We have a rendezvous with destiny: The rise and fall of the Liberal alternative.

Amir Goldstein “We Have a Rendezvous With Destiny”—he Rise and Fall of the Liberal Alternative ABSTR ACT he struggle between the workers’ parties and the right-wing Revision- ists took an increasingly central place in Zionist history beginning in the 1930s. he Labor Movement gained political hegemony during the period of the Yishuv (pre-state Israel). When Jabotinsky tried to challenge Mapai’s power position he sufered a bitter defeat. Most of Israel’s irst 13 years were marked by political polarity between Mapai and the Herut Movement (the latter led by Begin). Herut received a thrashing in the Knesset elections in 1951 and the General Zionists (GZ) became the second largest party after riding on the wave of middle class protest against the Mapai led govern- ment austerity regime. However, it failed to exploit its broad support into a permanent electoral base that would transform the right-center bourgeoisie into a political force that would serve as an alternative to Ben-Gurion’s government. In the summer of 1955, Herut replaced the GZ as the second largest Knesset party, and in 1959, Begin became head of the opposition after Herut won 17 seats, twice as many votes garnered by the GZ, which was reduced to its political size of the irst Knesset elections in 1949. he key political rivalry returned to the power struggle between the Zionist left and the nationalist right. T he article discusses one of the major attempts to establish a centralist party in Israel that would capture the center of the political map and ofer a liberal alternative to socialist Zionism, on the one hand, and the Revisionist right, on the other. It presents the background to the founding 26  “We Have a Rendezvous With Destiny”  •  27 of the Liberal Party (LP) on the eve of the elections for the 5th Knesset and the reasons for the party’s failure to reach its goal. THE GENER AL ZIONISTS AND THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY IN THE FIRST DECADE OF THE STATE From the time of their founding, the GZ exhibited pendulum-like swings between uniication and division (to use David Sha’ari’s term).1 For exam- ple, the GZ united in 1946, but when the state was established they again split into two main political parties: the GZ and the Progressive Party (PP). By the early 1950s, GZ leaders in the US tried to merge the two GZ parties—but their eforts were in vain.2 A valiant attempt to reunite the GZ and Progressives was made by the Zionist leader, Nahum Goldmann, between autumn 1953 and summer 1954. Goldmann, who was considering settling in Israel, held initial contacts with Yosef Serlin and Pinchas Rosen with the aim of forming a parliamentary block made up of the two GZ parties that would act in tandem as a irst step toward a complete merger.3 he GZ leaders responded favorably to the initiative. hey viewed the Progressives’ union with their party, as elections to the 3rd Knesset approached, as a move that could inject new life into the party and attract a larger number of liberal circles in society that had heretofore shunned the party. However, a sharp internal dispute erupted in the PP over the Goldmann initiative and at the GZ conference in July 1954 opponents of uniication won the day, with Moshe Kol, the head of the party’s Zionist Worker faction, leading the rejectionists of Goldmann’s proposal. After the merger’s failure, the parties continued to compete with each other in the two following election campaigns. he split in the GZ camp was not accidental; it was the result of basic diferences between two trends. he GZ emphasized the economic aspects of liberalism far more than its social-cultural side. he property holders and business magnates in the GZ party were conservative in their social and religious outlook. he petit- bourgeoisie, while supportive of liberal economic trends, was basically conservative and aloof to progressive positions. hus, the PP continued to represent mostly white collar and government workers, intellectuals, and the labor intelligentsia, all of whom favored the social liberalism, broadly- based universal views, and social and religious pluralism that the party stood for.4 Only an event as momentous as the “Lavon Afair” could have precipitated the bridging of gaps among the GZ divisions. 28  •  isr ael studies, volume 16 number 1 “WE HAVE A RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY”— THE LAVON AFFAIR AS A CATALYST FOR UNIFICATION In the early 1960s, the two segments of the GZ made their most determined attempt at reuniication. An outside event was the main factor in the found- ing of the LP. he “Afair” shook the entire political system and, beginning in the autumn of 1960, created a new agenda for Israelis that focused on issues related to the nature of the democratic regime and the relationship between civil society and Ben-Gurion’s authoritarian leadership. he elections to the 5th Knesset, which were advanced to the summer of 1961, focused on issues that had never before been in the center of an election campaign. Mapai had reached the height of its power just two years earlier; now it was dragged into an election contest under unfavorable conditions. In Herut, also an atmosphere of helplessness prevailed, such as the awareness that the movement’s loud propaganda sloganeering dealt with issues that were probably removed from the public’s interest—against the background of the “Afair.” he issure between Mapai and the Herut Movement (HM) expanded into a potential breeding ground for a centrist party with a civil agenda—this was the main setting for the founding of the LP. In a PP debate in mid-February 1961 over the possibility of establishing a new party, Sha’ari assessed: his was not a government crisis but a crisis of democracy . . . Mapai will lose ten mandates that will be distributed among the rest of the parties . . . We need to assume the task. he decision cannot be put of. We now have a rendezvous with destiny. If we miss this opportunity, I don’t know when the Progressive Party will have another chance.5 [My emphasis—A.G.] Other processes also gathered momentum in the early 1960s, facilitat- ing a possible merger between the GZ and Progressives. he irst obstacle removed on the road to unity had to do with the establishment of a GZ workers faction in the Histadrut. During the 1930s, the question of rela- tions with the Histadrut stood at the heart of the internal dispute in the GZ trend. he founding of an independent GZ workers’ organization eventually led to the split into two separate parties.6 When a merger among the GZ trends was attempted in 1946 (Ha’oved Hatziyoni members were prohibited from taking part in the uniied party). he GZ 1952 conference decided to establish a workers’ association inside the Histadrut to give the party a more populist and less bourgeoisie character. his proved to be an efective means for moving closer to the PP.  “We Have a Rendezvous With Destiny”  •  29 Cooperation between Ha’oved Hatziyoni and Igud Ha’ovdim– the only two civilian, non-socialist factions, in the Histadrut—strengthened during the 1950s and peaked in the 9th Histadrut Convention in February 1960 when both factions expressed jointly agreed-upon positions on most of the sections of the decisions. It was natural that the GZ leaders found common ground with Kol and his colleagues. Of even greater signiicance was the metamorphosis undergone by Ha’oved Hatziyoni who had consistently opposed the ini- tiatives for GZ uniication. he group learned from the joint activity in the Histadrut that their diferences were not as acute as they previously appeared, and that cooperation with one faction could empower them and increase their inluence in the Histadrut. he decision to merge the factions in the Histadrut preceded the parties’ general consolidation. Cooperation in the Histadrut convention, in efect, closed the circle that had been opened 25 years earlier with the establishment of the GZ’s Igud Ha’ovdim, and was interpreted as an admission by the GZ of the justiication of Ha’oved Hatziyoni that remained supportive of the Histadrut. hus, Kol and his col- leagues who torpedoed Goldmann’s attempt at uniication in 1954 became the main driving force behind the initiative for a new merger in the early 1960s. he second obstacle, also connected to calming the Progressive leaders’ fears, was removed due to the weakening of the GZ’s electoral strength. he GZ won 8 seats in the 4th Knesset, but the PP’s rise to 6 allowed their union into a common party of two factors of equal strength.7 he apprehension of the PP’s leadership that one of the parties would forfeit its inluence and be swallowed up by the GZ had deterred many progressives from supporting the initiative for a merger in the mid-1950s (when the GZ numbered 29 MKs and the LP only 4). During the 1950s, the electoral gap between the parties narrowed, and the Progressives could assume that their qualitative advantage would