Theory of mind

Why Studies of Autism Spectrum Disorders Have Failed to Resolve the Theory Theory Versus Simulation Theory Debate

by Meredith Wilkinson

Co-authored with Linden J Ball

Wilkinson, M. R., & Ball, L. J. (forthcoming) Why Studies of Autism Spectrum Disorders Have Failed to Resolve the Theory Theory Versus Simulation Theory Debate, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2012, DOI 10.1007/s13164-012-0097-0

Misyurov D.A. Dialectical formulas based on the binary notation as the development formulas // Credo New. 2012. №2

by Dmitry Misyurov

The article suggests dialectical formulas based on the binary notation as the development formulas: formula with... more The article suggests dialectical formulas based on the binary notation as the development formulas: formula with dominant and the non-dominant elements; universal formula; formula with symbolic weight of elements; tautological formula. For example, it suggests an opportunity to use the dialectical formulas for modeling and artificial intelligence creation, etc.

Beyond Folk Psychology? Toward an Enriched Account of Social Understanding

by Mitchell Herschbach

Ph.D. Dissertation, Philosophy & Cognitive Science, UC San Diego, 2010

Arbitrating between Theory-Theory and Simulation Theory: Evidence from a Think-aloud Study of Counterfactual Reasoning

by Meredith Wilkinson

Co-authored with Linden J. Ball and Rachel Cooper

Wilkinson, M. R., Ball, L. J., & Cooper, R. (2010).  Arbitrating between theory-theory and simulation theory:  Evidence from a think-aloud study of counterfactual reasoning. Chapter in S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (Eds.) Proceedings of the Thirty-Second Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. (pp. 1008-1013) Austin, Texas: Cognitive Science Society     

Krpič, T. 2006. Suburbs in Our Minds: Art and Critique of Cultures of Fear in the Light of Cognitive Sociology. Teorija in praksa 43 (3-4): 523-539.

by Tomaž Krpič

Abstract

Author’s intention is to illustrate E. Zerubavel’s typology of mind, used as an analytical tool... more Abstract

Author’s intention is to illustrate E. Zerubavel’s typology of mind, used as an analytical tool for critical interpretation of modern cultures of fear and terror as presented in the movie Predmestje (Suburbs) of one of currently most influential Slovene movie director V. Möderndorfer. Typology of mind consists of three elements: the rigid, the fuzzy and the flexible mind. Author states that the rigid mind, as an essential element of culture of fear, contributes to the construction of many social phenomena, such as homophobia, xenophobia and general intolerance towards others, by rising cognitive boundaries and establishing rigid social order. By application of the fuzzy mind, contained in the form of artistic cognitive promiscuity, transgression of cognitive boundaries is possible. Yet, art itself, without certain moral background, cannot provide adequate social critique. Moral standards allow constitution of the third type of mind, the flexible mind, which mediate between the art and the social context. Author believes that Möderndorfer’s movie Predmestje presents an excellent example of interwoveness of above-mentioned typology of mind by indicating the shift of Slovenian society towards modern culture of fear and terror along with longing for more humane moral order.

Addendum - More Seminal Ethics Implications

by Mark Singer

Tandem works include: "Seminal Ethics," "Kant Concept Art," "More Seminal Ethics Implications" - also on this site.

This paper includes the "Possibility Implications" of the Kantian, Machiavellian, and Nietzschean Ethical Standards.

Immortality of the Soul as an Intuitive Idea

by Vera Pereira

Co-authored with Luís Faísca and Rodrigo Sá-Saraiva
Published in Journal of Cognition and Culture

