Displacement and statecraft in Iraq: Recent trends, older roots.
by Ali Ali
Published in the International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies Volume 5 Issue 2 (2011).
This article discusses the relationship between state formation and refugees, linking statecraft - the 'art' of state... more This article discusses the relationship between state formation and refugees, linking statecraft - the 'art' of state building - and displacement in post-2003 Iraq. It uses the testimonies of displaced Iraqis now living in Syria to show how parties and militias in Iraq targeted specific groups, including religious minorities such as the Mandaeans. They created new forms of exclusion, forcing some communities to flee. In some cases, they compelled people to leave abruptly; in others, hostile forces gradually encroached upon the target groups. Some organizations had their origins in pre-2003 dynamics and were not the first in Iraq to use displacement as a means to implement a political design.
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This is a copy of a paper I plan to deliver at the European Social Science History Conference at Glasgow University on April 14th, 2012. The caption on figure 10 shouldn't read decennial change in population, as the inter-censal period was subject to some alteration around this time. It is a DRAFT! I will adjust when I have time。
Between 1920 and 1922, the city of Belfast, Northern Ireland was the location of intense violence between Catholic... more Between 1920 and 1922, the city of Belfast, Northern Ireland was the location of intense violence between Catholic nationalists and Protestant unionists arising out of the broader political conflict engulfing the island. Approximately 500 people died within the city as a result of these tensions. There existed marked spatial variation in patterns of fatality during these original ‘Troubles’ which accompanied the creation of the Northern Ireland state. This paper will present findings from research into this period which makes use of Geographical Information Systems (G.I.S.) technology to analyse the spatial distribution and impact of political and sectarian deaths in the early years of the 1920s.
Struttura e significato del silenzio nel rituale d’iniziazione pitagorico: il silenzio come morte rituale in Studia Patavina: Rivista di Scienze Religiose, Vol 52, N°1
by Pietro Piro
Publisced in Studia Patavina: Rivista di Scienze Religiose, Vol 52, N°1, Padova 2005, pp. 127-148, ISSN 0039-3304, ora in Le prime luci dell'alba. Materiali di storia delle religioni, Navarra Editore, Palermo 2009, pp. 94-122.
Starting from an analysis of Greek society, wholly orientated, in political terms, towards creating an essentially... more Starting from an analysis of Greek society, wholly orientated, in political terms, towards creating an essentially structural paideia, the author aims to illustrate how the mystical alternatives represented an attempt to accede to an alternative way of salvation to that offered by the political religion. The Pythagorean sect represented such an alternative and precisely because of its characteristics as a communitas, was exposed to the typical tensions of the structure/anti-structure dialectic which pervaded the society. In this light the events which culminated in the anti-Pythagorean revolt are examined and interpreted. Having considered the general political context, the role of silence within the initiation ritual of the sect is analysed, firstly by considering some interpretations which concentrate more on the doctrinal contents to leave unsaid rather than on the actual use of silence as a structural moment of the initiation ritual. The role of silence as part of the ritual practice is then analysed, identifying four fundamental phases: an initial physiognomic and anamnestic exam; a preliminary three-year period; a further intermediate period of five years; and a final phase of either aggregation to the communitas or violent expulsion. In this perspective silence was interpreted as a period of ritual death and rebirth, inserted within a specific initiation context.
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Seen by: and 8 more‘Can civil society succeed where elites have failed on the war against sectarianism in Northern Ireland? Towards an infinitely demanding politics for the North’
by Peter Doran
Published in Leonard, L. and Allen, K. (Eds.), Irish Journal of
Sociology, Vol.18, No.2, pp.155-182.
