Turkish Nationalism

Traditionalists vs. Reformists: The Struggle for Leadership within the Turkish Community of Cyprus between the World Wars

by Erdem Erginel

Delivered at and published in the Proceedings of the Third International Congress for Cyprus Studies (2000).

Cyprus, during the period between the two world wars witnessed a political struggle between two groups within the... more Cyprus, during the period between the two world wars witnessed a political struggle between two groups within the Turkish Cypriot community:  the traditionalists and the reformists.  When the British took over the administration of the island in 1878, the existing Ottoman establishment aligned itself with the new rulers, in order to consolidate the power structure that served its interests.  The position of the traditional Ottoman establishment in Cyprus came to be challenged with the emergence of a group of intellectuals who were inspired by Kemalism and the principles and policies of the Republic of Turkey.  Calling themselves ‘halkçılar’, this reformist group criticized the traditionalists, particularly for guarding the interests of the British and themselves, rather than that of the Turkish Cypriot community.  The British and the traditionalists tried to contain this political development, but the popular support for the halkçılar continued to grow.  At one point the British realized that they could no longer continue their policy of supporting the traditionalists and so they undertook steps to acknowledge and win the sympathies of the reformists.  Academic research has generally focused on the Greek Cypriot community and its relations with the British or the Turkish Cypriots.  This paper will attempt to discuss the split within the Turkish Cypriot community between the world wars and the British reaction to it, and bring to light and analyze this hitherto unexamined area of Cyprus studies.

Gender Ideology and Turkish Nationalisms

by Karl Griggs

A general overview of the development of modern Turkish nationalism from Ottomanism and its fundamental intersection with gender identities. In this paper, I challenge the seemingly ubiquitous assumptions about the links between 'secularity' and women's rights, and the inverse association of 'Islamism' with oppression.

Gender Ideology and Turkish Nationalisms

by Karl Griggs

A general overview of the development of modern Turkish nationalism from Ottomanism and its fundamental intersection with gender identities. In this paper, I challenge the seemingly ubiquitous assumptions about the links between 'secularity' and women's rights, and the inverse association of 'Islamism' with oppression.

Representations of the ‘Kurds’ by the Turkish Judiciary

by Derya Bayir

Although the tensions around Kurdish ethnic identity and the extent of human rights violations against Kurds... more Although the tensions around Kurdish ethnic identity and the extent of human rights violations against Kurds throughout the history of the Turkish Republic are well-documented, little research exists about the role played by the Turkish judiciary in relation to the legal position, demands, and identity of the Kurds in Turkey. An analysis of the role of the judiciary is demanded especially given its position as one of the guardians of the foundational values of the Turkish state. This article analyzes how Turkey’s judiciary has navigated the demands of Kurdish people, how it has represented Kurds, and to what extent it has accommodated their alterity in its jurisprudence. Among its findings are that Turkish judges have participated in reproducing Turkish nationalism within their legal discourse, which continues to re-emerge in the case law at various points in time. Since the 1970s, the judiciary has represented Kurds as having no distinct existence and as being Turkish. Somewhat contradictorily, it has also acknowledged the Kurds while consistently rejecting Kurdism. Reproducing a legal orientalist discourse, the judiciary has constructed the Kurds as the ‘other’ to justify civilizing them by legal means. The lack of self-criticism of the dominant strain in the jurisprudence, based on the narrative of the Turkishness of the Kurds, indicates that the judiciary in Turkey has failed to produce a culturally pluralist jurisprudence which accommodates the demands of the Kurds. It has also produced an ethno-culturist jurisprudence with reference to the Turkish ethnie, and perpetuated the discourse of Turkish ethnic nationalism.

