Theories Of Reference

El antirrepresentacionalismo de Hegel y su concepción del conocimiento como praxis intersubjetiva

by Hector Ferreiro

Este artículo aparecerá publicado próximamente en una antología de trabajos sobre la filosofía de Hegel editada por Daniel Brauer en la Editorial Prometeo, Buenos Aires, 2012.

Do Moral Realists Need Convergence?

by Laura Schroeter

(with François Schroeter)

Doe a moral realist need to posit ideal convergence in moral judgments? Richard Boyd has argued that moral realists... more Doe a moral realist need to posit ideal convergence in moral judgments? Richard Boyd has argued that moral realists don't need to accept that all competent speakers will converge in their moral judgments, if they opt for a certain type of externalist account of the reference of moral terms. Boyd's account has been highly influential: even realists who reject naturalistic and causal aspects of his account have taken his approach as a template for reference determination for moral terms (e.g. Sayre-McCord, van Roojen). But a closer examination of Boyd’s account of reference and the ways it could be developed or modified, we’ll argue, suggests that explaining co-reference without convergence in the moral domain is a much more challenging problem than many realists have supposed.

Gruesome Diagonals

by Laura Schroeter

Philosophers' Imprint 2003

Argues that 2D semantics cannot simultaneously fulfill two different roles: determining reference and capturing... more Argues that 2D semantics cannot simultaneously fulfill two different roles: determining reference and capturing plausible conditions of linguistic or conceptual competence.

Two-Dimensional Semantics and Sameness of Meaning

by Laura Schroeter

In this survey article, I focus on whether 2D semantics can fully capture the epistemic and semantic phenomena that... more In this survey article, I focus on whether 2D semantics can fully capture the epistemic and semantic phenomena that seem central to individuating meanings. After outlining the motivations for 2D semantics as a response to externalist thought experiments, I argue that the approach faces an internal tension in fully vindicating the traditional role of meaning. I contrast the 2D theory's broadly descriptivist approach to meaning individuation with a relational approach.

Two-Dimensional Semantics and Sameness of Meaning

by Laura Schroeter

In this survey article, I focus on whether 2D semantics can fully capture the epistemic and semantic phenomena that... more In this survey article, I focus on whether 2D semantics can fully capture the epistemic and semantic phenomena that seem central to individuating meanings. After outlining the motivations for 2D semantics as a response to externalist thought experiments, I argue that the approach faces an internal tension in fully vindicating the traditional role of meaning. I contrast the 2D theory's broadly descriptivist approach to meaning individuation with a relational approach.

Influence of script structure on reference resolution and concept recognition in 8 and 11 year-old children.

by Guy Tiberghien

Any sum of parts which are water is water

by henry laycock

HUMANA.MENTE
International Journal of Philosophical Studies founded in Florence in 2007. Official journal of the Italian Philosophical Society

Issue 19 - December 2011
COMPOSITION, COUNTERFACTUALS AND CAUSATION
The idea behind this issue is to offer a representation of the most recent theories and position which are emerging in the debate and take David Lewis as their main theoretical source, critical target, or point of departure

ABSTRACT. Mereological entities often seem to violate ‘ordinary’ ideas of what a concrete object can be like, behaving... more ABSTRACT. Mereological entities often seem to violate ‘ordinary’ ideas of what a concrete object can be like, behaving more like sets than like Aristotelian substances. However, the mereological notions of ‘part’, ‘composition’, and ‘sum’ or ‘fusion’ appear to find concrete realisation in the actual semantics of mass nouns. Quine notes that ‘any sum of parts which are water is water’; and the wine from a single barrel can be bottled and distributed around the globe without affecting its identity. Is there here, as some have claimed, a ‘natural’ or ‘innocent’ form of mereology? The claim rests on the assumption that what a mass noun such as ‘wine’ denotes – the wine from a single barrel , for example – is indeed a unit of a special type, the sum or fusion of its many ‘parts’. The assumption is, however, open to question on semantic grounds.

