Wittgenstein

Death of the Mind Doesn’t Mean Death of the Soul: Vilém Flusser on Wittgenstein’s Semantic Buddhism and the Grace of Doubt

by Wanderley Dias da Silva

While philosophers grapple with uncertainties, fools strike by surprise ― Henrique de Sousa Filho While philosophers grapple with uncertainties, fools strike by surprise ― Henrique de Sousa Filho

Sobre el fundamento y el escepticismo; el conocimiento según On Certainty.

by victoria Lavorerio

Tsilipakos - 2012 - Poverty of Ontological Reasoning

by Leonidas Tsilipakos

O que é o “Big Typescript”? (What is the “Big Typescript”?) Dois Pontos (2009).

by Mauro Engelmann

The Multiple Complete Systems Conception as Fil Conducteur of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics. Pre-Proceedings of the 32nd Wittgenstein International Symposium, 2009. To appear also in the Agora Project.

by Mauro Engelmann

Pragmatism and Legal Reasoning

by Narve Strand

Constitutional Value Judgments and Interpretive Theory Choice

by Ian Bartrum

Philip Bobbitt’s remarkable work describing the ‘modalities’ of constitutional argument is an immense contribution to... more Philip Bobbitt’s remarkable work describing the ‘modalities’ of constitutional argument is an immense contribution to the study of constitutional law. He describes a typology of six forms of argument alive in our interpretive practice, and offers a limited account of how these modalities interact, and sometimes conflict, in actual constitutional decisions. One of the persistent puzzles Bobbitt’s description leaves open, however, is how we should account for the choice between conflicting modalities in cases where that choice is likely outcome-determinative. Because the modalities are ‘incommensurable’ — a term’s meaning in one modality may not be fully translatable into another — there is no internal way to justify the choice of one approach over another. Bobbitt ultimately concluded that such acts of ‘decision’ are the product of ‘judicial conscience’; which some individuals possess (or exercise) to a greater degree than others.

I have always felt that Bobbitt’s resolution is probably correct, but still unsatisfying. I think we can do a little more to explain the processes of interpretive theory choice, even if those choices ultimately remain idiosyncratic and individual. To that end, I look to another account of choices made between incommensurable theories — that Thomas Kuhn gave in his work on scientific paradigm changes. Kuhn argued that, while no universal algorithm defines a ‘correct’ decision to adopt a new scientific paradigm, there are broadly shared choice criteria or ‘values’ that scientists regularly refer to when justifying their decisions. It is, Kuhn suggested, the scientist’s willingness to discuss and explain these underlying value judgments that makes her approach ‘scientific.’

This paper attempts to apply some lessons from Kuhn’s work to constitutional practice, particularly the choices we must make between Bobbitt’s interpretive modalities in outcome determinative cases. I derive a list of four overlapping and sometimes competing ‘constitutional values’ — constraint, flexibility, representation, and identity — from texts in the constitutional canon. I look to the canon because it important that the values I identify are broadly shared, as that is what allows them to serve as a somewhat ‘objective’ set of choice criteria. That is, when we make an interpretive theory choice, we should justify it in terms of the purposes we widely believe the Constitution serves in our legal practice. I then speculate on the ways that underlying value judgments may have influenced interpretive theory choices in several Supreme Court opinions, and conclude that judges should be more transparent in acknowledging and defending these often obscure processes.

Tsilipakos - On Ebersole's Pictures _Draft_(2010)

by Leonidas Tsilipakos

Wittgenstein's "Most Fruitful Ideas" and Sraffa

by Mauro Engelmann

Forthcoming: Philosophical Investigations

In the preface of the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein says that the “most fruitful ideas” of the book are... more In the preface of the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein says that the “most fruitful ideas” of the book are due to the stimulus of Sraffa’s criticism, but does not mention him nowhere else in the book. It remains a puzzle in the literature how and why Sraffa influenced Wittgenstein. I solve the puzzle by explaining Sraffa’s role in Wittgenstein’s philosophical development. Due to Sraffa’s stimulating criticism, Wittgenstein definitely parted away from the calculus conception of language of the Big Typescript (arguably, an adaptation of the calculus of the Tractatus), introduced the “anthropological approach”, and structured the opening sections of the Philosophical Investigations.

"La perception de l’image selon Wittgenstein"

by Hugo Clémot

publié in Philosophies de l'image, Editions M-Editer, 2010.

