Self Consciousness

Call for papers - La rivoluzione interiore (XVI e XVII secolo)

by Lo Sguardo - Rivista di Filosofia

Il numero X de Lo Sguardo ha come oggetto i secoli XVI e XVII. Il tema che si intende approfondire è quello dell'interiorizzazione del mondo e dello sviluppo di una interiorità individuale nel periodo compreso tra Rinascimento e prima età moderna. A questo scopo il numero esplorerà la psicologia cinque-seicentesca soffermandosi in particolare su alcune facoltà “ausiliari” dell'intelletto quali la memoria, l'immaginazione, la fantasia, in relazione al processo di apprehensio, alla pratica degli esercizi spirituali e all'ideale dell'homo faber sui.

Lingue accettate: Italiano, Inglese, Francese, Spagnolo, Tedesco.
Deadline: 10/09/2012

Per maggiori informazioni scrivere a: redazione@losguardo.net.

http://www.losguardo.net
http://www.losguardo.net/public/collabora/collabora.html

How Does Recognition Emerge from Nature? The Genesis of Consciousness in Hegel’s Jena Writings

by Italo Testa

Draft, forthcoming in “Critical Horizons”, Special Issue edited by J.-P. Deranty & H. Hikaeheimo, 2012

The paper proposes a reconstruction of some fragments of Hegel’s Jena manuscripts concerning the natural genesis of... more The paper proposes a reconstruction of some fragments of Hegel’s Jena manuscripts concerning the natural genesis of recognitive spiritual consciousness. On this basis it  will be argued that recognition has a foothold in nature. As a consequence, recognition should not be understood as a bootstrapping process, that is, as a self-positing and self-justifying normative social phenomenon, intelligible within itself and independently of anything external to it.

A Metacognitive Model of the Sense of Agency over Thoughts

by Glenn Carruthers

in press, in Cognitive Neuropsychiatry

Introduction: The sense of agency over thoughts is the experience of oneself qua agent of mental action. Those... more Introduction: The sense of agency over thoughts is the experience of oneself qua agent of mental action. Those suffering certain psychotic symptoms are thought to have a deficient sense of agency. Here I seek to explain this sense of agency in terms of metacognition.
Method: I start with the proposal that the sense of agency is elicited by metacognitive monitoring representations that are used in the intentional inhibition of thoughts. I apply this model to verbal hallucinations and the like and examine the plausibility of this model explaining deficits associated with these symptoms.
Results: By tying the sense of agency to metacognitive inhibition I propose that the loss of a sense of agency in certain psychotic symptoms is accompanied by a particular deficit in the patient’s ability to control their own thinking. This is consistent with the experiences of those at high risk of developing hallucinations, who report more intrusive thoughts than controls. The model I present is able to explain why those at risk of developing verbal hallucinations and those suffering from verbal hallucinations have deficits in the intentional inhibition of thought. I defend this account from a possible objection by distinguishing the form of the intentional inhibition deficit displayed by those suffering verbal hallucination from that displayed by those suffering from orbital-frontal cortex lesions and post-traumatic stress disorder.
Conclusion: A plausible hypothesis is that the sense of agency over thoughts is elicited by the metacognitive monitoring representation used to intentionally inhibit thoughts. The deficit in the sense of agency over thoughts associated with certain psychotic symptoms could be explained by a failure to properly metacognitively monitor certain thought processes.

Toward a Cognitive Model of the Sense of Embodiment in a (Rubber) Hand

by Glenn Carruthers

in press in the Journal of Consciousness Studies

The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is the experience of an artificial body part as being a real body part and the... more The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is the experience of an artificial body part as being a real body part and the experience of touch coming from that artificial body part. An explanation of this illusion would take significant steps towards explaining the experience of embodiment in one’s own body. I present a new cognitive model to explain the RHI. I argue that the sense of embodiment arises when an on-line representation of the candidate body part is represented as matching an off-line prototype representation of what one’s body is usually like. The cause of the sense of embodiment in the model body part only partially overlaps with the causes of proprioceptive drift, which commonly accompanies the RHI, and so is compatible with observed dissociations between the illusion and proprioceptive drift. The distinguishing features of this model are the off-line body representation, and the process of matching an on-line model to an off-line model, both of which are to be understood in terms of a conceptual space.

Key Words: Rubber Hand Illusion; RHI; Sense of Embodiment; Self Consciousness; Body Experience

tebhyaś caitanyaṃ: il “sé” secondo il Materialismo indiano (draft)

by Krishna Del Toso

to appear in "Intrecci Filosofici" (ed. by K. Del Toso, A. Cislaghi), Mimesis Ed.

This paper takes into consideration the idea(s) of “self” developed by Indian Materialists. This paper takes into consideration the idea(s) of “self” developed by Indian Materialists.