Homo Balkanicus, Çılgın Türkler ve Diğerleri

by sezgi durgun

The Legal Adaptation of British Settlers in Turkey

by Derya Bayir

This article is based on a fieldwork project conducted by the authors in the Muğla region of western Turkey. The... more This article is based on a fieldwork project conducted by the authors in the Muğla region of western Turkey. The region is the locale for a significant level of settlement by British people, within the wider context of settlement by groups of other EU nationals in western Turkey. Based on a series of interviews with British settlers and Turkish locals, it examines the factors which affect the process of legal adaptation of the former group. It identifies and discusses the place of British settlers within the larger Turkish legal order, their integration into Turkish life, and the extent to which different socio-legal disabilities and advantages affect this process. The article also casts some light on the extent to which, given the level of British immigration into the area, Turkish officialdom is prepared for their presence.

Rus Arşiv Belgelerinde Bitlis İsyanı 1914

by Tibet Abak

Turkish soccer crisis dents Erdogan’s political prospects

by James M. Dorsey

By James M. Dorsey

Turkey's soccer federation has rejected a proposed rule change that would have... more By James M. Dorsey

Turkey's soccer federation has rejected a proposed rule change that would have prevented teams found guilty of match-fixing from being relegated in a move that counters Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s catering to soccer bosses and their corporate backers and plunges the country’s troubled multi-billion dollar league into an even deeper crisis.

The vote during a tense emergency session of the federation’s general assembly also threatens Turkish soccer’s efforts to become more competitive.

It came two weeks before the opening of a trial against 93 people, including Aziz Yildirim, president of Istanbul’s Fenerbahce SK and 14 players, in a match-fixing scandal involving eight teams that affected 19 league games last season.

Despite being threatened with relegation and loss of its league title, Fenerbahce was among those opposed to a more lenient treatment of offenders. Fenerbahce has already been barred by European soccer body UEFA from Europe’s Champions League because of the match-fixing scandal.

Under the proposed change of article 58 of the Turkish Football Federation’s (TFF) disciplinary code, clubs found guilt would have been spared relegation but penalized with a minimum 12-point deduction.

The rejection puts the TFF at odds with UEFA which urged the association on the eve of the vote to take quick disciplinary action against those allegedly involved in the scandal. UEFA threatened to exclude Turkish clubs involved in the scandal such as Fenerbahce, Besiktas and Trabzonspor from future European competitions.

Fenerbahce alongside Istanbul rival Galatasaray, which has not been implicated in the scandal, justified its opposition to the rule change with the need to wait for legal proceedings to first take their course. In a written statement from his jail cell, Mr. Yildirim called the proposal "a black stain on the history of Turkish football." Echoing Mr. Yildirim, Galatasaray chairman Unal Aysal warned that “you can't change the rules when the game is being played."

The political fallout of the scandal has highlighted the battle lines in Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) between Mr. Erdogan and his party comrade, President Abdullah Gul in advance of elections in 2014. Mr. Erdogan last month drove against Mr. Gul’s will a controversial bill through parliament that reduced penalties for match-fixing from a maximum 12 to three years and prepared the ground for the rejected TFF rule change.

The legislative move further fuelled controversy over the match-fixing scandal. Mr. Gul opposed it, arguing that it would render the law as an insufficient deterrent. Mr. Gul said parliament’s penalty reduction would be viewed as benefitting those currently under suspicion.

Mr. Erdogan is widely believed to want to succeed Mr. Gul as president when his third term as prime minister ends in 2014. For his part, Mr. Gul is believed to be weighing his options, which include returning to active politics or accepting an international job, once he steps down from his largely ceremonial post. Critics charge that Mr. Erdogan is pushing for constitutional reform in the next two years as a way to shift power from the prime minister to the president in advance of his becoming Turkey’s next head of state.

Mr. Erdogan’s chances of success ride to a significant degree on Turkey’s continued economic performance. Economists however predict that economic growth in 2012 will drop from a stellar seven per cent to about three per cent as a result of its reliance for growth on foreign capital and government-backed stimulus programs, an unorthodox monetary policy and a widening current account deficit.

