Virtue Ethics

Virtue in argument

by Andrew Aberdein

Published in Argumentation, 24(2), 2010, pp. 165-179.

Virtue theories have become influential in ethics and epistemology. This paper argues for a similar approach to... more Virtue theories have become influential in ethics and epistemology. This paper argues for a similar approach to argumentation. Several potential obstacles to virtue theories in general, and to this new application in particular, are considered and rejected. A first attempt is made at a survey of argumentational virtues, and finally it is argued that the dialectical nature of argumentation makes it particularly suited for virtue theoretic analysis.

Keywords: Ad hominem - Logical universality - Virtue epistemology - Virtue ethics

Profectus virtutum. The Roots of Devout Moral Praxis

by Krijn Pansters

In: H. Blommestijn e.a. (ed.), Seeing the Seeker. Explorations in the Discipline of Spirituality. A Festschrift for Kees Waaijman on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday. Studies in Spirituality. Supplement 19 (Louvain: Peeters, 2008), 231-249

Profectus virtutum. From Psalm 83,8 to David of Augsburg’s Profectus religiosorum

by Krijn Pansters

In: Studies in Spirituality 18 (2008), 185-194

Stoic "Harm" as Degradation: A Response to James Taylor

by William Ferraiolo

"Depositum gladius non debet restitui furioso: Precepts, synderesis and virtues in Saint Thomas Aquinas"

by Ana Marta González

The Thomist, vol. 63, nº. 2, pp. 217-240, 1999. ISSN 0040-6325

"Las fuentes de la moralidad a la luz de la ética aristotélica de la virtud"

by Ana Marta González

apientia, vol. LVI, pp. 357-377, 2001. ISSN 0036-4703

"Depositum gladius non debet restitui furioso: Precepts, synderesis and virtues in Saint Thomas Aquinas"

by Ana Marta González

The Thomist, vol. 63, nº. 2, pp. 217-240, 1999. ISSN 0040-6325

"Las fuentes de la moralidad a la luz de la ética aristotélica de la virtud"

by Ana Marta González

apientia, vol. LVI, pp. 357-377, 2001. ISSN 0036-4703

The practice of making and sustaining family life: a school of the virtues

by Kim Redgrave

Draft only, do not cite or circulate

In this paper I will develop the idea that the making and sustaining of family is an example of what Alasdair... more In this paper I will develop the idea that the making and sustaining of family is an example of what Alasdair MacIntyre calls a practice, which is any well-ordered and rational form of socially established cooperative human activity. MacIntyre includes the making and sustaining of family life in his list of practices in After Virtue but does not develop the point further. In his later work, Dependent Rational Animals MacIntyre argues that the end of family life is to initiate children into adult activities through various institutions outside of the family. Thus the family does not have its own specific internal good; rather the good of family life is realised through the pursuit of goods internal to the practices of the milieu of associations and institutions in which families participate. This paper will draw on MacIntyre’s theory whilst offering a critical response to his understanding of the internal goods of family life, suggesting that his argument ignores another important aspect of family life: the care of dependent adults.  Recognition of this is crucial to any theory of the family because it has a huge impact not only on family members but also on the wider society in which a family is located. This paper will therefore develop MacIntyre’s Aristotelian approach to identify the internal goods of family life and will examine whether the Western model of the institution of the family sustains or corrupts this end.

The Ethics of Care, Virtue Ethics and the Flourishing Family

by Kim Redgrave

Draft only, do not cite or circulate

Carol Gilligan’s psychological moral theory popularised the idea of a feminist ethics of care during the 1980s, around... more Carol Gilligan’s psychological moral theory popularised the idea of a feminist ethics of care during the 1980s, around the same time that a renewed interest in Aristotelian virtue ethics was sparked by Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue. Both care ethics and virtue ethics have been fiercely critical of contemporary liberal thinking, such as rights-based theory and the abstract universalism of Kantianism, and, in particular, the focus on the individual at the expense of relationships and community. Moreover, little attention has been paid to the family by mainstream liberal theory, with the exception of David Archard’s The Family: A Liberal Defence and to some extent John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. The key theoretical concern of this paper is how we can conceptualise a flourishing family life. This paper will argue that it is only by drawing on virtue ethics rather than contemporary liberal theory, as many care ethicists currently do, that we can properly give an account of flourishing family life. I will firstly discuss the importance of care ethics for discussion of the family. In doing so I will explore some of the tensions within care ethics on what is meant by care or care-giving and what the relevant values of care ethics are to thinking about the family. The paper will then go on to discuss how some virtue ethics can improve on the insights of care ethics to provide a philosophical account of the flourishing family.