transform them into a factor with formidable clout in the new party. he PP leaders were apparently fed up with the role they had been play- ing for 13 years as a small qualitative party appended to Mapai’s table. he events between the autumn of 1960 and spring of 1961 heightened Rosen’s personal indignation at Ben-Gurion8 and demonstrated to his colleagues that the addition of a seat or two to their party9 would not lead to a genuine change in the level of their inluence on the character of the state. hey realized that Mapai’s hegemony precluded a Progressive minister having any chance of becoming a central player in the shaping of government policy. he Progressive leaders concluded that the only way to achieve a political 30  •  isr ael studies, volume 16 number 1 breakthrough would be by creating an electoral mass that would relect the intellectual quality they believed themselves to represent. Uniication with the GZ would provide the necessary quantitative dimension. As opposed to them, in the elections to the 4th Knesset, the GZ lost all that was left of their self-conidence in reviving their party as an inde- pendent entity in elections. he gradual collapse experienced by the party’s leadership in the 1950s caused many GZ to seek uniication with a factor proximate to them on the political map. During contacts with the HM in 1958, the party’s internal opposition made it clear that a merger with the Zionist right would produce a schism among the GZ. Against this backdrop, uniication with the PP remained the only channel of political activity likely to breathe hope and new life into the ranks of GZ activists. he party heads had to unite with the Progressives as an external means to help them formulate a new political coloring, one that was more liberal, less conservative, and would dispel, so they hoped, the impedimenta of the bourgeoisie image that weighed heavily on them. Yosef Sapir and his associates concluded that they needed the PP if they hoped to reach out to a new circle of supporters that was leery of the GZs’ image as a conservative party smoldering in self-interest. he GZ leadership hoped that their union with the Progressives would enable them to participate in the government for the irst time in many years. Since the dismissal of the party’s ministers from the Sharett Gov- ernment on the eve of the elections to the 3rd Knesset, the GZ had not been courted into any coalition government. hey were forced to see the ministers with economic portfolios implementing policy that the public regarded as “liberal,” while they (the GZ) were barred from any prospect of inluencing government policy and were distanced from any power posi- tions that the central government might grant. heir leaders hoped that the power concentrated in the new LP would convince Mapai that it was a desirable coalition partner and return it to a position of partnership in the state’s leadership. GZ leaders also igured that their membership in a party along with Rosen, Harari, and Kol would lift the leftwing parties’ ban on their partnership and return them to the focus of public activity. ESTABLISHING THE NEW PARTY he irst step on the path to reuniication in the GZ occurred in January 1961 with the decision to consolidate the workers’ factions of both parties in the Histadrut.10 he realigned faction that was supposed to represent  “We Have a Rendezvous With Destiny”  •  31 10% of Histadrut’s members, a 60% majority in various institutions, would be reserved for Ha’oved Hatziyoni members. When the statutory meeting of the Liberal Labor Movement took place on 20 February, the dynamics for party uniication was already in gear on the national level too.11 he government crisis that came in the wake of the dispute over the decisions of the 7th Convention revived the GZ. Diferences of opinion were awakened in the PP regarding the merger proposal. he party that was accustomed to dealing with issues in an inti- mate family-like manner was expected in one move to cede the advantages it had accrued over the years from its special status.12 Harari opposed a move that distanced party members from Mapai, which was close to them in spirit, and that consigned the Progressives into part of the bourgeoisie bloc that he believed was destined to be dragged, because of political strife, to the right, far from the party’s true progressive colors.13 A large number of kibbutz members of the Hanoar Hatziyoni (Zion- ist Youth) Movement and some of the party’s overseas supporters were also opposed to the developing uniication. Kol acted vigorously to convince his longtime partners on the PP’s left lank to drop their opposition to the move. He pulled all his weight in the conference of the party’s kibbutz members at Kibbutz Usha and persuaded them to support the uniication. He promised that the party would be established only after its liberal and progressive principles were guaranteed.14 At the same time, Artzi quelled the opposition to the developing move by members of Hanoar Hatziyoni’s Latin-American Center. He also warned the rejectionists that without a lib- eral party, a rightwing Herut-General Zionist15 bloc was likely to develop. he eforts of Kol and Artzi succeeded. After discussion, the PP ratiied, by a decisive majority, the establishment of the LP.16 he GZ institutions decided easily on the merger because of the party’s predicament. In the vote to unite with the Progressives none of the mem- bers of the executive voted against it.17 Two of the three abstentions were by former members of the Revisionist Movement who explained their vote as their desire to refrain from establishing a bloc that included the HM as a third partner. Serlin demanded that the liberal uniication should be only the irst step on the way to a partnership with Herut that would ofer the electorate a genuine alternative to Mapai.18 his was also the opinion of many members of the GZ Executive who participated in the debate, but most soon became reconciled to the Progressive leaders’ unconditional stipulation: the rejection of any possibility for discussion on the inclusion of the HM in the new party. 32  •  isr ael studies, volume 16 number 1 SCUTTLING ATTEMPTS TO BRING THE HERUT MOVEMENT INTO THE UNITED PARTY he Progressives’ decision to leave the HM outside the process of build- ing a new party was a sine qua non in light of the contradictory views and temperaments of Rosen, Kol, and their supporters on the one hand, and Begin and his supporters on the other. Both the debates in the PP and the letters sent to advance the liberal initiative, underscored Herut’s place as being outside the camp. Kol wrote to Goldmann that “Under no circum- stances will I take Herut into account in this plan, since demagoguery and liberalism are [self-] contradictory.”19 Elsewhere he stated: I see no ideological partnership between Herut and us. [Herut] is radical in its foreign policy, demagogical in its social policy, and opposed to our approach to the Workers Histadrut, its economy and mutual assistance projects. We reject Ben-Gurion’s formula ‘anyone but Herut and Maki.’ We do not decree bans on political life, rather [we call for] a high level of honest and account- able debates out of a sense of national responsibility. But the party must be founded on a clear ideological basis, and no such basis exists between our progressive humanistic liberalism and Herut.20 he PP leaders went further than just neutralizing the proposal for Herut’s immediate merger with the new party. At a meeting at Kol’s house in which Sapir and Elimelech Rimalt participated Kol demanded that the GZ leaders clarify whether the idea of a merger with the HM had been taken of the LP’s agenda or would remain a permanent issue.21 he leaders of the Progressives and GZ apparently reached a secret agreement regarding their parties’ merger (that would last for four years).22 he GZ felt that they were being asked to make a very great sacriice: the addition of the HM to the party in the process of being formed could transform Sapir, Rimalt, and their colleagues into the party’s central body and enable them to play a key role as the linchpin between the HM and PP. heir surrender to the ultima- tum of Rosen and Kol may have been unavoidable, but it soon become clear that the new party had been promised, for all practical purposes, seniority for the Progressive leaders who, at this stage, were enlisting a leadership to the still crystallizing party that was close to their style and outlook.  “We Have a Rendezvous With Destiny”  •  33 THE SEARCH FOR A LEADER—NAHUM GOLDMANN he igure of Goldmann president of the WZO occupied the new party’s leaders. he heads of the GZ, and to a greater extent the leaders of the Pro- gressives, realized the weakness that characterized the longing for an alter- native stemmed from the absence of a leader of national stature who could run the party. he two presidents designated for the PP, Rosen (74 years old) and Bernstein (71) were highly-esteemed Zionist functionaries who had gained public respect for their intellectual and humanitarian qualities, but neither could make the claim to being a national leader. here was no one in the front tier of leadership of either party who possessed the charisma that could challenge the igures of Ben-Gurion or Begin. hus, they turned to Goldmann, a famous Zionist leader for decades and a major igure in the WZO, who would, they hoped, bestow upon the LP the aura of leadership it so desperately needed. Kol turned to Goldmann immediately after the PP Directorate decided in favor of uniication, and conveyed to him the plan being formulated and the enormous chances of its realization: Now I’ve come to ask you personally if you’re ready to move to Israel and be here with the founders of this party and add your signature to it. I’ve been waiting for such an opportunity for years and at last it’s arrived. You could be an important igure in the organization, a non-partisan third factor [that would draw in] the intellectuals, intelligentsia, and inancial igures. To the best of my knowledge, a step like this on your part does not mean you have to resign from the presidency of the WZO.23 In the months preceding the party’s statutory meeting, Kol continued to woo Goldmann to stand at the head of the LP. he acute need for new leadership who would join the LP and add to its driving force was not the only consideration for pressuring Goldmann. Kol, Rosen, and their coterie needed Goldmann’s status and substance in the leadership as part of their attempt to impart a moderate and progressive image to the LP, an image closer to their views than to those of the GZ. hey believed that Sapir and Rimalt would not be able to oppose the entry of a renowned Zionist leader to head the party list because of the public advantage in the move. Furthermore, a permanent majority of progressive positions would be introduced at the top cadre of the LP’s leadership. Goldmann was aware of the lofty expectations the LP leaders had of him but he continued to waver throughout the election campaign. He met with scientists, writers, 34  •  isr ael studies, volume 16 number 1 and economists, and especially maintained contact with the heads of the PP, but he still deferred making a decision.24 On 17 April 1961 approximately one week before the party’s statutory meeting Goldmann shared his vacillations with his colleagues: “his is not so simple for me. I have various roles in Diaspora Jewry that I cannot talk about here . . .” However, at all events, he considered “helping this party after all the years that I’ve truly removed myself from Israel’s internal politi- cal arena.”25 he president of the WZO, whose statements were the focus of the discussion, noted the damage that the “Afair” had caused and that it had been a catalyst for his increased involvement in Israeli domestic politics. “. . . the damage rendered in this area is hard to describe. All the splendor, all the glory, all the legend of the state has declined . . .” Goldmann pointed to two elements that required immediate attention in order to redress Israeli democracy: the irst was the Israeli political parties’ activity in areas directly related to politics. (“Nowhere in the world do political parties construct neighborhoods, establish health funds, or grant loans.”) he second element that demanded immediate reparation was the absence of an alternative to Mapai. (“Quality is not the determining factor here . . . nor intelligence, nor brains, but the majority, quantity, and permanent numbers are . . .”) he leader of world Zionism, who fervidly believed in the need for a political alternative in Israel, announced that he would not lead the list of candidates. Goldmann had initiated the GZ merger in 1954, but in the early 1960s he was prepared to contribute very little toward its realization. It seems that he wished to be appointed foreign minister after the elections to the 5th Knesset, and that he reckoned that the LP would serve as a useful platform for realizing this goal. Goldmann had his doubts over the success of the new political move and also felt that his presence at the head of a political struggle in an election campaign would transform him from a “wandering Jew” unencumbered by Israeli citizenship into a soft target for arrows of criticism from other parties. He was concerned that by assum- ing the LP leadership he would rile public anger against him in light of his unconventional positions on foreign policy and defense issues. He was referring to his neutral position toward the superpowers and his willingness to repatriate Palestinian refugees in Israel. Moreover, he was reluctant to give up his international role and status, and their accompanying prestige and side beneits. Goldmann was also hesitant about entering a bitter confrontation with Mapai that had supported him in his struggle in the Zionist Movement and had voted for his election to its presidency.26 As the weeks passed, he was unwilling to announce his agreement to lead the LP in the national  “We Have a Rendezvous With Destiny”  •  35 elections and was very skeptical about the signs that he would receive a senior party position after the elections.27 he lively but ultimately disap- pointing courting of Goldmann by the heads of the Liberals highlighted the party’s inherent leadership vacuum. His refusal to plunge into Israel’s political waters taught the party activists about his premonitions of the party’s showing in the coming elections, and augmented a pall of gloom instead of heightening a burst of enthusiasm. “THE THIRD FORCE” he inal issue that occupied the leaders of the two parties that were engaged in merging was connected to the desire to recruit a group of distinguished public igures who would supply the new party with an additional push in the elections. he respective leaders were interested in presenting the emerging party as a promising factor in Israeli politics, as a party whose overall potential was greater than the sum of its parts. hey believed that the introduction of nonpartisan public igures to the LP would attract additional voting groups. Against the background of rising protest and growing public awareness of the thinking middle-class, the introduction of key personalities hitherto outside the political game might consolidate the unorganized or non-aligned groups around the newly established party. Each mother-party sought to bring people close to its worldview into the LP. In this matter, the Progressives exhibited greater initiative and activism. It soon became clear that well-known igures who could entrench the GZ wing in the party and whose names had been tossed in the air—men such as Shmuel Tamir,28 Eliezer Livneh, and others active in the “new regime”—had no inclination to take part in the latest political venture. hose who had joined the hird Force from the GZ periphery were not accorded realistic spots on the list. he journalists Dr. Zeev Katz (Ha’aretz ) and Yosef Lapid (Ma’ariv) had shown inconsistency in their party activity. he only person who would eventually be integrated into the LP leadership was Yitzhak Moda’i29 his is how three candidates whose views were close to those of the PP, and who were identiied organizationally with the party’s institutions and its moderate wing, were advanced to the front row of the LP list for the Knesset: Prof. Yitzhak (Hans) Klinghofer,30 Rachel Kagan, chairwoman of WIZO, and lawyer Baruch Uziel. Rosen and Kol welcomed their presence as trump cards that would convince fence-straddling party members of the progressive, non-bourgeoisie “color” of the new party. he hird Force’s contribution to the success of the LP was minimal.31 he 36  •  isr ael studies, volume 16 number 1 absence of new forces capable of recruiting a new audience in the “open area” between the LP and HM on the right and Mapai on the left, was felt throughout the election campaign and even more so after the results were published. THE STATUTORY MEETING OF THE LIBER AL PARTY Once the party institutions approved the initiative for merging, a peripa- tetic committee was set up to reach out to people interested in joining the new party and work out an organizational plan for establishing the new party—dealing with such questions as branches and the preparations for the statutory meeting.32 Simultaneously, a special sub-committee was formed to determine the party’s name. he debate over the name symbolized the divergent trends in the basis of the decision to establish the party. he GZ representatives, Tamir and Rimalt, proposed that the party be called the Central Party, while Harari and Yehuda Sha’ari from the Progressives preferred the Democratic Party. In the end, they agreed upon the Liberal Party.33 he decision to establish the party was characterized by speed and resolve on the one hand, and caution in amalgamating the GZ and Progressives on the other. Parity was strictly maintained in all party institutions. Leadership roles were binary: one for each mother-party. here were two presidents (Rosen and Bernstein); two chairmen (Kol and Sapir); two secretaries (Artzi and Tamir); and two addi- tional functionaries –Harari, chairman of the Knesset faction, and Rimalt, chairman of the political committee.34 he decision for parity in the party’s Knesset list—notwithstanding the balance of forces in the 4th Knesset that favored the GZ—led to an absurd situation. In the 5th Knesset, the Liberals seated 7 Progressives, the same number of GZ, and 3 members of the hird Force who were close to the Progressives. However, the GZ, who had lost their self-conidence after the setbacks that began in the mid-1950s, were prepared to make far-reaching concessions after Goldmann declined to appear on the list, by allotting the irst slate to Rosen. hey were also reconciled to the Progressives’ insistence not to merge the party’s assets—following Ha’oved Hatziyoni’s refusal to cede its economic independence. he Progressives took satisfaction in the transformation of Haboker, the LP’s organ. For the irst time in years, they had a party stage for expressing their views.35 Since there were no major ideological diferences between the two camps on most of the issues on  “We Have a Rendezvous With Destiny”  •  37 the agenda, the formulation of the joint platform proceeded relatively smoothly. Celebrations over the founding of the LP blurred the diferences in the members’ political outlooks and enabled the postponement of discus- sion on various issues until after the elections. Each faction was given the freedom to vote on basic questions in the new party.36 Haboker gushingly reported on the statutory meeting of the LP on 25 April 1961: With three knocks of the gavel and the playing of ‘Hatikva’ [Israel’s national anthem] the festive statutory meeting of Israel’s LP opened yesterday exactly at nine o’clock in the evening in the Cultural Hall in Tel-Aviv. housands crowded the entranceway to the Cultural Hall well before the hall’s doors swung open. Hundreds were left disappointed outside the hall because the tickets had been sold out and [the] auditorium was crammed.37 Prof. Yaakov Talmon delivered a lecture on the theory, practice, and sig- niicance of the liberal idea. His presence was important for not only the intellectual atmosphere it imbued in the political event but also for its link between the new party and the intelligentsia that had opposed the prime minister during the “Afair.”38 Goldmann deined himself as “a friend and supporter of the party, and perhaps soon one its members,” and described the LP as the continua- tion of classic Zionism.39 Rosen stressed the need to pursue a prudent path in foreign and domestic policy—while he decried adventurous extremism and cheap nationalistic demagoguery. He promised that the LP would serve as a bridge to the Labor Movement to the extent that the latter remained faithful to its ideals.40 Kol, on the other hand, emphasized the birth of the alternative that for the irst time since the establishment of the state ofered the possibility for a change of government. Sapir noted that for the irst time in many years the liberal school had found a politi- cal home. Like Sapir, all the speakers felt that they were expressing a true public awakening. he founders of the new party seemed to be under the impression that they were organizing and representing public forces of enormous weight that until now had been latent and divided for the most part. he festivities of the statutory meeting magniied the optimism in the approaching elections.41 38  •  isr ael studies, volume 16 number 1 THE LIBER AL PARTY IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN In order to understand what was the LP’s goal in the race to the 5th Knesset we need to discern the extent to which the declarations for an alternative were expressions of the speakers’ real intentions or were designed to add momentum to the election campaign. Pamphlets stressed the alternative idea as a way to solve Israel’s democracy quandary: he new party’s main role is the formation of a political body with the strength and responsibility necessary for changing the balance of power in the country. To serve as a focus for coalition unity and to enable a change of government that is the oxygen of every properly functioning democratic regime.42 Despite the crisis that engulfed the ruling party, no one in the LP seems to have believed it could really challenge Mapai on equal terms. During the campaign, the more it became clear that Goldmann preferred to wait for election results rather than inluence them, and the hope that the hird Force carried with it was limited—the LP leaders set their sights on more modest goals. hey hoped to beat the HM at the polls and become the second largest Knesset party. hey even believed that following their electoral empowerment they would be able to force Mapai into a coalition under conditions diferent from those which had existed in the early 1960s (and one without a majority of Mapai ministers).43 According to Yitzhak Artzi, “Our main aim is not the overthrow of the Mapai regime but the cre- ation of a strong party that will be able to inluence the government, either with or without Mapai.” Kol, on the other hand, wrote about “a powerful struggle of values for a properly functioning democracy based on a regime of justice and honesty, tolerance and mutual respect, and a healthy coalition government in the future.”44 In the words of the Ha’oved Hatziyoni leader who was the prime motivating force behind the move, it turns out that the LP’s only intention was to strengthen the political balance of power and reform the methods of the ruling party: If Mapai realizes it is facing a serious challenger that is liable to equal it in strength or inluence, it will cease its disdain of the other, its high-handedness, and will return to being a constructive-pioneering party as it was in the past.45 he LP’s election platform highlighted political, economic, and social issues, emphasizing the need for a basic constitution that would guarantee civil freedom, citizens’ rights and obligations, and that would deine the  “We Have a Rendezvous With Destiny”  •  39 regime’s authorities. It called attention on the need to set up a mandatory health insurance program administered by a government oice and the transfer of the remainder of the Histadrut’s social and welfare services to the state’s responsibility. It guaranteed equal rights and obligations to the Arab minority and the annulment of the military government.46 he con- necting common denominator between these promises was the longstand- ing agreement among the GZ on the need for speciic reforms and the assumption that the addition of the proposed reforms would contribute to an improvement in civil-state relations (or at least limit the power of the ruling government). he new party was vigorously attacked from both the left and the right. he HM vigorously charged that the Liberals were not really interested in challenging the “current regime” but only wanted to enhance their bar- gaining position during the formation of the new coalition. “hey’re only praying for a fatter slice of the coalition with Mapam.” Other charges that resurfaced in Herut’s propaganda assault against the Liberals included the Progressives’ takeover of the party platform and the minimalist approach to political and security issues that characterized Liberal leaders. he defense issue was the Achilles’ heel of the new LP which tried, without success, to recruit a senior military oicer to its list of candidates, someone who could change the party’s “toothless” image.47 Most of the criticism of the LP emanating from their two chief rivals was directed against Goldmann’s unconventional views. Not only did his leadership potential remain unfulilled but also the minimalist line that he was identiied with played into the hands, as he suspected, of the LP’s rivals and their propaganda machinery.48 Kol wrote about “the detestable mud- slinging against the president of the WZO” and charged that, “people who hold respected positions in Mapai are perpetrating this dirty work.”49 Rosen rejected Goldmann’s request that the publication of an article in support of the new party suice. Rosen feared that accusations made in the passion of debate would damage the party. Rosen’s biographer notes that he ordered the Zionist leader to appear in political rallies throughout the country and promised, “To bare his chest to the arrows shot in Goldmann’s direction.”50 Goldmann complied but his country-wide tour failed to spark the expected excitement. Artzi, who accompanied him on part of the tour, wrote: he parlor diplomat was not a leader of the masses. In meetings with the rank and ile he appeared as a dull igure. His familiarity with the arcana of Zion- ism engendered no interest. He knew too little about the Israeli issues on the agenda, and his theoretical approach put his listeners to sleep.51 40  •  isr ael studies, volume 16 number 1 Goldmann stayed in the country for the two last weeks