Willard Van Orman Quine

Modal Metaphysics

by Ted Parent

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

This summarizes of some prominent views about the metaphysics of possible worlds. This summarizes of some prominent views about the metaphysics of possible worlds.

CONTEÚDO EMPÍRICO DE TEORIAS E SUBDETERMINAÇÃO EM WILLARD QUINE

by Sofia Stein

Referência deste artigo: STEIN, S. I. A. . Conteúdo empírico de teorias e subdeterminação em Quine. Principia, Florianópolis, v. 2, n. 2, p. 205-226, 1998.

Segundo Quine, se queremos preservar a tese da subdeterminação de teorias científicas, devemos admitir que existam... more Segundo Quine, se queremos preservar a tese da subdeterminação de teorias científicas, devemos admitir que existam formulações de teorias que, além de serem empiricamente equivalentes, sejam também logicamente incompatíveis. Pois é justamente isso que afirma a tese da subdeterminação de teorias: que existem teorias que explicam os mesmos fatos, que têm, portanto, conteúdo empírico equivalente, e ao mesmo tempo são logicamente incompatíveis. A suposição de Quine de que possam existir diferentes formulações de teorias empiricamente equivalentes, ou seja, de que, não importando a maneira como descrevemos a realidade, o que, ao final das contas, afirmamos acerca do que observamos na realidade e do que iremos observar pode equivaler, não é uma obviedade.

Wittgenstein, Quine and a naturalistic approach to propositional attitudes

by Sofia Stein

Published In: Primer Congreso Logica, Argumentacion y Pensamiento Critico, 2008, Santiago. Actas del Primer Congreso Logica, Argumentacion y Pensamiento Critico. Santiago : Centro de Estudios de la Argumentacion y el Razonamiento, Facultad de Psicologia, Universidad Diego, 2008.

In recent writings of a naturalistic nature, philosophers such as Eric Lormand have tried to explain from a... more In recent writings of a naturalistic nature, philosophers such as Eric Lormand have tried to explain from a philosophical point of view —but based on scientific evidence— what the nature of propositional attitudes is, to what extent they depend on empirical content (e.g. impressions), and to what extent they depend on a mental domain which is not necessarily linked to impressions. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the need to presuppose some kind of correlation between propositional attitudes and internal states —both physical and mental, with the intention of demonstrating certain limits of the explanatory capacity of Wittgenstein’s later anti-mentalism. I will reflect on the relationship between the notion of use and the notion of reference —or ‘self-reference’ in this specific case— in the arguments put forward by John V. Canfield (1996) concerning the differing positions of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Willard Quine regarding propositional attitudes. On the one hand, the analysis will reflect on Wittgenstein’s affirmation that it is unnecessary to establish any kind of internal correlation —to a subject of speech— between the expression of a propositional attitude and an internal state to the subject, in order for ‘correct usage’ of propositional attitudes to occur. On the other hand, this analysis may help to clarify to what extent the behaviourism present in Quine’s semantic perspective (1960; 1990) depends on the supposition of correlations between phrases and stimuli, which is considered by Canfield to be a clearly positivist trait of Quine’s position. The conclusions will not be purely interpretative.  I intend to contribute to the discussion concerning the need to talk about mind experiences —in a naturalistic way— for the explanation of language-games, which are necessarily inter-subjective and intentional.

Empirismo e a ontologia das ciências naturais; Empiricism and the ontology of natural sciences

by Sofia Stein

This paper examines the problem of the construction of objects in natural sciences through the analysis of texts... more
This paper examines the problem of the construction of objects in natural sciences through the analysis of texts by Hans Reichenbach and Willard Quine. Particularly, it intends to show that scientific objects are not the result of an accurate representation of reality, but of theoretical reasoning based on experience. Although 20th century empiricism does not concede to rationalism the existence of a priori structures of knowledge, it does admit, from an apparently conventionalist point of view, the empirical underdetermination of theories and the diversity of possible interpretations of experience. The analysis of Quine’s view of ontological commitments and of Reichenbach’s view of quantum mechanics leads to considerations about de problem of ontology in natural sciences. Finally, the paper discusses to what extent this ontology can be described from an empiricist point of view.

Key words: empiricism, ontology, Hans Reichenbach, Willard Quine, quantum mechanics.