Words Without Objects (BOOK)

by henry laycock

Clarendon Press, Oxford (this is not the complete book, unfortunately)

CLICK ON THE 'DOWNLOAD' - NOT THE 'QUICK VIEW' [ERROR!]

The book seeks to resolve the so-called ‘problem of mass nouns’ — a problem which cannot be resolved on the basis of a... more The book seeks to resolve the so-called ‘problem of mass nouns’ — a problem which cannot be resolved on the basis of a conventional system of logic. It is not, for instance, possible to explicate assertions of the existence of air, oil, or water through the use of quantifiers and variables which take objectual values. The difficulty is attributable to the semantically distinctive status of non-count nouns — nouns which, although not plural, are nonetheless akin to plural nouns in being semantically non-singular. Such are the semantics of a non-singular noun, that there can be no such single thing or object as the thing of which the noun is true. However, standard approaches to understanding non-singular nouns tend to be reductive, construing them as singular expressions — expressions which, in the case of non-count nouns, are true of ‘parcels’ or ‘quantities’ of stuff, and in the case of plural nouns, are true of ‘plural entities’ or ‘sets’. It is argued that both approaches are equally misguided, that there are no distinctive objects in the extensions of non-singular nouns. With plural nouns, their extensions are identical with those of the corresponding singular expressions. With non-count nouns, because they are not plural, there can be no corresponding singular expressions. In consequence, there are no objects in the extensions of non-count nouns at all. In short, there are no such things as instances of stuff: the world of space and time contains not merely large numbers of discrete concrete things or individuals of diverse kinds, but also large amounts of sheer undifferentiated concrete stuff. Metaphysically, non-singular reference in general is an arbitrary modality of reference, ungrounded in the realities to which it is non-ideally or intransparently correlated.

Mass nouns, count nouns and non-count nouns: philosophical aspects

by henry laycock

The online Concise Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language and Linguistics (below, ScribD) provides access to an accurate, edited version of the article.

THE CENTRAL THESIS OF THIS ARTICLE IS THAT - CONTRARY TO A BELIEF WHICH IS WIDESPREAD AMONG BOTH LINGUISTS AND PHILOSOPHERS - (SO-CALLED) 'MASS' NOUNS ARE SEMANTICALLY NON-SINGULAR: THEY DO NOT DENOTE INDIVIDUAL THINGS OR OBJECTS.

Linguists often distinguish count and non-count nouns (count+ and count-- nouns; CNs and NCNs, for short). The... more Linguists often distinguish count and non-count nouns (count+ and count-- nouns; CNs and NCNs, for short). The distinction, though hardly simple, is both exhaustive and entirely natural. In philosophical writings, by contrast, it is more usual to posit a
dichotomy of count nouns and mass nouns (CNs and MNs) — a dichotomy which is very commonly (and however vaguely) supposed to be of metaphysical or ontological significance. But this dichotomy, unlike that of CNs and NCNs, is deeply problematic; here in consequence I speak only of a supposed dichotomy of CNs and MNs, and by the same token, of a putative category of MNs.

Hilary Putnam: Agyak a tartályban

by Ferenc Ruzsa

A Hungarian translation of Putnam's "Brains in a vat" paper.

Is Gödel a plagiarist? Building Blocks for a New Experimental Semantics.

by Carlos M. Muñoz-Suárez

DRAFT.

Reference and indexicality

by Erich Rast

Rast, Erich: Reference and Indexicality. Serie Logische Philosophie, Vol. 17. Logos, Berlin 2007.