In emotional remarks TFF chairman Mehmet Ali Aydinlar responded to the rejection of the rule change, saying that at stake was the image of Turkish soccer. "We have made all efforts so that Turkish football is not harmed or loses prestige abroad. But people spoke differently to us than they did behind their backs. Everyone is innocent and only we are guilty. We came with honour and that's how we'll go. History will write the truth," Mr. Aydinlar said.

If Mr. Erdogan’s political future is hitched to the economy, it is also linked to the country’s soccer performance given that the beautiful game is a reflection of the economy.

Economists worry that Turkey’s imminent economic problems could result in a hard landing for its economy unless it moves quickly to streamline its monetary policy and starts focusing on reducing its macro-economic imbalances and particularly the current account deficit. Turkey got a taste of the risks it faces when this fall external funding tightened because of the global crisis and the country’s currency devalued more than had been predicted.

Turkish soccer faces the same risks because it operates on the same principles, according to a sports research note issued last month by Renaissance Capital. 

“Turkey’s declining success in football can be mapped to economics,” the note said according to the Financial Times.

Like the economy, Turkish soccer “imports almost all their best players from abroad, and exports (only) one or two good players every year” incurring high levels of debt to attract stars, the note said. It said clubs like Fenerbahce, Besiktas and Galatasaray operated as commercial companies that eschew competitiveness for profit.

Renaissance Capital cautioned that buying expensive but old has-beens such as former Real Madrid stars Roberto Carlos and Gut boosts merchandising, but does not add real quality to the team. The focus on sales rather than soccer performance produces the ills many Turkish companies face:  complacency and reduced competitiveness.

The proof is in the pudding. Turkey’s top clubs have dominated the country’s soccer for decades but failed recently twice in a row to win the Turkish league or qualify for the Champions League.

The poor performance mirrors a trend in Turkish economic development as growth shifts from the country’s economic capital to the Anatolian inland, according to Renaissance Capital.

Two of Turkey’s recently most successful teams, Bursapor and TrabzonSpor, hail from the former Ottoman capital of Bursa and Trabzon on the Black Sea. The finance house pointed to a further trend in line with the economy: Bursa and Trabzon boast trade surpluses while Istanbul accounts for 60 per cent of Turkey’s trade deficit.

The similarities between the economy and soccer are not absolute. In some way, Turkish soccer is more in line with its European counterparts than the economy is. Turkish soccer economics mirror those of European clubs that operate on the basis of high debt levels to import rather than export talented players.

European spending on players as of Friday, two days before the Premier League player transfer window closes was down by more than half compared to the same period last year, according to Dan Jones, a partner in business advisory group Deloitte’s sports business. “Their comparative restraint is indicative of an overriding reflection on spending levels,” Mr. Jones said.

The model in contrast to the Turkish clubs has often translated into performance for their European counterparts. One reason is that Turkish clubs have not seen the kind of influx of foreign investment, particularly from the Gulf, from which teams like Manchester City and Paris St. Germain have benefitted.

Nonetheless, in contrast to the Turkish economy and most European clubs, Turkish soccer thanks to domestic demand has not faced problems accessing funds.

The outlook for non-soccer Turkish companies is far bleaker. “Without an increase in competitiveness Turkey is trapped with manic depressive success,” Renaissance Capital said.

For Turkey to maintain or restore economic growth it will have to enhance competitiveness. Turkish soccer will have to become an important soccer player exporter rather than merely an importer.

James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.

From Nationalization of Islam to Privatization of Nationalism: Islam and Turkish National Identity

by Tamer Balci

Published in History Studies, 2009

This article traces the origins of various proposals to nationalize Islam in Turkey. The initial Turkish proposals... more This article traces the origins of various proposals to nationalize Islam in Turkey. The initial Turkish proposals failed because none of them had a feasible philosophical base to facilitate the co-existence of Islam and secularism. Aside from the previous studies on the nationalization of Islam, this article carries the topic to the Cold War by arguing that the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was the last stage on the nationalization of Islam. Since TIS had no vision to alter the official ideology, Kemalism, and it claimed the compatibility of Islam, nationalism, secularism as well as Kemalism, it fulfilled the need of a national religion the Turkish state envisioned but it created a de facto Turkish national identity that made Islam a prerequisite for Turkishness.