My Body Tells A Story: Embracing my Scars and Imperfections By Michele Stopera Freyhauf

by Michele Stopera Freyhauf

originally published on the Feminism and Religion Project

As we approach New Years Eve, there is an emphasis on losing weight, getting in shape, etc. in the coming Year. ... more As we approach New Years Eve, there is an emphasis on losing weight, getting in shape, etc. in the coming Year.  We make resolutions to better ourselves and reflect on the year that passed us by.  With the impending New Year, there is also a realization that we become a year older, which for some means more grey hair, wrinkles, or other marks that appear on our body.  It is safe to say that we live in a world that is obsessed with body image and the search to find the fountain of youth.  In fact, TV is plagued with reality shows that perpetuate this obsession.  Keeping up with the Kardashians displays such a problem.  People who watch this show watch Kris Jenner’s facelift to her struggle with body image despite the fact that she gave birth to six healthy children and is 56 years young.  There are also shows that show people obsessed, even addicted to plastic surgery – they are trying to attain perfection, attempting to reverse the aging process, and remove the scars of their lives.

As I reflect on this plastic surgery and the body image obsessed culture that we live in I reflect on my own imperfections.  When we are born, we are born relatively mark free.  As we age, marks begin to appear.  As we become older, scars begin to appear because of different incidents in our lives.  They help shape us and serve as a reminder.

Consciousness: What a Conversation from leading thinkers would sound like

by Khaldoun Sweis, PhD

The attached paper is an imaginary conversation on the ever elusive qualia, or the ‘what is it like’ feeling, or... more The attached paper is an imaginary conversation on the ever elusive qualia, or the ‘what is it like’ feeling, or conscious experiences, that has left philosophers and cognitive scientists searching for answers. This article is meant to give the beginning reader an overall view of this phenomena. Qualia is the technical name for conscious experiences like seeing the colour red or listening to Handel's Messiah. The problem is that these conscious experiences are apparently nowhere to be found in our physical brains. Thus, it would not register on any physical system in the known world (although the results of it, such as neurons firing, would).

Stand In Awe: A Parable About Love, Youth, & Change

by Horace Columbus Neal II

Draft N: December 9, 2011 - It is finished.

This is a simple three-page short story that calls for a reflection on the core need of today's troubled youth. In 36... more This is a simple three-page short story that calls for a reflection on the core need of today's troubled youth. In 36 CE, a group of rowdy, Cushite-Hebrew youths go to see the Roman crucifixions, hoping to have some fun taunting the victims. Their encounter at one man's cross causes them to stand in awe. Notes and images follow the narrative to aid the readers' conceptualization of some of the story's themes. The story is thematically multilayered to facilitate productive discussions on a number of topics.

Paradoxical Position of Self-Reflection in Teaching and Assessment in Higher Education: How the Application of Blogging Challenges Learning Habits

by marta rabikowska

Abstract: The main aim of the paper is to observe how blogging affects self-reflection. The application of blogs is... more Abstract: The main aim of the paper is to observe how blogging affects self-reflection. The application of blogs is discussed, based on the case study from a Year One module. A process of implementing and delivering this method throughout a period of one semester is analysed from a practical and theoretical point of view (Burge, EJ & Haughey, M (2001)Using Learning Technologies, Routledge: Falmer). The quality of students’ interaction online is evaluated alongside pedagogical
effects of blogging employed as part of formative assessment. The main finding of the paper regards the independent approach of the students, which can be developed without direct instructions from the tutors. It has been observed that the students can take responsibility over their own learning, if the structure of the assessment permits flexibility and agility. It is argued that blogging enables the students to become elf-reflective at a very early stage of the learning process and secondly, that assessments’ structure determines the approach to learning.

Varieties of self-systems worth having

by Philip Robbins

Amor Fati: Consciousness in Nietzsche’s Gay Science

by Mark Sentesy

in Pensées: The Canadian Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy. Montreal: McGill University, 2002:3.

In The Gay Science, Friedrich Nietzsche tries to sketch a way of living in the face of nihilism.  By outlining... more In The Gay Science, Friedrich Nietzsche tries to sketch a way of living in the face of nihilism.  By outlining the conditions of his society’s nihilism, he mounts a radical attack on epistemology and metaphysics, but also prepares a solution. He argues that there is no “reality” in the traditional sense: there are no “things.” For us, reality is made up of appearances, of surfaces that we constitute. Language and communication on the one hand, and consciousness on the other, are key tools in Nietzsche’s critique of epistemology and of the solution that he offers. The insight that relates these tools to one another, is that consciousness is not individual, but developed under the pressure of the need to communicate. This will serve as a lens through which we will try to glimpse a cluster of ideas at or near the centre of his thought. Nietzsche’s critique is so radical that it challenges the possibility of both knowledge and consciousness. On the other hand, Nietzsche wants to refine a higher form of consciousness: amor fati (love of fate), a “Yes” to reality as such. I argue that this problem can be resolved by distinguishing two kinds of consciousness. Nietzsche says that consciousness penetrates and merges with its object, but this cannot yield self-consciousness, and so does not make consciousness possible. But a prior shape of the mind allows us to grasp what is impenetrable and unique, to remain outside the object. I argue that this is the meaning of Nietzsche’s metaphor of distance, in which his project of incorporating consciousness into the human creature, of “life as a means to knowledge”  intertwines with the idea of writing one’s life.

