Terrorism and counterterrorism; insurgency and counterinsurgency

Landscapes of political memories: War legacies and land negotiations in Laos

by Ian Baird

Ian G. Baird and Philippe Le Billon (Published online, May 2012) Political Geography

Wars and their aftermaths frequently transform land use and ownership, reshaping ‘post-conflict’ landscapes through... more Wars and their aftermaths frequently transform land use and ownership, reshaping ‘post-conflict’ landscapes through new boundaries, population movements, land reforms and conditions of access. Within a global context of controversial land concessions and farmland acquisitions, we bring to light the continued salience of historical memories of war in the ways land conflicts are being negotiated in Laos. Considering circumstances at different scalesdfrom bilateral government relations to village-level claimsdwe find that political capital linked to memories of wartime affiliations have crucial spatial and place-based connections, and that they affect the ways investors, government officials and villagers negotiate over land concessions. Ethnographic evidence, spatial analysis and a survey of expatriate development workers engaged with land issues in Laos suggest that such ‘political memories’ are an important but often overlooked factor in shaping an uneven concessions landscape. We discuss implications for foreign development organizations that tend to privilege technical and legal aspects of land
management over such political dimensions.

Abductions: Maoists on top in every scenario

by Bibhu Prasad Routray

Published in New Indian Express, 6 May 2012 & Sunday Standard, 6 May 2012

On the surface, it appears that the Odisha government came out relatively unscathed from the month-long abduction... more On the surface, it appears that the Odisha government came out relatively unscathed from the month-long abduction episodes involving two Italians and an MLA. Only a handful of the prisoners were released in exchange. In Chhattisgarh too, with pressure on the Maoists increasing even from their known apologists, it is quite possible that the abducted collector too would be released without the state having to concede too much. Just like the tunes of Ram Dhun marked the release of the MLA in Odisha attempting to depict a peaceful resolution of the episode, Chhattisgarh too would find reason to boast about its methods of negotiating differently. So does it mean that it’s back to normal till one more high-profile abduction takes place? Or do the states have to introspect what these episodes have cost them?

"Gagner les coeurs" pour gagner la guerre? le rôle des identités dans l'alliance américano-pakistanaise contre le terrorisme

by Sophia Benhaddou

Sciences Po Aix diploma thesis, defended in 2011

Dix ans après le début des opérations en Afghanistan, les Etats-Unis se rendent compte que leur « victoire » dans la «... more Dix ans après le début des opérations en Afghanistan, les Etats-Unis se rendent compte que leur « victoire » dans la « lutte contre la terreur » dépend entièrement de la coopération du Pakistan. Or l’alliance américano-pakistanaise rencontre un écueil majeur en ce qu’elle est caractérisée par la méfiance de part et d’autre. Alors que la stratégie de contre-insurrection implémentée dans cette guerre a pour enjeu de gagner les « cœurs et les esprits » de la population locale, l’anti-américanisme grandissant des Pakistanais rend difficile la poursuite d’un tel objectif. Il est notamment nourri par une critique de la politique « ultra-réaliste » des Etats-Unis dans la région et de leur déni de reconnaissance d’une identité pakistanaise.

Stability Operations: From Policy to Practice

by Jason Alexander

Examining the causes of the 9/11 attacks and the responses required to diminish the likelihood of future attacks, the... more Examining the causes of the 9/11 attacks and the responses required to diminish the likelihood of future attacks, the Bush administration undertook a comprehensive national security review. Two significant findings emerged. First, contemporary threats facing the United States could not be mitigated by military force alone. Second, it is necessary to stabilize weak or failed states in order to diminish the grievances terrorists and other spoilers use to mobilize support. The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) acknowledged this new international environment and declared fragile and conflict states a threat to U.S. security. Consequently, “stabilizing” these countries became a foreign policy goal. The Obama administration’s May 2010 NSS continued this policy. Nevertheless, U.S. responses to unstable environments remain ad hoc and in most cases ineffective. While there are numerous challenges, a key constraint is the lack of practical tools for civilian and military field personnel conducting stability operations. This article examines the features of stability operations; reasons why bureaucratic, doctrinal, and policy changes have not had an effect at the operational and tactical levels; and how the use of USAID’s District Stabilization Framework (DSF) can help practitioners conduct more effective stability operations.

