Social Dilemmas

Of virtual victims and victimized virtues: differential effects of experienced aggression in video games on social cooperation

by Tobias Rothmund

Rothmund, T., Gollwitzer, M. & Klimmt, C. (2011).
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37(1), 107-119.

In two experimental studies we investigated how interacting with aggressive virtual characters in video games affects... more In two experimental studies we investigated how interacting with aggressive virtual characters in video games affects trust and cooperation of players. Study 1 demonstrates that experiencing virtual aggression from a victim’s perspective can impair players’ investments in a subsequent common goods dilemma situation. This effect is mediated by reduced expectations of trust in the cooperativeness of interaction partners. In Study 2 the same effect was replicated by using a different cooperation task and by investigating the moderating role of justice sensitivity from a victim’s perspective as a dispositional factor. Participants transferred less money to an unknown partner in a trust game after the exposure to aggressive non player characters in a video game. This effect was stronger for people high in victim sensitivity. Results of both studies can be interpreted in line with the sensitivity to mean intentions model and add to the body of research on violent media effects.

Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds

by Tatsuya Sasaki

Co-authored with Tatsuo Unemi (Soka Univ., Japan); preprint; published in 'Journal of Theoretical Biology', 2011

Which punishment or rewards are most effective at maintaining cooperation in public goods interactions and deterring... more Which punishment or rewards are most effective at maintaining cooperation in public goods interactions and deterring defectors who are willing to freeload on others’ contribution? The sanction system is itself a public good and can cause problematic “second-order free riders” who do not contribute to the provisions of the sanctions and thus may subvert the cooperation supported by sanctioning. Recent studies have shown that public goods games with punishment can lead to a coercion-based regime if participation in the game is optional. Here, we reveal that even with compulsory participation, rewards can maintain cooperation within an infinitely large population. We consider three strategies for players in a standard public goods game: to be a cooperator or a defector in a standard public goods game, or to be a rewarder who contributes to the public good and to a fund that rewards players who contribute during the game. Cooperators do not contribute to the reward fund and are therefore classified as second-order free riders. The replicator dynamics for the three strategies exhibit a rock-scissors-paper cycle, and can be analyzed fully, despite the fact that the expected payoffs are nonlinear. The model does not require repeated interaction, spatial structure, group selection, or reputation. We also discuss a simple method for second-order sanctions, which can lead to a globally stable state where 100% of the population are rewarders.

Sex Differences in Cooperation: A Meta-analytic Review of Social Dilemmas

by Daniel Balliet

Balliet, D., Li, N. P., Macfarlan, S. J., & Van Vugt, M. (in press). Sex differences in cooperation: A meta-analysis of social dilemmas. Psychological Bulletin.

Although it is commonly believed that women are kinder and more cooperative than men, there is conflicting evidence... more Although it is commonly believed that women are kinder and more cooperative than men, there is conflicting evidence for this assertion. Current theories of sex differences in social behavior suggest that it may be useful to examine in what situations men and women are likely to differ in cooperation. Here we derive predictions from both sociocultural and evolutionary perspectives on context-specific sex differences in cooperation and conduct a unique meta-analytic study of 272 effect sizes -- sampled across 50 years of research -- on social dilemmas to examine several potential moderators. The overall average effect size is not statistically different from zero (d = -.05), suggesting that men and women do not differ in their overall amounts of cooperation. However, the association between sex and cooperation is moderated by several key features of the social context: Male-male interactions are more cooperative than female-female interactions (d = .16) yet women cooperate more than men in mixed-sex interactions (d = -.22). In repeated interactions men are more cooperative than women. Women were more cooperative than men in larger groups and in more recent studies, but these differences dissappeared after statistically controlling for several study characteristics. We discuss these results in the context of both sociocultural and evolutionary theories of sex differences, stress the need for an integrated biosocial approach, and outline directions for future research.

Communication and cooperation in social dilemmas: A meta-analytic review

by Daniel Balliet

Balliet, D. (2010). Communication and cooperation in social dilemmas: A meta-analytic review. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54, 39-57.

