Il n’y a pas de rapport sexuel: The Irresolvability of the Gadamer-Habermas Debate
class paper written Good Friday, April 6, 2012
Stepping Off the Pendulum: Why Only an Action-based approach Can Transcend the Nativist-Empiricist Debate
This paper has been selected by the Jean Piaget Society as a target article for commentary and response in its official journal of Cognitive Development
We argue that the nativist-empiricist debate in developmental psychology is distorted, both theoretically and... more
We argue that the nativist-empiricist debate in developmental psychology is distorted, both theoretically and methodologically, by a shared framework of assumptions concerning the nature of representation. In particular, both sides of the debate assume models of representation that make the emergence of representation impossible. This, in turn, distorts conceptions of cognitive development by forcing developmentally new representation to be constructed out of some already available (innate) foundation of atomistic representations — it forces a foundationalism.
Contemporary nativists and empiricists differ with respect to the size and scope of such foundations, but are equally committed to some form of foundationalism. In further consequence, this foundationalism distorts methodologies by rendering any form of developmental emergence of representation impossible, and, thus, renders control conditions in experiments for such kinds of development (and their precursors) seemingly irrelevant. In precluding representational emergence, foundationalisms motivate an assumption that infants perceive the world in the same way as adults (adultomorphism) because the possibility of the developmental emergence of perceptual representation is already conceptually excluded.
In this discussion, we focus most strongly on the currently dominant nativist framework, and, in particular, on two seminal sets of studies: Baillargeon’s drawbridge studies and Wynn’s addition and subtraction studies. We begin with an historical overview of the growth of developmental nativist frameworks, showing how they emerged out of a synergy between a competence-performance distinction and the methodology of infant looking studies. Both of these enabling conditions for the historical rise of nativist positions are themselves flawed. We then proceed to a discussion of extant criticisms of the two focal sets of studies. We argue that these criticisms explore various empirical and conceptual alternatives to the standard nativist interpretations of such studies — alternatives that avoid the adultomorphisms of standard interpretations, and, thus, are open to the possibility of anti- foundationalist developmental emergence of representation.
We then explore some non- and anti-nativist positions, showing that they too involve a foundationalist commitment, which thus weakens their criticisms of nativist positions, and argue that the common foundationalism follows from a common assumption about the nature of representations: that representation is fundamentally constituted as encodings.
Finally, we outline an approach to modeling representation that is not committed to foundationalism because it explicitly models representational emergence. This is an action based approach, akin to Piaget’s model. Ironically, it was the (invalid) rejection of Piaget’s model that fueled much of the growth of nativism in the first place.
93 views
Seen by:Understanding Bourdieu’s contribution to organization and management studies
by Ahu Tatli
Özbilgin M. and Tatli, A. (2005) Understanding Bourdieu’s contribution to organization and management studies, Academy of Management Review, 30, 4: 855-869.
In this paper we argue that Bourdieu’s works can potentially contribute to multilevel and relational research practice... more In this paper we argue that Bourdieu’s works can potentially contribute to multilevel and relational research practice and theory building in organizational studies at two major levels. First, organizational studies may benefit from the insight brought in by Bourdieu at the level of critical engagement with the issues pertaining to the questions of research philosophy, ontology, and epistemology. Second, utilization of Bourdieuan concepts may advance the ongoing discussions of relational methodologies and theory building in the field of organizational research through linking agency and structure by situating individuals within the context of the organization and in their relations to each other, as well as by situating the organization and organizational culture within the context of society and history. We qualify these two statements by discussing the fundamental concepts proposed by Bourdieu. Engaging in a critical overview of the mainstream concepts such as power, culture, attitudes, human capital, and meritocracy in organization studies, we propose alternative Bourdieuan concepts such as dispositions, different forms of capital, habitus, and the field. The realist tradition of social sciences, in which Bourdieu’s work can be located, assumes a keen focus on the layered, complex, and interwoven nature of social reality, in a way that transcends the traditional dualisms of macro versus micro perspectives, agentic versus structural explanations, or qualitative versus quantitative insights, with a view to combine them through a layered, multidimensional, and relational analysis. We argue that the Bourdieuan concepts capture the layered, intersubjective, interdependent nature of social phenomena better than the mainstream concepts, which are developed to read organizations through exclusively objectivist or subjectivist perspectives that characterize organizational studies.
Dislodging “Embedded” Religion: A Brief Note on a Scholarly Trope
published in Numen: International Review for the History of Religion 55 (2008)
Scholars of ancient cultures are increasingly speaking of the "embeddedness" of ancient religion — arguing... more Scholars of ancient cultures are increasingly speaking of the "embeddedness" of ancient religion — arguing that the practices modern investigators group under the heading of "religion" did not compose a well-defined category in antiquity; instead, they claim that "religion was embedded" in other aspects of ancient culture. These writers use this notion of "embeddedness" to help us see that categories post-Enlightenment thinkers often regard as distinct (such as politics, economics, and religion) largely overlapped in antiquity. The trope of "embedded religion" can, however, also produce the false impression that religion is a descriptive concept rather than a redescriptive concept for ancient cultures (i.e., that there really is something "out there" in antiquity called "Roman religion" or "Mesopotamian religion," which scholars are simply describing rather than creating). By allowing this slippage between descriptive and redescriptive uses of "religion," the rhetoric of "embedded religion" exacerbates the very problem it is meant to solve.