Consciousness from a first-person perspective

by Max Velmans

This is a clean PDF of my reply to 36 peer reviews of my target article in BBS, 1991 “Is human information processing conscious?” As it develops quite a few themes that are fundamental to consciousness studies, I have added an Abstract and references so that it can be read as a stand-alone paper. As this paper tries to address all the points raised by the commentaries it ranges widely, and to assist easier reading it has been subdivided into sections that separate experimental issues from the more theoretical and philosophical issues. The commentators included many of the experimentalists and theoreticians that were prominent in consciousness studies at the time, including scientists such as Bernie Baars, Francis Crick, Christoph Koch, John Gardiner, Jeffrey Gray, Marcel Kinsbourne, Ben Libet, Dan Lloyd, George Mandler, Bruce Mangan, Norman Dixon, Howard Shevrin, Keith Stanovich, Geoff Underwood and philosophers such as Ned Block, Fred Dretske, Valery Hardcastle, Georges Rey, Aaron Sloman and Robert van Gulick. Viewed historically, it is interesting to see how confused the literature was at the time concerning how phenomenal consciousness relates to information processing and particularly to attentional processing. Viewed 20 years later, I would still make a similar defence of my original target article although many of the themes introduced in these two papers have now been elaborated in my subsequent writings.

This paper replies to the first 36 commentaries on my target article on “Is human information processing conscious?”... more This paper replies to the first 36 commentaries on my target article on “Is human information processing conscious?” (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1991, pp. 651-669). The target article focused largely on experimental studies of how consciousness relates to human information processing, tracing their relation from input through to output, while discussion of the implications of the findings both for cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind was relatively brief. The commentaries reversed this emphasis, and so, correspondingly, did the reply. The sequence of topics in the reply roughly follows that of the target article. The discussion begins with a reconsideration of the details of the empirical findings, whether they can be extrapolated to non-laboratory settings, and the extent to which one can rely on their use of subjective reports. This is followed by an in-depth discussion of what is meant by “conscious processing” and of how phenomenal consciousness relates to attentional processing. We then turn to broader philosophical and theoretical issues. I point out some of the reasons why I do not support epiphenomenalism, dualist-interactionism, or reductionism, and elaborate on how first- and third-person views of the mind can be regarded as complementary and mutually irreducible. I suggest how the relation of conscious experiences to their neural correlates can be understood in terms of a dual-aspect theory of information, and how this might be used to resolve some of the paradoxes surrounding the causal interactions of consciousness and brain. I also suggest that, viewed from a first-person perspective, consciousness gives purpose to existence, which allows a different way of viewing its role in evolution.

Primate social cognition: Thirty years after Premack and Woodruff

by Alexandra Rosati

Rosati, A.G., Santos, L.R. & Hare, B. (2010) In: Primate Neuroethology (M.L. Platt & A.A. Ghazanfar, eds.)

Since Darwin declared the mind as the province of biology as well as psychology, the human intellect has been a major... more Since Darwin declared the mind as the province of biology as well as psychology, the human intellect has been a major challenge for evolutionary biologists, with some researchers emphasizing the continuity between humans and other animals, and others emphasizing seemingly unique aspects of our psychological makeup. Research over the past ten years has revealed that at least some primates have some capability to assess the psychological states of others—while simultaneously showing striking differences between the social-cognitive capacities of humans and other primates. Here we address two aspects of primate social cognition—understanding of intentional, goal-directed action, and understanding perceptions, knowledge, and beliefs—focusing on newest comparative research since the last major reviews were written on the topic over a decade ago. We first review evidence suggesting that diverse species of primates understand the actions of others in terms of goals and intentions, and furthermore can reason about some, but probably not all, kinds of psychological states. We then examine the hypothesis that primates show their most complex social skills in competitive contexts, and suggest that inquiry into other aspects of primate social life, such as during cooperative interactions, may prove to be the next important step for experimental inquiries into primate social-cognitive skills. Finally, we examine primate social cognition in a broader evolutionary context that may allow us to better understand both primate and human cognitive skills.

Embodied Cognition and Mindreading

by Shannon Spaulding

(2010) Mind & Language, 25, 119-140.

Recently, philosophers and psychologists defending the embodied cognition research program have offered arguments... more Recently, philosophers and psychologists defending the embodied cognition research program have offered arguments against mindreading as a general model of our social understanding. The embodied cognition arguments are of two kinds: those that challenge the developmental picture of mindreading and those that challenge the alleged ubiquity of mindreading. Together, these two kinds of arguments, if successful, would present a serious challenge to the standard account of human social understanding. In this paper, I examine the strongest of these embodied cognition arguments and argue that mindreading approaches can withstand the best of these arguments from embodied cognition.

