Sigmund Freud

Bergson e Freud: nascita e tramonto della religione nella critica di Benjamin Fondane

by Alice Gonzi

published in "Arkete", I, 2011

Dans ce texte, sans pouvoir approfondir la question de la précision herméneutique de l’analyse qui Benjamin Fondane... more Dans ce texte, sans pouvoir approfondir la question de la précision herméneutique de l’analyse qui Benjamin Fondane donne des livres : Les deux Sources de la morale et de la religion Bergson et L’avenir d’une illusion (Die Zukunft einer Illusion) de Freud, on tentera de suivre la façon dont Fondane, en partant de deux auteurs, considère le discours philosophique en général.
L’analyse que Fondane fait de Bergson et de Freud semble, d’un point de vue strictement technique, plongée dans son projet personnel de contester un certain type de philosophie, plutôt
qu’orientée dans le sens d’une rigueur explicative. En effet, plus qu’exposer les théories philosophiques qu’il considère, en les discutant, il les réfute pour avancer ses propres idées.
Chez Fondane, il s’agit de revendiquer le droit humain à construire un rapport avec Dieu. C’est un rapport complexe, hasardeux (comme, d’ailleurs tous les rapports authentiques), un rapport ambivalent où l’amour est toujours penché sur le gouffre de la haine, car « Dieu est ton ennemi mortel ».





The critical reflection on Henri Bergson's The Two Sources of Morality and Religion and Sigmund Freud's The Future of an Illusion by the existential thinker Benjamin Fondane, within is important work La conscience malheureuse.

Pointenlose Bildkomik

by Lino Wirag

Essay on contemporary pictoral humour without punchline

The Multilingual Pleasures of Slavic Worlds

by Anne Dwyer

Forthcoming in _Comparative Literature_2013

'I suffer in an unknown manner that is hieroglyphical’. Jung and Babette en route to Freud and Schreber

by Angela Woods

History of the Present 1(2): 244-258.

This paper was first presented at a conference to mark the 100th anniversary of the death of Daniel Paul Schreber,... more This paper was first presented at a conference to mark the 100th anniversary of the death of Daniel Paul Schreber, reviewed here:
http://historypsychiatry.com/2011/04/26/conference-report-%E2%80%9Cdaniel-paul-schreber-centenary-200-years-of-sonnenstein%E2%80%9D

Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis: 'A Problematic Proximity'

by Robert Trumbull

Derrida Today 5.1 (2012)

This essay explores Derrida’s work on repetition in psychoanalysis and what Freud, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle,... more This essay explores Derrida’s work on repetition in psychoanalysis and what Freud, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, called the ‘compulsion to repeat’. Revising the model of the psyche that had to that point dominated his theory, Freud began in 1920 to ascribe greater significance to experiences of trauma and unpleasure, and to their recurrence in the analytic treatment. This type of repeated repetition ultimately suggested to Freud the existence of a ‘death drive’ antithetical to life. I examine here how Derrida re-reads Beyond in The Post Card, analysing the way uncontrollable effects of repetition repeatedly undo Freud’s efforts to make any progress on what lies beyond the pleasure principle. Another ‘logic’ of repetition, other than the one Freud invokes, inhabits Freud’s text, threatening the fundamental opposition between the life drives and the death drive. But in reading Freud in this way, Derrida himself cannot quite ‘do justice to’ Freud, to the ambivalence at work in Freud’s text. At certain key moments in his reading of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, I show, Derrida seems to restrict an ambiguity in Freud’s thinking around the relation between life and death. What Derrida’s reading makes legible in part, then, is Derrida’s resistance to psychoanalysis, the tension inhabiting Derrida’s dealings with Freud in The Post Card and beyond.

From the Problem of the Nature of Psychosis to the Phenomenological Reform of Psychiatry. Historical and Epistemological Remarks on Ludwig Binswanger’s Psychiatric Project, Medicine Studies, 2012 (DOI) 10.1007/s12376-012-0076-x

by Elisabetta Basso

This paper focuses on one of the original moments of the development of the “phenomenological” current of psychiatry,... more This paper focuses on one of the original moments of the development of the “phenomenological” current of psychiatry, namely, the psychopathological research of Ludwig Binswanger. By means of the clinical and conceptual problem of schizophrenia as it was conceived and developed at the beginning of the twentieth century, I will try to outline and analyze Binswanger’s perspective from a both historical and epistemological point of view. Binswanger’s own way means of approaching and conceiving schizophrenia within the scientific, medical, and psychiatric context of that time will lead us to grasp the epistemological stakes at the origins of his project of reforming psychiatry by means of phenomenology. I will finally attempt to upgrade and update Binswanger’s project in light of the current reappraisal of phenomenology within the ongoing debate on psychopathology engaged by studies in the field of science and philosophy of mind.

