by Reshef Agam-Segal
I problematize the notion of self-legislation. I suggest that on a plausible reading of Kant, he does not so much... more
I problematize the notion of self-legislation. I suggest that on a plausible reading of Kant, he does not so much misidentify the sources of moral normativity, as fails to identify any such sources in the first place: The set of terms with which the Kantian is attempting to do so is confused.
For Kant, the recognition of the moral law motivates us as if it were “the bidding of another person.” Legislation is typically remote in this way. It typically requires a distance between lawgiver and law-receiver—a distance that allows, for instance, for surveillance and judgment. It is questionable, however, whether we can be remote from our own actions in the way required—whether we can (non-empirically) observe our own actions. We cannot, for example, raise our hand and wonder how far it will go up. I develop this claim into an Anscombean challenge to Kant, and I call upon Kantians to take it seriously.
(Further discussion in my "Figurative Dramas" paper)
Forthcoming in the Journal of Philosophical Research
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