Adaptive Red Teaming: Protecting Across the Spectrum

by John P. Sullivan

Co-authored with Adam Elkus. 'Red Team Journal' Occasional Paper 01, July 2010.

Adaptive red teaming involves an iterative range of analytical and physical approaches to understanding an adversary.... more Adaptive red teaming involves an iterative range of analytical and physical approaches to understanding an adversary. These approaches are valuable tools for counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and counter‐violence approaches and are used by military, police, and critical infrastructure protection professionals. This essay reviews the concept of adaptive red teaming and discusses some of the analytical red teaming tools available for intelligence assessments and operational planning. This essay reviews the concept of adaptive red teaming and discusses some of the analytical red teaming tools available for intelligence assessments and operational planning.

A Mujahideen Conundrum: The multiple faces and roles of the Iranian MeK

by Eduardo Lacerda

This paper attempts to understand the ambiguous and multifaceted role played by the Islamic-Socialist organization... more This paper attempts to understand the ambiguous and multifaceted role played by the Islamic-Socialist organization Mojāhedin-e Khalq (MeK) in its trajectory from anti-Shah dissident to anti-American terrorist, from American protégé to pro-western spy. The American troops protect the MeK members as a politically threatened minority while at the same time the US Department of State classifies it as FTO- Foreign Terrorist Organization. I argue that historical changes and political choices of both the USA and Iran prompted the MeK to assume diverse and even contradictory roles, while attempting to reach its main goal of defeating the Islamic Regime of Iran.

Beyond Active Response: An Operational Concept for Police Counterterrorism Response

by John P. Sullivan

Co-authored with Adan Elkus at 'New Criminologist,' 14 May 2010.

This paper reviews the need for the development of 'police operational art' to address complex threats and high... more This paper reviews the need for the development of 'police operational art' to address complex threats and high intensity crime and terrorist attacks.

Public Transportation Security, Volume 1: Communication of Threats: A Guide

by John P. Sullivan

Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) Report 86, Vol. 1; co-authored with John N. Balog and Matthew G. Devost, Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2002.

Rapid and accurate information sharing is a critical operational need for coping with threats against public... more Rapid and accurate information sharing is a critical operational need for coping with threats against public transportation systems. This first volume of TCRP Report 86: Public Transportation Security will be of interest to transit general managers, police and staff in security, operations, communications, information technology, training, and human resources. It will also be of interest to federal, state, and local law enforcement. This volume offers information on a variety of approaches to improving the sharing of threat information. Current practices, operational needs, technologies for threat information dissemination, and system functional requirements are discussed. Effective strategies for sharing analyzed and unanalyzed reports of suspicious activities and a path to an interoperable set of national, regional, and local threat-information forums are proposed.

Postcard from Mumbai: Modern Urban Siege

by John P. Sullivan

Co-authored with Adam Elkus in 'Small Wars Journal,' 16 February 2009.

According to many television news reports, the Mumbai terrorist attacks were a "siege." But there were no... more According to many television news reports, the Mumbai terrorist attacks were a "siege." But there were no catapults, cannons, or breaching ladders. Instead, a dozen men with guns paralyzed one of the world's largest cities, killing 173 with barely concealed glee. Sadly, Mumbai heralds a new chapter in the bloody story of war in cities—the siege of the city from within. The polis is fast becoming a war zone where criminals, terrorists, and heavily armed paramilitary forces battle—and all can be targeted. All the while, gardens of steel spring up, constricting popular movement and giving way to an evolving architecture of fear. The "feral city" and the military colony battle each other for dominance in the urban siege.