DISPENSING WITH REFERENCE TO ELEMENTARY EXPERIENCES

by Sofia Stein

Reference of this paper: STEIN, S. I. A. Dispensing with reference to elementary experiences. In: III Meeting on Pragmatism, 2006, Granada. Contributions to the III Meeting on Pragmatism: Inference, Agency and the Origins of Analytic Philosophy. Granada : Faculty of Philosophy, University of Granada, 2006. p. 105-116.

The aim of this paper is to show that, on the basis of the phenomenalist view in Carnap’s Aufbau, it is possible to... more The aim of this paper is to show that, on the basis of the phenomenalist view in Carnap’s Aufbau, it is possible to observe part of the evolution, from the beginning to the middle of the 20th century, of the philosophical analysis concerning sense and reference in the direction of a more pragmatic view. Some differences between the thought of Carnap in 1928 and the philosophy of Quine, which is close to certain statements of the second phase of Wittgenstein, are established. It is not intended, given the limited number of authors analysed and given the temporal limit of the works discussed, to assert that the evolution noted is the main one. However, on observing this small fragment of the 20th century thought, it is possible to understand better other advances which have occurred in semantics and ontology.

Aspectos Convencionalistas da Filosofia de Willard Quine

by Sofia Stein

Publicado em Principia 7 (1-2) 2003, pp. 185-203

Abstract: One of the main contributions from the philosophers of the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th... more Abstract: One of the main contributions from the philosophers of the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century to the philosophy of science and semantics was the thesis, inspired in the scientific advances of the natural and exact sciences, that there is not a single true theory on what goes on in the empirical world, but rather, the possibility of the construction of multiple versions, equally satisfactory, of an explanation of the world. In the Vienna Circle, more specifically, the conventionalist movement showed its influence primarily in the writings by Neurath, but also, more subtly, in the texts by Carnap. In my paper, I will examine the theoretical relationships between the conventionalist aspects and the holistic thesis in Quine's work, using, for that purpose, the analysis of Neurath's holistic coherentism and of the conventionalist and holistic aspects present in Camap's work, which combine themselves mainly in the Aufbau, with reductionist pretensions. Thus, I intend to help clarify to what extent Quine's holism depends on a conventionalist position and to what extent conventionalism, in turn, can get along with reductionist epistemological remains.

Os Pressupostos da Visão Eliminativista de Quine

by Sofia Stein

Publicado na Manuscrito 2002

Resumo: O presente artigo pretende apresentar os pressupostos que levam Quine a mostrar desconfiança com relação a... more Resumo: O presente artigo pretende apresentar os pressupostos que levam Quine a mostrar desconfiança com relação a entidades mentais, apesar de admitir a utilidade, em seus últimos escritos, do discurso sobre entidades mentais e sua irredutibilidade a um discurso fisicalista. Para tanto, discorrerei sobre a defesa da tese da extensio¬nalidade em Quine e sobre sua crítica à admissão de entidades abstratas sem um critério claro de identidade.

Palavras-chave: Quine; objetos abstratos; fisicalismo; entidades mentais; eliminativismo.

Empathy and Epistemology: A Quinean Perspective

by Antti Keskinen

Submitted to Mind & Language (in April 2012)

According to W.V. Quine, linguistic expressions he calls observation sentences constitute the link between language... more According to W.V. Quine, linguistic expressions he calls observation sentences constitute the link between language and world. Quine argues that the use and the ostensive learning of observation sentences depends on empathy, the ability to understand what another subject is perceiving. In this paper, Quine’s attribution of empathy to prelinguistic children and his view of the role of their empathy in early language acquisition is discussed in the light of recent psychological research. Quine also gives a theoretical analysis of empathizing in terms of perception attributions. Quine’s analysis of empathizing is shown to involve serious problems. An alternative account of empathizing is proposed.

