Later Roman Battle Tactics
by Ross Cowan
in C. Koepfer, F.W. Himmler and J. Löffl (eds), Die römische Armee im Experiment (Region im Umbruch, Band 6). Frank & Timme, Berlin 2011, 267-286
How did the emperors Septimius Severus, Aurelian, Constantine the Great and Julian the Apostate fight and win their... more
How did the emperors Septimius Severus, Aurelian, Constantine the Great and Julian the Apostate fight and win their battles? This essay demonstrates how Roman commanders of the later second, third and fourth centuries AD drew on the classic repertoire of battle formations and manoeuvres that had served Julius Caesar, and added their own devastating refinements.
We begin with the first battle of Adrianople in AD 313. This lesser-known conflict, which secured Licinius’ control of the eastern half of the Roman Empire, is also significant as one of the last encounters between classic legionary forces, but little is known about the organisation of the opposing armies or the tactics employed. An investigation of legionary battle organisation in the second to early fourth centuries AD follows, and it is shown how the ancient triplex acies (triple battle line) system was revived, and how it continued, in altered form, into the later fourth century. Our attention then turns to the decisive cavalry and anti-cavalry tactics employed by Aurelian, Constantine and the generals of Septimius Severus. We then consider how defensive and offensive formations like the forfex, agmen quadratum, orbis and cuneus were employed. Finally, we return to the first battle of Adrianople to fill in the gaps concerning the organisation of the rival armies and their tactics.
Value of Expertise for Forecasting Decisions in Conflicts
by J Armstrong
Co-authored with Kesten C. Green.
In important conflicts such as wars and labor-management disputes, people typically rely on the judgment of experts to... more
In important conflicts such as wars and labor-management disputes, people typically rely on the judgment of experts to predict the decisions that will be made. We compared the accuracy of 106 forecasts by experts and 169 forecasts by novices about eight real conflicts. The forecasts of experts who used their unaided judgment were little better than those of novices. Moreover, neither group’s forecasts were much more accurate than simply guessing. The forecasts of experienced experts were no more accurate than the forecasts of those with less experience. The experts were nevertheless confident in the accuracy of their forecasts. Speculating that consideration of the relative frequency of decisions across similar conflicts might improve accuracy, we obtained 89 sets of frequencies from novices instructed to assume there were 100 similar situations. Forecasts based on the frequencies were no more accurate than 96 forecasts from novices asked to pick the single most likely decision. We conclude that expert judgment should not be used for predicting decisions that people will make in conflicts.
When decision makers ask experts for their opinions, they are likely to overlook other, more useful, approaches.
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Seen by:Scorched-Earth Tactics in Ottoman Hungary: On a Controversy in Military Theory and Practice on the Habsburg–Ottoman Frontier. In: Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 61. (2008) No. 1–2. [Festschrift for Gyula Káldy-Nagy] p. 181–200.
by Géza Pálffy
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Seen by: and 15 moreThe Battle of Nisibis, AD 217
by Ross Cowan
Ancient Warfare 3.5 (2009), 29-35
In AD 217, the armies of Rome and Parthia met in battle for the last time. Sometimes presented as a Parthian victory,... more In AD 217, the armies of Rome and Parthia met in battle for the last time. Sometimes presented as a Parthian victory, the battle of Nisibis was in fact a draw, with the Romans employing a range of tactics that effectively countered the Parthians' superiority in missile troops and cavalry. The article also considers the problem of Caracalla's 'Macedonian phalanx' and the phalangarii of legio II Parthica.
Changing Formations and Specialists: Aspects of Later Roman Battle Tactics
by Ross Cowan
Ancient Warfare 3.6 (2009), 44-49
This article examines three aspects of Roman battle tactics in the second to fourth centuries AD. First, what is the... more This article examines three aspects of Roman battle tactics in the second to fourth centuries AD. First, what is the evidence in this period for the triplex acies, the classic triple battle line? Second, how did light Roman infantry and light cavalry operate against cataphracts and clibanarii? Third, what were forfex, orbis and cuneus formations?
The Centuria in Battle: Tactical Organisation and Combat
by Ross Cowan
Ancient Warfare special issue 2010: Core of the Legion: The Roman Imperial Centuria, 36-49
The ancient literary sources refer predominantly to legions and their cohorts, but the legionary cohort lacked a... more
The ancient literary sources refer predominantly to legions and their cohorts, but the legionary cohort lacked a commanding officer and it is therefore difficult to understand how it operated in battle. However, the six centuries from which the cohort was composed did possess commanders and essential under officers that allowed them to function as tactical units. The centuriae were the real building blocks of the legions. Sections include:
The contubernium
Veterans in the front ranks
File closers and optiones
Where did the centurion stand?
The centurial command group
The number of ranks
Deployment
The cohort command conundrum
A return to manipular tactics?
The last vexillations
Principles of War - A Tacticians Thoughts - A military Approach To Cyber Security
As a former Cyber Operations Officer and Intelligence Professional - Jose "Joey" Hernandez put together this document to spur conversation and open the thought process to introducing tactical approaches to Cyber Security Defense
Joey Hernandez CISSP CISM MBCI CE|H Sec+
Elevated age in cyber warfare
Malware has become focused
SCADA Systems (Stuxnet)
Malware performs... more
Elevated age in cyber warfare
Malware has become focused
SCADA Systems (Stuxnet)
Malware performs Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE)
Conficker (Millions still infected)
Ransomeware
Data is being held hostage
The advanced capability of the threat has increased the risk.
Understanding the risk allows employment of defensive measures to mitigate the risk – “Risk will always be present”
Out With the Old, in With the New: the Civil War Switch From Napoleonic to Trench Warfare
by Conor Reid
The American Civil War was a war dominated by outdated Napoleonic-era battle tactics. As the war dragged on,... more The American Civil War was a war dominated by outdated Napoleonic-era battle tactics. As the war dragged on, countless battles were won and lost thanks to the blood and sacrifice of thousands of Americans, sometimes needlessly. The weapons of war had changed, so Napoleonic tactics simply caused more casualties than were needed. Late in the war, a few men realized this and slowly began to change their tactics from Napoleonic to trench warfare. As the war ended, more and more people realized the advantages of trench warfare, and it slowly became the main battle tactic of armies worldwide. The American Civil War served as a testing ground for new tactics, and demonstrated that the old tactics used by Napoleon and others during that era were obsolete because of the new advances made in the weapons of war.
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