Caught between the well armed imaginations of paramilitary organisations competing for the hearts and minds of a... more Caught between the well armed imaginations of paramilitary organisations competing for the hearts and minds of a divided population, and State engineering of a liberal peace, civil society‟s impact on Northern Ireland‟s identity politics was limited during the thirty-year conflict. Specifically, the community and voluntary sector itself has tended to reproduce as much as it challenged patterns of segregation in many of its own structures. With plans set out in the Northern Ireland Executive‟s Programme for Government (2008-2011) to engage civil society in opening a new era of „good relations‟ work to counter sectarianism and racism, civil society organisations will face a complex terrain, facing scepticism about their contribution to peace making before the Good Friday Agreement, and working in a post-Agreement environment marked by elite and communal antagonism. In this article, I want to suggest that civil society has a new role to play in encouraging communities to confront the contradictions and tensions that continue to haunt the political architects of the Good Friday Agreement by affirming the dominant identities while embracing a radical vision of democracy as democratisation. I will draw on the work of Simon Critchley, Emmanuel Lévinas and Wendy Brown, to offer an approach to identity politics in post-conflict Northern Ireland, focusing on the future orientation of civil society.
The ‘mediation’ of Muslim–Christian relations in Egypt: the strategies and discourses of the official Egyptian press during Mubarak's presidency
This article analyses the representation of Muslim–Coptic relations in the Al-Ahrām newspaper between 2005 and 2010.... more This article analyses the representation of Muslim–Coptic relations in the Al-Ahrām newspaper between 2005 and 2010. The primary goal is to assess the strategies and discourses used by this newspaper to represent sectarianism. As scholars note, negative representations of the ‘other’ in the media can contribute to shaping and prolonging conflict. Therefore, Al-Ahrām's representation of sectarian incidents is significant for the analysis both of the dynamics of Muslim–Christian relations in Egypt, and of state and church policies towards communal violence. Three are three central discourses. (1) The use of selective narratives of history to construct a collective understanding of national unity as a natural state of relations between Muslims and Christians in Egypt. (2) Displacement of blame, which means constructing inter-religious conflict as alien and external through the use of an ‘us versus them’ paradigm in order to shift responsibility for Egypt's sectarian incidents to ‘outsiders’. (3) The control of extreme religious views through a discourse of ‘extremists versus moderates’.
‘Sectarianism’ and Scottish football: Critical reflections on dominant discourse and press commentary
by john kelly
Published in hard journal copy in December 2011.
This article provides a critical discourse analysis of Scottish newspaper reports relating to football and... more This article provides a critical discourse analysis of Scottish newspaper reports relating to football and ‘sectarianism’ in Scotland. It claims that there is a powerful and longstanding ideological ‘framing’ of sectarianism in sections of the Scottish press that is latently power-laden. This discourse attempts to construct and reaffirm a unified non-sectarian core identity that ‘real’ and ‘authentic’ Scots (should) share in opposition to a set of sectarian ‘others’. The various connotations attached to sectarian and sectarianism, together with their use in particular ways that reflect an ideological hegemony, are illustrated. Much of the press treatment of sectarianism is shown to lack sensitivity to the historical, hierarchical and relational aspects of religious, political and ethnic identities in Scotland.
Hibernian Football Club: The Forgotten Irish?
by john kelly
Published in 'Sport in Society', 2007
The popular expression of the Irish sporting diaspora in Scotland has traditionally been closely associated with... more
The popular expression of the Irish sporting diaspora in Scotland has traditionally been closely associated with Celtic Football Club, despite Hibernian Football Club (Hibs), formed in 1875 by the Catholic Young Men's Society, being the first prominent Irish Catholic football club in Scotland. During Hibs’ history, with increasing assimilation into Edinburgh and Scottish society, there have been periods when the club's Irish Catholic ethos has been challenged, resulting in its identity having to be renegotiated. For some supporters (Catholic) ‘Irish’ symbols signify a simplistic and pejorative association to ‘sectarian’ and as such there have been periods when they have downplayed this element of their identity. [1
] This makes erroneous any claims that Hibs is the Celtic of the East. However, at the same time, it is naive to disregard the efficacy which ‘Irishness’ holds for sections of Hibs' supporters. In the increasingly secularized and corporatized environment of the Scottish Premier League, there are renewed attempts, for different reasons perhaps, at reclaiming Hibs' ‘Irishness’ within the club itself and among some of its supporters. Ironically, this process of Hibs reclaiming its ‘Irishness’ is occurring when sections of Celtic's supporters are increasingly questioning the legitimacy of their ‘Irishness’. [2] This essay attempts to locate and analyse the sense of ‘Irishness’ existing among Hibs supporters today. Hibs' relationship with its main ‘other’, Heart of Midlothian Football Club (Hearts), is shown to exhibit a unique inter-city Edinburgh rivalry that intimately affects the nature of Hibs' ‘Irishness’, ensuring its differences from that of Celtic's. The interconnected nature of Hibs' and Celtic fans' respective sense of ‘Irishness’ is demonstrated in the increased confidence and desire of Hibs FC to begin reclaiming its ‘Irishness’ without fear of being associated with the often disdainfully viewed Celtic or ‘sectarianism’.