Freud and free-will: Fact, fantasy, and philosophy

by Simon Boag

Boag, S. (2011). Freud and free-will: Fact, fantasy, and philosophy [Review of the book Freud, the reluctant philosopher]. PsycCRITIQUES-Contemporary Psychology: APA Review of Books, 56 (6).

Pathological science and the myth of recovered memories: Reply to McNally

by Simon Boag

Boag, S. (2007). Pathological science & the myth of recovered memories: Reply to McNally. Review of General Psychology, 11 (4), 361-362.

Response to McNally, R. (2007). Do Certain Readings of Freud Constitute "Pathological Science"? A Comment on Boag (2006). Review of General Psychology, 11 (4), 359-360.
pg. 359-360

Richard McNally’s thoughtful commentary points to a non-controversial source of the fixation with Freud’s early theory... more Richard McNally’s thoughtful commentary points to a non-controversial source of the fixation with Freud’s early theory of repression. At the same time, however, McNally’s account does not directly address the critical issue at the heart of my original article, namely that Freud’s later theory of repression is persistently misconceptualised and accompanied by a breakdown in critical inquiry. Although the account proposed by McNally does not necessarily contradict this proposal, other potential sources of bias should also be considered. In particular, the acrimony provoked by the recovered memory dispute and the prevalence of ad hominem attacks against Freud suggests that emotional factors may also be obscuring rigorous debate. Issues surrounding the scientific inquiry of Freud’s theory of repression are further discussed.

Repression, suppression, and conscious awareness

by Simon Boag

Boag, S. (2010). Repression, suppression, & conscious awareness. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 27 (2), 164-181.

Both ‘repression' and ‘suppression' are said to involve removing mental content from awareness. However, repression is... more Both ‘repression' and ‘suppression' are said to involve removing mental content from awareness. However, repression is generally said to be unconscious whereas suppression is said to be conscious. The meanings of the terms ‘unconscious' and ‘conscious', though, are open to a variety of interpretations and so the validity of this distinction is uncertain . This paper discusses the relationship between repression and suppression and whether conscious awareness distinguishes these processes. Consciousness and unconscious are discussed in terms of a relational account of cognition where ‘knowing' is understood as a relation between a cognising subject and a cognised object term. On this view, problems arise from confusing consciousness and unconsciousness with properties or qualities of mental processes. Examined in this light, the present analysis reveals that repression can become conscious and that suppression can occur unconsciously. The role of ‘resistance' and the recognition of a series of defenses are discussed.

Is language necessary for consciousness? An assessment of Freud's ‘word/thing' presentation distinction

by Simon Boag

Boag, S. (2008). Is language necessary for consciousness? An assessment of Freud's ‘word/thing' presentation distinction. In S. Boag (Ed.), Personality Down Under: Perspectives from Australia (pp. 81-89). New York: Nova.

The belief that language is a necessary condition for consciousness is common within psychoanalytic literature. This,... more The belief that language is a necessary condition for consciousness is common within psychoanalytic literature. This, in turn, has led to accounts of ‘passive primal repression', where pre-verbal mental content cannot become conscious at a later time. This paper discusses consciousness and unconsciousness as certain relations rather than as qualities of mental processes. On this view, to be conscious of mental content requires taking it as the object of a second mental act. The view that language is a necessary condition for consciousness is rejected on the basis that applying language to mental content requires knowing the mental content first (i.e., being conscious of it). Implications for primal repression theory, and the manner in which language may facilitate becoming conscious awareness, are discussed.

Freudian Repression, the Common View, and Pathological Science

by Simon Boag

Boag, S. (2006). Freudian repression, the common view, and pathological science. Review of General Psychology, 10 (1), 74-86.