Amongst the most researched solutions to social dilemmas is communication. Since the late 1950’s, it has been well... more Amongst the most researched solutions to social dilemmas is communication. Since the late 1950’s, it has been well known that communication enhances cooperation in social dilemmas. This paper reports a meta-analysis of this literature (45 effect sizes) and finds a large positive effect of communication on cooperation in social dilemmas (d = 1.01). This effect is moderated by the type of communication, with a stronger effect of face-to-face discussion (d = 1.21) compared to written messages (d = .46). The communication-cooperation relationship is also stronger in larger, compared to smaller, group social dilemmas. Whether communication occurred before or during iterated dilemmas did not statistically affect the communication-cooperation effect size. Results are discussed according to theory and research on communication in social dilemmas.

Rewards, Punishment, and Cooperation: A Meta-analysis

by Daniel Balliet

Balliet, D., & Mulder, L. B., & Van Lange, P.A.M. (2011). Reward, punishment, and cooperation: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 137, 594-615.

How effective are rewards (for cooperation) and punishment (for noncooperation) as tools to promote cooperation in... more How effective are rewards (for cooperation) and punishment (for noncooperation) as tools to promote cooperation in social dilemmas, or situations when immediate self-interest and longer-term collective interest conflict? And what variables can promote the impact of these incentives? Although such questions have been examined, social and behavioral scientists provide different answers. To date, there is no theoretical and/or quantitative review of rewards and punishments as incentives of cooperation in social dilemmas. Using a novel interdependence-theoretic framework, we propose that rewards and punishment should both promote cooperation, and identify two variables – cost of incentives and source of incentives – that are predicted to magnify the effectiveness of these incentives in promoting cooperation. A meta-analysis involving 187 effect sizes, revealed that rewards and punishments exhibit a statistically equivalent positive effect on cooperation (d = .51 and .70, respectively). The effectiveness of incentives was stronger when the incentives were costly, compared to free, to administer. Centralization of incentives did not moderate the effect size. Punishments were also more effective during iterated dilemmas when participants continued to interact in the same group, compared to both iterated dilemmas with re-assignment to a new group after each trial and one-shot dilemmas. We also examine several other potential moderators of the effect size, such as iterations, partner matching, group size, country, and participant payment. We discuss broad conclusions, implications for theory, and suggest directions for future research on rewards and punishment in social dilemmas.

E-Research Collaboration and the Free-Rider Problem: Communication Solutions to Social Dilemmas in Computer Mediated Research Collaborations

by Daniel Balliet

Balliet, D. (2010). e-Research collaboration and the free-rider problem: Communication solutions to social dilemmas in computer mediated research collaborations. M. Anandarajan & A. Anandarajan (Eds.). e-Research collaboration: Theory, techniques, and challenges (pp. 277-288). Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag.

Collaborative scientific projects can be considered public goods dilemmas. This is a particular type of social... more Collaborative scientific projects can be considered public goods dilemmas. This is a particular type of social dilemma, where short-term immediate self-interests are at odds with long-term collective benefits. Perhaps the best known solution to the free-rider problem in social dilemmas is communication between participants prior to making contributions to the public good. However, there is research to suggest that people contribute less to public goods while communicating on-line before the dilemma, as opposed to face-to-face discussion. This chapter will discuss why computer-mediated mediums of communication are less effective at improving cooperation amongst collaborators (e.g. lack of social cues to examine the credibility of commitment, less leadership, and poorer monitoring of other’s behavior) and propose several means for addressing this challenge to on-line collaborations (e.g. videoconference, telephone communication, prior face-to-face interactions, frequent coordinated communications, and reputation evaluations).

Relating Trait Self-Control and Forgiveness within Prosocials and Proselfs: Compensatory versus Synergistic Models

by Daniel Balliet

Balliet, D., Li, N. P., & Joireman, J. (in press) Relating trait self-control and forgiveness among prosocials and proselfs: A test of compensatory and synergistic models. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.