of the election, taking part in nine meetings. His sojourn in Israel was emblazoned in Haboker in large headlines which presented him as “he Head of the Dias- pora,” a distinguished international leader, and a personality who ofered an alternative to the Israeli government’s policy.52 he LP was attacked for its agreement of the constructivist PP to unite with interested elements in the GZ. Mapai depicted the LP as a reactionary party dominated by “speculators”—fat cats with big cigars. As the elections approached, it published a propaganda pamphlet that reminded its readers of the iniquities of the Jewish bourgeoisie in the period of the Yishuv: hey fought against the Jewish worker so that they could hire Horanim [Arabs from southern Syria] on their farms for the price of peanuts. hey were aided by the British police in arresting Jewish laborers who demanded their right to employment in the homeland. hey resisted democratic elections in the cities and moshavot [collective farming settlements], and against every attempt to grant the right to vote to those who couldn’t aford the property tax. hey struggled against the Histadrut and the Va’ad Haleumi’s (National Committee) authority that was the highest prestate institution of the Yishuv.53 In light of this reminder, the spokesmen of the ruling party were surprised that the PP chose to merge with those who only a few years earlier had tried to establish a rightwing party with Herut. he LP was cognizant of their tenuous status in the Zionist ethos, and tried to counter the accusations54 and highlight their role in the Zionist enterprise: We have nothing to be ashamed of regarding our actions in the past. History knows the part our ranks in the organized public played in the period of ‘the state in the making’ in settlement, illegal immigration, defense, and in the pledge to inance the ‘state in the making.’ We did what we did to establish the state and lay the state’s foundations and bestow upon it the image of a properly functioning democratic state.55 ELECTION RESULTS AND THE PARTY’S REACTION During the election campaign LP leaders were optimistic about expected electoral outcome: Sapir set the goal at 25 Knesset seats and estimated that LP would carry between 20 and 25 seats.56 he LP received 13.6% of the total vote and received 17 seats.  “We Have a Rendezvous With Destiny”  •  41 he LP viewed the results with mixed emotions. It was delighted to be the main party whose strength had risen in the 5th Knesset57 however its failure to become the second largest Knesset faction and the fact that the HM had even gained a thousand votes caused much disappointment. An editorial in Haboker was forced to acknowledge that, “. . . whatever hap- pened, the power revolution that many people in Israel had anticipated did not occur.” It noted the millions of Israeli pounds that Mapai had invested in the election campaign, and compared it with the organizational prob- lems of the new LP, “Greater eforts will have to be made in formation and expansion until [the party] can present itself as Mapai’s main contender . . . Herut, contrary to the general expectation, increased its position considerably.”58 he results reairmed the dilemmas that the LP had to deal with. hey pointed clearly to the attitude of diferent social sectors toward the new party. While thousands of Ashkenazi middle-class voters switched from Mapai to the LP, the party’s poor showing was conspicuous in the new immigrant neighborhoods and development towns comprised of Oriental Jews. In Tel-Aviv the LP grew stronger in the northern neighborhoods (middle-class Ashkenazi residents) at the expense of Mapai, whereas in the southern neighborhoods (lower-class Oriental population) the HM strengthened, and support for the ruling party declined. he LP chalked up miniscule percentages in the south of Tel-Aviv.59 he dream of the LP leaders to remodel their party into a popular party proved unrealistic. he “Afair,” which had contributed to the consolidation of the GZ, was of interest mainly to the established public that could aford the time to be concerned by questions of regime and government patterns. he “Afair” remained remote from the interests of the “other Israel.” Gold- mann the minimalist, the transplant, was far too removed from Israeli life to serve as a suitable personality in contending for the votes of the Herut electorate.60 he liberal messages appeared irrelevant in the lower-class neighborhoods and townships: the bourgeoisie party that worried about reorganizing the relationship between the established sectors in society and the state’s cofer—failed to win the support of the Oriental public. hus, the LP could derive only limited satisfaction from the election results. Although the increase in Knesset seats could not be seen as defeat, but the size of support was limited in light of a campaign that had touted a manifestly civil agenda, as a glowing accomplishment. Despite the “hype” over an alternative that the LP “ballyhooed,” Begin made it clear that an alternative to Mapai, the ruling party, would be impossible without him and his movement. In the struggle between the Herut-led nationalist right 42  •  isr ael studies, volume 16 number 1 and the Liberal-led bourgeoisie right or conservative center over the ques- tion of “who can coalesce around him the nucleus of a government alter- native,” Begin triumphed over the ledgling party that had been spawned by the merging of the GZ and Progressives. What impeded the potential growth of the LP was the very limited support that it had received from the Oriental electorate. he pact that Begin had created with this voting sector, whose electoral power was growing from election to election, obstructed, in efect, any likelihood of establishing an alternative without the participation of the HM. he basic dilemma at the heart of the LP’s identity was one of direc- tion. Should it develop an alternative path in the opposition or should it persist in the Progressives’ long-running attempt to inluence government policy from within? his question was solved when, following the elections to the 5th Knesset, the irst possibility was removed from the agenda. he LP had to ind a way to attain a position of inluence in the Mapai-run government, but this possibility too would frustrate party leaders and, to their dismay, remain unrealized. THE LIBER ALS AND THE “CLUB OF FOUR” Immediately after the elections, Eshkol asked Kol to begin negotiations for a coalition. he LP chose a ten-member parity committee that seems to have held initial talks between the sides.61 he LP quickly put the “alterna- tive” banner in the closet and made it clear that their electorate expected to see them in an inluential position in government: As we see it, the constituents who voted for the Liberals wanted to see them more as a partner in the government than as an opposition party. his is not to say that the Liberals must be in the government at any price. Such an idea could have been disastrous to the new party. Whoever wanted to be in the opposition generally voted for Herut which had announced its intention to remain in the opposition, and whoever voted for the Liberals wanted them in the government, but on conditions other than those when the General Zionists and Progressives participated in Israeli governments.62 However, a few days later, the LP joined the “Club of Four” initia- tive. It did so after analyzing the new reality that was created, as many in the Israeli political system seemed to believe, after the elections to the 5th Knesset. Mapai’s loss of 5 MKs to 42 and the loss of its ally, the Progressives,  “We Have a Rendezvous With Destiny”  •  43 as the last-resort for setting up a narrow coalition—following the estab- lishment of the LP—produced tough conditions for Ben-Gurion to form a government. he condemnatory atmosphere toward the Mapai ruling government and its leader during the “Afair” caused an unprecedented attempt by mediocre Knesset parties to force new coalition game rules on Ben-Gurion. he parties that joined the Mapai-dominated coalitions in the past had painfully felt that Mapai’s hegemony stemmed, inter alia, from the mutual understanding that Mapai MKs were guaranteed majority repre- sentation in every government. he coalition partners decided to narrow Ben-Gurion’s room for maneuvering and form a bloc that could compel his party to glue together a new type of a coalition. In the post-election period, the LP, National Religious Party (NRP), Mapam, and Achdut-Ha’avoda (A-H) announced that heretofore they would be coordinating their moves and that their condition for joining the Mapai government was parity of ministers between the ruling party and its four coalition partners. hat the four parties had a total of 46 MKs—the same number as Mapai and its partners from the Arab lists—served as a legitimate, not only political, basis to their demand. A modus operandi between the LP and leftwing parties on this initia- tive, despite their sharp diferences