"Hartmann, Schutz and the Hermeneutics of Action"
published in in 'Axiomathes,' 12 (2001) 327-338
Hartmann's way of conceiving what he terms "the actual ought-to-be (aktuales Seinsollen]" offers a fruitful... more
Hartmann's way of conceiving what he terms "the actual ought-to-be (aktuales Seinsollen]" offers a fruitful approach to crucial issues in the phenomenology of action. The central issue to be dealt with concerns the description of the "constitution" of anticipated possibilities as projects for action. Such these are termed "problematic possibilities" and are contrasted with "open possibilities" in most of the works published by Husserl as well as those published by Alfred Schutz. The description given by Alfred Schutz emphasized that the projecting of possibilities is thoroughly conditioned by the agent's habitual beliefs and interests. Schutz, however left open the possibility that other factors might affect the projecting of courses of action and the choosing of one in preference to others. In particular, he left open the possibility that the agent come to take an interest in possibilities in which she had no prior interest. More recent interpretations of his position on this issue have left this possibility undiscussed or else excluded it altogether. The result has been that a sort of value nihilism (subjectivism, sociologism, lingualism, anthropologism, historicism, psychologism, etc.) came to prevail in the phenomenological description of actions.
A quite parallel development occurred in interpretations of Heidegger's account of actions (of "explication [Auslegung]" in the vocabulary of Being and Time). Heidegger expressly and emphatically rejected most ways of conceiving values in discussing the forms of action (circumspection and assertion in the vocabulary of Sein und Zeit). it came quite generally to be assumed that he subscribed to some variation of nihilism regarding values despite his insistence in the "Letter on Humanism" that he meant no such thing. The literature' on this subject has concentrated on Scheler's work to the complete exclusion of Hartmann's axiology — as happened in Parvis Ermad's Heidegger and the Phenomenology of Values, His Critique of Intentionality, foreword by Walter Biernel (Glen Ellyn, Illinois: Torey Press, 1981). Scheler's view entails the radical separation of ontic traits from axiotic traits, of what-is from what-ought-to-be. However, for Hartmann, the set of ontic traits that becomes actual when laws about what-ought-to-be are satisfied is identical with the set of traits that ought-to-be,
Hartmann's way of conceiving the ought-to-be, the actual ought-to-be, and the three-fold structure of the finalistic nexus seems entirely compatible with Heidegger's way of thinking about actions. They are also an enlightening supplement to Schutz's description of "Choosing Among Projects of Action" (in Collected Papers 1, 67-96). That description requires that choice and action be thoroughly conditioned by psychological, social, and historical facts about the agent. However, nothing of this vital determination of actions is sacrificed when these concepts that are so central to Hartmann's "absolutism" with respect to values are introduced into the description.
Their introduction provides an elaboration that Schutz himself neglected, perhaps due to pragmatic deference to biases which were prevalent then in the intellectual climate of philosophy and sociology in the U.S. Still, the transformation they bring is a significant improvement. It shows decisively that being conditioned linguistically, psychologically, socially, and historically does not enclose the choice among projects within a "Hermeneutical Circle" such as would exclude the possibility that agents be open to previously unfamiliar values. Hartmann's conception of the plurality as well as the absoluteness (or "objectivity") of primary goods allows: put in Kantian terms, that an agent may, however rarely, take an interest in possibilities such as she may never before have been interested in at all; or, put in Heideggerian terms, that she may come to care about possibilities such as have never concerned her before.
English corpus linguistics
McEnery, T. & Gabrielatos, C.
2006
In B. Aarts & A. McMahon (Eds.), The Handbook of English Linguistics (pp. 33-71). Oxford: Blackwell.
In the past forty years, electronic corpora have come to prominence as a resource used by linguists. While their use... more
In the past forty years, electronic corpora have come to prominence as a resource used by linguists. While their use remains a source of debate and controversy to this day (see for example Newmeyer, 2003; Prodromou, 1997; Widdowson, 1991) their contribution to linguistics in general, and English linguistics in particular, as well as to language teaching, is now widely acknowledged. Corpus tools have not only strengthened the position of descriptive linguistics, but have also enhanced theoretically-oriented linguistic research. This contribution has been felt most strongly in English linguistics, as it was pioneering work undertaken on English language corpora, such as the Brown corpus (Francis & Kučera, 1964), which set the agenda for much of the work that has been undertaken using corpora since then. In this chapter we will examine the nature of corpus linguistics, review the general contribution of corpora to linguistic theory and then explore in more depth the contribution of corpora in four major areas:
• language description in general, and the production of reference resources in particular;
• lexicogrammar and the lexical approach to language analysis and description (lexical grammar);
• the teaching of English as a foreign language;
• the study of language change, with particular reference to the role that corpora have to play in theoretically informed accounts of language change.

