Self-deception

The Mind Game: Invisible Cheating and Inferable Intentions

by Jiang Ting

LICOS Discussion Paper

This paper presents a novel cheating game, which I call the ‘mind game’, in which subjects can cheat purely in their... more This paper presents a novel cheating game, which I call the ‘mind game’, in which subjects can cheat purely in their minds so that it is invisible.  However, since the mind game is a game of chance, the probability of cheating can be inferred.  In this study, I show how a subtle variation in the rules of the game affects the extent of cheating.  In one treatment, subjects can cheat purely in the mind, while in another treatment, the order of the steps in which subjects should play the game is changed so that subjects have to disregard the prescribed order in order to cheat.  I find that subjects in this second treatment cheat significantly less.  Since subjects play the game fully in private with a double-blind payment procedure, I conjecture that this is because of self-image maintenance and the role that intent inference plays in it.  In the first treatment, the intent to cheat is unclear, while in the second, the act of disregarding the order of play cannot be easily accounted for by errors or ignorance but is due to the intent to cheat.  The clearer awareness of the intent to cheat makes it harder for subjects to be self-deceptive for preserving a moral self-image while cheating.  This study thus suggests a potential role of the ease of intent inference in deterring cheating.

Truthiness, Self-Deception, and Intuitive Knowledge

by Amber Griffioen

Published in The Daily Show and Philosophy: Moments of Zen in the Art of Fake News, ed. by Jason  Holt (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing 2007).

An article for the layperson, introducing the philosophical problems regarding self-deception by appealing to Stephen... more An article for the layperson, introducing the philosophical problems regarding self-deception by appealing to Stephen Colbert's notion of 'truthiness'.

Realism, Self-Deception and the Logical Paradox of Repression

by Simon Boag

Boag, S. (2007). Realism, self-deception, & the logical paradox of repression. Theory & Psychology, 17 (3), 421-447.

Historically, repression has been considered a cornerstone of psychoanalytic theory. However, explaining how the ego... more Historically, repression has been considered a cornerstone of psychoanalytic theory. However, explaining how the ego maintains repression without knowing the repressed appears to create a logical paradox of knowing in order not to know. Maze and Henry’s realist analysis of the problem provides an important new direction for framing possible solutions. However, their proposed explanation in terms of ‘affective blocking’ is found to be limited with respect to explaining important features of repression, such as the clinical phenomenon of resistance. Alternatively, the present thesis proposes that a solution can be provided in terms of strong partitioning and neural inhibition. The resolution of the paradox hinges upon the recognition that repression inhibits knowledge of knowing the repressed. Implications of this position for understanding self-deception are discussed.

Czy zdolność do oszukiwania uczyniła nas ludźmi?

by Mateusz Hohol

published in 'Granice nauki' (The Limits of Science), in cooperation with 'Interia.pl' (04.04.2012) [scientific article for the general public]

Against the Deflationary Account of Self-Deception

by José Eduardo Porcher

Published in Humana.Mente, Feb. 2012, Vol. 20, pp. 67–84.

Self-deception poses serious difficulties for belief attribution because the behavior of the self-deceived is deeply... more Self-deception poses serious difficulties for belief attribution because the behavior of the self-deceived is deeply conflicted: some of it supports the attribution of a certain belief, while some of it supports the contrary attribution. Theorists have resorted either to attributing both beliefs to the self-deceived, or to postulating an unconscious belief coupled with another kind of cognitive attitude. On the other hand, deflationary accounts of self- deception have attempted a more parsimonious solution: attributing only one, false belief to the subject. My aim in this paper is to critically examine this strategy and, subsequently, to suggest that its failure gives support to the neglected view that the self-deceived are not accurately describable as believing either of the relevant propositions.

Zjawisko kłamstwa w perspektywie nauk neurokognitywnych i ewolucyjnych [The Phenomenon of Lie in the Perspective of Neuroscience and Evolutionary Sciences]

by Mateusz Hohol

published in: "Semina Scientiarum" 2009, no. 8, pp. 91-109.

"Further Applications" (Chapter 8 of *Mind and Supermind*)

by Keith Frankish

Eprint of the final chapter of my *Mind and Supermind* (CUP 2004)

This chapter sketches some applications of the two-level framework developed in the book, focusing on akrasia,... more This chapter sketches some applications of the two-level framework developed in the book, focusing on akrasia, self-deception, and first-person authority. To understand the details, you'll need to read the earlier chapters, but the general ideas should be clear enough. I particularly like the applications to akrasia and first-person authority, and I plan to develop them in more detail in new  papers.