on other issues, was reached because of the shared disgust with Mapai’s exclusive rule in the wake of the “Afair.” However, the establishment of a four-pronged front, and Mapai’s refusal to yield on the decision that had ensured it a majority in government, resulted in lengthy coalition negotiations that took much more time than was customary. Eshkol assumed responsibility for the job of forming a coali- tion, and in a few maneuverings he succeeded in neutralizing the “Club of Four’s” eforts and bringing about its dissolution. he four parties felt that their initiative had peaked since there was no practical way for them to establish an alternative coalition (among other reasons, because of the leftwing parties’ refusal to enter a coalition with the HM).63 Eshkol began negotiations simultaneously and separately with each of the parties and, in late October 1961, managed to hammer out a draft for two possible coalitions: one with the NRP and A-H, and the second with the NRP and the LP. Already at this stage, the LP decided to join a narrow government, accept four portfolios that would be allotted to the heads of the party, and consent to most of the articles in the coalition platform. Convinced that Ben-Gurion and Eshkol wanted to form a joint coalition, the members of the LP’s Central Committee held a meeting to reach a inal decision on the party’s entry into the government. Apparently none 44  •  isr ael studies, volume 16 number 1 of the committee members were prepared for the shock awaiting them that evening. On 27 October 1961, the Mapai Secretariat too convened a crucial meeting that turned everything upside down. he majority of speakers rejected the Ben-Gurion’s position on the formation of a government irst and foremost with the LP. Nearly all preferred setting up a broad coalition government that would include the Liberals, NRP, and A-H. It soon became clear that A-H was unwilling to become part of a gov- ernment that included the LP, and that the Mapai Secretariat had opted for a government with A-H. he reasons for this decision were essentially intra-party ones: (1) the decision to sideline the LP stemmed from the fear of possible internal unrest in the party’s ranks if the coalition was tainted with a bourgeoisie party rather than a workers’ alliance; and (2) the pref- erence of veteran members in the leadership to draw closer to A-H by establishing a joint government (that would eventually lead to the creation of a permanent political pact in the form of the Ma’arach or Alignment).64 Most vigorously opposed to the LP was Golda Meir, the foreign minister. She and her colleagues—the leadership of the founding generation—pre- ferred the relatively young, activist leaders of A-H, as a counterweight in their ongoing power-struggle with “Ben-Gurion pups.” hat the LP was relatively large seems to have increased Mapai’s leadership’s qualms over its partnership in the coalition. Unlike the smaller PP, whose inluence had been more limited, apprehension grew that the LP would demand a high price for its participation in government—a situation that would detract from Mapai’s political hegemony. While the prime minister was interested in a coalition with the Lib- erals, he was also apparently keen on staving of its potential for hurting his young associates in the event of an A-H -Mapai rapprochement. His other reasons for preferring partnership with the LP were his hopes that in this way he could advance his initiative for changing the voting system, strengthen the state line (mamlachtiyut) in government policy, and improve relations with the Zionist Movement abroad. Ben-Gurion’s main reason— as he declared during the coalition negotiations—for establishing a govern- ment with the LP rather than with A-H was his fear that by pushing the LP into the opposition, its leaders would have no alternative but to form a political alliance with the HM. he autumn of 1961 was one of the pin- nacles of Ben-Gurion’s anxiety over the “fascist danger” lurking in Begin and his movement. In private talks, Ben-Gurion warned Harari that conduct of the lef- twing parties would assist Begin in establishing despotic rule that would replace the military’s upper echelon and usurp Israeli democracy.65 At the  “We Have a Rendezvous With Destiny”  •  45 meeting of the Mapai Secretariat, Ben-Gurion joined the debate when he perceived that the gist of the discussion was blowing in the direction of workers’ unity. He deined the outcome of the meeting’s decision as “momentous” and warned that if the LP were rejected it would fall straight into Herut’s lap. He repeated his iery prophecy that Herut and its fascist nucleus would win the next elections and try to destroy Israeli democracy. Despite his frightening admonitions, the mood in the meeting tilted in the direction of A-H, and a few days later Mapai agreed to form a government with it. hus, after Eshkol and the LP leaders had decided on the basic prin- ciples of a joint coalition, Giora Yoseftal, the secretary of Mapai, phoned to announce Mapai’s decision not to include Kol, Sapir, and their colleagues in the government. To their utter amazement, the LP heads discovered that even the possibility of their acting as a corrective was blocked. he party that dreamed of serving as a government alternative was rebufed by the ruling party and blackballed from any position of practical inluence. Kol relates that Ben-Gurion, frustrated by his party’s decision, dispatched Shimon Peres to the Liberals’ leaders and begged them to continue demand- ing that Mapai honor the signed agreement between the two parties in the hope this would pave the way for the Liberals to join the government. he insult and injury sufered by the Liberals at the hands of Mapai left them no other choice but to decamp to the opposition.66 Peres told the LP leaders that the reason for his mission was Ben-Gurion’s fear of possible historical developments if the LP was left outside the government. Ben-Gurion felt that his own party had rekindled the danger that the GZ would revert to the idea of uniication with the HM and worried by Begin’s steps toward a merger. MENACHEM BEGIN’S CALL FOR A MERGER; AND ITS REJECTION On 20 August 1961 with the publication of the election results, Begin pro- posal that the Herut Directorate turn to the LP received unanimous positive response. He wrote to the two presidents of the LP, congratulating them on their election to the 5th Knesset: he Directorate of the Herut Movement has requested that I present you, as the former presidents of the two parties that have merged into the LP, with a proposal to open negotiations on the creation of a joint parlia- mentary bloc between the Herut Movement and the LP. [It is true] that 46  •  isr ael studies, volume 16 number 1 major diferences exist between the Herut Movement and the LP, or parts of it, whether over tradition and the past, or in the ideological realm. here is no reason or need to try to cover up the gravity of these diferences, to hide or deny them, nor is it necessary to disallow either side the right to be proud of what diferentiates it from the other side. But over and above these diferences, there is the national and state need—I will not hesitate to say the historical [need, too]—to establish an alternative force to the ruling party as quickly as possible, an alternative that is, irst and foremost, political in nature, but also one of quantitative representation.67 Begin proposed setting up, as a irst step, a joint parliamentary bloc of 34 MKs. He emphasized that the representative force of the two parties was almost (!) equal therefore neither party had reason to fear its loss of inluence in a joint bloc. He added to his proposal an innovation that did not appear in previous rightwing inter-party contacts: the parties would decide at the outset which issues both sides agreed not to agree on, and he expressed the hope that their number would eventually shrink as a result of “continual meetings of hearts and minds.” Begin’s plan was designed to achieve a number of goals: irst was his overt desire to create a political alternative to the ongoing Mapai regime. He appealed to the leader of the LP in 1961 under conditions that had not been present earlier. he primary factor this time was the large number of MKs that the uniication of the two parties had attained: 34 (vis-à-vis only 42 for Mapai). his was the irst time that the citizen-rightwing bloc had won such a large number of Knesset representatives concentrated in only two parties, rather than being split among numerous lists (GZ, Herut, PP, and ethnic lists). he merger of the two parties was likely to bring their representation to within “touching distance” of Mapai’s power position. Begin’s other goal was linked to his desire to prevent Mapai from recovering too easily from its political crisis. Begin estimated that if the Liberals joined the government, it would guarantee the regime political stability and enable Ben-Gurion to restore his party to the