Outrageous state, sectarianized citizens: deconstructing the 'textbook controversy'in the Northern Areas, Pakistan
by Nosheen Ali
You're In, You're Out!
A paper submitted to the late Dr. Russel Stapleton.
This paper provides notes on ritual, ethics, and sectarianism in Leviticus 18 and 20. In this paper I proposed that... more This paper provides notes on ritual, ethics, and sectarianism in Leviticus 18 and 20. In this paper I proposed that these chapters have to do with "sustaining a functional social structure through maintaining the social identity." This is expressed in the prohibitions which may be grouped into three: (1) social roles or identity (vv. 7-18), sexual functions (vv. 19, 20, 22, 23), and cultic identity (v. 21). In these chapters, Israel is differentiated from other nations through its cultural and cultic distinctive. A short theological reflection is provided at the end of the paper. The theological reflection is partly for Philippines context.
Identifying Sectarian Characteristics in the Phylacteries from Qumran
Published in: Revue de Qumran, 89 (2007), pp. 79–92.
The present study has examined the question of whether the Qumran phylacteries are to be viewed as representative of... more The present study has examined the question of whether the Qumran phylacteries are to be viewed as representative of practices generally observed by mainstream Judaism during the second temple period, or whether these exemplars represent customs peculiar to the Qumran sectarians. Two scribal characteristics have been identified as distinctive of biblical texts deriving from sectarian circles – vulgar orthography and non-Masoretic textual character. It has been shown that the vast majority of the phylactery exemplars from Qumran display at least one of these sectarian characteristics, and should thus be recognized as sectarian phylacteries. Only two exemplars, 8QPhyl I and 4QPhyl D-F, were found to have been completely compatible with Pharisaic scribal norms. While virtually all of the exemplars displaying sectarian scribal practices include “extended” scriptural passages not prescribed by rabbinic law, the two exemplars which are compatible with normative Pharisaic scribal practices contain only the four “abbreviated” scriptural passages prescribed by rabbinic law. As such, the phylactery exemplars from Qumran provide no evidence for the theory that the Decalogue was commonly included in phylacteries during the second temple period as part of “extended” scriptural portions.
Syria and Bahrain: Two poles of the Arab revolt highlight a slide toward sectarianism
By James M. Dorsey
If Syria and Bahrain represent two poles of the 10-month old popular revolt sweeping the... more
By James M. Dorsey
If Syria and Bahrain represent two poles of the 10-month old popular revolt sweeping the Middle East and North Africa, they also highlight the increasing danger of the uprising descending into a sectarian confrontation between Sunni and Shiite Muslims.
Voices in Syria calling for armed resistance to President Bashar al-Assad’s six-month old brutal crackdown that has failed to squash largely peaceful mass anti-government protests are gaining momentum as Sunni Muslim resentment mounts against Alawites, an offshoot of Shiism to which Mr. Assad and his ruling clique belong, and the government fans sectarian flames to undermine the opposition’s calls for greater freedom and economic opportunity.
Brutal repression and sectarianism enabled Bahrain King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa, a Sunni ruling a Shiite majority, to drive a wedge between his Sunni and Shiite Muslims subjects and squash mass protests demanding the toppling of the king’s family that has ruled the Gulf island since the 18th century. The crackdown moved the protests out of the capital Manama and into villages.