Defending against the urban siege requires bridging the gap between police and military, building a layered defense, and fighting to preserve the right to the city. Despite the terrifying nature of the threat, the ultimate advantage lies with the vibrant modern city and the police, soldiers, and civilians tasked to defend it. The key to success lies in the construction of resilient physical and moral infrastructure.

The New Great Game: Military, Police and Strategic Intelligence for Global Security

by John P. Sullivan

In 'Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism,' Volume 2, Issue 2, 2007.

Intelligence and counter terrorism are key elements of the contemporary global security environment. Profound changes... more Intelligence and counter terrorism are key elements of the contemporary global security environment. Profound changes in the nature of states fuelled by globalization, information technology, and the influence of non‐state actors are changing the structure and dynamics of intelligence. A range of global threats and conditions influence the contemporary global security and intelligence stage. These include global insurgency and terrorism (as seen in the Salafist jihadi struggle with the West), the rise of global business and civil society, global political movements, transnational organized crime, the rise of global cities, networked diasporas, global disease, and the prospect of planet‐wide climate change. Yet, while all players in this new ‘Great Game’ recognize that intelligence is essential to situational understanding, few have the institutional structure, experience, and understanding of the various types of intelligence necessary to negotiate the current and emerging security environment. This article will review the threats and conditions influencing global security environment, and discuss the roles of military, police, and strategic intelligence in understanding this environment.

Suicide Bombings in Operation Iraqi Freedom

by John P. Sullivan

Land Warfare Paper Co-authored with Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan (Land Warfare Paper 46W, September 2004)

The authors' research details about the historical and strategic context of this form of warfare, how it has affected... more The authors' research details about the historical and strategic context of this form of warfare, how it has affected coalition forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom and how the U.S. Army needs to adapt to the enemy’s continuing use of suicide attacks in the future.

Future Conflict: Criminal Insurgencies, Gangs and Intelligence

by John P. Sullivan

At 'Small Wars Journal,' 31 May 2009.

Gangs dominate the intersection between crime and war. Traditionally viewed as criminal enterprises of varying degrees... more Gangs dominate the intersection between crime and war. Traditionally viewed as criminal enterprises of varying degrees of sophistication and reach, some gangs have evolved into potentially more dangerous and destabilizing actors. In many areas across the world—especially in 'criminal enclaves' or 'lawless zones' where civil governance, traditional security structures, and community or social bonds have eroded—gangs thrive. This essay briefly examines the dynamics of crime and war in these contested regions. Specifically, it provides a framework for understanding 'criminal insurgencies' where acute and endemic crime and gang violence challenge the solvency of state political control.

Preventing Another Mumbai: Building a Police Operational Art

by John P. Sullivan

Co-authored with Adam Elkus at 'CTC Sentinel,' Vol.2, Issue 6 (Combating Terrorism Center, US Military Academy, West Point).

Half a year after the devastating Mumbai attack in November 2008, its lessons have yet to be learned. Many have... more Half a year after the devastating Mumbai attack in November 2008, its lessons have yet to be learned. Many have commented on the disorganization of the Indian police and security forces’ response, but fail to address the problem’s root cause. The Mumbai police’s command and control failures, slowness and disorganization of tactical response, and inability to prevent the terrorists from entrenching are rooted in a central doctrinal flaw: the lack of police operational art. Police operational art is defined as the capacity to go beyond managing single tactical incidents to influencing the effects of multiple incidents in multiple locations over time. Current police practice, for example, conceives response as a series of tactical engagements, rather than a campaign with many different elements that must be intricately coordinated to achieve a larger aim. Operational myopia is not exclusive to Mumbai—even the best American police units do not effectively recognize or utilize the operational level of maneuver.

