Special Operations And Low Intensity Conflict

The Haganah and SOE: Allies and Enemies - Irregular Warfare & Politics in Mandatory Palestine - Given at SMH 2012

by Jacob Stoil

‘Act of Valor’: A Review and Commentary (Review)

by Jeff Emanuel

Review of "Act of Valor," directed by Mike McCoy and Scott Waugh (Bandito Brothers, 2012)

The Degüello: The Story of One Special Forces A-Team and the Mission of a Lifetime (Review)

by Jeff Emanuel

Review of "The Degüello," by Scott A. Zastrow (Lulu, 2011)

Is There a Future for Targeted Killing?

by Danny Steed

Published in Infinity Journal, Volume 2, Issue 1, Winter 2011

Targeted Killing is a richly topical as well as controversial subject: will their controversy be their demise? Danny... more Targeted Killing is a richly topical as well as controversial subject: will their controversy be their demise? Danny Steed argues that not only does Targeted Killing have a future, but it will be of increasing relevance to strategic practitioners.

Transforming Counterinsurgent Strategy - Using the Topography of Intelligence

by Lukas Milevski

Infinity Journal 2/1 (December 2011), 21-24.

Covert Operations, Strategic Asset

by Simon Anglim

Draft paper on covert activities. Rejected already by one journal as possibly 'too hot to handle.'

Stuxnet and Strategy - A Special Operation in Cyberspace?

by Lukas Milevski

Joint Force Quarterly 63 (October 2011). Has been translated into Persian (unsanctioned). On the 2011-2012 reading list for the "Warfighting" course at the Air War College, USA. Reprinted in USI Digest (September 2011 - February 2012). On the 2012 syllabus for the "Policy Analysis: Military Force Planning and Decision Making" course at Princeton University.

Orde Wingate in the Sudan, 1928-1933: Formative Experiences of the Chindit Commander

by Simon Anglim

Special Forces - Strategic Asset

by Simon Anglim

Draft copy of the paper I published in 'Infinity' No.2, March 2011, on the strategic utility of Special Forces

Special Forces are military assets designed and trained to conduct tactical actions delivering strategic outcome out... more Special Forces are military assets designed and trained to conduct tactical actions delivering strategic outcome out of proportion with their size and that if conducted by conventional units may have disproportionate negative impact on policy.  The aim of Special Forces is to deliver high precision at lower risk and cost than might otherwise be possible.
The very need for Special Forces has been questioned.  The author has been told at various times that Special Forces leech away the best people from the rest of an army, that there is nothing they do in general war that a well-trained infantry unit cannot do, that their role in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism would be performed better by armed police, and that they survive and prosper thanks to the ‘elite force’ image they project, yet which has been their undoing more than once thanks to the hubris it can generate.  The paper is an unapologetic rebuttal of those arguments and a case for Special Forces being a vital strategic asset performing functions others cannot.

Orde Wingate,'Guerrilla'Warfare and Long-range Penetration, 1940–44

by Simon Anglim

A draft copy of the paper summarising the development of Orde Wingate's military thought, post-Palestine, published in 'Small Wars and Insurgencies', Volume 17 No.3, September 2006.

Major General Orde Wingate was a highly controversial figure in his time and remains so among historians. However, his... more Major General Orde Wingate was a highly controversial figure in his time and remains so among historians. However, his eccentric and colourful personality has drawn attention away from the nature of his military ideas, the most important of which was his concept of long range penetration, which originated from his observations of his operations in Italian-occupied Ethiopia in 1941, and evolved into the model he put into practice in the Chindit operations in Burma in 1943-44. A review of Wingate’s own official writings on this subject reveals that long range penetration combined local guerrilla irregulars, purpose-trained regular troops and airpower into large-scale offensive operations deep in the enemy rear, with the intention of disrupting his planning process and creating situation regular forces could exploit. This evolved organically from Major General Colin Gubbins’ doctrine for guerrilla resistance in enemy occupied areas, and bears some resemblance to the operational model applied by US and Allied forces, post September 2001.

