From Dichotomous to Relational Thinking in the Psychology of Creativity: A Review of Great Debates
Lead article in the April 2013 edition of Creativity and Leisure: An Intercultural and Cross-disciplinary Journal
This article invites us to think about the role of dichotomies in the psychology of creativity and how they can... more
This article invites us to think about the role of dichotomies in the psychology of creativity and how they can sometimes lead to a misrepresentation of the phenomenon. Especially when turned into oppositions, which is often the case with dichotomies, distinctions such as those between individual and society, Big C and little c, domain generality and domain specificity, evolutionary and revolutionary creation, product and process, can have detrimental effects on our understanding of the nature and characteristics of creative expression. In contrast, the article advocates for a relational type of logic that encourages us to observe the inter-dependence between categories and the ways in which they are embedded into each other. Examples are given from the five ‘debates’ mentioned above and some consequences of adopting a new way of thinking about creativity discussed towards the end.
Keywords: creativity, dichotomous logic, relational logic, categories, great debates.
Personal construct psychology and social constructionism are not incompatible: Implications of a reframing
Published in Theory & Psychology, 2011
21(3)
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A usual way of thinking about the relationship between personal construct psychology (PCP) and social constructionism... more A usual way of thinking about the relationship between personal construct psychology (PCP) and social constructionism (SC) is treating them as two separate entities that are similar in some aspects, but also very different in others. This paper aims at exploring some of the possible implications of reframing the relationship between PCP and SC. I point to two important implications: treating PCP as a discourse and adding a new metaphor of the person. Finally, I argue that the invitation to reframe the relationship between PCP and SC extends both approaches and offers more than each of them alone. On one hand, it extends and enriches SC theory and points to benefits of applying the PCP “toolkit” to constructionist therapy and research. On the other hand, proposed reframing contributes to PCP theory and points to new ways of addressing social construction in therapeutic conversations.
Priming Effects and Free Will
International Journal of Philosophical Studies (forthcoming)
I argue that the empirical literature on priming effects does not warrant nor suggest the conclusion, drawn by... more I argue that the empirical literature on priming effects does not warrant nor suggest the conclusion, drawn by prominent psychologists such as J. A. Bargh, that we have no free will or less free will than we might think. I focus on a particular experiment by Bargh - the ‘elderly’ stereotype case in which subjects that have been primed with words that remind them of the stereotype of the elderly walk on average slower out of the experiment’s room than control subjects – and I show that we cannot say that subjects cannot help walking slower or that they are not free in doing so. I then illustrate how these cases can be reconciled and normalized within a Davidsonian theory of action to show that, in walking slower, subjects are acting intentionally. My argument applies across various experiments, including those of goal priming. In the final section I argue that the only cases in which priming effects are efficacious are so called Buridan cases.
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Seen by:Habitual creativity: Revising habit, reconceptualising creativity
Review of General Psychology, Vol 16(1), Mar 2012, 78-92
Current psychological scholarship is based on a dichotomy between habit, associated with automatic reflex behaviour,... more
Current psychological scholarship is based on a dichotomy between habit, associated with automatic reflex behaviour, and creativity, which involves deliberation, purpose and heuristic procedures. However, this account is problematic and contradicts everyday experience where mastery, for instance, is one of the highest levels of creative performance achieved within a habitual practice. This article argues that such a separation misrepresents both habit and creativity with important theoretical and practical consequences. A first step towards reconciling the two terms is made by revisiting a series of foundational strands of theory from psychology and related disciplines. In light of these sources, habit is reformulated as a social, situated and open system and habitual creativity defined as the intrinsically creative nature of customary action, reflected in the way habits adjust to dynamic contexts, the way they are used, combined and ultimately perfected. Further distinctions are then made between habit, improvisation and innovation. Both improvisational and innovative creativity are embedded in habitual forms and this is well illustrated by craftwork: a practiced type of activity on the basis of which artisans improvise, whenever obstacles or difficulties are encountered, and even get to innovate, when their intention is to generate novel artefacts or work techniques.
Keywords: creativity, habit, improvisation, innovation, pragmatism, folk art.
