Call for papers - The Inner Revolution (16th and 17th century) [English version]
by Lo Sguardo - Rivista di Filosofia
This tenth issue of Lo Sguardo will be dedicated to the “inner revolution” of he 16th and 17th century; in particular it will delve into the matter of the interiorization of the world” and the development of an “individual interiority” in the period included betweenthe end of the Renaissance and the early modern Age. With this purpose the issue will consider the “psychology of the soul” livering over the role of the “auxialiry faculties” –such as memory, imagination, fantasy – in relation to the notion of apprehensio, to the practice of spiritual exercises and to the concept of homo faber sui.
Accepted languages: English, French, Italian, Spanish, German
Deadline for the delivery: September, 10th 2012
Please feel free to contact us for any further informations: redazione@losguardo.net
http://www.losguardo.net/index.html
http://www.losguardo.net/public/collabora/collabora.html
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Seen by: and 1 moreSelf-knowledge and the Disciplines in Augustine’s De ordine
An early form of this paper was presented at Tokyo Metropolitan University, Ancient Philosophy regular meeting of 2002 organised by Prof. Shigeru Kanzaki and also at Kyoto University, Kyodai Society of Mediaeval Philosophy monthly seminar of 2002 organised by Prof. Shinsuke Kawazoe.
Published in Patristica, Supplementary volume 2 (2006) 85-109.
Introduction
1. Synopsis of De ordine
2. The sapiens and the stultus
3. The core of the discipline “in...
Introduction
1. Synopsis of De ordine
2. The sapiens and the stultus
3. The core of the discipline “in uita”
Conclusion
38 views
Seen by:Non-Observational Knowledge of Action
Forthcoming in Philosophy Compass
Intuitively, the knowledge of one’s own intentional actions is different from the knowledge of actions of other sorts,... more Intuitively, the knowledge of one’s own intentional actions is different from the knowledge of actions of other sorts, including those of other people and unintentional actions of one's own. But how are we to understand this phenomenon? Does it pertain to all actions, under every description under which they are known? If so, then how is this possible? If not, then how should we think about cases that are exceptions to this principle? This paper is a critical survey of recent attempts to answer these questions. I consider views under three headings: "special source" views, which hold that the knowledge of one's intentional actions has a non-perceptual source; "special domain" views, which hold that some but not all aspects of one's intentional actions are known in a special way; and "special character" views, which hold that the knowledge of intentional actions is special not because of where it comes from, but because of some other respect in which it is different in kind from the knowledge of other things.
Habits of Freedom: John Dewey and the Art of Education
Doctoral dissertation (University of Guelph, 2010)
This thesis is an investigation of the relationship among education, human nature, human culture, and human freedom.... more This thesis is an investigation of the relationship among education, human nature, human culture, and human freedom. The basic idea behind the thesis is that education is essential to realizing our freedom, where freedom is conceived positively rather than merely negatively. Specifically, through an analysis of John Dewey's view of human nature, I show that human culture is a necessary but not sufficient condition for human freedom. A surprising corollary of this argument about the relationship between human nature and human freedom is that, if left to run its natural course, human culture in fact tends not to enable but rather to preclude human freedom. Hence, there are very specific cultural practices—habits acquired through education—that are required if we are to realize our freedom. Through an analysis of the interrelationship among Dewey's conceptions of habit, growth, and mind, I show that the habits of growth that must be acquired if we are to realize our freedom are primarily habits of mind. I then examine three specific categories of habits of mind that I contend are necessary but not sufficient for human fulfilment, namely, habits of self-knowledge, self-control, and meaningful self-expression. The development of such habits is not sufficient for human fulfilment, because it is impossible to account for the contingent objective conditions that one encounters over the course of living. However, the development of such habits is necessary for human fulfilment, because, without such habits, we cannot partake in the kind of adaptive change that constitutes an effective response to our ever-changing physical and social environments.
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Seen by:The level of the system's self-knowledge as a measure of its adaptive ability in the light of the Kwiatkowski's system development rule.
Stocki, R. (submitted). The level of the system's self-knowledge as a measure of its adaptive ability in the light of the Kwiatkowski's system development rule.
Kwiatkowski, a Polish economist, formulated the rule linking economic development of nations with proportion of... more Kwiatkowski, a Polish economist, formulated the rule linking economic development of nations with proportion of population knowledgeable in the economic systems of their times. In the present paper we propose to broaden the rule to other systems, particularly organizations and propose empirical and information tools for testing the rule – quantitative analysis of the cognitive maps. We also present results of preliminary research where relation between development and the cognitive maps supported our assumptions.
Identification and Identity
In Contours of Agency, a Festschrift for Harry Frankfurt, edited by Sarah Buss and Lee Overton (MIT Press, 2002), pp. 91-123
The Self As Narrator
Published in John Christman & Joel Anderson (eds.), Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism (2005)
On Daniel Dennett's theory of the self as a "center of narrative gravity" On Daniel Dennett's theory of the self as a "center of narrative gravity"
From Self-Psychology to Moral Philosophy
Published in Philosophical Perspectives (2000)
Empirical evidence supporting my theory of practical reason as self-understanding Empirical evidence supporting my theory of practical reason as self-understanding
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