Words Without Objects (BOOK)
Clarendon Press, Oxford (this is not the complete book, unfortunately)
CLICK ON THE 'DOWNLOAD' - NOT THE 'QUICK VIEW' [ERROR!]
The book seeks to resolve the so-called ‘problem of mass nouns’ — a problem which cannot be resolved on the basis of a... more The book seeks to resolve the so-called ‘problem of mass nouns’ — a problem which cannot be resolved on the basis of a conventional system of logic. It is not, for instance, possible to explicate assertions of the existence of air, oil, or water through the use of quantifiers and variables which take objectual values. The difficulty is attributable to the semantically distinctive status of non-count nouns — nouns which, although not plural, are nonetheless akin to plural nouns in being semantically non-singular. Such are the semantics of a non-singular noun, that there can be no such single thing or object as the thing of which the noun is true. However, standard approaches to understanding non-singular nouns tend to be reductive, construing them as singular expressions — expressions which, in the case of non-count nouns, are true of ‘parcels’ or ‘quantities’ of stuff, and in the case of plural nouns, are true of ‘plural entities’ or ‘sets’. It is argued that both approaches are equally misguided, that there are no distinctive objects in the extensions of non-singular nouns. With plural nouns, their extensions are identical with those of the corresponding singular expressions. With non-count nouns, because they are not plural, there can be no corresponding singular expressions. In consequence, there are no objects in the extensions of non-count nouns at all. In short, there are no such things as instances of stuff: the world of space and time contains not merely large numbers of discrete concrete things or individuals of diverse kinds, but also large amounts of sheer undifferentiated concrete stuff. Metaphysically, non-singular reference in general is an arbitrary modality of reference, ungrounded in the realities to which it is non-ideally or intransparently correlated.
Object
I have converted my own copy of this 2010 piece, which appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, from WP into PDF for this document.
A LIVE-LINKS COMPLETE BIBLIOGRAPHY FOLLOWS
http://philpapers.org/sep/object/
ABSTRACT. The Frege / Russell account of the object-concept is here called into question. The most general category or... more ABSTRACT. The Frege / Russell account of the object-concept is here called into question. The most general category or concept of an object is a formal one -- a logico-semantic category which is not (as is commonly supposed) exhaustive of what may be thought or said to be. Bona fide objects, whether abstract or concrete, must be countable - 'no entity without identity' (and hence without distinctness). But stuff or matter is not countable and cannot be understood in terms of objects. The issue is significant, if only because the predicate calculus rests upon the object-concept: non-count nouns have no place within the notation
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Seen by: and 9 moreOnce again: Gregory of Nyssa on Universals
Journal of Theological Studies 56 (2005), 75-98
This essay takes up the contentious issue of Gregory of Nyssa’s use of a theory of the universal. It is argued that... more
This essay takes up the contentious issue of Gregory of Nyssa’s use of a theory of the universal. It is argued that Gregory, in his trinitarian theology and elsewhere in his thought, employs with remarkable coherence a kind of theory for which the universal is essentially the whole of its individuals (collection theory). For Gregory this is a realistic theory in which the concept of the whole is either entirely detached from that of the individuals (as ousia or hupostasis in his trinitarian theory) or related to them as actual to potential nature (for example in his cosmology). It is characteristic for him that he makes the whole collection the object of reference for the substance- sortal. This theory helps him avoid (to some extent) doctrinal ramifications within trinitarian theology as it explains the Trinity as a perfect unity-in-
trinity which is both irreducibly one and irreducibly three.
The Problem of Universals in Late Ancient Philosophy and Theology
This article discusses theological interest in a theory of the universal in late antiquity. It demonstrates that and... more
This article discusses theological interest in a theory of the universal in late antiquity. It demonstrates that and how the problem of universals was adapted to the needs of Christian theology in the fourth century by Apollinaris of Laodicea and Gregory of Nyssa.
A fuller version of this, including an account of the reception of those early Patristic theories in later Byzantine and early medieval thought has been published in German in Millennium 2 (2005), 137-174.
Universals in the Greek Church Fathers
Draft of a chapter to appear in a collection of essays.
In this text I seek to give an overview of the development of theories of the universal from roughly the 4th to the... more In this text I seek to give an overview of the development of theories of the universal from roughly the 4th to the 8th centuries. I show how trinitarian theology around the middle of the 4th century necessitated for the first time systematic theological reflection about the nature of the universal. Its historically most influential result, which I then sketch, is Gregory of Nyssa's complex theory which he applies to a variety of other theological questions as well. One of those is Christology, but it turns out that this particular application becomes the crux of Gregory's theory. The latter part of my paper is dedicated to the proof that and how theological developments after the Council of Chalcedon (451) caused fundamental modifications to that theory, which in their turn had a wide-ranging impact on broader metaphysical issues.