Неоисторический Взгляд На Российско-Турецкие Отношения

by Orkhan Gafarli

Если расссмотреть отношения  Турции и России в годы холодной войны, то можно увидеть, что оба государства в целом... more Если расссмотреть отношения  Турции и России в годы холодной войны, то можно увидеть, что оба государства в целом оборонялись от потенциальных военных нападений друг друга. В постсоветском периоде интересно то, что мы являемся свидетелями положительных добрососедских отношений между двумя странами.

Dersim İçin Özür, Ya Peki 1915 Olayları?

by Emre Iseri

Debt fuels Turkish soccer but threatens country’s economic growth

by James M. Dorsey

By James M. Dorsey

Reeling from a massive match-fixing scandal, Turkish soccer’s economic model mirrors... more By James M. Dorsey

Reeling from a massive match-fixing scandal, Turkish soccer’s economic model mirrors that of the country’s economy:  debt-driven economics that in the case of Turkey is likely to spark a nose dive in economic growth but could increase the competitiveness of the country’s beautiful game.

At first glance, debt would seem to be Turkish soccer’s Achilles heel as it tries to recover from its worst match-fixing scandal that has led to the indictment of 93 suspects, including some of its most senior officials, whose trial is expected to open on February 14.

The political fallout of the scandal has already outlined the battle lines in Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party between President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan  in advance of elections in 2014. Mr. Erdogan in a bid to cater to soccer bosses and their corporate backers earlier this month drove against Mr. Gul’s will a controversial bill through parliament that substantially reduces penalties for match-fixing.

The Turkish Football Federation Federation (TFF) has decided in the wake of the new law to discuss in late January changing an article in its disciplinary code that mandates relegation of any club found guilty of match-fixing. Eight Turkish teams, including Fenerbahce, Trabzonspor and Besiktas, are under investigation and could be relegated if the article remains in force.

Mr. Erdogan is widely believed to want to succeed Mr. Gul as president when his third term as prime minister ends in 2014. Mr. Gul is said to be weighing his options, which include returning to active politics or accepting an international job, once he steps down from his largely ceremonial post. Critics charge that Mr. Erdogan is pushing for constitutional reform in the next two years as a way to shift power from the prime minister to the president in advance of his becoming Turkey’s head of state.

Mr. Erdogan’s chances of success ride to a significant degree on Turkey’s continued economic performance. Economists predict that economic growth in 2012 will drop from a stellar seven per cent to about three per cent as a result of its reliance on foreign capital and government-backed stimulus for growth, unorthodox monetary policy and widening current account deficit.

Turkey’s current account deficit has soared from 6 to 10 per cent of GDP while and inflation has risen to 10 per cent. Efforts by the central bank to address the fallout of Turkey’s rapid growth through counter-intuitive measures involving maintaining low interest rates while raising the reserve requirements for banks has failed to produce results.

Economists worry that Turkey’s imminent economic problems could result in a hard landing for its economy unless it moves quickly to streamline its monetary policy and starts focusing on reducing its macro-economic imbalances and particularly the current account deficit. Turkey got a taste of the risks it faces when this fall external funding tightened because of the global crisis and the country’s currency devalued more than had been predicted.

Turkish soccer faces the same risks as the country’s economy because it operates on the same principles, according to a sports research note issued by Renaissance Capital.  “Turkey’s declining success in football can be mapped to economics,” the note says according to the Financial Times.

Like the economy Turkish soccer “import almost all their best players from abroad, and export one or two good players every year” incurring high levels of debt to attract stars, the note said. It said clubs like Fenerbahce, Besiktas and Galatasaray operated as commercial companies that eschew competitiveness for profit, it said.

