Gods schepping, zijne wetenschap vormen (Woltjer 1896, 53). 220 [And finally, Ideas exist in man’s spirit or in the human race, so that he, 219 created according to God’s image, and by virtue of this spiritual capacity, can know the ideas from out of the cosmos in which they are objectified. And in that way, he carries within himself his own world of ideas, which form his science insofar as they are rooted in the essence, the relation and the order of God’s creation.] (my translation) Tol cites this passage (Tol 443), but does not make the connection to Vollenhoven’s later thought. Yet Vollenhoven himself refers to the world as created by the divine Logos; he says we cannot have knowledge of those Ideas, but only their expression in the cosmos. Vollenhoven is relying on the distinctions made by Woltjer. For Woltjer’s emphasis, too is that we obtain knowledge of Ideas from within the cosmos, where they are objectified. Since we are born from God, we love God. This is an unconscious mystical tendency: love reveals itself wherever a being is born from another (Woltjer 1896, 54). Woltjer carries through the idea of image ontologically. The Son is the image of the Father, and man is created as the image of God. If we take the image without any reference to what it is an image of, then it becomes an idol (Woltjer 1896, 15). This idea of image of God is rejected by Vollenhoven, but accepted by Dooyeweerd (See Appendix A). There is also a degree of reality, depending on duration in time. An image in a mirror has less duration than a thing, so it is less real. And one’s own spiritual existence, which we place over against [tegenover] the diversity of things outside of us, and which we experience as a continuing identical unity, has more reality than material things. It is the Archimedean point, the viewpoint from which we can know the diversity of the world. In our selfhood there is revealed a reality that is elevated far above the being of visible things (Woltjer 1896, 15, 41). 220 This idea of setting ourselves over-against the world is explained further Wij stellen echter ook geheel ons kennend wezen, ons ik met inbegrip onzer gewaardwordingsvoorstellingen en begrippen als subject tegneover Woltjer distinguishes between Ideas as ‘ideëele’ and the ideal as ‘ideeale’ (Woltjer 219 1896, 18). This is the likely source for Dooyeweerd’s idea of the Archimedean point. Woltjer cites 220 Calvin’s Institutes I, 15, 2, for this view of the selfhood. 221 de wereld buiten ons als object. Waar we zóó de tegenstelling nemen, kan de idee het subjectieve, het reëele het objectieve genoemd worden. (Woltjer 1896 45) [We really set our whole knowing being, our self, including our perceived representations and concepts as subject over-against the world outside of us as object. If we act in such an over-against way, the idea can be called subjective, and the real may be called objective.] 221 In support of this idea, he refers to Heinrich Rickert’s Die Grenzen der naturwissenshaftlichen Begriffsbildung (Freiburg 1896, 168ff). Rickert sees as subject the whole man, both body and soul. The working of what Kant calls the thing-in-itself occurs within us, completely separate from our outer and inner perception. How this occurs is a mystery. But we know that the matter of our body belongs to the thing-in-itself, with respect to time, space, causality and other categories that its nature carries. “Wij zijn met de onbekende van de Kantiaansche school stofverwant” [We are materially related to the unknown of the Kantian school” (Woltjer 1896, 34). Ideas: The forming of ideas [begrippen] should not be explained by abstraction. We can’t explain concepts by separate perceptions, or abstracted awareness. The mind combines various perceptions. But in the Idea, not every awareness is taken up into the Idea but only those that are essential. Furthermore, whenever we abstract, we do not have an Idea; it consists in the universal that appears in the particular quality [hoedanigheid]. In 222 bringing awareness together, the mind is not free; in abstraction it is free (Woltjer 1896, 37-39). Wij kunnen elke gewaarwording, elke eigenschap abstraheeren; doch in het begrip is niet elke gewaarwording der individueele dingen opgenomen, maar alleen die welke wezenlijk zijn. En bovendien, wanneer ik eene waarneming abstraheer, dan heb ik nog volstrekt niet een begrip; het begrip bestaat dan juist weer in het algemeene, dat in die bijzondere hoedanigheid uitkomt. (Woltjer 1896, 38) But Woltjer criticizes naive realism for its view that the things outside of us are as we 221 know them (Woltjer 1896,28). This may be Dooyeweerd’s basis for distinguishing between Gegenstand of thought and the object of naive experience. Tol uses the phrase “ider in hun eigen hoedanigheid” to describe Vollenhoven’s 222 position regarding the modalities (Isagôgè, 21). 