Conservative Meinongianism

by Ted Parent

draft only

This paper defends the Meinongian thesis that “there are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects,”... more This paper defends the Meinongian thesis that “there are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects,” re: fictitious and illusory objects. I first collect 23 different data-points from natural language, and discuss why an anti-Meinongian is hard pressed to explain them. The Meinongian, in contrast, easily and uniformly explains the same data, by allowing the existence Pegasus, pink elephants, and the like. But unlike other Meinongians, who hold that Pegasus and the rest are mind-independent, I hold that such things are mind-dependent, precisely because they are imaginary or hallucinated. (Yet unlike Quine’s McX, I distinguish Pegasus from the idea of Pegasus, even though the Pegasus-idea is mind-dependent as well.) Such a Meinongian view is “conservative” in that it merely acknowledges the sense in which there are mind-dependent objects, imaginary and illusory objects being prime examples. (The “ideology” is conservative as well, in that I paraphrase away the Meinongian’s jargon of “nuclear” or “encoded” properties.) I end by arguing that it is presumptive to use Occham’s razor against Meinongian objects, since this would assume we can achieve empirical adequacy without them. Yet this assumption is now seen as contentious, provided the contrast between the Meinongian and the anti-Meinongian explanations.

Vagueza na Tradução Radical

by Renato Mendes Rocha

Trabalho de Graduação

Trabalho final da disciplina "Tradução Radical" ministrada pela profª. Araceli Veloso no curso de Graduação... more Trabalho final da disciplina "Tradução Radical" ministrada pela profª. Araceli Veloso no curso de Graduação em Filosofia da UFG.

A intenção desse trabalho é falar sobre a Vagueza. A motivação surgiu a partir da leitura do capítulo dois do W&O de Quine, precisamente de um trecho da décima seção desse capítulo.

“A área de penumbra decorrente da vagueza de ‘Vermelho’ consiste em estimulações a respeito das quais os significados estimulativos de ´Vermelho” tendem a variar de falante para falante, de ocasião para ocasião; (...)”

O assunto principal desta seção não é exatamente a vagueza, mas sim as frases de observação. Antes de discorrer sobre a vagueza, devo fazer uma introdução à famosa discussão deste capítulo.

How to Express Ontological Commitment in the Vernacular

by Jamin Asay

Philosophia Mathematica, 18(3): 293-310, October 2010

According to the familiar Quinean understanding of ontological commitment, (1) one undertakes ontological commitments... more According to the familiar Quinean understanding of ontological commitment, (1) one undertakes ontological commitments only via theoretical regimentations, and (2) ontological commitments are to be identified with the domain of a theory’s quantifiers. Jody Azzouni accepts (1), but rejects (2). Azzouni accepts (1) because he believes that no vernacular expression carries ontological commitments. He rejects (2) by locating a theory’s commitments with the extension of an existence predicate. I argue that Azzouni’s two theses undermine each other. If ontological commitments follow from predications of existence, then ontological commitments can be expressed in the vernacular via negative existential sentences.

Price on there are more metaphysicians than homeless people, Tuboly

by Adam Tuboly

A draft of a paper which was presented (in hungarian) at the "Analytic Pragmatism – In Focus: Huw Price’s Work" conference at the University of Pecs, 09.05.2011. All comments are welcome.

La tematica ontologica nel pensiero di W.V.O. Quine. Tra radice pragmatista e rigore neoempirista.

by Paolo Dal Cin

Breve introduzione alla tematica ontologica nel pensiero di W.V.O. Quine, con attenzione alla commistione di elementi della tradizione pragmatista americana con elementi del neopositivismo di matrice europea.

Egy még radikálisabb fordítás felé

by Zsolt Kapelner

Ez a kiindulópontja annak, amit a következő időszakban kutatni szeretnék. Lehet megjegyzéselni!

Quine radikális fordítási gondolatkísérletének egy lehetséges kiterjesztését vizsgálom. Quine számos nyelvfilozófiai... more Quine radikális fordítási gondolatkísérletének egy lehetséges kiterjesztését vizsgálom. Quine számos nyelvfilozófiai érvét igyekezett alátámasztani egy olyan elképzelt szituációra hivatkozva, amiben egy nyelvész, kizárólag megfigyeléseire hagyatkozva kénytelen lefordítani egy teljesen ismeretlen népcsoport nyelvét. E gondolatkísérletet elemezve jutott jutott el a fordítás, a jelentés, a referencia meghatározatlanságának – hétköznapi nyelvhasználatunkra is érvényes – téziseiig. Felvetődik azonban a kérdés, hogy valójában mennyire radikális ez a szituáció? Végtére is az emberi viselkedés általános jellemzői, nyelvi intuícióink, az elme sajátosságai mind alapot szolgáltathatnak a fordításhoz. Mi történik tehát, ha nyelvészünket egy valóban idegen, nem emberi környezetbe helyezzük? Milyen problémákat old meg és vet fel egy ilyen szituáció vizsgálata Quine téziseire nézve? És egyáltalán jogosult-e a kísérlet ilyen módon való kiterjesztése?