power it had enjoyed until the turbulence of the “Afair” erupted. he proposal to establish a joint parliamentary bloc was designed to convince the LP that it was now able to realize its election platform by creating a veritable alternative to the Mapai regime through revamping Israeli democracy. Begin hoped that his proposal would demonstrate to the LP that there was a real chance to challenge Mapai’s hegemony and that this realization would strengthen those elements in the LP that opposed their party’s participation in the government. Begin’s turn to the Liberals went beyond  “We Have a Rendezvous With Destiny”  •  47 his hopes to scuttle their entry into the Mapai-led coalition; it was also intended to carve a wedge between two camps in the LP, on the assumption that there were key members in the GZ who would oppose blocking of the option for a merger with Herut. Begin’s solicitation of the presidents of the LP was published in the newspapers even before the letters reached their destination. his height- ened the LP’s suspicions that the Herut leader’s main objective was tactical in nature and that he was interested in embarrassing the new party by having it engage in an internal dispute that could sabotage its growth. Nonetheless, the irst reaction to the proposal appeared in an editorial in Haboker and did not reject Begin’s proposition outright. Bernstein, who was a signatory to the article, wrote, “In light of the election results, there’s a kind of logic in this proposal; naturally, unless certain allergies are still around, this proposition will not encounter much opposition in the LP.”68 Indications of an opposing trend appeared in the oicial discussions in the party’s institutions. he Knesset party faction spent ive hours debating Begin’s ofer. Again, the accusation was made that Begin’s proposition was a trick to disrupt the formation of the new party and that it belied the party’s promises to its constituents.69 Kol emphasized that, “he Herut Movement and social liberalism cannot dwell together in the same house.” Yitzhak Golan declared, “he voter did not give us a mandate to bring Begin to power.” Rimalt asserted, “Greater ainity exists between Mapai and Herut than between the Liberals and Herut. he establishment of a rightwing parliamentary bloc will undoubtedly lead to the formation of a leftwing front in the country and over-polarization in the state.”70 Other opinions were not part of the central negotiations, but were heard only in the sidelines. Moshe Nisim, who participated in the meeting even though he was not elected to the Knesset, claimed that Begin’s inten- tion was genuine, and he asked to open negotiations with Herut. MK Zvi Zimmerman suggested postponing the decision and taking time before replying negatively.71 At this stage, the majority of the GZ were inclined not to precipitate the party into an internal argument. Even Bernstein, who supported the initiative on principle, declared in the meeting that party solidarity was the main goal and a unanimous decision had to be reached. he inal decision stated: he Liberal faction in the Knesset has decided that it is impossible to estab- lish a parliamentary bloc, which in practical terms means a merging of the factions of the two independent parties that even the chairman of the Herut Movement admits that serious diferences exist between them.72 48  •  isr ael studies, volume 16 number 1 he crucial decision of the Liberals’ institutions seems not to have fully relected the position of the former heads of the GZ.73 We may assume that Sapir and his colleagues did not suddenly fall blind to the political advantages to be gained in the right’s concentration of power. Neverthe- less, the majority of MKs—former GZ—backed their new partners—the Progressives. he more likely explanation for the discrepancy between the basic desire on the part of the GZ leaders for a merger with Herut and the statements made and position taken in the actual voting—apparently lies in the gentleman’s agreement arrived at on the eve of the LP’s founding.74 In general, the Liberals’ institutions rejected the proposition by a large majority. Begin was not surprised, but neither did he renege on his initia- tive which he advanced continuously in the following years. His response appeared in an article, “We Have Patience.”75 he patience that the Herut leader displayed paid of. he LP was consigned to the opposition against its will. It had failed to take advantage of the optimal conditions created after the “Afair” for replacing the Mapai regime with a civilian alternative. Mapai refused to cooperate with the LP in the Knesset and blocked them from exerting their inluence on government policy. In the wrangling between Herut speakers who came to the podium in Knesset debates immediately after government representatives, and LP speakers, there was no doubt that the hand of the former was on top. CONCLUDING REMARKS he two main factors that contributed to the failure to establish a LP that might have become a government alternative were the Mapai regime’s eco- nomic policy and the Liberals’ leadership shortcoming. he ruling party learned its lesson from the GZs’ impressive electoral gains in the 2nd Knesset. Already in the 1950s, Mapai had become a state-oriented party that employed socialist rhetoric at times, but chose a pragmatic economic policy—not a socialist one—inter alia, in order not to frighten of the middle-classes. Mapai gradually reduced the political center’s fears of the ruling party, thus cutting of the LP’s potential constituency. In the early sixties, Minister of Finance, Eshkol instituted a policy of economic liberal- ization reforms. hus, the sting was removed from the economic criticism that the Liberals might have leveled against the government. At the same time, the leaders of the GZ and Progressives found it diicult to agree on a joint position regarding issues related to Israel’s liberal image. For example, the LP’s institutions held long and futile discussions over such issues as state  “We Have a Rendezvous With Destiny”  •  49 versus religion and reforming the voting system. he party failed to come up with a liberal-democratic agenda that would compensate for the loss of the efectiveness of its liberal economic banner. A second factor that detracted from LP’s ability to build its power base was the absence of a leader with the capacity to unify the party and chart its path. he leadership vacuum that characterized the GZ over the years remained unoccupied in the 5th Knesset. Following the elections, the Liberals still expected that Goldmann would settle in the country—within a year—and take control of the new party, however he maintained only limited contact with the party leaders while he focused his activity in the international theater. he LP did not produce a mutually agreed-upon leader, a prima inter pares who would symbolize the Liberals’ image for party members and supporters. he presidents of the party, Rosen and Bernstein slowly retired from political activity, and leadership was taken over by a group that included Kol and Harari alongside Sapir and Rimalt, none of whom succeeded in rising above other party members or gather- ing around them a signiicant coterie. his is why the party had to cope with the doldrums of the opposition and the disappointment of having fumbled the coalition negotiations without a leader who could wield his inluence and magnetic personality for navigating the party line and serving as an anchor for shaping a new party identity for diverse and sometimes contentious groups. he venture called the “Liberal Party” lasted less than four years. It ended in a return to the old division within the GZ—reminiscent of the Mandate period. he GZ, who completely squandered their credibility and capacity to vie independently in the elections, found themselves playing a secondary role in the LP, and fulilling Ben-Gurion’s prophecy by establish- ing with the HM—Gahal (the Herut-Liberal Bloc). he PP, renamed the “Independent Liberal Party,” resumed its progressive activity by trying to inluence government policy—even if only marginally—from within the Labor camp, and ailiating itself with the ruling party. In the end, both parties were absorbed by the Israeli right and left. Twice the conditions appeared ripe for creating a GZ alternative to the workers’ hegemony. In 1951 the turnabout failed to transpire despite the harsh economic agenda that characterized the Mapai regime’s austerity and rationing programs. he GZ scored impressively at the polls, but this turned out to be a “once only” achievement. In 1961, the “Afair” brought forth a civil agenda and scathing criticism of the government patterns that Ben-Gurion had instituted. But the “rendezvous with destiny” that seemed to present itself to the GZ trend for the second time, gave birth to the LP 50  •  isr ael studies, volume 16 number 1 which turned out to be the swan song of this mostly-forgotten trend in the Zionist Movement. With the decline of General-Zionism, the political system reverted to the historical pattern with the Labor Movement and Revisionist right struggling for political hegemony. At the end of the day, the factions of General Zionism were absorbed into both these movements. Notes [All references are to Hebrew publications unless otherwise noted] 1. David Sha’ari, From Ordinary Zionism to General Zionism: Uniication and Division in the Beginning of the Path of the World Association of General Zionism, 1929–1939 ( Jerusalem, 1990) 241. 