222 [We can abstract each awareness, each quality; but not every awareness of individual things is included in the Idea, but only those that are essential. And furthermore, whenever I abstract a perception, I have certainly not reached an Idea; an Idea consists in the universal, which appears in the particular quality [mode]] There is a difference in the way in which things are ‘daarstellingen’ of the idea [says it is Germanism] (Woltjer 1896, 49). Things are “thinks.” But this should not be taken in Berkeley’s idealistic sense (Woltjer 1896, 38). The qualitative and quantitative qualities are given matter (Woltjer 1896, 46). We find in the cosmos an objectification of ideas; even the substrate is an objectification of an idea (Woltjer 1896, 48). That appears to be an anticipation of the later challenge to substance, but Woltjer does not follow it up. Ideas, whether they are called empirical, ontological or metaphysical are something sui generis, although they are formed in connection with and working with perceptions [naar aanleiding en onder medewerking van gewaarwordingen]. Concepts and ideas have the reality of spiritual things. Ideas are objects of beholding [aanschouwing] (Woltjer 1896, 38-39, 41, 45) But the power of sin clouds our reason and separates us from God, in whose light alone we can see light; we need rebirth in order to restore the correct relation with God. True science takes its origin from out of God who thought it in His plan of creation, through the creation and the re-creation, and which returns to God (Woltjer 1896, 42, 54) Things outside of us are not as we know them [ze zijn niet als wij ze kennen]. Naive realism does not ask this question. But we must give an account of our knowing. Knowledge presupposes an object that is known and one that is known. There is a dualism of subject and object. (Woltjer 1896, 28) Woltjer also emphasizes that apart from individual realities, there are also various relations and actions between things among themselves and in relation to ideas. Knowledge is a knowledge of relations. It is nonsense to speak of a thing in itself without relation to a knowing being (Woltjer 1896, 14, 29-30, 46). In this he rejects Kant’s views of a thing-in-itself [Ding-an-sich]. And he contrasts Kant’s view that the categories are forms of thought, not in things (p. 32). 223 Rejection of empiricism. Woltjer says that things possess the form, colour and properties that we perceive in them. The colour that I perceive in an apple is outside of me and comes from outside to me. We objectify the colours in our mind, from inside out. Our mind combines all impressions; we do not perceive anything as a whole. [perspectivalism, later emphasized in phenomenology]. Colour is not just due to light, but to the various nature of things in relation to the working of light (Woltjer 1896, 19, 25- 27, 33). Dooyeweerd also rejected the empiricistic distinction of primary and secondary qualities (Friesen 2009, Thesis 23 and references). This idea of relations is also an important idea in Vollenhoven’s Isagôgè. Woltjer says 223 that all things stood as thoughts in God before creation, and that this plan of God also included the relations between things. He contrasts this with the doubt expressed in the Hindu Rigveda (a portion of which he cites), indicating doubt in the One whether he had known what his creation would bring forth. In citing the Rigveda, Woltjer shows knowledge of the scholar of Hinduism Max Müller (Woltjer 1896, 31, 64). Woltjer says we search for the attributes and qualities [attributen, eigenschappen] of the thing in order to perceive what is real. Ideas give the qualities of things. Things are known by the human spirit; there is a common origin of both. We begin with the visible and sensory, and proceed to the invisible and non-sensory. There is a transition of meaning not only from the concrete to the abstract but also in the other way, from the abstact to the concrete (Woltjer 1896 9, 11-12). This view of looking for attributes can be related to Vollenhoven’s later use of abstraction to find qualities and relations of things. Woltjer distinguishes between the Idea and the ideal. An ideal is only a representation of a separate reality that corresponded to the idea; we can have adequate knowledge (Woltjer 1896 18, 21). Thus, Vollenhoven’s 1921 discussion of the distinction between ideal and idea, and even the idea of an “adequate” knowledge is already anticipated in Woltjer! And in 1926, Vollenhoven no longer speaks of ‘kennen’ and ‘weten,’ but of ‘weten’ 223 van’ and ‘weten dat’ (Tol 251 fn 54). 224 Even Vollenhoven’s later statement that we read the laws from creation is found in Woltjer, who compares creation to a book of God’s thoughts (Woltjer 1896, 52; Kok, 49). And Vollenhoven’s emphasis of dynamism in the cosmos is also in Woltjer, who says that the system directed by the Logos “is not sunk in quiet rest. Rather, with all of its parts, its activity is continual” (1897, cited Kok 29). Woltjer’s ideas about the priority of the whole, that our ideas relate to the “unity in the diversity of the relations that are given with everything, the whole that is in the parts” (Kok 53) is in accord with Dooyeweerd’s (and Baader’s) view of Idea, except that they refer to totality. There is a parallelism of our ideas and things that fall under that idea. Our thought fits the things of nature and their acts (Woltjer 1896, 43). Woltjer’s idea of soul seems similar to Poincaré’s view, with which Woltjer was familiar (Van Deursen 23). Woltjer distinguishes three functions of the soul: understanding, will and creative imagination 224 (Kok 59). The reality of our soul is not the same as consciousness; for in sleep we are not conscious but our spirit continues (Woltjer 1896, 19). This work also shows Woltjer’s familiarity with Eduard von Hartmann, whom he cites as rejecting the idea of naive realism. Von Hartmann says that naive realism was the view that it is matter and not powers [krachten] of which we are aware (Woltjer 1896 19 fn1; 21). Woltjer does not like Von Hartmann’s argument from physics. And yet in 1914, in 225 his “Materie en Wezen,” Woltjer used science in just such a way in his idea that things are composed of powers, not substance (Woltjer, 1914). This “functionalistic” approach to reality is also taken over by Vollenhoven’s Isagôgè . 