Reference and indexicality are two central topics in the Philosophy of Language that are closely tied together. In the... more Reference and indexicality are two central topics in the Philosophy of Language that are closely tied together. In the first part of this book, a description theory of reference is developed and contrasted with the prevailing direct reference view with the goal of laying out their advantages and disadvantages. The author defends his version of indirect reference against well-known objections raised by Kripke in Naming and Necessity and his successors, and also addresses linguistic aspects like compositionality. In the second part, a detailed survey on indexical expressions is given based on a variety of typological data. Topics addressed are, among others: Kaplan's logic of demonstratives, conversational versus utterance context, context-shifting indexicals, the deictic center, token-reflexivity, vagueness of spatial and temporal indexicals, reference rules, and the epistemic and cognitive role of indexicals. From a descriptivist perspective on reference, various examples of simple and complex indexicals are analyzed in first-order predicate logic with reified contexts. A critical discussion of essential indexicality, de se readings of attitudes and accompanying puzzles rounds up the investigation.

The Access Problem

by michelle montague

(2012a) Cuantificadores y Determinantes

by Diego Gabriel Krivochen

Second draft, comments welcomed!

En este trabajo nos proponemos analizar la sintaxis y semántica de los cuantificadores y determinantes desde la... more En este trabajo nos proponemos analizar la sintaxis y semántica de los cuantificadores y determinantes desde la interfaz entre la gramátic generativa y la Teoría de la Relevancia. Hacemos una revisión de la teoría descripcionalista de Russell sobre la referencia para luego proponer nuestra propia visión, en el marco del Minimalismo Radical (Krivochen, 2011a et. seq.)

Reference and Misdescriptions

by Andrea Marino

Published in Esercizi Filosofici 6, 2011, pp. 76-93

Das Problem der Referenz und der Bedeutung in der Philosophie Hilary Putnams

by Christian Straßer

My Master thesis dealing critically with the problem of reference and meaning the in the philosophy of Hilary Putnam. My Master thesis dealing critically with the problem of reference and meaning the in the philosophy of Hilary Putnam.

Theories of Reference and Experimental Philosophy

by James Genone

Philosophy Compass, Vol. 7, 2012

In recent years, experimental philosophers have questioned the reliance of philosophical arguments on intuitions... more In recent years, experimental philosophers have questioned the reliance of philosophical arguments on intuitions elicited by thought experiments. These challenges seek to undermine the use of this methodology for a particular domain of theorizing, and in some cases to raise doubts about the viability of philosophical work in the domain in question. The topic of semantic reference has been an important area for discussion of these issues, one in which critics of the reliance on intuitions have made particularly strong claims about the prospects for philosophical theories of reference and arguments based on claims about reference. In this article, I review the main lines of argument in this area of experimental philosophy, with particular emphasis on the relevance of empirical data about intuitions to philosophical views. I argue that although traditional philosophical theorizing about reference faces little threat from experimental data about intuitions, there is nevertheless much to be gained from collecting and analyzing such data, which holds the promise of greatly enriching our conception of the mechanisms governing judgments about semantic reference in ways that are highly relevant to philosophers.

The Limits of Conceptual Analysis

by Laura Schroeter

(2004) Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85.

Argues that conceptual analysis is committed to an implausible type of epistemic foundationalism. Argues that conceptual analysis is committed to an implausible type of epistemic foundationalism.

Part Structures In Situations: The Semantics of 'Individual' and 'Whole'

by Friederike Moltmann

Wild Thoughts on Modality, Propositions and Concepts

by Tristan Haze

This is not really a paper, but an unsystematic selection of fairly rough notes toward a book on modality. Maybe it will interest some people. There's 'a lot of hard thinking in it', although some parts of it are certainly foolish. (At one point I get overexcited and claim to have solved "the problem of the contingent a priori", whereas on reflection the things I was saying at the time are none too clear.)

The notes date roughly from October 2010 to May 2011, one of the most intellectually active periods of my life. Readers of Wittgenstein may notice that I am trying to make positive use of something like his method.

For newer, shorter, clearer material cf. http://sprachlogik.blogspot.com/2011/06/sketch-of-way-of-thinking-about.html

My book will be less confused, easier to understand, and better than all of this.