Ontologie Quine'a współcześnie: Michał Heller i Stephen Hawking [Quine's ontologies today: Michael Heller and Stephen Hawking]

by Mateusz Hohol

"Rocznice perspektywy analitycznej", Wydaw. Uniwersytetu Pedagogicznego, Kraków 2011 [forthcoming].

Neo-pragmatist Philosophy of Education

by Khosrow Bagheri Noaparast

Sobre pluralidad de modelos (On the plurality of models)

by Nicolas Saavedra Garreton

Publicado en PRAXIS. Revista de Psicología Año 13 Nº 19 (75-96), I Sem. 2011

En este trabajo se aborda la pluralidad de modelos en la construcción de teorías científicas, asumiendo dicha... more En este trabajo se aborda la pluralidad de modelos en la construcción de teorías científicas, asumiendo dicha pluralidad como una condición para la teorización fructífera. El tratamiento de este tópico es llevado a cabo tomando como base las propuestas de Max Black sobre modelos científicos, presentadas en su artículo Models and Archetypes. En esta referencia, Black caracteriza tres clases de modelo: analógico,
matemático y teórico. Algunas de las distinciones introducidas por Black son aplicadas al contraste de nociones pertenecientes a dos teorías de corriente principal en el ámbito
de la lingüística contemporánea: la lingüística generativa y la lingüística cognitiva. A partir de este contraste, se busca relativizar tanto el compromiso –aparentemente constitutivo– de estas teorías con el uso de ciertos tipos de modelo, como la resistencia de éstas al uso de modelos distintos. Esta relativización es introducida en función de las ventajas descriptivas y explicativas que un uso plural de modelos podría acarrear para las teorías en contraste.


This paper tackles the plurality of scientific models in constructing scientific theories, assuming this plurality as a condition for fruitful theorizing. The treatment
of this topic is carried out taking as a base Max Black’s proposals on scientific models, as presented in his article Models and Archetypes. In this reference, Black characterizes
three classes of models: analogical ones, mathematical ones and theoretical ones. Some distinctions introduced by Black are applied to the contrast between notions pertaining
to two mainstream theories in contemporary linguistics: generative linguistics and cognitive linguistics. From this contrast, the aim is to relativize both the – apparently
constitutive – commitment of these theories with the use of certain kinds of models, and the rejection of models of a different kind. This relativization is introduced according to the descriptive and explicative advantages that a plural use of models may
entail for the contrasting theories.

Quine on Objects: Realism or Anti-Realism?

by Antti Keskinen

Pre-publication version of a paper forthcoming in Theoria 2012.

W.V. Quine describes himself as a "robust realist" about physical objects in the external world. This... more W.V. Quine describes himself as a "robust realist" about physical objects in the external world. This realism about objects is due to Quine's naturalism. On the other hand, Quine's naturalistic epistemology involves a conception of objects as posits that we introduce in our theories about the world. This conception of objects can be seen as anti-realist rather than realist. In this paper, I discuss the questions whether there is a tension between Quine's realism and his epistemological conception of objects, and how Quine's conception of objects should be understood if he is also to be regarded as a realist. I also address the question whether Quine should be placed in the realist or the anti-realist side of the current realism debate. I argue that Quine's conception of objects as posits is a general account of the nature objects, and that this account does not conflict with Quine's realism as long as this realism is properly understood. I also argue that Quine cannot be placed on either side of the contemporary realism debate, since his realism is not metaphysical realism and his conception of objects is not an anti-realist doctrine according to which objects would be less than real.

A Priori Infallibilism: Reply to Hoffmann

by Ted Parent

draft only

The present piece is a reply to G. Hoffmann on my (2007) infallibilist view of self-knowledge. Contra Hoffmann, it is... more The present piece is a reply to G. Hoffmann on my (2007) infallibilist view of self-knowledge. Contra Hoffmann, it is argued that the view is compatible with (i) strictly a priori justification, and (ii) the Quinean revisability of any belief, in light of new evidence.

The Mathematicization of Nature

by Jeffrey Ketland

PhD Thesis, LSE 1998

The thesis sets out the indispensability argument against mathematical nominalism. The thesis sets out the indispensability argument against mathematical nominalism.