Ludwig Wittgenstein nous aide à saisir l'importance du rôle joué par les images en philosophie. Il est des images,... more Ludwig Wittgenstein nous aide à saisir l'importance du rôle joué par les images en philosophie. Il est des images, c'est-à-dire des théories, des idées préconçues comme celle de la définition ostensive, qui nous emprisonnent lorsque nous philosophons.
La notion d'image mentale se voit également souvent attribuer un rôle explicatif qu'elle ne peut avoir la plupart du temps.
Mais le philosophe d'origine autrichienne peut aussi nous aider à mieux penser les images comprises en un troisième sens qui est aussi le sens le plus littéral, à savoir comme ces tableaux, ces figurations que sont les peintures, les photographies ou les films. En effet, ses considérations sur la perception de l'aspect nous permettent de résoudre ce que l'on appelle le paradoxe de la vision des images. Ce problème tient à ce que lorsque nous voyons une image, nous ne disons pas spontanément que nous voyons ce qui est sous nos yeux, l'image, mais plutôt que nous voyons ce qui est absent, à savoir ce que l'image représente. En fait, la solution consiste à comprendre pourquoi « certaines choses dans le voir nous paraissent énigmatiques, parce que le voir dans son ensemble ne nous paraît pas assez énigmatique.

« Ostension ou pourquoi et comment les images posent des problèmes aux philosophes selon Wittgenstein »

by Hugo Clémot

Ressource pédagogique sur l'espace pédagogique numérique de l'Académie de Nantes (2009)

Cette ressource propose de réfléchir la perception de l'aspect à l'aide de textes philosophiques et d'une vidéo... more Cette ressource propose de réfléchir la perception de l'aspect à l'aide de textes philosophiques et d'une vidéo conférence de 6'.

Wittgenstein on the Gridiron: Gestures and Language Games in American Football

by Armando Lopez

Term paper for my Wittgenstein conference course.

In this essay I will examine the sport of football as a case study for Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notion of... more In this essay I will examine the sport of football as a case study for Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notion of “language-games” as expounded in Philosophical Investigations. I will then go on to critically evaluate the extent to which some fairly common movements in football, such as head-fakes, might count as linguistic practice or gesture, and whether they might be better understood as non-lingustic indicators of action. I will argue that such movements are best understood as “instruments” or “elements” of language, but that the context in which they are performed is based on non-linguistic indication or inference.

The cradle of language: making sense of bodily connexions

by Stephen J. Cowley

This appeared as:
Cowley, S. J. (2007). The Cradle of Language: making sense of bodily connections. In D. Moyal-Sharrock (ed.) Perspicuous Presentations: Essays on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology, Palgrave MacMillan, Hondmills, pp. 278-298.

If you would like to see the original slides, please write and ask.

Much is rotten in the ‘sciences’ of language and cognition. To those familiar with Wittgenstein’s work this is... more Much is rotten in the ‘sciences’ of language and cognition. To those familiar with Wittgenstein’s work this is apparent in, for example, the gulf that separates investigations of mind from those of language. Equally, it appears in how empirical work tends to skate over conceptual issues while theories of discourse proceed with disregard for causal processes. Taking another direction, I invoke ‘natural history’ in posing new questions about the origins of minded and discursive behaviour. In this context, I use ‘micro-investigations’ to demonstrate how a single moment of interaction can be used to throw new light on the processes of human development. Rather than argue for my proposed ascriptions, my aim is to show the power of the method by close examination of a moment when, in Wittgenstein’s phrase, “understanding dawns”.

Ragionare con la mente estesa. Facebook, il pensiero e l’argomentazione

by Edoardo Acotto

Published on Alfabeta 2, july 2011

Per chi può permettersi un computer e un abbonamento a internet – e non sono ancora tutti, nemmeno nei paesi più... more Per chi può permettersi un computer e un abbonamento a internet – e non sono ancora tutti, nemmeno nei paesi più ricchi – l’esistenza odierna è parzialmente online. Sembra allora un compito arduo provare a indicare un senso globale delle interazioni tra i soggetti che popolano i social network, per la pervasività delle pratiche di vita online e per il continuo intreccio di attuale e virtuale.

Considero i social network in generale come una “tecnologia dell’intelletto” (Jack Goody a proposito della scrittura) e in particolare come un’esteriorizzazione della facoltà di ragionare: non solo luoghi virtuali ma veri e propri dispositivi cognitivi allargati, una protesi delle facoltà mentali innate e culturalmente implementate.

"The mother-tongue of thought". James and Wittgenstein on common sense

by Anna Boncompagni

in Cognitio - Revista de Filosofia, vol. 13 no. 1, forthcoming

“Our later and more critical philosophies are mere fads and fancies compared with this natural mother-tongue of... more “Our later and more critical philosophies are mere fads and fancies compared with this natural mother-tongue of thought”, says William James in his lecture on common sense. The deep bond connecting language, common sense and nature is also one of the main concerns of the later Wittgenstein. The aim of this paper is to compare the two philosophers in this respect, particularly focusing on James’ Pragmatism and on Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Similarities, but also differences, will be highlighted. A further element will be offered by the analysis of a fragment of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, which anticipates his image of the river-bed of thought through the critique of James’ stream of thought. By means of this comparison, I will question Wittgenstein’s explicit refusal of pragmatism. I will argue that his late philosophy can be said to be even more pragmatist than James’, in that it delineates a conception of the common sense certainties which shape our Weltbild (world-picture) as practically, and not merely epistemically, connected to our life.