Filosofische kritiek op de computer als model voor de verhouding tussen lichaam en geest
by Titus Rivas
Based on an article published in Terugkeer, 15, Winter 2004, Nr. 4, pp. 22-25, entitled "Filosofische kritiek op het computermodel voor de geest".
PSYCHICAL APPEARANCE AND REALITY: KANT, RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE IDENTITY THEORY Kant's error about rational psychology: …
by Titus Rivas
The ontological identity theory is a contradictory position based on the untenable notion of two perspectives from... more The ontological identity theory is a contradictory position based on the untenable notion of two perspectives from which one would be able to consider the conscious mind. The only viable road to the conscious mind is the subjective one. The conscious mind is not really something physical.
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Seen by:De mysterieuze relatie tussen hersenen en geest (The mysterious relationship between the brain and the mind)
by Titus Rivas
Published in Prana, 78, 1993, pp. 69-74,
Metasubjective cognition beyond the brain: Subjective awareness and the location of concepts of consciousness
by Titus Rivas
Also see this Dutch paper:
"Waarom er een psychisch geheugen moet bestaan" at http://www.txtxs.nl/artikel.asp?artid=195
Consciousness has irreducible qualitative and subjective aspects that cannot be represented in a physical, purely... more Consciousness has irreducible qualitative and subjective aspects that cannot be represented in a physical, purely quantitative system. This implies that an exhaustive conceptual ‘metasubjective’ representation (i.e. a representation of the defining properties of conscious experiences) in the brain as an exclusively physical system is impossible. Similarly, individual memories of conscious experiences must contain information about qualitative and subjective aspects as well, since concepts of consciousness ultimately derive from such information abstracted from episodic memories. Therefore, the stored bases from which such individual memories of conscious experiences are reconstructed must also contain elements that cannot be represented in the brain. Both metasubjective concepts and bases of our individual memories of subjective experiences can only be stored in a personal non-physical memory linked to consciousness. There must be a personal mind or psyche that embraces consciousness, metasubjective concepts and bases of episodical memories of one’s subjective experiences.
The efficacy of consciousness and psychological theory: a short comment
by Titus Rivas
The theory of the Non-Efficacy of Consciousness or epiphenomenalism (and other non-reductive forms of physicalism) may... more The theory of the Non-Efficacy of Consciousness or epiphenomenalism (and other non-reductive forms of physicalism) may be influential, but the author shows why they inevitably must be rejected as incoherent. It is time to accept and integrate the consequences of the analytical disqualification of physicalism into theoretical psychology. The ultimate criterion for the a priori-tenability of any fundamental framework for theoretical psychology is to be found in reason rather than mere social consensus.
Laxenburg TECT: Reflections on a literature that GIScientists and Historians do not know
Report for the DynCoopNet Project, TECT (The Evolution of Cooperation and Trading), EUROCORES Scheme, European Science Foundation
Report on the TECT Conference at the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria,... more Report on the TECT Conference at the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria, 15-18 September 2009. Conference title: “Evolution of Cooperation: Models and Theories”; prepared especially for the nineteen core researchers of the TECT project “Dynamic complexity of self-organizing, cooperation-based commercial networks in the first global age”, who were excluded from participation by the collapse of TECT networking funds. The DynCoopNet Project within TECT focuses on cooperation within the networks linking the global domains of Iberian Monarchies during the First Global Age, 1400-1800.
Psychology and Psychologies: which Epistemology? (Introduction)
by Marco Fenici
published in 'HumanaMente', 2006, n. 11, pp. v-xv. Download it at http://www.humanamente.eu/PDF/Issue11_Introduction_Fenici.pdf
If the definition of a scientific discipline depends on the definition of its object of investigation, the unity of... more If the definition of a scientific discipline depends on the definition of its object of investigation, the unity of psychology should depend on the unitarian description of the mind. However, the mind is anything but a unitarian concept. Its common sense definition is subject to temporal and geographical variation because the mental is also a cultural construct; and the variety of psychological disciplines nowadays existing proposes several definitions of the mental. The epistemology of psychology investigates the definition of the mental by assuming the pluralism of the psychological disciplines as a fact, rather than as a problem, and it invites psychologists to reason about the epistemological bases of their empirical research.