Evolution of Representations. From Basic Life to Self-Representation and Self-Consciousness

by Christophe Menant

TSC 2006 Poster

The notion of representation is at the foundation of cognitive sciences and is used in theories of mind and... more The notion of representation is at the foundation of cognitive sciences and is used in theories of mind and consciousness. Other notions like ‘embodiment’, 'intentionality‘, 'guidance theory' or ‘biosemantics’ have been associated to the notion of representation to introduce its functional aspect. We would like to propose here that a conception of 'usage related' representation eases its positioning in an evolutionary context, and opens new areas of investigation toward self-representation and self-consciousness. The subject is presented in five parts:Following an overall presentation, the first part introduces a usage related representation as being an information managed by a system submitted to a constraint that has to be satisfied. We consider that such a system can generate a meaningful information by comparing its constraint to a received information (Menant 2003). We define a representation as being made of the received information and of the meaningful information. Such approach allows groundings in and out for the representation relatively to the system. The second part introduces the two types of representations we want to focus on for living organisms: representations of conspecifics and auto-representation, the latter being defined without using a notion of self-representation. Both types of representations have existed for our pre-human ancestors which can be compared to today great apes.In the third part, we use the performance of intersubjectivity as identified in group life with the presence of mirror neurons in the organisms. Mirror neurons have been discovered in the 90‘s (Rizzolatti & al.1996, Gallese & al.1996). The level of intersubjectivity that can be attributed to non human primates as related to mirror neurons is currently a subject of debate (Decety 2003). We consider that a limited intersubjectivity between pre-human primates made possible a merger of both types of representations. The fourth part proposes that such a merger of representations feeds the auto-representation with the meanings associated to the representations of conspecifics, namely the meanings associated to an entity perceived as existing in the environment. We propose that auto-representation carrying these new meanings makes up the first elements of self-representation. Intersubjectivity has allowed auto-representation to evolve into self-representation, avoiding the homunculus risk. The fifth part is a continuation to other presentations (Menant 2004, 2005) about possible evolution of self-representation into self-consciousness. We propose that identification with suffering or endangered conspecifics has increased anxiety, and that the tools used to limit this anxiety (development of empathy, imitation, language and group life) have provided a positive feedback on intersubjectivity and created an evolutionary engine for the organism. Other outcomes have also been possible. Such approach roots consciousness in emotions. The evolutionary scenario proposed here does not introduce explicitly the question of phenomenal consciousness (Block 1995). This question is to be addressed later with the help of this scenario.The conclusion lists the points introduced here with their possible continuations.

The will is caused, not '“free'

by Brian Earp

Bargh, J. A., & Earp, B. D. (2009). The will is caused, not 'free'. Dialogue, Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Vol 24 No 1, 13-15.

The Nature of Representation and the Experience of Oneself: a Critical Notice on Gottfried Vosgerau’s Mental Representation and Self Consciousness

by Glenn Carruthers

in press  Philosophical Psychology

Reply to Tsakiris and Fotopoulou 'Is my body the sum of online and offline body representations'

by Glenn Carruthers

(2008) in Consciousness and Cognition 17(4) pg 1321-1323

I thank Tsakiris and Fotopoulou for their insightful commentary on my target article. In particular I welcome the... more I thank Tsakiris and Fotopoulou for their insightful commentary on my target article. In particular I welcome the opportunity to revisit how the online/offline representation of the body distinction is drawn. Tsakiris and Fotopoulou raise three major points of concern with my model. First they argue that the sense of embodiment is not sufficient for self recognition. Second they show that the relationship between online and offline representations of the body cannot be the simple ‘serial construction’ relationship I advocate in the target article. Third they claim that my model makes a false prediction. I agree with the first two lines of criticism. As to the first I will clarify and tone down the claims made about the role of the sense of embodiment in self recognition tasks. However, I will argue that the sense of embodiment is measured in van den Bos and Jeannerod’s study. I strongly welcome the second line of criticism Tsakiris and Fotopoulou offer. I will add some reasons to agree that the ‘serial construction’ account of the relationship between online and offline representations cannot be true. I maintain, however, that this does not affect the central thesis of target article, namely that it is an offline representation of the body that underlies the sense of embodiment. Finally, I will defend the model by arguing that it does not make the false prediction Tsakiris and Fotopoulou attribute to it.