The present research tests two competing models specifying how two traits (concern with the well-being of others and... more The present research tests two competing models specifying how two traits (concern with the well-being of others and self-control) interact to predict forgiveness. According to the compensatory model, forgiveness requires being high on either trait; according to the synergistic model, forgiveness requires being high on both traits. Two preliminary studies demonstrate the main effect of trait (Study 1a) and primed (Study 1b) self-control on forgiveness. Three primary studies consistently support the compensatory model in predicting willingness to forgive a partner who behaves non-cooperatively in a two-alternative prisoner’s dilemma (Study 2), a continuous give some dilemma (Study 3), and a two-alternative maximizing difference game (Study 4). Among proselfs or those low in trait forgiveness, trait self-control positively relates to forgiveness, suggesting that self-control can compensate for a lack of concern with others’ well-being. Implications for theory and research on forgiveness are discussed.

Pasta Wars

by Noam Ebner

Cooperation in social dilemmas and the need to belong: The moderating effect of group size

by Geoffrey Leonardelli

De Cremer, D., & Leonardelli, G.J. (2003). Cooperation in social dilemmas and the need to belong: The moderating effect of group size. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 7(2), 168-174.

The present research examined the effects of the need to belong and group size on cooperation in a public goods... more The present research examined the effects of the need to belong and group size on cooperation in a public goods dilemma. On the basis of previous research (R. F. Baumeister & M. R. Leary, 1995), it was expected that those high in the need to belong would cooperate most. In addition, it was expected that the need to belong would predict cooperation for large-group members but not for small-group members. Analyses supported both hypotheses. Furthermore, individual differences in the need to belong were positively correlated with frustration about individuals’ cooperative) decision, a feeling believed to emerge from the felt uncertainty over whether cooperation would be reciprocated by others, the conflicting motivations of the need to belong and personal self-interest, or both.

Group Discussion and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: Does the Medium Matter?

by Charles Samuelson

Co-authored with Kristen Watrous-Rodriguez, published in volume entitled, Social Decision Making: Social Dilemmas, Social Values, and Ethical Judgments, edited by R.M Kramer, A.E. Tenbrunsel, and M. H. Bazerman. New York: Routledge (2009).

Effects of Information and Motivational Orientation on Harvest of a Declining Renewable Resource

by Charles Samuelson

Co-authored with David Loomis and Jane Sell, published in Society and Natural Resources (1995).

Effects of Soliciting Opinions on Contributions to a Public Good

by Charles Samuelson

Co-authored with Scott Allison and David Messick, published in Journal of Applied Social Psychology (1985).

Attitudes Toward Energy Conservation: A Confirmatory Factor Analysis

by Charles Samuelson

Co-authored with Michael Biek, published in Journal of Applied Social Psychology (1991).

A Multiattribute Evaluation Approach to Structural Change in Resource Dilemmas

by Charles Samuelson

Published in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (1993).

Individual restraint and structural change as solutions to social dilemmas

by Charles Samuelson

Alternative Structural Solutions to Resource Dilemmas

by Charles Samuelson

Co-authored with David Messick, published in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (1986).

A Computer Laboratory for Studying Resource Dilemmas

by Charles Samuelson

Co-authored with Richard Parker, Layton Lui, Chris Messick, David Messick, Marilynn Brewer, Roderick Kramer, and Henk Wilke, published in Behavioral Science (1983).

When Do People Want to Change the Rules for Allocating Shared Resources?

by Charles Samuelson

Co-authored with David Messick, published in volume entitled, Social Dilemmas: Perspectives on Individuals and Groups, edited by D.A. Schroeder, Westport, CT: Praeger (1995).

Effects of Environmental Uncertainty and Social Value Orientation in Resource Dilemmas

by Charles Samuelson

Co-authored with Sylvia Roch, published in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (1997).

Framing and Communication Effects on Group Members' Responses to Environmental and Social Uncertainty

by Charles Samuelson

Co-authored with David Messick and Scott Allison, published in volume entitled, Applied Behavioural Economics (Vol. 2), edited by S. Maital, New York University Press (1988).