Semantic Externalism

Müssen wir erkennen, was wir denken? – Die semiotische Seele bei Ockham

by Martin Lenz

Forthcoming in: Abschied vom Seelischen? Ed. by Hans-Ulrich Rüegger, Zürich: vdf Hochschulverlag 2012

Locke as a Social Externalist

by Martin Lenz

Draft; forthcoming (with a commentary by Michael Ayers) in the Dawes Hicks Lectures on Philosophy: Proceedings of the British Academy,Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012

What determines the meaning of linguistic expressions: the mental states of language users or external factors? John... more What determines the meaning of linguistic expressions: the mental states of language users or external factors? John Locke is still taken to hold the simple thesis that words primarily signify the ideas in the mind of the speaker and thus to commit himself to an untenable mentalism. The present paper challenges this widespread view and sketches an argument to the effect that Locke should be seen as defending a kind of social externalism, since, for Locke, it is primarily the speech community that plays the essential role in determining meaning. 

(Re)presenting

by Narve Strand

Normative Concepts: a connectedness model

by Laura Schroeter

co-authored with François Schroeter

An elaboration of jazz model of meaning: we seek to characterize not just linguistic communication, but normative thinking. We focus on the cognitive role of concepts in keeping track of a topic, through changes in associated descriptive beliefs and motivations. A relational account of meaning identity, we argue, better explains this tracking ability. It also affords new resources for vindicating realism about normative properties.

This paper proposes a relational account concepts and explains how the model fits normative terms like 'is right'. Our... more This paper proposes a relational account concepts and explains how the model fits normative terms like 'is right'. Our connectedness model builds social and historical facts into the foundations of concept identity. This aspect of the model, we argue, reshapes normative epistemology and provides new resources for a vindication of realism in ethics.

Do Moral Realists Need Convergence?

by Laura Schroeter

(with François Schroeter)

Doe a moral realist need to posit ideal convergence in moral judgments? Richard Boyd has argued that moral realists... more Doe a moral realist need to posit ideal convergence in moral judgments? Richard Boyd has argued that moral realists don't need to accept that all competent speakers will converge in their moral judgments, if they opt for a certain type of externalist account of the reference of moral terms. Boyd's account has been highly influential: even realists who reject naturalistic and causal aspects of his account have taken his approach as a template for reference determination for moral terms (e.g. Sayre-McCord, van Roojen). But a closer examination of Boyd’s account of reference and the ways it could be developed or modified, we’ll argue, suggests that explaining co-reference without convergence in the moral domain is a much more challenging problem than many realists have supposed.

The metasemantics of memory

by Sanford Goldberg

The Dialectical Context of Boghossian's Memory Argument,'

by Sanford Goldberg

Internalism and Externalism In Semantics and Epistemology

by Sanford Goldberg

BROWN ON SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND DISCRIMINABILITY1

by Sanford Goldberg

The twin earth chronicles

by Sanford Goldberg

Externalism and Authoritative Knowledge of Content: A New Incompatibilist Strategy

by Sanford Goldberg

What Do You Know When You Know Your Own Thoughts?

by Sanford Goldberg

Self-ascription, self-knowledge, and the memory argument

by Sanford Goldberg

On Our Alleged a Priori Knowledge That Water Exists

by Sanford Goldberg

Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification

by Sanford Goldberg

(Nonstandard) Lessons of World-Switching Cases

by Sanford Goldberg

Anti-individualism, content preservation, and discursive justification

by Sanford Goldberg

Word-Ambiguity, World-Switching, and Semantic Intentions

by Sanford Goldberg

Do Anti-Individualistic Construals of Propositional Attitudes Capture the Agent's Conceptions?

by Sanford Goldberg

The Relevance of Discriminatory Knowledge of Content

by Sanford Goldberg