Is the body schema sufficient for the sense of embodiment? An alternative to de Vignemont's model

by Glenn Carruthers

(2009) in Philosophical Psychology Vol 22 (2) pg 123-142

De Vignemont argues that the sense of ownership comes from the localization of bodily sensation on a map of the body... more De Vignemont argues that the sense of ownership comes from the localization of bodily sensation on a map of the body that is part of the body schema. This model should be taken as a model of the sense of embodiment. I argue that the body schema lacks the theoretical resources needed to explain this phenomenology. Furthermore, there is some reason to think that a deficient sense of embodiment is not associated with a deficient body schema. The data de Vignemont uses to argue that the body image does not underlie the sense of embodiment does not rule out the possibility that part of the body image I call ‘offline representations’ underlies the sense of embodiment. An alternative model of the sense of embodiment in terms of offline representations of the body is presented.

Commentary on Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen 2008

by Glenn Carruthers

2009 in Consciousness and Cognition 18(2): 515-520

Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen (2008) offer a powerful explanation of the sense of agency. To argue for their model... more Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen (2008) offer a powerful explanation of the sense of agency. To argue for their model they attempt to show that one of the standard models (the comparator model) fails to explain the sense of agency and that their model offers a more general account than is aimed at by the standard model. Here I offer comment on both parts of this argument. I offer an alternative reading of some of the data they use to argue against the comparator model. I argue that contrary to Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen’s reading the case of G.L. supports rather than contradicts the comparator model. Next I suggest how the comparator model can differentiate failures of action attribution in patients suffering parietal lobe lesions and delusions of alien control. I also argue that the apparently unexpected phenomenon of ‘‘hyperassociation” is predicted by the comparator model. Finally I suggest that as it stands Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen’s model is not well specified enough to explain deficits in the sense of agency associated with delusions of thought insertion. Thus they have not met their second argumentative burden of showing how their model is more general than the comparator model.

A Problem for Wegner and Colleagues’ Model of the Sense of Agency

by Glenn Carruthers

2010, in Phenomenology and the Cogntive Sciences, 9(3) pp. 341-357 doi: 10.1007/s11097-010-9150-6

The sense of agency, that is the sense that one is the agent of one’s bodily actions, is one component of our self... more The sense of agency, that is the sense that one is the agent of one’s bodily actions, is one component of our self consciousness. Recently Wegner and colleagues have developed a model of the causal history of this sense. Their model takes it that the sense of agency is elicited for an action when one infers that one or other of one’s mental states caused that action. In their terms the sense of agency is elicited by the inference to apparent mental state causation. Here I argue that this model is inconsistent with data from developmental psychology that suggests children can identify the agent behind an action without being capable of understanding the relationship between their intentions and actions. Furthermore, I argue that this model is inconsistent with the preserved sense of agency in autism. In general the problem is that there are cases where subjects can experience themselves as the agent behind their actions despite lacking the resources to make the inference to apparent mental state causation.

The case for the comparator model as an explanation of the sense of agency and its breakdowns

by Glenn Carruthers

in press, in Consciousness and Cognition

I compare Frith and colleagues’ influential comparator account of how the sense of agency is elicited to the... more I compare Frith and colleagues’ influential comparator account of how the sense of agency is elicited to the multifactorial weighting model advocated by Synofzik and colleagues. I defend the comparator model from the common objection that the actual sensory consequences of action are not needed to elicit the sense of agency. I examine the comparator model’s ability to explain the performance of healthy subjects and those suffering from delusions of alien control on various self-attribution tasks. It transpires that the comparator model needs case-by-case adjustment to deal with problematic data. In response to this, the multifactorial weighting model of Synofzik and colleagues is introduced. Although this model is incomplete, it is more naturally constrained by the cases that are problematic for the comparator model. However, this model may be untestable. I conclude that currently the comparator model approach has stronger support than the multifactorial weighting model approach.

Keywords: Self Consciousness, Sense of Agency, Comparator Model, Multifactorial Weighting Model, Frith, Synofzik, Delusions of Alien Control

Proposal for An Approach to Artificial Consciousness Based on Self-Consciousness

by Christophe Menant

AAAI 2007 Fall Symposia Position Paper
Poster at:
http://crmenant.free.fr/AAAI-2007/Artificial-Consciousness.Christophe-Menant.pdf

Current research on artificial consciousness is focused on
phenomenal consciousness and on functional... more Current research on artificial consciousness is focused on
phenomenal consciousness and on functional consciousness.
We propose to shift the focus to self-consciousness in order
to open new areas of investigation. We use an existing
scenario where self-consciousness is considered as the result
of an evolution of representations. Application of the
scenario to the possible build up of a conscious robot also
introduces questions relative to emotions in robots. Areas of
investigation are proposed as a continuation of this
approach.