Embodied Social Cognition

by Shannon Spaulding

Forthcoming in Philosophical Topics

In this paper I evaluate embodied social cognition, embodied cognition’s account of how we understand others. I... more In this paper I evaluate embodied social cognition, embodied cognition’s account of how we understand others. I identify and evaluate three claims that motivate embodied social cognition. These claims are not specific to social cognition; they are general contentions about cognition. As such, they may be used in more general arguments for embodied cognition. I argue that we have good reasons to reject these claims. Thus, the case for embodied social cognition fails. Moreover, to the extent that arguments for embodied cognition in general rest on these premises, such arguments are correspondingly uncompelling.

Mirror Neurons and Social Cognition

by Shannon Spaulding

forthcoming in Mind & Language

Mirror neurons are widely regarded as an important key to social cognition. Despite such wide agreement, there is very... more Mirror neurons are widely regarded as an important key to social cognition. Despite such wide agreement, there is very little consensus on how or why they are important. The goal of this paper is to clearly explicate the exact role mirror neurons play in social cognition. I aim to answer two questions about the relationship between mirroring and social cognition: What kind of social understanding is involved with mirroring? How is mirroring related to that understanding? I argue that philosophical and empirical considerations lead us to accord a fairly minimal role for mirror neurons in social cognition.

Introduction to debates on embodied social cognition

by Shannon Spaulding

(penultimate draft) forthcoming in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

Embodied social cognition (ESC) aims to explicate how our embodiment shapes our knowledge of others, and in what this... more Embodied social cognition (ESC) aims to explicate how our embodiment shapes our knowledge of others, and in what this knowledge of others consists. Although there is much diversity amongst ESC accounts, common to all these accounts is the idea that our normal everyday interactions consist in non-mentalistic embodied engagements. In recent years, several theorists have developed and defended innovative and controversial accounts of ESC. These accounts challenge, and offer deflationary alternatives to, the standard cognitivist accounts of social cognition. As ESC accounts grow in number and prominence, the time has come for a dedicated, sustained debate on ESC and its most controversial and innovative elements. The goal of this special issue is to host such a debate with the aim of bringing clarity to the discussion of social cognition.

Gestural Coupling and Social Cognition: Möbius Syndrome as a Case Study

by John Michael

Krueger J and Michael J (2012). Gestural Coupling and Social Cognition: Möbius Syndrome as a Case Study. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 6:81. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00081

Social cognition researchers have become increasingly interested in the ways that behavioral, physiological and neural... more Social cognition researchers have become increasingly interested in the ways that behavioral, physiological and neural coupling facilitate social interaction and interpersonal
understanding. We distinguish two ways of conceptualizing the role of such coupling processes in social cognition: strong and moderate interactionism. According to strong interactionism (SI), low-level coupling processes are alternatives to higher-level individual cognitive processes; the former at least sometimes render the latter superfluous. Moderate interactionism (MI) on the other hand, is an integrative approach. Its guiding assumption is that higher-level cognitive processes are likely to have been shaped by the need to coordinate, modulate and extract information from low-level coupling processes. In this paper, we present a case study on Möbius Syndrome (MS) in order to contrast SI and MI. We show how MS—a form of congenital bilateral facial paralysis—can be a fruitful source of insight for research exploring the relation between high-level cognition and low-level coupling. Lacking a capacity for facial expression, individuals with MS are deprived of a primary channel for gestural coupling. According to SI, they lack an essential enabling feature for social interaction and interpersonal understanding more generally and thus ought to exhibit severe deficits in these areas. We challenge SI’s  prediction  and  show  how  MS  cases  offer  compelling  reasons  for  instead  adopting  MI’s 
pluralistic model of social interaction and interpersonal understanding. We conclude that investigations of coupling processes within social interaction should inform rather than
marginaliz e or eliminate investigation of higher-level individual cognition.