Failed efforts to address the protesters’ concerns in a national dialogue have left anti-government sentiment boiling at the surface. Some 10,000 people attended the funeral of a 14 year-old boy killed by police during an end of Ramadan demonstration and prompted demonstrators for the first time to attempt to reclaim Pearl Roundabout, the rallying point in Manama of the squashed protests, that was bulldozed in March and turned into a traffic junction.
The prospect of Syria deteriorating into armed conflict plays into Saudi-led efforts to paint the wave of revolts across the region as a confrontation between the Saudi-led Sunni and the Iranian-led Shiite worlds. Saudi and Bahraini portrayal of the anti-Khalifa protesters as Iranian stooges that are part of an attempt by the Islamic repubic to undermine the region’s conservative Sunni rulers has deepened the sectarian divide on the island.
With a growing number of Syrian protesters, inspired by the NATO-backed rebel success in Libya that drove Libyan leader Col. Moammar Qaddafi from power in a six-month civil war, reports of Saudi funding of arms acquisitions are mounting. Prices on Lebanon’s market reportedly have soared in recent weeks. Mohammed Rahhal, the head of the Revolutionary Council of the Syrian Coordination Committees, a Syrian opposition group, told Ash Sharq al-Awsat newspaper last week that “we made the decision to arm the revolution, which will turn violent very soon, because what we are being subjected to today is a global conspiracy that can only be faced by an armed uprising.”
The eruption of widespread armed resistance would turn Mr. Assad’s repeated allegations that his forces are confronting foreign-supported armed gangs rather than peaceful protesters into a self-fulfilling prophecy. So far, the protests in which more than 2,000 people have been killed, have been largely peaceful despite a number of armed attacks on Syrian military and security personnel.
German weekly Die Zeit journalist Wolfgang Bauer, one of a few reporters that have penetrated Syria, which has refused entry to international media describes the situation in Homs, Syria’s third largest city, as similar to war-torn Beirut at the time of the Lebanese civil war, “divided along ethnic and religious lines where it's too dangerous for people to travel in a particular direction because they will be shot if they do so ... Alawites have secured the streets leading to their residential areas with checkpoints. Their street barricades aren't manned by the military, but by Alawite civilians who now fear being massacred in a Syria without Assad."
Following an attack in July on a Sunni mosque by Alawites, Sunnis reportedly reacted by abducting and killing three Alawites. In response, Alawites went on a rampage, looting and burning Sunni shops, killing three Sunnis. Afraid of retaliation, Alawites are fleeing the city. A Facebook page entitled Homs Revolution posts reports about abused Alawites and urges Sunnis, who account for three quarters of Homs’ population, to take up arms against the government. The page has been endorsed by thousands.
The increased sectarian violence complicates US and European efforts to support the Syrian opposition publicly with condemnations of the crackdown and sanctions against the Syrian regime and quietly with advice and targeted aid. It also raises the specter of sectarian violence spreading to neighboring Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan and Turkey.
The United States and Europe have sought to stem the slide toward increased violence and sectarian strife in Syria and Bahrain in different ways with little success on the Gulf island and a sliver of hope in Syria. Western nations have urged King Khalifa to engage in genuine dialogue with his opponents but have stopped short of holding the ruler accountable for his actions.
By contrast, the West has slapped a series of economic sanctions on Mr. Assad and his cohorts in a bid to drive a wedge between the Syrian leader and significant segments of the predominantly Sunni and Christian business community that has so far sat on the side lines of the crisis. The sanctions have prompted a growing number of businessmen to weigh choosing between what they see as a choice between a rock and a hard place: fear of a rise of retribution and retaliation and the emergence of Islamists in a post-Assad Syria, and a period of civil war and chaos in which the business community would at least be seen as having supported the eventual defeat of the Syrian leader.
To state that Syria and Bahrain both demonstrate that brutal crackdowns do not provide solutions and tend to aggravate rather than alleviate a crisis is kicking in an open door. Yet, a slide into escalated sectarianism violence in Syria, Bahrain and elsewhere in the region would not only constitute a significant setback for anti-autocratic protesters but could turn the Middle East and North Africa into an even more volatile, instable region of protracted bloody clashes, assassinations, suicide bombings, sectarian cleansing and mass migrations of refugees.
James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.
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