Narco-Armor in Mexico

by John P. Sullivan

Co-authored with Adam Elkus at 'Small Wars Journal,' 14 July 2011

Known alternatively as "narco-tanks" (narcotanques), "Rhino trucks," and "monster... more Known alternatively as "narco-tanks" (narcotanques), "Rhino trucks," and "monster trucks"(monstruos), the crude armored vehicles emerging in Mexico's cartel war are evidence of a changing tactical logic on the ground. "Narco-tanks" are better characterized as improvised armored fighting vehicles (IAFVs)—portending a shift in the infantry-centric nature of the cartel battlespace.

Narco-tactics have been, for the most part, infantry-centric—consisting of small raids, blockades, and gun battles. The use of armored sport utility vehicles for transportation, raids, and tactical in-battle maneuver is largely an extension of the small unit infantry operations that characterize the tactical logic of the cartel war. The presence of armored vehicles ups the ante.

Explosive Escalation? Reflections on the Car Bombing in Ciudad Juarez

by John P. Sullivan

At 'Small Wars Journal,' 21 July 2010.

In an apparently significant acceleration of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), Mexican cartel violence... more In an apparently significant acceleration of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), Mexican cartel violence embraced the car bomb in an attack on Federal police in embattled Ciudad Juárez last Thursday, 15 July 2010. Not only did the attack employ a car bomb (apparently a primitive improvised explosive secreted inside a car not the fully-integrated variant found in Iraq, and the AfPak theatres known as a VBIED), but it also was an ambush that directly targeted police. This TTP is a classic insurgent attack method that promises to be part of Mexico's future engagements in its on-going criminal insurgencies.

Barbarization and Narcocultura: Reading the Evolution of Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency

by John P. Sullivan

Co-authored with Adam Elkus at 'Small Wars Journal.' 31 August 2011.

Mexico’s criminal conflicts continue to rage, and the government, cartels, and vigilantes increasingly contest the... more Mexico’s criminal conflicts continue to rage, and the government, cartels, and vigilantes increasingly contest the crucial plazas surrounding drug trafficking routes. Our series on Mexico’s criminal insurgency (or more specifically interlocked criminal insurgencies) has covered a number of trends—such as the emergence of cartel operations against the state in 2007, the growing trend of “societal warfare” and barbarism as well as internecine cartel warfare since 2010, the narco-cultural dimension and the growing international element of cartel operations. In the time since our last assessment in February 2010, many of these trends have intensified.

This essay will focus primarily on methods of interpreting the drug war, societal warfare, sophistication of cartel operations, and the internationalization of the conflict. This piece aggregates other publications on the violence since our last update, collecting many pieces of events and trends and modes of analysis observed and published in the interim.

Cartel v. Cartel: Mexico's Criminal Insurgency

by John P. Sullivan

Co-authored with Adam Elkus at 'Small Wars Journal,' 01 February 2010.

As the decade ends, Mexico's criminal insurgency continues. Yet the narco-war in 2010 is not identical to the violence... more As the decade ends, Mexico's criminal insurgency continues. Yet the narco-war in 2010 is not identical to the violence that began three years ago. Mexico's criminal insurgency at the beginning of 2010 is distinguished by three main trends: continuing (though increasingly diffused) violence against the state, increasing militarization of the Mexican state's response, and a growing feeling of defeat among some within Mexican policy circles. Additionally, the conflict has assumed broader transnational dimensions.

On the surface, the conflict has entered into a period of seeming stasis. But it is a bloody stalemate—and the war promises to continue simmering well into this year and beyond. According to the Mexican press, 2009 may have been the bloodiest year of the war, with 7,600 Mexicans perishing in the drug war. Whatever the nature of the conflict, the danger still remains to American interests. As we have noted before, loose talk of a Mexican "failed state" obscures the real problem of a subtler breakdown of government authority and bolstering of the parallel authorities that cartels have already created.

Criminal Insurgency in the Americas

by John P. Sullivan

At 'Small Wars Journal,' 13 February 2010.