Wittgensteinian Epistemology and Cartesian Skepticism (draft)

by Claudio Salvatore

What is Wittgenstein’s view of the Idea that Someone understands a General Term because they know what Essence it picks out? Does his account raise any problems?

by Daniel. J. Woolley

This is an essay that I wrote during my final year as an undergraduate.

This essay comes in two parts. The first part will be to explicate the essentialist account of how we can understand a... more This essay comes in two parts. The first part will be to explicate the essentialist account of how we can understand a general term, particularly when picking out an individual object/entity/concept that falls into a category of kinds. This will be followed by Wittgenstein’s attack on the essentialist position with the account of family resemblances. The second part will consist of two objections that can be raised to the notion of family resemblances. The first objection is that the boundaries of a general term are either unknown or presupposed by the subject and so a general term would not be able to be used to pick out individuals at all or if they can this is due to a presupposition that leads Wittgenstein into trouble. The second objection is that which is put forward by Michael Hodges. The objection is that the notion of family resemblances refutes essentialism at a certain level. Yet we can ask how we pick out the properties that resemble and so on into an infinite regress. I shall conclude that Wittgenstein’s refutation of essentialism initially seems like the better alternative in understanding how a general term can pick out individuals. However, once we delve into Wittgenstein’s positive account, family resemblances, we encounter problems that leave us in limbo as neither position seems to be a credible position.

If Ethical Statements Say Nothing There is no Point in Making Them! How would Wittgenstein Have Responded to this? Do you agree with him?

by Daniel. J. Woolley

This was an essay I wrote as an undergraduate in my final year.

I show why ethical statements are of profound importance for Wittgenstein and therefore showing that he would disagree... more I show why ethical statements are of profound importance for Wittgenstein and therefore showing that he would disagree that there is no point in making them. To do this I am going to map out Wittgenstein’s account of reality and the limits of the world. I will clarify the three types of sentences, that are, propositions that have sense and senseless and nonsensical sentences. Then I shall state the distinction between saying and showing. Using an elucidatory interpretation of what Wittgenstein is doing throughout his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), I will then show why nonsensical statements and therefore ethical statements, as ethical statements are a type of nonsensical sentence, provide as useful elucidations because they delineate the limits of the world. This is the whole point of the Tractatus – to draw a limit to what can be thought. In agreement with Wittgenstein I will show why this is the case.

Nauseating Flux: Iris Murdoch on Sartre and Heraclitus

by David Robjant

forthcoming, The European Journal of Philosophy
Article first published online: 17 APR 2012

I observe Iris Murdoch’s distinctive use of the word ‘flux’ in discussion of Sartre’s Nausea and show that her usage... more I observe Iris Murdoch’s distinctive use of the word ‘flux’ in discussion of Sartre’s Nausea and show that her usage is persuasive and revolutionary, first as Sartre exegesis, second as Heraclitus exegesis, and throughout as a contribution to the philosophy of language. Murdoch’s usage of ‘flux’ frames a comparison of Sartre’s Roquentin with other figures who have had similarly flowing experience but without nausea. Roquentin's plight is shown to be ‘a philosopher's plight’ precipitated by a defective theory of descriptive success. I then show how the Heraclitean fragments would support Murdoch’s treatment of flux and on close analysis contradict the established view exemplified in the work of Wittgenstein and Jonathan Barnes. Flux is not a variety of change, and the river image ‘cannot be analysed into non-metaphorical components without a loss of substance’.

Elucidating Forms of Life

by Anna Boncompagni

Submitted for the International Conference "In Wittgenstein's Footsteps", University of Iceland, September 2012

Although the expression “form of life” and its plural “forms of life” occur only five times in Philosophical... more Although the expression “form of life” and its plural “forms of life” occur only five times in Philosophical Investigations, and generally few times in his works, it is commonly agreed that this is one of the most relevant issues in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Starting from the analysis of the contexts in which Wittgenstein makes use of this concept, the paper focuses on the different interpretations that have been given in secondary literature, and proposes a classification based on two axes of debate: the monistic versus pluralistic interpretation, and the empirical versus transcendental interpretation. After placing some well-known readings in the resulting scheme, such as those offered by Bernard Williams, Stanley Cavell, Newton Garver, Max Black, Naomi Scheman, John Hunter, Norman Malcom, Jonathan Lear, Daniéle Moyal-Sharrock and others, an attempt will be made to offer an evolutionary reading of Wittgenstein’s own ideas about forms of life. It will be argued that the empirical and plural view that seems characteristic of his writings in the Thirties, slowly turns towards a monistic view, that in On Certainty can be read as evoking the transcendental flavor of the Tractatus, but from within a deeply different, pragmatic perspective.