A sustained misconceptualisation of a theory leading to invalid applications and inferences indicates a failure in the... more A sustained misconceptualisation of a theory leading to invalid applications and inferences indicates a failure in the scientific process. This has repeatedly occurred with Freud’s theory of repression, a cornerstone of psychoanalytic theory. This paper traces the development of Freud’s theory of repression and compares this with the ‘common view’ found in mainstream psychology: the motivated forgetting of trauma. A fixation with Freud’s original, and superseded theory (1893-1897) ignores the theoretical developments that constitute mature psychoanalysis (1900-1940), and has impacted upon attempts to test Freudian theory and the current ‘recovered memory’ debate. Although certain accidental factors contribute to this misunderstanding, the sustained failure to comprehend Freudian repression reveals a scientific pathology. Implications for psychology as a whole are discussed.

“Freudian dream theory, dream bizarreness, & the disguise-censor controversy”: Response to Commentaries.

by Simon Boag

Boag, S. (2006). “Freudian dream theory, dream bizarreness, & the disguise-censor controversy”: Response to Commentaries. Neuro-psychoanalysis, 8 (1), 59-68.

Response to commentaries by Mark Blechner, Rosalind Cartwright, Claudio Colace, Calude Gottesman, Brain Johnson, Nigel... more Response to commentaries by Mark Blechner, Rosalind Cartwright, Claudio Colace, Calude Gottesman, Brain Johnson, Nigel Mackay, Doris McIlwain, Agnes Petocz, and Calvin Kai-Ching Yu.

“Freudian dream theory, dream bizarreness, & the disguise-censor controversy”: Response to Commentaries.

by Simon Boag

Boag, S. (2006). “Freudian dream theory, dream bizarreness, & the disguise-censor controversy”: Response to Commentaries. Neuro-psychoanalysis, 8 (1), 59-68.

Response to commentaries by Mark Blechner, Rosalind Cartwright, Claudio Colace, Calude Gottesman, Brain Johnson, Nigel... more Response to commentaries by Mark Blechner, Rosalind Cartwright, Claudio Colace, Calude Gottesman, Brain Johnson, Nigel Mackay, Doris McIlwain, Agnes Petocz, and Calvin Kai-Ching Yu.

“Freudian dream theory, dream bizarreness, & the disguise-censor controversy”: Response to Commentaries.

by Simon Boag

Boag, S. (2006). “Freudian dream theory, dream bizarreness, & the disguise-censor controversy”: Response to Commentaries. Neuro-psychoanalysis, 8 (1), 59-68.

Response to commentaries by Mark Blechner, Rosalind Cartwright, Claudio Colace, Calude Gottesman, Brain Johnson, Nigel... more Response to commentaries by Mark Blechner, Rosalind Cartwright, Claudio Colace, Calude Gottesman, Brain Johnson, Nigel Mackay, Doris McIlwain, Agnes Petocz, and Calvin Kai-Ching Yu.

Freudian Dream Theory, Dream Bizarreness, and the Disguise-Censor Controversy

by Simon Boag

Boag, S. (2006). Freudian dream theory, dream bizarreness, & the disguise-censor controversy. Neuro-psychoanalysis, 8 (1), 5-16.

One particular area of contention in discussions of Freudian dream theory and its relation to the neuroscientific... more One particular area of contention in discussions of Freudian dream theory and its relation to the neuroscientific evidence is the notion of ‘disguise-censorship’ and its relation to dream bizarreness. The discussion to date, however, has neglected the conceptual basis of repression and disguise-censorship and this paper aims to clarify the role of repression in dreaming and its contribution to dream bizarreness. An analysis of disguise-censorship and repression reveals two competing accounts in Freud’s theory. Freud’s account of the ‘dream-censor’, acting as an agency intentionally disguising cognitive content, is found to be problematic. However, Freud’s alternative account of repression, in terms of cognitive inhibition instigated by motivational conflict, is developed and discussed in relation to neural inhibition. On this view, dream bizarreness arises, in part, through inter-drive competition preventing direct expression of wishes and the subsequent formation of substitute aims. Resolution of certain contradictions and inconsistencies between the neurological evidence and Freudian dream theory are discussed.

La obscenidad del Sujeto hegeliano. La" noche del mundo" y la experiencia de la pulsión de muerte

by Luis Felip

Sarah Kofman's Art of Affirmation, or the Non-illusory Life of an Illusion”

by Pleshette DeArmitt

On Erich Fromm: why he left the Frankfurt school

by Caroline Kamau

Kamau, C. (2012).