Transnational criminal organizations and gangs are threatening state institutions throughout the Americas. In extreme... more Transnational criminal organizations and gangs are threatening state institutions throughout the Americas. In extreme circumstances, cartels, gangs or maras, drug trafficking organizations, and their paramilitary enforcers are waging de facto criminal insurgencies to free themselves from the influence of the state.

A wide variety of criminal gangs are waging war amongst themselves and against the state. Rampant criminal violence enabled by corruption and weak state institutions has allowed some criminal enterprises to develop virtual or parallel states. These contested or "temporary autonomous" zones create what theorist John Robb calls "hollow states" with areas where the legitimacy of the state is severely challenged. These fragile, sometimes lawless zones (or criminal enclaves) cover territory ranging from individual neighborhoods, favelas or colonias to entire cities—such as Ciudad Juaréz—to large segments of exurban terrain in Guatemala's Petén province, and sparsely policed areas on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua.

As a consequence, the Americas are increasingly besieged by the violence and corrupting influences of criminal actors exploiting stateless territories (criminal enclaves and mafia-dominated municipalities) linked to the global criminal economy to build economic muscle and, potentially, political might.

Insurgencia Criminal en las Américas

by John P. Sullivan

At 'Small Wars Journal,' 27 March 2011. This article was orginally published in English at 'Small Wars Journal' as "Criminal Insurgency in the Americas" on 13 February 2011.

Organizaciones criminales transnacionales y las pandillas están amenazando instituciones estatales en todas partes de... more Organizaciones criminales transnacionales y las pandillas están amenazando instituciones estatales en todas partes de las Américas. En circunstancias extremas, los carteles, las pandillas o maras, las organizaciones de tráfico de drogas, y sus encargados de hacer cumplir paramilitares están librando de facto insurgencias criminales para liberarse de la influencia del estado.

Una gran variedad de pandillas criminales están librando una guerra entre si y contra el estado. La violencia criminal desenfrenada realizada por la corrupción y la debilidad de las instituciones estatales han permitido que algunas empresas criminales desarrollen estados virtual o correspondiente. Estas zonas disputados o "temporal autónomos" introducen lo que el teórico John Robb llama "estados vacios" con áreas donde la legitimidad del estado está severamente desafiada. Estas zona frágiles, a veces sin ley (o enclaves criminal) cubre el territorio que se extiende de las vecindades individuales, a favelas o colonias, hasta ciudades enteras—tales como Ciudad Juárez—a grandes segmentos de terrón afueras en la provincia de Guatemala, Petén, y en zonas escasamente vigiladas de la Costa Atlántica de Nicaragua.

Como consecuencia, las Américas son cada vez mas sitiado por la violencia y la influencia corruptora de los actores criminales explotando territorios sin estado (enclaves criminales y los municipios dominados por la mafia) vinculado a la economí­a criminal global para construir musculo económico y, potencialmente, la fuerza polí­tica.

Terrorism Early Warning and Counterterrorism Intelligence

by John P. Sullivan

Co-authored with James J. Wirtz: Sullivan, John P. and Wirtz, James J. (2008) 'Terrorism Early Warning and Counterterrorism Intelligence', International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 21:1, 13 - 25

Contemporary terrorist networks challenge state institutions and global security. The 11 September 2001 attacks on New... more Contemporary terrorist networks challenge state institutions and global security. The 11 September 2001 attacks on New York City and Washington, DC, the M-11 (Eme Once) attacks against the Madrid Metro, and the 7 July 2005 attacks on the London Underground highlight the threat posed by transnational terrorism. Extremist organizations, exemplified by al-Qaeda and its affiliates, are complex, nonstate actors. They undertake operations using transnational networks that draw upon a galaxy of like-minded individuals and sympathetic groups. These operations transect traditional boundaries between national security and criminal law enforcement, exploiting the legal and bureaucratic seams between crime and war. In operational terms, the difference between terrorist networks and criminal gangs is actually diminishing as terrorists turn to criminals to help finance their activities, and as criminal gangs come to see terrorists as a new and lucrative market for their goods and services.