Major General Orde Wingate's Chindit Operations in World War II - Historical Case Study for the Operating without a Net Project

by Simon Anglim

This paper was authored by me in 2008-2009 for the SCITOR consultancy as part of a research project for the US Department of Defense on how modern military forces can operate dispersed and without a reliable communications network.

  Major General Orde Charles Wingate formed his Long-Range Penetration Groups, or 'Chindits' in order to carry... more   Major General Orde Charles Wingate formed his Long-Range Penetration Groups, or 'Chindits' in order to carry out operations against Japanese lines of communication and other vulnerable points behind their lines in occupied Burma in 1942.  These units, as of necessity, worked dispersed, in rough country, with no lines of communication of their own and just a limited number of radios to exercise command and control.  Wingate overcame these deficiencies via resupply by airdrop and by intensive training with the intention of enforcing a common tactical doctrine and procedures for many other important activities, so they could perform to his satisfaction without supervision from above.  He also practised a clear form of 'mission command' tolerating a high level of initiative from his subordinate commanders and allowing them to find their own solutions to any tactical problems they encountered.

Orde Wingate And The British Army, 1922-1944: Military Thought and Practice Compared and Contrasted

by Simon Anglim

Callwell versus Graziani: how the British Army applied 'small wars' techniques in major operations in Africa and the Middle East, 1940–41

by Simon Anglim

This is a manuscript copy of a paper I published in 'Small Wars and Insurgencies', Volume 19 No.4, December 2008

The period 1940-41 saw British forces in North and East Africa, and the Middle East, defeat considerably larger... more The period 1940-41 saw British forces in North and East Africa, and the Middle East, defeat considerably larger Italian and Vichy French forces in the Western Desert, Ethiopia, Somaliland and Syria. A key factor in this was the use at the operational and tactical level of fast-moving mobile forces, operating dispersed and with considerable initiative devolved upon junior commanders. This has been put down to a range of influences - Liddell Hart, Percy Hobart, Eric Dorman-Smith, etc, but this paper demonstrates its origins in the 'small wars' practices of the inter-war years, upon which a major influence was Major General Callwell's much-cited, but not often read tome, 'Small Wars'.

Orde Wingate and the Special Night Squads: A Feasible Policy for Counter-terrorism?

by Simon Anglim

Draft copy of the paper I published in 'Contemporary Security Policy' Volume 28 No.1, April 2007.

This paper analyses the counter terrorist operations carried out by Captain (later Major General) Orde Wingate in... more This paper analyses the counter terrorist operations carried out by Captain (later Major General) Orde Wingate in Palestine in 1938 and whether these might inform current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Wingate’ s Special Night Squads were formed from British soldiers and Jewish police specifically to counter terrorist and sabotage attacks, and their approach escalated from interdicting terrorist gangs to pre-emptive attacks on suspected terrorist sanctuaries to reprisal attacks in response to terrorist atrocities. They continued the British practice of using irregular units in counterinsurgency, which was sustained into the post war era and contributed to the evolution of British Special Forces. Wingate’s methods proved effective in pacifying terrorist-infested areas and could certainly be applied again, but only in the face of ‘friction' arising from changes in cultural attitudes since the 1930s, and from the political-strategic context of post-2001 counterinsurgent and counterterrorist operations..

Plan Colombia Under Clinton: 1993-2001

by Leif Brecke

U.S. intervention in Colombia was initially sold to the American public as necessary to contain the threat of... more U.S. intervention in Colombia was initially sold to the American public as necessary to contain the threat of Communism. Plan Colombian, under Clinton was sold to the American public under the guise of the “War on Drugs” to curb narcotics flow into the U.S. The hegemonic discourse is that the American public demanded “strong leadership” in a battle against the corruption of America's youth. In reality, the Clinton administration heavily financed a “manufacture of consent” under Drug Czar Barry McCaffrey. I will demonstrate this propaganda machine and Clinton's crony corporate network that profited from this war.