2. Arie Gelblum, Ha’aretz, 6 December 1950, 26 April 1951. 3. Khayyam Paltiel, “he Progressive Party: A Study of a Small Party in Israel,” (PhD diss., he Hebrew University, 1963) 335–40 [English]. 4. Amir Ben-Porat, Where’s the Bourgeoisie? A History of the Israeli Bourgeoisie ( Jerusalem, 1999) 127; Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, Changes in Israeli Society ( Jerusalem, 1989) 183. 5. PP Directorate Protocol, 16 February 1961, Masua Archive (MA), M 4/10. 6. At the time, the GZ “B” Faction refused to join the Histadrut. his caused a rupture in the GZ trend and the split into two factions. 7. Yitzhak Artzi, Davka a Zionist (Tel-Aviv, 1999) 206. 8. See, for example, Rosen’s statements in the meeting of the party directorate, February 26 1961, MA, M 4/10. 9. he Progressive Party won 3.2% (1951–4 seats) and 4.6% (1959–6 seats). 10. Haboker, 20 January 1961. 11. Haboker, 19 February 1961. 12. Ha’aretz, 5 May 1961. 13. Statements, PP Directorate meeting, 16 February 1961, MA, M 4/10. 14. Moshe Kol, Struggles and Enterprises: Autobiographical Chapters (Tel-Aviv, 1984) 87 [Hebrew] [hereafter: Struggles and Enterprises]; Ruth Bondi, Felix: Pinchas Rosen and his Times (Tel-Aviv, 1990) 558 [Hebrew] [hereafter: Felix]. 15. Artzi to Glazerman et al., 13 March 1961, MA, M 3/32. 16. Haboker, 24 February 1961. 17. Haboker, 3 April 1961. 18. Yosef Tamir, Behind the Scenes: Personal Letters from the Knesset (Tel-Aviv, 1991) 112; Yosef Serlin, Haboker, 24 February 1961. 19. Kol to Goldmann, 26 February 1962, MA, M 4/32. 20. Quoted in Kol, Struggles and Enterprises 90. 21. Bondi, Felix, 558; Arye Avneri, he Liberal Connection (Tel-Aviv, 1984) 66.  “We Have a Rendezvous With Destiny”  •  51 22. Bondi, Felix 561. 23. Kol to Goldmann, 26 February 1961, MA, M 4/32. 24. Haboker, 16 April 1961. 25. MA, M 1/1. 26. Yochanan Bader, he Knesset and I (Tel-Aviv, 1979) 147; Bondi, Felix 558. 27. Haboker, 7 May 1961. 28. Tamir states that he met with Sapir through the mediation of S.Z. Abramov, but the two parted ways in friendship after “I gave much consideration to the proposal but made no reply. he General Zionists seemed to be a party bereft of inspiration and vision.” Shmuel Tamir, A Denizen of this Land: An Autobiography, 2 (Tel-Aviv, 2002) 1286. 29. Describing the GZs and Progressives, Moda’i wrote, “I doubted whether I’d ind my place in either party as long as they remained closed clubs.” He was elected to the Knesset in 1973. Yitzhak Moda’i, Expunging Ciphers (Tel-Aviv, 1988) 48. 30. Klinghofer served as dean of the Law Faculty at he Hebrew University for two years before being ofered a position on the Liberals’ list. 31. A month before the elections, a group published an advertisement in support of the LP. See Avneri, Liberal Connection 64–5. 32. Haboker, 10 March 1961; Avneri, Liberal Connection 66. 33. Avneri, Liberal Connection 21. 34. Kol, Struggles and Enterprises, 87; Avneri, Liberal Connection 80–1. 35. Shneur Z. Abramov, On Liberalism and the Party that Vanished (Tel- Aviv, 1993) 37–8. 36. Tamar Henkin (ed.), General Zionism as an Ideological Trend—A Blueprint of the Ideological-Political Development of the Liberal Party in Israel ( Jerusalem, 1979) 61. 37. Haboker, 26 April 1961. 38. Yaakov Talmon, “Liberalism in the Test of Our Times.” 39. Avneri, Liberal Connection 22, 63. 40. Haboker, 27 April 1961. 41. Kol, Struggles and Enterprises 91. 42. “he Goal: he Renewal of Israeli Democracy,” MA, OS–7–11; Haboker, 25 June 1961. 43. Nathan Yanai, Political Crises in Israel: he Ben-Gurion Period ( Jerusalem, 1982) 171. 44. MA, M–3/32; Moshe Kol, Paths in Zionism and Liberalism ( Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv, 1964) 72. 45. Kol, Struggles and Enterprises 90. 46. “he Goal: he Renewal of Israeli Democracy,” MA, OS–7–11. 47. Herzl Rosenblum’s criticism, Yediot Aharonot, 19 May 1961. 48. Ben-Gurion referred disparagingly to Goldmann as “he distinguished guest from New York,” 7 August 1961, General File, Ben-Gurion Archive (BGA). 49. Kol, Paths in Zionism and Liberalism 86. 52  •  isr ael studies, volume 16 number 1 50. Bondi, Felix 558. 51. Artzi, Davka a Zionist 208. 52. Haboker, 3 and 4 August 1961. 53. “Our Opinion on the Figure Behind the Veil,” Labor Party Archives, 102- 1959-13-4. See also, the Mapai ad, “he Fields hey Didn’t Sow,” Ha’aretz, 9 August 1961. 54. Yosef Sapir, “All of the Declarations of Mapai Spokesmen, as though the Lib- eral Party is a Bourgeoisie Party, are Totally Unrealistic,” newspaper advertisement, 24 June 1961, Jabotinsky Institute Archives ( JIA), H3–19/1. 55. Rosen’s election broadcast three days before the Knesset elections, MA, M 7/42. 56. Shlomo Amir and Tzvi Eliraz, “New Faces in the Party Landscape,” Panim el Panim, March 17; Kol to Goldmann, 26 February 1961, MA, M 4/32. 57. Haboker, 17 August 1961. 58. Ibid. 59. Zvi Elgat, Ma’ariv, 20 August 1961. 60. Ha’aretz, 17 August 1961. 61. Kol, Struggles and Enterprises, 91; Bondi, Felix, 260. 62. Moshe Kol, “he Liberals’ Conditions for Joining the Coalition,” Tmoorot, XII, 387 (September 1961). 63. Yossi Goldstein, Eshkol—An Autobiography ( Jerusalem, 2003) 438; also see the examination of Eshkol’s moves. 64. Israel Guri and Zeev Hering statements, Mapai Secretariat, 27 October 1961, Protocol Section, BGA. All of the following quotes come from this protocol unless otherwise noted. 65. Ben-Gurion Diaries (BGD), BGA, 13 September 1961. Ben-Gurion’s alarm over the rise of Herut fascism also emerged in talks held with A-H leaders during the coalition negotiations. BGD, BGA, 12 and 28 October 1961. 66. Kol, Struggles and Enterprises 92. 67. Begin to Bernstein and Rosen, 20 August 1961, JIA, P 20-3-2. 68. Haboker, 20 August 1961. 69. See, for example, statements by Rosen, Harari, Sha’ari, and Sapir in “Protocol from the Liberal Party Debate,” 27 August 1961, MA, F–8/27. 70. Ibid. 71. Ibid. 72. 27 August 1961, MA, F–8/27; and also Haboker, 28 August 1961. 73. Haboker, 29 August 1961. 74. See Sapir’s statements during the debate: “At the start of the negotiations for the establishment of a new party we agreed not to discuss the merger with any other element unless through mutual agreement, in the absence of such an agreement, we have to reject the proposal,” 27 August 1961, MA, F–8/27. 75. Herut, 8 September 1961.  Contributors  •  199 AMIR GOLDSTEIN is the principal of the Danziger School, Kiriyat Shmona. His recent publications include: he Gallows Martyrs ‘Memory and Historiography ( Jerusalem, 2011); “he Big Breakthrough, Menachem Begin and the ‘Waiting Period’,” Iyunim Bitkumat Israel, 17 (2007); “Menachem Begin and the Whole Land of Israel,” Cathedra, December (2007) [all in Hebrew]. ARTURO MARZANO is a Lecturer of Middle East History at the Univer- sity of Pisa. His publications include: co-authored with Marcella Simoni, Rome and Jerusalem: Israel in Italian Political and Cultural Life, 1949–2009 (Genova, 2010); Forty Years Later. Borders, Barriers and Limits in Israel and Palestine (1967–2007) (Bologna, 2007); A Land to Be Born Again: he Italian Chalutzism and the Jewish Immigration to Palestine before the War, 1920–1940 (Milano, 2003). ZAKI SHALOM is a senior researcher at the Ben-Gurion Research Insti- tute for the Study of Israel and Zionism at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. His recent publications include: Defeating Terror: he Story Behind Israel’s Victory over the Palestinian Intifada (Tel-Aviv, 2010) [Hebrew]; Ben- Gurion’s Political Struggles, 1963–1967: A Lion in Winter (London, 2007); Between Dimona and Washington: he Political Struggle over the Build-up of Israel’s Nuclear Option (Sede Boker and Tel-Aviv, 2005) [Hebrew]. EFRAIM SICHER is professor in the Department of Foreign Literature at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. His recent publications include: he Holocaust Novel (New York, 2005); “Tancred’s Wound: From Repression to Symbolization in Second-Generation Narratives,” Journal of Modern Jewish Studies, 5.2 (2006); co-authored with Linda Weinhouse, Under Post- colonial Eyes: Figuring the “Jew” in Postmodern and Postcolonial Writing (forthcoming). BOAZ VANETIK is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Jewish History at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. He is co-author with Zaki Shalom of “he March of Folly: White House Policy as a Catalyst for the Outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973,” Iyunim Bitkumat Israel, 19 (2009). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.