224 Creative imagination is the ability “to see, beyond things and in things, the idea in all its beauty and perfection” (Kok, 60) Woltjer says that this is arguing in a circle. If philosophy is the ground of science, then 225 we cannot appeal to a specific science in order to ground ideas in philosophy (Wolter 1896, 24). 225 Woltjer also says that our knowledge [kennen] is based on perception or by information and witness [bericht en getuigenis]. This idea of our knowledge being based on information is part of Vollenhoven’s mature philosophy (Woltjer 1896, 29). Woltjer also refers to Wilhelm Wundt’s ideas on psychology, citing Wundt’s Grundriss der Psychologie (Leipzig 1896). Woltjer criticizes Wundt’s “incorrect empirical standpoint” (Woltjer 1896 39). This would explain Vollenhoven’s interest in Wundt and later Felix Krueger, who studied under Wundt. Woltjer cites Ecclesiastes 3:11, that God has placed eternity in our heart (Woltjer 1896 46, fn 4). He uses this to support his assertion that we can know the idea of the infinite. Dooyeweerd criticizes Woltjer for this interpretation (Dooyeweerd 1939). Woltjer says that in living things that are organic, there is a principle that does not come from matter. There are various levels in the organic world: plant, animal and man. Each are new creations that have the previous as their foundation, but that cannot develop from out of the lower. Woltjer says that man’s soul does not come from generation; the body comes from the parents, the soul is given by God. But even the material body is created by God and has its basis in the spiritual. So man is the most individual of all earthly beings, and yet remains one human race, sprung from one blood [uit éénen bloed gesproten]. Man is a microcosm insofar as everything in the world outside of him is the basis of his existence, but he is more than microcosmos insofar as he is of born of God [van Gods geslacht], created according to His image (Woltjer 1896, 49-50). This is the question that would occupy Buytendijk. “Beginsel en norm in de literatuur” [Principle and norm in the literature] (1901) In this article, Woltjer also refers to our ability to see Ideas in our creative imagination. The intuitive kind of knowing, the “inner vision [aanschouwing] of the poet,” beholds ideas (Kok 60). Tol ignores this early use of intuition and ‘aanschouwing.’ “Het Woord, zijn Oorsprong en zijn Uitlegging” [The Word, its Origin and its interpretation] (Rectoraatsrede, Oct 20, 1908) In this article, Woltjer refers to the idea that out of the heart are the issues of life. Kok quotes the passage: 226 We know our life only to the extent it reveals itself in manifest actions. All the functions that characterize human life proceed from the soul, like water from a spring, whose depths remain concealed. From out of the heart, from our innermost being, are the issues of life. We can perceive all the actions of our senses within ourselves until we come to what is innermost, where we lose track and stand before the unknowable, before the mystery (cited Kok 49). Although Woltjer is obviously considering Kuyper’s statement from the 1898 Stone Lectures that so impressed Dooyeweerd, Woltjer is not yet using it in the sense of a heart center that includes the logos as a temporal function. We know that Woltjer continued to hold to the idea of body and soul as two substances, even though he interpreted these as each having functions (Woltjer 1914). Perhaps the idea of functions is derived from Kuyper’s statement, but Woltjer still refers to ‘substance.’ This passage is interesting in what it says about levels of what is conscious and unconscious in the heart. At some level we can perceive within ourselves, but there comes a point where we lose track (the unconscious?) and stand before the unknowable (mystical encounter with God in the depths of our being?). 226 “De Natuurkundige Faculteit aan de Vrije Universiteit [The Faculty of Natural Sciences at the Free University] (1911) In this lecture, Woltjer says …all things are created by God’s will in such a way that they form an ordered whole in which the one part is aligned with the other; that they have a defined nature and characteristics, possessing immanent forces and capacities [werkingen] (cited Kok 55) Again, this is a significant idea that Tol should have discussed in relation to Vollenhoven’s basic distinction between things and modalities. “Het Wezen der Materie” [The Essence of matter] Lecture 1914 Discussed in detail within this article. 226 Dooyeweerd later referred to the unconscious.