Theories of truth (Philosophy)

Truth as Mediated Correspondence

by Robert Barnard

R. Barnard and T. Horgan, ''Truth as Mediated Correspondence'', The Monist, 89 (2006), 28–49

Synthetic Unity of Truth

by Robert Barnard

R. Barnard and T. Horgan, "The Synthetic Unity of Truth," in C. Wright and N. Pederson (eds.) Truth Pluralism: Current Debates, Oxford University Press. (forthcoming)

Semantic Conception of Truth. What It Is and What It Is Not

by Ladislav Koren

This is a slightly corrected and revised version of the thesis for PhD degree: "Truth and Meaning: the Dialectics of Theory and Practice".

Alfred Tarski’s semantic conception of truth is arguably the most influential – certainly, most discussed - modern... more Alfred Tarski’s semantic conception of truth is arguably the most influential – certainly, most discussed - modern conception of truth. It has provoked many different interpretations and reactions, some thinkers celebrating it for successfully explicating the notion of truth, whereas others have argued that it is no good as a philosophical account of truth. The aim of this work is to offer a systematic and critical investigation of its nature and significance, based on the thorough explanation of its conceptual, technical as well as historical underpinnings.

The methodological strategy adopted in the thesis reflects the author’s belief that in order to evaluate the import of Tarski’s conception we need to understand what logical, mathematical and philosophical aspects it has, what role they play in his project of theoretical semantics, which of them hang in together, and which should be kept separate. Chapter 2 therefore starts with a detailed exposition of the conceptual and historical background of Tarski’s semantic conception of truth and his method of truth definition for formalized languages, situating it within his project of theoretical semantics, and Chapter 3 explains the formal machinery of Tarski’s truth definitions for increasingly more complex languages. Chapters 4 - 7 form the core of the thesis, all being concerned with the problem of significance of Tarski’s conception. Chapter 4 explains its logico-mathematical import, connecting it to the related works of Gödel and Carnap. Having explained the seminal ideas of the model-theoretic approach to semantics, Chapter 5 tackles the question to what extent Tarski’s ‘The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages’ (and related articles from the 1930s) anticipates this approach, and what elements might be missing from it. Chapter 6 then deals with the vexed question of its philosophical import and value as a theory of truth, reviewing a number of objections and arguments that purport to show that the method fails as an explanation (explication) of the ordinary notion of truth, and, in particular, that it is a confusion to think that Tarski’s truth definitions have semantic import. Finally, Chapter 7 is devoted to the question whether Tarski’s theory of truth is a robust or rather a deflationary theory of truth.

On the basis of a careful analysis, the thesis aims to substantiate the following view. [A] Tarski’s theory with its associated method of truth definition was primarily designed to serve logico-mathematical purposes. [B] It can be regarded a deflationary theory of a sort, since it completely abstracts from meta- semantical issues concerning the metaphysical or epistemological basis or status of semantic properties. Indeed, [C] this can be interpreted as its laudable feature, since by separating formal (or logico-mathematical) from meta-semantical (or foundational) aspects it usefully divides the theoretical labour to be done in the area of meaning and semantic properties in general. [D] In spite of the fact that Tarski’s conception of truth has this deflationary flavour, the formal structure of its method of truth-definition is quite neutral in that it can be interpreted and employed in several different ways, some of them deflationary, others more robust.

Truth and Physics Education.

by Robert Shaw

Robert Keith Shaw (2010). Truth and Physics Education. Doctoral dissertation, University of Auckland

This thesis develops a hermeneutic philosophy of science to provide insights into physics education. -/- Modernity... more This thesis develops a hermeneutic philosophy of science to provide insights into physics education. -/- Modernity cloaks the authentic character of modern physics whenever discoveries entertain us or we judge theory by its use. Those who justify physics education through an appeal to its utility, or who reject truth as an aspect of physics, relativists and constructivists, misunderstand the nature of physics. Demonstrations, not experiments, reveal the essence of physics as two characteristic engagements with truth. First, truth in its guise as correspondence enables a human being to prepare for the distinctive event of physics. Second, the event of physics occurs in human perception when someone forces a hidden reality to disclose an aspect of itself. Thus, the ground of physics is our human involvement with reality achieved by way of truth. To support this account of physics, the thesis reports phenomenological investigations into Isaac Newton’s involvement with optics and a secondary school physics laboratory. These involve interpretations of Heidegger’s theory of beings, schema and signification. The project draws upon, and contributes to, the hermeneutic phenomenology of modern physics, a tradition in continental philosophy that begins with Immanuel Kant, and advances particularly from Martin Heidegger to Patrick Heelan. The thesis advocates an ontological pedagogy for modern physics which has as its purpose each individual student’s engagement with reality and truth. Students may achieve this through demonstrations of phenomena that will enable them to dwell with physics, an experience that contrasts with their embroilment in modernity, and which perpetuates nature’s own science.

Truth, Conservativeness, and Provability

by Cezary Cieslinski

published in Mind 2010, 119, 409-422.

Conservativeness has been proposed as an important requirement for deflationary truth theories. This in turn gave rise... more Conservativeness has been proposed as an important requirement for deflationary truth theories. This in turn gave rise to the so-called ‘conservativeness argument’ against deflationism: a theory of truth which is conservative over its base theory S cannot be adequate, because it cannot prove that all theorems of S are true. In this paper we show that the problems confronting the deflationist are in fact more basic: even the observation that logic is true is beyond his reach. This seems to conflict with the deflationary characterization of the role of the truth predicate in proving generalizations. However, in the final section we propose a way out for the deflationist — a solution that permits him to accept a strong theory, having important truth-theoretical generalizations as its theorems.