Renaissance Capital cautioned that buying expensive but old has-beens such as former Real Madrid stars Roberto Carlos and Gut boosts merchandising, but does not add real quality to the team. The focus on sales rather than soccer performance produces the ills many Turkish companies face:  complacency and reduced competitiveness.

The proof is in the pudding. Turkey’s top clubs have dominated the country’s soccer for decades but failed recently twice in a row to win the Turkish league or qualify for the UEFA Champions League. The poor performance of the three major Istanbul clubs mirrors a trend in Turkish economic development as growth shifts from the country’s economic capital to the Anatolian inland, according to Renaissance Capital.

Two of Turkey’s recently most successful teams, Bursapor and TrabzonSpor, hail from the former Ottoman capital of Bursa and Trabzon on the Black Sea. The finance house points out a further trend in line with the economy: Bursa and Trabzon boast trade surpluses while Istanbul accounts for 60 per cent of Turkey’s trade deficit.

The similarities between the economy and soccer are not absolute. In some way, Turkish soccer is more in line with its European counterparts than the economy is. Turkish soccer economics also mirror those of European clubs that operate on the basis of high debt levels to import rather than export talented players.

It is a model that in contrast to the Turkish clubs has often translated into performance for their European counterparts. One reason is that Turkish clubs have not seen the kind of influx of foreign investment, particularly from the Gulf, from which teams like Manchester City and Paris St. Germain have benefitted. Nonetheless, in contrast to the Turkish economy and most European clubs, Turkish soccer thanks to domestic demand is not facing problems in accessing funds.

The outlook for non-soccer Turkish companies is far bleaker. “Without an increase in competitiveness Turkey is trapped with manic depressive success,” Renaissance Capital said.

For Turkey – whether in terms of its economy or its soccer – to maintain or restore growth it will have to enhance competitiveness and become a more important player in exports.

James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.

Space, state-making and contentious Kurdish politics in the East of Turkey: the case of Eastern Meetings, 1967

by Azat Zana Gundogan

Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Volume 13, Number 4, pp. 389-416, December 2011

Kürt meselesi nasıl tanımlanır?

by Akin Unver

AKP’nin önayak olduğu, toplumun farklı kesimleri ile görüşme, fikir alma ve uzlaşı arama politikası, bazı muhalefet... more AKP’nin önayak olduğu, toplumun farklı kesimleri ile görüşme, fikir alma ve uzlaşı arama politikası, bazı muhalefet üyeleri tarafından zikredildiği gibi ‘alıştırma politikasının bir parçası’ değil, Kürt açılımı dahilinde ortaya çıkacak siyasi tezahürlerin ne olacağı hakkında varılacak toplumsal uzlaşının bir parçasıdır

Thomas Kühne, "Friendship into Comradeship. Gang Culture, Genocide, and Nation-Building in Germany, 1914-1945,” paper given to the workshop Friendship and the Nation, Henry J. Leir Luxembourg Center-Clark University, Luxembourg, 4-7 March 2010.

by Thomas Kühne

1O. Yıl Marşı Hep Aynı Okunur: İleri!

by Ahmet Alis

Maalesef, her üç kişiden beşinin terör uzmanı olduğu bir ülkede barışı konuşmak kadar boşluğa söylenen sözler yoktur.... more Maalesef, her üç kişiden beşinin terör uzmanı olduğu bir ülkede barışı konuşmak kadar boşluğa söylenen sözler yoktur. Öyle ki dünyada terör suçuyla hapsedilmiş mahkûmların üçte biri sadece Türkiye'de.

Sonuç olarak, Ayla Akat Ata, "ülkede yangın varken çatı inşa edemeyiz" diyerek aslında bize başka bir 12 Eylül'ün yaşanmamasını hatırlatıyor. Bir başka 12 Mart Muhtırası ve belki de 12 Eylül vakası yaşanmaması için bu kritik dönemde iktidara eleştiriler cılız kalmamalı. Nihayetinde iktidara karşı mesafeli olmak aklın selameti için her zaman iyidir. Hele Ortadoğu'da bir kat daha gereklidir.

