Substance (Theory of Categories)

R. Chiaradonna, "Connaissance des intelligibles et degrés de la substance: Plotin et Aristote", Études Platoniciennes, 3 (2006), pp. 57-85

by Riccardo Chiaradonna

J O'Shea - Kantian Matters: The Structure of Permanence' in Acta Analytica 1996

by James O'Shea

In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues for a 'Principle of the Permanence of Substance' (A182, the 'First Analogy... more In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues for a 'Principle of the Permanence of Substance' (A182, the 'First Analogy of Experience'). Put in the most general terms, Kant offers a transcendental argument for the conclusion that all the changing appearances we encounter in experience must be conceived as the alterations of absolutely permanent, forever abiding substance. It is widely acknowledged that it is difficult to find an actual argument for this thesis in the text. The source of the difficulty, however, lies at least as much in unclarity as to what exactly Kant is trying to prove as to how he goes about proving it. Consequently for the bulk of this paper I will be less concerned with the structure and validity of Kant's argument than with the correct interpretation of his unique conception of substance and material reality in general. I will then argue that correcting certain basic misconceptions concerning the nature of Kantian material substance serves to put his argument for absolute permanence in proper perspective.

The Separability and Individuality of Substance: Potentiality and Actuality in Aristotle

by J.W. Trull

Object

by henry laycock

I have converted my own copy of this 2010 piece, which appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, from WP into PDF for this document.
A LIVE-LINKS COMPLETE BIBLIOGRAPHY FOLLOWS
http://philpapers.org/sep/object/

ABSTRACT. The Frege / Russell account of the object-concept is here called into question. The most general category or... more ABSTRACT. The Frege / Russell account of the object-concept is here called into question. The most general category or concept of an object is a formal one -- a logico-semantic category which is not (as is commonly supposed) exhaustive of what may be thought or said to be. Bona fide objects, whether abstract or concrete, must be countable - 'no entity without identity' (and hence without distinctness). But stuff or matter is not countable and cannot be understood in terms of objects. The issue is significant, if only because the predicate calculus rests upon the object-concept: non-count nouns have no place within the notation

Some Questions of Ontology

by henry laycock

Journal: The Philosophical Review

Matter does not fit within the traditional 'Universal / Particular' dichotomy of metaphysics; and words for matter -... more Matter does not fit within the traditional 'Universal / Particular' dichotomy of metaphysics; and words for matter - MASS NOUNS or NONCOUNT NOUNS are not, as is usually supposed, semantically singular. The views of Quine and Strawson are analysed and rejected. Matter is an ontologically distinct category from that of objects and the semantics of mass nouns are closely related to those of plural nouns.

THIS IS, I BELIEVE, THE VERY FIRST FORMULATION OF THE IDEA THAT 'MASS NOUNS' ARE SEMANTICALLY NON-SINGULAR

The Matter of Objects

by henry laycock

Forthcoming conference proceedings

Michael Pelis (ed.): The Logica Yearbook 2011,
College Publications, London, 2012..

The final sections of the work include discussion of the problem of MIXTURE, following from Aristotle's distinction between MIXIS and SYNTHESIS

THIS PAPER IS A BITE-SIZED MANIFESTO WHICH ATTACKS THE IDENTIFICATION OF EXISTENCE-STATEMENTS WITH QUANTIFIED SENTENCES. THE KEY INNOVATION OF THIS HIGHLY PROGRAMMATIC WORK CONSISTS IN ITS BRIEF ARGUMENT FOR THE VIEW THAT THERE ARE SENTENCES WITHOUT SUBJECTS AT ANY LEVEL BEYOND THE SYNTACTIC -: SENTENCES WHICH ARE NEITHER QUANTIFIED, NOR REFERENTIAL IN THE FULL-BLOODED (OR ANY OTHER) SENSE.

In formal, logico-semantic terms, the concept of an object, individual or thing is widely thought to be exhaustive.... more In formal, logico-semantic terms, the concept of an object, individual or thing is widely thought to be exhaustive. Whatever we may say or think – it is supposed – our thought or talk is always thought or talk of objects. Here, I briefly sketch out and defend a rival view: like that of a property, the concept of an object is best understood in terms of that which it excludes. Object-concepts correspond to count nouns; but count nouns are just one of two great categories of nouns, the other being that of non-count nouns. Both count nouns, and the concept of an object, are inseparable from reference and identity – but non-count nouns are not; and they are not a vehicle for thought or talk of objects in the first place.

The Building Blocks of Spinoza's Metaphysics: Substance, Attributes, and Modes

by Yitzhak Melamed

Forthcoming in Michael Della Rocca (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Chisholm's Changing Conception of Ordinary Objects

by Mark Steen

Grazer Philosophische Studien 76

Aristotle, Metaphysics, Z, 3, 1029a6

by Luca Gili

forthcoming in Classical Quarterly 62.1 (2012).