Higher-order one-many problems in Plato’s Philebus and recent Australian metaphysics
by Cathy Legg
This paper is now published online by the Australasian Journal of Philosophy
We discuss the one-many problem as it appears in the Philebus and find that it is not restricted to the usually... more We discuss the one-many problem as it appears in the Philebus and find that it is not restricted to the usually understood problem about the identity of universals across particulars that instantiate them (the Hylomorphic Dispersal Problem). In fact some of the most interesting aspects of the problem occur purely with respect to the relationship between Forms. We argue that contemporary metaphysicians may draw from the Philebus at least three different one-many relationships between universals themselves: instantiation, subkind and part, and thereby construct three new “problems of the one and the many” (an Eidetic Dispersal Problem, a Genus-Species Problem, and an Eidetic Combination Problem), which are as problematic as the version generally discussed. We then argue that this taxonomy sheds new and interesting light on certain discussions of higher-order universals in recent Australian analytic philosophy.
Example, Experiment and Experience in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit
Dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, January 2000, Thesis Director: John Russon
Determining the character of the relationship between universals and particulars, or between general claims and... more
Determining the character of the relationship between universals and particulars, or between general claims and determinate examples thereof is a central concern for epistemology. Hegel examines the theme of examples in relation to knowledge in the first chapter of his Phenomenology of Spirit. He argues that “sense-certainty” – the epistemological stance that takes immediacy to be the criterion for knowledge – fails to recognize the role played by examples in knowledge and experience. Although the theme of example is not explicitly dealt with elsewhere in the text, the question of the relation between universal and particular in knowledge is a crucial one for the Phenomenology of Spirit as a whole. The present study aims to develop the conception of example that is implied within Hegel’s text as a whole.
In addition to attempting a resolution of a number of the criticisms raised against Hegel’s account of “sense-certainty,” the first chapter develops the implications of Hegel’s claim that sense-certainty fails to appreciate the fact that it relies upon a determinate conception of the nature of examples, which undercuts its claims to immediate knowledge. The second chapter focuses upon experimental knowledge, and shows that the turn to experiment in epistemology can be interpreted as an attempt to rethink the nature of examples as they relate to knowledge. Hegel’s basic criticism of the “experimental conception of knowledge” is contrasted with a number of the criticisms that have been raised by recent investigations of experimental practices. Chapters three and four examine Hegel’s conception of self-knowledge, and show that a number of the problems raised within the previous forms of knowing are resolved within the sphere of self-consciousness and “Spirit.” In particular, the final chapter shows that the kind of self-knowing that takes place in the phenomenon of “conscientious forgiveness” has a universality that is attentive to the particularity of the situation wherein it arises. It is argued that to this form of knowledge there corresponds a conception of example – that of “exemplary selfhood” – that can successfully resolve the problem of the relation between universal and particular in knowledge with which the study begins.
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Le vocalisme de Roscelin de Compiègne
Ithaque, Université de Montréal, vol. 7, automne 2010, p. 1-20.
Tily, H. and Jaeger, T.F. 2011. Complementing quantitative typology with behavioral approaches: Evidence for typological universals. Linguistic Typology 15(2), 497-508.
Submitted for proofs. Feel free to cite, but pls quote only from final copy.
Dunn et al. (2011) employ computational phylogenetic methods to test whether certain pairs of languages features are... more Dunn et al. (2011) employ computational phylogenetic methods to test whether certain pairs of languages features are universally related in that they co-develop over time (Greenbergian implicational universals). They nd little evidence for universal word-order correlations, contrary to both generative and functional accounts of language. Other commentaries in this issue point to potential problems with the approach employed by Dunn and colleagues (e.g. Croft et al, this issue). Some of these are inherent to quantitative typology: in particular, sparsity of available data and uncertainty about language history. There are, however alternative methods for creating new data to test universal biases for certain word orders. Here we discuss two methods that we take to be of particular promise: Articial Language Learning, which has been used to study language acquisition, and Iterative Articial Language Learning, which extends the former method to the study of language change over generations. We discuss recent work within these two paradigms that suggests language learners exhibit universal biases that might cause universals like those discussed by Dunn et al. to emerge over time.
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Seen by: and 11 moreSome Convergences and Divergences in the Realism of Charles Peirce and Ayn Rand
Published in The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Fall 2006), pp. 19-39.
Structured around Charles S. Peirce's three-fold categorical scheme, this article proposes a comparative study of Ayn... more Structured around Charles S. Peirce's three-fold categorical scheme, this article proposes a comparative study of Ayn Rand and Peirce's realist views in general metaphysics. Rand's stance is seen as diverging with Peirce's argument from asymptotic representation but converging with arguments from brute relation and neutral category. It is argued that, by dismissing traditional subject-object dualisms, Rand and Peirce both propose iconoclastic construals of what it means to be real, dismissals made all the more noteworthy by the fact each chose to ground them in indissoluble triads of self-evident first principles.