Religious Bodies and the Secular State: The Merve Kavakci Affair

by Kim Shively

Published in JMEWS, 2005

Teaching History and Sense of Citizenship: Trabzon Model

by Akif Pamuk

Pamuk,A. & Alabas, R (2007). Teaching History and Sense of Citizenship: Trabzon Model, History Educators International Research Network Symposium (10th - 12th September 2007) İstanbul 

"Muhayyel Komünizm: Türk Sağının Anti-komünizm Propagandası" Doğu Batı (Türk Muhafazakarlığının Eleştirisi), Sayı: 58, 2011

by Aytul Tamer

http://www.dogubati.com/component/content/article/184/184.html

Soğuk Savaş yıllarında SSCB’ye ve komünizme karşı yürütülen mücadelede Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin bölgesel olarak... more Soğuk Savaş yıllarında SSCB’ye ve komünizme karşı yürütülen mücadelede Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin bölgesel olarak önemli blok güçlerinden biri Türkiye olmuştur. Bu süreçte ABD’nin takip ettiği ve/veya temas halinde olduğu Pan-Turanist, Türkçü milliyetçi kesim, komünizme karşı mücadele temel bir rol üstlenmiştir. Bu çalışmanın amacı ABD’nin uluslararası politikaları bağlamında Türk milliyetçileri ile ilişkilerini ortaya koyarak Türkiye’de 1945 sonrası anti-komünist propaganda faaliyetlerini değerlendirmektir. Bu çalışmanın birincil kaynağı 1945-1960 yılları arasında, milliyetçi muhafazakâr kesimin Çınaraltı, Sebilürreşad, Toprak ve Türk Düşüncesi gibi dönemin sağ/milliyetçi dergilerindeki anti-komünist propaganda içeren makaleleri ve ayni minvalde yayımlanan broşürler, kitaplardır. İkincisi önemli kaynak, ABD Türkiye Büyükelçiliği raporları ve ABD hükümeti tarafından Türkiye’de milliyetçilik ve komünizm üzerine hazırlanan çalışmaların belgeleridir (ABD Ulusal Arşivi). Türk sağının anti-komünist propaganda faaliyetlerini, söz konusu kaynaklar çerçevesinde analiz ederken milliyetçi muhafazakâr entelektüellerin komünizme karşı kendini konumlandırışı ve tavrı da değerlendirilmeye çalışılacaktır.

The development of a new scale for measuring national, civic and cultural identity in Turkey

by Ahmet Coymak

Society is considered to refer to a community with many interrelated institutions constructed formally or informally... more Society is considered to refer to a community with many interrelated institutions constructed formally or informally by people. Without doubt, individuals do not have a sense of belonging to a society or nation as a single category, but more likely as a multitude of social groups or categories, such as race, citizenship, religion, language, culture, gender, etc. In the 21st century, to understand individuals' sense of belonging to society is a more crucial issue than in past centuries given the continuous globalization movement and the ensuing need to reconsider the meaning of the nation-state. For this reason, we developed a new scale that captured individuals' identification with their ethnic-national, citizenship and cultural groups, as independent social categories. The scale was administered to 239 students and non-students in different cities in Turkey. The results of factor analyses confirmed the independent existence of the three types of identification, but also showed solidarity as a separate dimension of identification. All factors were reliable. We tested the construct validity of the scale in relation to other ethnic identity measures. We were able to test the predictive validity of our scale by comparing the levels of different identities between Turkish and Kurdish participants. As expected, Turks showed a significantly higher sense of national and cultural identification than Kurds, but both groups displayed similar levels of civic identification and solidarity. This poses a challenge to the assumption that social cohesion has to be achieved just by identification with a single national or societal group.