Chapter synopsis: 'On Erich Fromm: Why he left the Frankfurt School':

-Biography: Erich Fromm
-Erich... more Chapter synopsis: 'On Erich Fromm: Why he left the Frankfurt School':

-Biography: Erich Fromm
-Erich Fromm was very critical of Freudian psychoanalysis. The Frankfurt School disapproved of that.
-Tension arose between Fromm and Horkheimer/Adorno/Marcuse and other pro-Freudian contemporaries
-Erich Fromm had reservations about the Frankfurt School's desire to merge psychoanalysis with Marxist theory
-Controversy arose over the Frankfurt School's decision not to publish a manuscript that Fromm wrote, with Weiss. This was a report of their landmark authoritarian personality study of 1931. The topic and methodology shaped the Frankfurt School's later research into authoritarianism (e.g. Adorno et al.'s famous studies).

This chapter also discusses Erich Fromm's work post-Frankfurt School:
--Fromm on social neurosis
--Fromm on thoughts as a form of self-presentation or impression management
--Fromm's theoretical focus on self identity, rather than instincts
--Fromm's theory about personality traits
--Fromm on empiricism and psychology versus psychoanalysis

Desiring Oedipus in Stephen Frear's The Grifters

by Melissa Tanti

Tanti, Melissa. “Desiring Oedipus in Stephen Frear’s The Grifters.” Journal of Religion and Film.15.2 (2011)

Forbidden Transformation: analysing the ambiguous identity of Joey Hateley by Michael Tatham

by Joey Hateley

MA Theatre Studies (Research Thesis), by Michael Angelo Tatham, University of Reading—2008

I began this project wanting to explore the concept of transgression and how it functioned and related to this... more I began this project wanting to explore the concept of transgression and how it functioned and related to this performer called Joey Hateley whose gender was difficult to decipher. The company name—TransAction—was for me principally about transgenderism and transgression within the space of theatre, and the focus of my research stemmed from a question hypothesized by Judith Butler in her highly influential text Gender Trouble: ‘what kind of [theatrical] performance will enact and reveal the performativity of gender itself in a way that destabilizes the naturalized categories of identity and desire [?]’ (Butler 1999: 177). I investigated the possibilities of theatrical impersonation and role-play in the transgression of gender norms and social boundaries. The connection between certain forms of theatrical performance and queer theories excited me, and I thought that what I had seen at The Drill Hall—Joey Hateley in a show about the mimicry and fluidity of gender behavior and appearance—called into question, or transgressed, hegemonic and heterosexist ideologies pertaining to identity and desire.

The focus changed, slightly, and despite originally setting out to measure and assess the degree of transgression, or the extent to which cultural boundaries had been violated and surpassed in specific instances of theatricality, I became instead more interested in some of the other words and ideas associated with ‘trans’. While transgressive acts in theatrical contexts—or what Jonathon Dollimore understands as ‘transgressive reinscriptions’—disrupt the dimorphic structure of gender, they might also equally reinforce the binary logic of that organizing principle (Dollimore 1991: 322-325). The notion of trans became more about transformation, transition, and transcendence. It felt more appropriate, more accurate even, to claim that Joey was not necessarily transgressing gender, but rather transforming—or expanding—the possibilities of gender as it is lived, constructed, displayed and perceived.

Joey, then, more than a transgressor, is seen in this dissertation as a theatrical transformer who transitions across, through, and in-between a multiplicity of constructed stage identities. The artistic projects by TransAction have opened up—for me and hopefully for many others—new perspectives and new understandings of what it means to live gender(s) and to do gender(s). In watching these exciting transformations—by analyzing this person’s shifting silhouettes—I also re-register my personal changes, consider my multiple others, and am in this sense enlightened, transformed, and yet still transforming. This focus in the work of TransAction, then, to recognize individual alterity, to question differentiation, to document potential social change, and to dream of transcendence is vital if, as Elizabeth Wilson writes, we are to ‘have an idea of how things could be different’ or better still for queer and/or marginalized identities:

In other words, transgression on its own leads eventually to entropy, unless we carry within us some idea of transformation. It is therefore not transgression that should be our watchword, but transformation (Wilson in Kemp & Squires., ed. 1997: 369-370).