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Seen by:"Goethe's Analysis of Exodus 34 and Its Influence on Julius Wellhausen: The Pfropfung of the Documentary Hypothesis."
Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 114 (2002) 212-223.
This article investigates the intellectual history of the argument for the antiquity of Ex 34,11–26. In the... more
This article investigates the intellectual history of the argument for the antiquity of Ex 34,11–26. In the contemporary debate about pentateuchal theory, a question that remains insufficiently addressed is how and why the idea originally developed that the unit represents an ancient, independent, pre-Deuteronomic legal source. Wellhausen credited the idea to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s »Zwo bisher unerörterte biblische Fragen …« (1773). Like Goethe, Wellhausen regarded the unit as a »ritual Decalogue,« in contrast to the »ethical Decalogue« of Exodus 20. The distinction helped Wellhausen consolidate the classical model of the documentary hypothesis: he attributed the cultic Decalogue to the Yahwist and the ethical one to the Elohist. Despite the importance of Goethe’s essay to the history of pentateuchal criticism, it is not clear that its arguments have previously been investigated. The article addresses equally Goethe's construction of the Jew as "other" and as particularistic, in contrast to the German Protestant as "self" and universal. The article demonstrates that Goethe could not have read read Spinoza's Tractatus, despite the common belief otherwise.
Keywords:
Julius Wellhausen, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Baruch Spinoza, Zwo bisher unerörterte biblische Fragen, Dekalog, Decalolgue, cultic Decalog, ethical Decalog, German Jewish history, Christian Jewish relations, Ten Commandments, history of biblical scholarship, Exod 34:11-26; German Romanticism
Mereology, Magic or Mixture? Higher-order one-many problems in Plato’s Philebus and recent Australian metaphysics
by Cathy Legg
co-authored with Stephanie Gibbons, Philosophy, University of Waikato.
AN IMPROVED VERSION IS NOW PUBLISHED - see above
We discuss the one-many problem as it appears in the Philebus and find that it is not restricted to the usually... more We discuss the one-many problem as it appears in the Philebus and find that it is not restricted to the usually understood problem about the identity of universals across particulars that instantiate them (the “Dispersal Problem”). In fact some of the most interesting aspects of the problem occur purely with respect to the relationship between Forms. In this domain we distinguish three one-many problems: the Eidetic Dispersal Problem, the Genus-Species Problem, and the Eidetic Combination Problem, which turn on the relations of instantiation, subkind-kind and part-whole respectively. We examine certain discussions of higher-order universals in recent Australian analytic philosophy in the light of this new analysis.
Predication and the Problem of Universals
by Cathy Legg
published in Philosophical Papers, 30(2), 2001, pp. 117-143.
This paper contrasts the scholastic realists of David Armstrong and Charles Peirce. It is argued that the so-called... more This paper contrasts the scholastic realists of David Armstrong and Charles Peirce. It is argued that the so-called 'problem of universals' is not a problem in pure ontology (concerning whether universals exist) as Armstrong construes it to be. Rather, it extends to issues concerning which predicates should be applied where, issues which Armstrong sets aside under the label of 'semantics', and which from a Peircean perspective encompass even the fundamentals of scientific methodology. It is argued that Peirce's scholastic realism not only presents a more nuanced ontology (distinguishing the existent front the real) but also provides more of a sense of why realism should be a position worth fighting for.
Tropes - the Basic constituents of Powerful Particulars?
published in Dialectica 65, 3, pp. 419-450, 2011.
This article presents a trope bundle theory of simple substances, the Strong Nuclear Theory [SNT] building on the... more This article presents a trope bundle theory of simple substances, the Strong Nuclear Theory [SNT] building on the schematic basis offered by Simons’s (1994) Nuclear Theory [NT]. The SNT adopts Ellis’s (2001) dispositional essentialist conception of simple substances as powerful particulars: all of their monadic properties are dispositional. Moreover, simple substances necessarily belong to some natural kind with a real essence formed by monadic properties. The SNT develops further the construction of substances the NT proposes to obtain an adequate trope bundle theory of powerful particulars. The SNT allows for the mutually co-located powerful particulars. However, every powerful particular is necessarily co-located with its constituent tropes, which determine its causal powers. Every constituent trope of substance i is part of a trope aggregate (the n-bundle or c-bundle) that forms an individual figuring in the basic spatio-temporal relations. The location of these individuals determines the location of individual tropes. Since they are necessarily co-located with substance i when they exist, every trope t of i is necessarily co-located with i when it exits. Every simple substance has nuclear tropes necessary to it. It belongs to certain primary natural kind K because its nuclear tropes belong to certain determinate kinds.

