What Properties Experience Represents

The Bones: Propertius 1. 21. 9-10

by Holt Parker

"The Bones: Propertius 1.21.9-10," Classical Philology 86 (1991) 328-33.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/270091

The Ways Things Look

by Richard Price

This is the whole of my thesis. This is the whole of my thesis.

Chapter 6 - Coarse-Grained Vision and New Kinds of Phenomenal Character

by Richard Price

In this chapter, I consider how objects might phenomenally look to beings with more coarse-grained visual systems than... more In this chapter, I consider how objects might phenomenally look to beings with more coarse-grained visual systems than us. Many hold that to such beings, objects may phenomenally look red, without phenomenally looking a particular shade of red. David Armstrong expresses this intuition as follows: ‘It is perfectly possible… to have a mental image of a piece of crimson cloth of no particular shade of crimson.’ In this chapter I try to make intuitions of the kind that Armstrong has precise, and I try to make some progress towards evaluating them.

Chapter 4 - Primitivism About Phenomenal Position Properties

by Richard Price

In the last two chapters we have considered a number of views about the nature of the position properties that objects... more In the last two chapters we have considered a number of views about the nature of the position properties that objects phenomenally look to have: the observer-relative view, the field-of-view relationalist view, the Leibnizian relationalist view, and the substantivalist view. All of these views seem to face serious objections. In this chapter I shall sketch a positive view about the nature of phenomenal position properties, which I call primitivism.

Chapter 5 - An Argument That Objects Phenomenally Look To Have z Coordinates

by Richard Price

In this chapter I use a thought experiment to argue that objects could phenomenally look to have z coordinates, in... more In this chapter I use a thought experiment to argue that objects could phenomenally look to have z coordinates, in addition to phenomenally looking to have x and y coordinates. I also argue that the thought experiment gives us reason to think that objects do phenomenally look to have z coordinates, in addition to phenomenally looking to have x and y coordinates.

Chapter 3 - Two More Arguments Against The View that Objects Phenomenally Look To The Left and Right Of Me, And Arguments Against Some Other Views About Phenomenal Position Properties

by Richard Price

In this chapter, I offer some further arguments that the position properties that objects phenomenally look to us to... more In this chapter, I offer some further arguments that the position properties that objects phenomenally look to us to have are not observer-relative ones (i.e. are not ones such as being to the left of me, and being in front of me).

Chapter 2 - The Tension Between Exportation And The View That Objects Phenomenally Look To The Left And Right Of Me

by Richard Price

This is an updated version of my paper 'Content Ascriptions and the Reversibility Constraint'. I argue that there is a... more This is an updated version of my paper 'Content Ascriptions and the Reversibility Constraint'. I argue that there is a tension between the fact that singular terms are exportable from within the scope of mental state ascriptions, and the view that objects phenomenally look to the left and right of me.

Chapter 1 - A Sparse View About The Properties That Objects Phenomenally Look To Have

by Richard Price

In this chapter I identify a certain kind of looking, which I call phenomenal looking, and I explore what properties... more In this chapter I identify a certain kind of looking, which I call phenomenal looking, and I explore what properties objects phenomenally look to have. I argue that objects phenomenally look to have only colours and positions, and that the colour properties do not include determinables such as being red.

Thesis Abstract

by Richard Price

Philosophers have often raised the question what kind of information is available to vision. For instance, Berkeley... more Philosophers have often raised the question what kind of information is available to vision. For instance, Berkeley argued that one could not see depth, Hume argued that one could not see necessary connections and, according to Paul Guyer, Kant held that there is no perception of change, but only change of perception (Guyer 2004).

Recently philosophers have asked what kinds of properties visual experience represents. According to sparse views, visual experience represents a sparse range of properties, for instance just colours, shapes, positions and sizes (see McGinn 1982, Burge 2003, Millar 2000). According to rich views, visual experience represents a rich range of properties, for instance properties such as being a tomato, and being sad (see Peacocke 2003, Siegel 2006, Searle 1983, McDowell 1998b).

In this thesis I discuss some questions arising from the above debate. Instead of using the terminology of what properties visual experience represents, I define a kind of looking, phenomenal looking, which is individuated in terms of differences in visual phenomenal character, and I raise the question what kinds of properties objects phenomenally look to have.

Content Ascriptions and the Reversibility Constraint

by Richard Price

Published in Philosophical Perspectives, volume 19 (1), Blackwell, 2005, 353-374

We often make content ascriptions to subjects that are assertable despite being literally false, in the sense that the... more We often make content ascriptions to subjects that are assertable despite being literally false, in the sense that the subject does not literally have the content that we are ascribing to them. The ascriptions are close enough to the truth, and in the conversational context it is convenient to be a little loose in one’s content ascriptions. In this paper, I shall give some examples of one kind of non-literal content ascription, and then propose a constraint, which I call the reversibility constraint, which distinguishes instances of this kind of non-literal content ascription from literal content ascriptions. I will then apply this constraint to looks-statements, and argue that the reversibility constraint can help us decide which looks-statements report the contents of visual experiences, and which do not. I will argue for the conclusion that ‘that apple looks to the left of me’ does not report the content of my visual experience when I do not see myself.

Introduction: Historical and Contemporary Views On The Visible/Non-Visible Distinction, and What the Visible/Non-Visible Distinction Is Not

by Richard Price

This is the introduction of my thesis. I discuss the ways in which past and contemporary philosophers have approached... more This is the introduction of my thesis. I discuss the ways in which past and contemporary philosophers have approached the question of the visible/non-visible distinction. I also discuss some distinctions which are similar to, but distinct from, the visible/non-visible distinction.

Aspect-Switching and Visual Phenomenal Character

by Richard Price

Published in Philosophical Quarterly July 2009

John Searle and Susanna Siegel have argued that cases of aspect-switching show that visual experience represents a... more John Searle and Susanna Siegel have argued that cases of aspect-switching show that visual experience represents a richer range of properties than colours, shapes, positions and sizes. I argue that cases of aspect-switching can be explained without holding that visual experience represents rich properties. I also provide an argument that, even if Searle and Siegel are right, and aspect-switching does require visual experience to represent rich properties, there is reason to think those properties do not include natural kind properties, such as being a tomato.