Reassessing Feminist Care Ethics from the standpoint of Contemporary Aristotelian Virtue Ethics

by Kim Redgrave

draft only

Over the past couple of decades feminist care ethics has put forward a substantial critique of the liberal paradigm of... more Over the past couple of decades feminist care ethics has put forward a substantial critique of the liberal paradigm of the self-interested economic man. Care ethicists such as Eva Feder Kittay (2002) and Virginia Held (1995) have proposed that this paradigm be replaced with that of the relationship between mother and child which is essentially other-directed. In this paper I will identify the problems with the mother-child moral paradigm and suggest instead we look to Aristotle’s conception of philia or friendship for an alternative paradigm, of which the mother-child relationship is a particular example. If we look at the mother-child relationship in terms of character friendship, the best kind of philia, we lose the connotation that maternal care is based on irrational feelings of love. Care ethicists have drawn attention to the facts of dependency and the need for care in social relations, not just in the private sphere. However, they continue to debate how care fits with justice and which should take priority (Bubeck, 2002). Another related concern within this field is how we define care. Is it a labour, a feeling, a virtue or all of the above? I will argue that care should not be narrowly defined as labour, as it is by Bubeck, but more broadly conceived as a disposition or virtue which one employs when a particular other is in need. Finally I will argue, along with MacIntyre, that in order to respond to dependency we need a combination of the virtues of justice, generosity and the disposition of affectionate regard which we can only cultivate through practices and intimate social relations. According to MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism, it is through the pursuit of the good life, not an abstract sense of justice or care, that we train our desires and impulses to act for the good of others.

Virtue Ethics and International Relations

by Kirsten Ainley

Work in progress, presented at Thinking Without Borders conference, St Andrews, July 2010

One of the most significant developments in contemporary International Relations (IR) has been the revival of interest... more One of the most significant developments in contemporary International Relations (IR) has been the revival of interest in arguments concerning ethics, but the most interesting critiques of contemporay liberalism from the point of view of international ethics – critiques of the notion of moral obligation itself, put forward by virtue ethicists – have in large part been missed.To understand why the critiques of virtue ethicists matter for international relations and for International Relations, this article first sets out the problem they are responding to. Virtue ethicists argue that the notion of moral obligation employed in contemporary liberalism and, therefore, Western life is foundationless, and that trying to live by rules without foundations can lead to harm. This position is briefly explored through a discussion of the increasing reliance on rules in the form of law in IR, and some recent criticism of the effect of rule-based international action. The article moves on to discuss what virtue ethicists offer in the place of obligation: a focus on character, practical reason and human flourishing, all situated in social contexts. There follows an outline of the few attempts that have been made to relate virtue ethics (VE) to IR, and a discussion of possibilities for future research into this innovative approach. The argument throughout is that a concern with virtue offers us an original way to think about the kind of ethical dilemmas that we face in international relations and IR, by moving away from an unrealistic and ultimately doomed search for universal rules and moral stability and towards the much more challenging, dynamic and rewarding endeavour of developing the practical judgment to answer questions about what it means, as individuals and as groups, located in time and place and politics, to live life well.

Retrieving the Virtues in Psychotherapy

by Kevin Reimer

The Rationality of Ultimate Concern: Moral Exemplars, Theological Ethics, and the Science of Moral Cognition

by Kevin Reimer

Anti-Theory

by Roberto Andorno

In: R. Chadwick, H. ten Have and E. Meslin (eds.), Sage Handbook of Health Care Ethics, London, Sage Publications, 2011, p. 31-38.