Choosing between the long and short informational routes to psychological explanation

by Marc Champagne

Published in Philosophical Psychology.

Following recent work by Don Ross (Ross, 2000; Ross & Spurrett, 2004), I contrast the influential theories of... more Following recent work by Don Ross (Ross, 2000; Ross & Spurrett, 2004), I contrast the influential theories of Daniel Dennett and Paul Churchland in information-theoretic terms. Dennett makes much of the fact that the morphological shorthand which emerges before a witness as she looks upon cohesive aggregates of matter commands some measure of predictive power. This, for him, speaks against eliminating recourse to an intentional vocabulary. By contrast, the eliminative materialism defended by Churchland does not gloss such informational compressibility as an explanatory desideratum, and thus regards the informational noise which accrues at higher levels of description as patently unacceptable. Yet, since it is unlikely, as Ross et al. (2007) have recently suggested, that anything remains once we subtract the appeal to patterns, I argue that the ubiquity of informational compression in scientific explanation seriously undermines the claim that talk of the mental could be eliminated.

Too much monkey business

by Louise Barrett

Toward a second-person neuroscience

by Bert Timmermans

Schilbach L and* Timmermans B, Reddy V, Costall A, Bente G, Schlicht T, & Vogeley K. Toward a second-person neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, target article accepted for publication. *equal contributions

In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that... more In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are only beginning to be studied and could —paradoxically— be seen as representing the ‘dark matter’ of social neuroscience. Recent conceptual and empirical developments consistently indicate the need for investigations, which allow the study of real-time social encounters in a truly interactive manner. This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is fundamentally different when we are in interaction with others rather than merely observing them. In this article, we outline the theoretical conception of a second-person approach to other minds and review evidence from neuroimaging, psychophysiological studies and related fields to argue for the development of a second-person neuroscience, which will help neuroscience to really go social; this may also be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders construed as disorders of social cognition.

"Life is too slippery for stories": Interview with Mark Rowlands

by Mikel Torres Aldave

The Development of Theory of Mind According to False Belief Performance of Children Ages 3 to 5

by Halil Eksi

Bahar KEÇELİ KAYSILI Funda ACARLAR
Educational Sciences: Theory & Practice - 11(4) • Autumn • 1821-1826

This study has examined the role of age in the false belief understanding in typically developing children and tomore This study has examined the role of age in the false belief understanding in typically developing children and to
determine if the different type of false belief tasks affects performance on false belief. The survey research design
was used. False belief understanding was measured in 72 children between the ages of 3.00 to 5.11 year
old. The sample consisted of 12 children in each age group and age groups were divided into six month period.
Four false belief tasks were conducted. The findings of this study indicated that the false belief understanding
of Turkish speaking children between the ages of 3.0 to 5.11 year old had some similarities as well as some differences
to children speaking other than Turkish. 3 year old children seemed to have developed an understanding
of the own false belief before they developed a clear understanding of others’ false belief. It was clear that
the rapid change of understanding false belief seemed to have appeared at 4.6 year old.

Differential Involvement of the Posterior Temporal Cortex In Mentalizing but Not Perspective Taking

by Nicole David

Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci. 2008 Sep;3(3):279-89

Understanding and predicting other people's mental states and behavior are important prerequisites for social... more Understanding and predicting other people's mental states and behavior are important prerequisites for social interactions. The capacity to attribute mental states such as desires, thoughts or intentions to oneself or others is referred to as mentalizing. The right posterior temporal cortex at the temporal-parietal junction has been associated with mentalizing but also with taking someone else's spatial perspective onto the world--possibly an important prerequisite for mentalizing. Here, we directly compared the neural correlates of mentalizing and perspective taking using the same stimulus material. We found significantly increased neural activity in the right posterior segment of the superior temporal sulcus only during mentalizing but not perspective taking. Our data further clarify the role of the posterior temporal cortex in social cognition by showing that it is involved in processing information from socially salient visual cues in situations that require the inference about other people's mental states.