Deflationism, Conservativeness and Maximality

by Cezary Cieslinski

published in Journal of Philosophical Logic 2007, 36(6), 695-705.

We discuss two desirable properties of deflationary truth theories: conservativeness and maximality. Joining them... more We discuss two desirable properties of deflationary truth theories: conservativeness and maximality. Joining them together, we obtain a notion of a maximal conservative truth theory – a theory which is conservative over its base, but can’t be enlarged any further without losing its conservative character. There are indeed such theories; we show however that none of them is axiomatizable, and moreover, that there will be in fact continuum many theories of this sort. It turns out in effect that the deflationist still needs some additional principles, which would permit him to construct his preferred theory of truth.

Why tolerate-reflections on Mill's truth principle

by Raphael Cohen-almagor

Philosophia, Vol. 25, Nos. 1-4 (1997), pp. 131-152.

The aim of this essay is to reflect on the Millian, utilitarian
argument from truth that is held as one of the... more The aim of this essay is to reflect on the Millian, utilitarian
argument from truth that is held as one of the most conspicuous
answers to the question Why tolerate? This argument postulates that only in a free market of ideas may the truth be discovered. Even the most unpopular idea may contain some truth in it and may contribute to the advancement of knowledge. It further commands us to contest those opinions which are believed to be true vigorously and earnestly to explore some further truth, and to acknowledge their false aspects.
The results of free exchange of opinions will either confirm our idea, or bring some doubt to our attention, to cast accounts and maybe change our opinion, at least to some extent.
After reflecting on some of the common arguments that are
frequently mentioned in this connection, I discuss Mill's formulation of the Truth Principle as it came into expression in his writings. Here I reflect on his article "Law of Libel and Liberty of the Press" which did not receive adequate attention by scholars. I show that it is difficult to reconcile what Mill had to say in this article with what he later said in On Liberty. I further maintain that the Millian view of truth as superior to all other social values might endanger the very ground which the Truth Principle is intended to safeguard, i.e., tolerance.

On what truth is about

by Ignacio Ojea

Reseña de "Truth and the End of Inquiry", de Cheryl Misak

by Juan Pablo Serra

Published in LOGOS: ANALES DEL SEMINARIO DE METAFÍSICA, vol. 41 (2008), 384-387 [book review]

A descriptive review of Cheryl Misak's superb thesis on Charles S. Peirce's account of truth, with one minor criticism... more A descriptive review of Cheryl Misak's superb thesis on Charles S. Peirce's account of truth, with one minor criticism to one of the points of the book (the Truth-Inquiry and the Inquiry-Truth conditionals, which, as I see things, do not neccesarily contradict themselves) and a brief reflection of my own where I say that overall one of the most suggestive things about the book is its implicit anthropological proposal, the claim that, among other things, the value of peircean account of truth resides in its connaturality with human being -and therefore Peirce's view of truth somehow could be labeled as a "natural" theory of truth.

Truthful (Hi)stories in Michael Ondaatje’s Anil’s Ghost

by Lydia Kokkola

This copy is the pre-proof version. The full article is available:


Kokkola, Lydia. 2009. Truthful (hi)stories in Michael Ondaatje’s Anil’s Ghost. In Finch Jason, Martin Gill, Anthony Johnson, Iris Lindahl-Raittila, Inna Lindgren, Tuija Virtanen and Brita Wårvik (eds.). Humane Readings: Essays on literary mediation and communication in honour of Roger D. Sell. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins pp. 119–133.

This paper examines the ways in which fiction and historical fact are combined in Michael Ondaatje’s novel, Anil’s... more This paper examines the ways in which fiction and historical fact are combined in Michael Ondaatje’s novel, Anil’s Ghost (2000), which set against the backdrop of the civil war in Sri Lanka. Kokkola argues that the novel foregrounds the contested nature of truth by questioning its value in the context of such a complex conflict. Ondaatje undermines the possibility of truth existing independently of circumstance by dismissing forensic science’s claim to be a neutral method of obtaining fact. Instead, the contingent nature of truthfulness is recognised and the only truth which is valued is that which leads to healing and reconcilliation.

Keywords: Anil’s Ghost, truth, Truth and Reconcialiation Commission (TRC), forensic science.

The Effects of Memes, Truthiness and Wikiality on Public Knowledge

by James Eric (Jay) Black

Presented at the National Communication Association Annual Conference, Chicago (November 2007).

Public knowledge is inadequately served by standard rhetorical studies for standard rhetoricians fail to acknowledge... more Public knowledge is inadequately served by standard rhetorical studies for standard rhetoricians fail to acknowledge how ideas once expressed are then circulated within the public sphere. Scholars are beginning to deploy socio-biological metaphors to describe the viral nets of influence and the survival of the fittest contesting of memes.  This essay will attempt to provide this alternate explanation for the creation of public knowledge using the evolution of memes through the media as a case study, though it is not to be assumed the media is the only means of spreading information. An explanation of the metaphor will be provided, and then the essay will turn to how information, both factual and nonfactual, can evolve into truths within the realm of public knowledge.