Anti-theory is a broad name for a contemporary movement that is critical of theory as the proper approach to ethics,... more Anti-theory is a broad name for a contemporary movement that is critical of theory as the proper approach to ethics, or at least of certain aspects or forms of ethical theorising. It is however not a unified camp, as it includes, among others, advocates of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, casuistry, and pragmatism. Among the claims that have been made by anti-theorists are the following: that our moral lives cannot be reduced to a legalistic application of a set of norms; that the emphasis on theoretical principles to solve concrete practical moral problems is misguided; that some forms of ethical theorising have a corrupting effect on how to live our moral lives; that ethical theories are inevitably embodied in a particular historical and sociocultural context and therefore it is an illusion to think that there is some neutral standpoint for practical rationality; that some accounts of morality ignore the plurality of goods and the possibility of conflict between them; and that there are no “moral experts”. These criticisms to ethical theorising will be briefly discussed, and then some responses to them will be summarized.

Moral Courage and Facing Others

by Matthew Pianalto

in International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21(2) (2012) (OPEN ACCESS)

Selected as the winning entry for the Robert Papazian Annual Essay Prize on Themes from Ethics and Political Philosophy Selected as the winning entry for the Robert Papazian Annual Essay Prize on Themes from Ethics and Political Philosophy

The Capacity for Duty: Kant's Teleological Theory of Virtue

by Matthew Simmermon-Gomes

Unpublished, submitted to Dr Mahmood Masaeli, Faculty of Philosophy, Saint Paul University

Do our moral judgements need to be guided by principles?

by Roberto Andorno

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics (in press)

This paper argues that, although principles play a key role in our moral judgments, these latter cannot be reduced to... more This paper argues that, although principles play a key role in our moral judgments, these latter cannot be reduced to the result of purely deductive reasoning, since they previously require another kind of rationality: instead of being purely deductive, our moral decisions appear to be the result of a combined inductive-deductive process. This claim is developed in two parts. The first part briefly presents some of the criticisms levelled in recent decades against purely deductive moral theories. The second part argues, appealing to Aristotle’s account of the knowledge’s process, that an inductive-deductive model provides a more realistic account of how sound moral judgments are actually made.

Virtudes cardeais no afresco de Rafael – Arte, Ética e Jusfilosofia

by Paulo Ferreira da Cunha

in "Vdetur", n.º 15, 2002, pp. 5-24

Este artigo procura arqueologias filosóficas para uma simbolização da Justiça. Tudo indica que Rafael não conhecia (ou... more Este artigo procura arqueologias filosóficas para uma simbolização da Justiça. Tudo indica que Rafael não conhecia (ou não aderiu) à perspectiva de autonomização do jurídico, cara a Aristóteles, nem ao desejo de laicização do Direito, protagonizado por Tomás de Aquino. Entre este último e o seu tempo interpusera-se, evidentemente, muita água nominalista e muita escolástica tardia sob as pontes da História. Porém, se a Prudência não é a virtude das virtudes em Rafael, tal se deve certamente ao facto de não estar a fazer teologia moral, mas representação da Justiça. E, mesmo assim, a Prudência surge no centro das virtudes e num plano superior. Aliás, o próprio Tomás de Aquino, na linha de Aristóteles, embora moderando o Filósofo, dá a maior relevância à Justiça, como suprema das virtudes morais, dependendo porém, na ordem do ser e da verdade, da Prudência.

Eyes Wide Open - helping students to see for themselves that ethics matters

by Suzy jagger

Awaiting publication - contact author for details s.jagger@roehampton.ac.uk

The immediacy and anonymity of information access has added a new dimension to the idea of ‘being ethical’. How can... more The immediacy and anonymity of information access has added a new dimension to the idea of ‘being ethical’. How can ethics educators deal with the challenge of new technology? This study examines the concepts of moral sensitivity and empathy and sees the development of these concepts as key to moral education. Conclusions are that class debates improved levels of moral sensitivity, which, in some cases, were instrumental in bringing about attitudinal and behavioural change. Such an approach to ethics education should tend to foster integrity, which addresses many of the special challenges of being ethical in the information age.