Have we vindicated the motivational unconscious yet? A conceptual review

by Alexandre Billon

Forthcoming in Frontiers in psychoanalysis and neuropsychanalysis

Motivationally unconscious (M-unconscious) states are unconscious states that can directly motivate a subject’s... more Motivationally unconscious (M-unconscious) states are unconscious states that can directly motivate a subject’s behavior and whose unconscious character typically results from a form of repression. The basic argument for M-unconscious states claims that they provide the best explanation to some seemingly non rational behaviors, like akrasia, impulsivity or apparent self-deception. This basic argument has been challenged on theoretical, empirical and conceptual grounds. Drawing on recent works on apparent self-deception and on the ‘cognitive unconscious’ I assess those objections. I argue that (i) even if there is a good theoretical argument for its existence, (ii) most empirical vindications of the M-unconscious miss their target. (iii) As for the conceptual objections, they compel us to modify the classical picture of the M-unconscious. I conclude that M-unconscious states and processes must be affective states and processes that the subject really feels and experiences —and which are in this sense conscious— even though they are not, or not well, cognitively accessible to him. Dual process psychology and the literature on cold-hot empathy gaps partly support the existence of such M-unconscious states.

MAYA'S KWELGEEST: TEMMIGJE RIJKSE VAN DE MANENBURG

by Titus Rivas

Published in 1998 in Spiegel der Parapsychologie, Vol. 36 (new edition), Nr. 1, 2-21.

A Dutch teenager, Maya, claimed she was accompanied by the ‘ghost' of a young girl, Temmigje, who at the beginning of... more A Dutch teenager, Maya, claimed she was accompanied by the ‘ghost' of a young girl, Temmigje, who at the beginning of the 19th century would have lived at the bulwark ‘The Manenburg’ in Utrecht. The ghost behaved rather like a traditional demon and Maya suffered much from her behaviour. At the Utrecht Municipal Archives, Maya found some names the ghost would have mentioned beforehand. Through a reconstruction of all relevant events and checking of data in the archives, the author was able to find some important ïnaccuracies in Mayas account. These make it conceivable that she did after all get to her data in a usual way despite her own account to the contrary. The exceptional interest of this case does not therefore lie in its paranormal content, but in its unique dissociative character..

Past-life Interpretations: We need all of them

by Titus Rivas

Lecture held on the 47th Study Day of the Society for Psychical Research on November 6th 2004 in London.

Selbsttäuschung: Wer ist hier (ir-)rational und warum? (Self-deception: Who is (ir)rational and why?)

by Thomas Sturm

Published in Studia Philosophica, 68 (2009), 229-254. (In German; English translation in preparation.)

This is a revised and extended version of parts of my (2007) papers on self-deception (one of which you can download... more This is a revised and extended version of parts of my (2007) papers on self-deception (one of which you can download below). Before, the focus was primarily on the role of the self in self-deception; here the issue at stake is the (ir)rationality of self-deception.
I argue that both psychological and philosophical studies in self-deception suffer from serious, albeit different, weaknesses. On the one hand, psychologists often employ various indiscriminative conceptions of self-deception in their research. On the other hand, philosophers either proceed heedless of psychological research – or take findings from empirical studies on human cognition and reasoning without realizing the extent to which the underlying theories and data rely on highly problematic assumptions. These weaknesses are significant for the question of whether self-deception is rational or irrational. Both sides present their views without clearly stating which normative theory of rationality it is to which they are committed, and without expounding how that theory serves to study and assess the phenomenon of self-deception. More thorough interdisciplinary work must be done to eliminate naive conceptions and biased methodologies from the study of self-deception.

Self-deception, delusion and the boundaries of folk psychology

by Lisa Bortolotti

Published in HumanaMente in 2012. Co-authored with M Mameli.

To what extent do self-deception and delusion overlap? In this paper we argue that both self-deception and delusions... more To what extent do self-deception and delusion overlap? In this paper we argue that both self-deception and delusions can be understood in folk-psychological terms. ‘Motivated’ delusions, just like self-deception, can be described as beliefs driven by personal interests. If self-deception can be understood folk-psychologically because of its motivational component, so can motivated delusions. Non-motivated delusions also fit (to a large extent) the folk-psychological notion of belief, since they can be described as hypotheses one endorses when attempting to make sense of unusual and powerful experiences. We suggest that there is continuity between the epistemic irrationality manifested in self-deception and in delusion.

Self-Legislation and Other Figurative Dramas

by Reshef Agam-Segal

The paper attemts to answer Anscombe's challenge to the Kantian notion of Self-Legislation, utilizing Wittgenstein's... more The paper attemts to answer Anscombe's challenge to the Kantian notion of Self-Legislation, utilizing Wittgenstein's ideas about figurative language.
I claim that the idea that we can self-legislate is best understood as a secondary use of language.