Second Scholasticism

“Only the King Can Do It: Adaptation and Flexibility in Crusade Ideology in Sixteenth Century Spain,”

by Patrick O'Banion

Church History (forthcoming)

Reforming efforts at the Council of Trent (1545-1563), the challenges of Protestantism, the rise of national states,... more Reforming efforts at the Council of Trent (1545-1563), the challenges of Protestantism, the rise of national states, and the reassessment of just war doctrine, had initiated a moment of crisis for crusading by the mid-sixteenth century.  Indeed, historians have described these trends as signaling the end of the movement.  This article explores the theoretical underpinnings deployed by an elite group of Spanish theologian and churchmen in May of 1567 to shore up their monarch’s claim to a lucrative version of the crusade indulgence granted by popes since the fifteenth century.  By rehearsing traditional arguments, eschewing those they saw as obsolete, and deploying new ones, these theorists expose the remarkable adaptability of crusading.  The integrity of papally sanctioned holy war against the enemies of the faith collapsed in later centuries with the rise of international law and recognition of permanent divisions within the respublica Christiana.  Yet, the ability of sixteenth-century Spanish theorists to recast ideology in the face of shifting intellectual, cultural, and social tides indicates the continuing viability of crusading during a period of inchoateness.

Intellectual Property: The Roman Catholic Scholastic Provenance of Jacobus Arminius' Prevenient Grace Theology

by Matthew Simmermon-Gomes

Unpublished; submitted to Dr Kenneth Melchin, THO 4108 Grace and Christian Existence

Le edizioni del "Cursus theologicus" di João Poinsot (1589-1644)

by Marco Forlivesi

improved version of the article 'Le edizioni del "Cursus theologicus" di Joannes a s. Thoma', published in 'Divus Thomas' (Bononias), 97/3 (1994), pp. 9-56.

João Poinsot (Joannes de sancto Thoma-Juan de sto Tomás-Jean de st Thomas-Giovanni di s. Tommaso-John of St Thomas). Bibliographie générale

by Marco Forlivesi

published in J. Schmutz (ed.), 'Scholasticon'.

Epokha shkilnyctva: Akademichna filosofija mizh XV i XVII st.

by Marco Forlivesi

transl. by Mykola Symchich, published in 'Istoryko-filosofskyj specvypusk', vol. 1 'Antichna i serednovichna filosofia', special issue of 'Filosofska dumka' and 'Sententiae', 2010, pp. 145-152.

L'età delle "scuole": la filosofia universitaria tra Quattrocento e Seicento

by Marco Forlivesi

published in U. Eco (ed.), 'Il Medioevo', Milano: Federico Motta Editore, 2009, vol. XI, pp. 55-68.

Ontologia impura. La natura della metafisica secondo Francisco Suárez

by Marco Forlivesi

published in 'Francisco Suárez. "Der ist der Mann". Homenaje al prof. Salvador Castellote', (Series Valentina, 50), Valencia: Facultad de Teología “San Vicente Ferrer”, 2004, pp. 161-207.

This essay is devoted to the position of Francisco Suárez on the nature of metaphysics and the object of this science.... more This essay is devoted to the position of Francisco Suárez on the nature of metaphysics and the object of this science. It first of all maintains that the Gilsonian and Heideggerian interpretation of Suárez’s doctrine prevents the possibility of understanding both the position of the Jesuit authors, and the history of the conceptions of metaphysics from the Later Middle Ages to the Early Modern Age. In particular, the pedestrian use of categories such as “ontology” and “ontotheology” leads to a misunderstanding not only of Suárez’s position, but also of the specificity of the path followed by contemporary and later academic thinkers in the Protestant area. Far from advocating a conception of metaphysics as “pure ontology”, Suárez constantly and consciously tried to develop a concept of metaphysics as a unified science. His “anti-ontological” conception of metaphysics is distinguished by two fundamental theses and two theses connected to the fundamental ones. The first fundamental thesis: as concerns the depth of the investigation conducted by metaphysics into spiritual substances and material substances, this science proceeds asymmetrically. This thesis is connected to the following: metaphysics is not a science concerned only with transcendental rationes; in fact, it provides a knowledge deeper than that constituted by the attribution of transcendental rationes to a certain number of subjects. The second fundamental thesis: comprehending the subject of metaphysics involves the acknowledgement of the existence of spiritual beings. This thesis is connected to the following: metaphysics, to some extent, demonstrates the existence of its object. All this prevents us from interpreting Suarez’s metaphysics as an ontology or, even less, a “pure” ontology. If someone is not willing to abandon the inadequate term “ontology”, my proposal is to broaden its meaning by means of a label like “impure”, to express the fact that the relationships of metaphysics with material being and spiritual being are - according to Suárez - asymmetrical and that the object of that science precisely summarizes and expresses those relationships and the binding links that found them.

Filippo Fabri vs Patrizi, Suárez e Galilei: il valore della “Metafisica” di Aristotele e la distinzione delle scienze speculative

by Marco Forlivesi

published in Gr. Piaia - M. Forlivesi (eds.), 'Innovazione filosofica e università tra Cinquecento e primo Novecento - Philosophical Innovation and the University from the 16th Century to the Early 20th', (La filosofia e il suo passato, 40), Padova: CLEUP, 2011, pp. 95-116.

This essay examines the criticisms which Filippo Fabri aimed at some doctrines advocated, respectively, by Francesco... more This essay examines the criticisms which Filippo Fabri aimed at some doctrines advocated, respectively, by Francesco Patrizi, Francisco Suárez and Galileo Galilei. Fabri (1564-1630) was a member of the Order of Friars Minor Conventual and taught metaphysics 'in via Scoti' (1603-1606) and theology 'in via Scoti' (1606-1630) at the 'Universitas Artistarum' of the Padua Studium. Against Patrizi (and Gianfrancesco Pico), Fabri maintained the soundness of Aristotle’s thought and works; against Suárez, he maintained a "proto-ontologist" and "realistic" conception of metaphysics; against Galilei – whom, however, Fabri did not explicitly mention – he asserted the separation between mathematics and physics. Fabri's argumentations reveal the epistemological reasons that induced several early 17th-century university authors to reject the diverse attempts made to abandon the Aristotelian system of sciences and the reading of the Stagirite's works.

Roma, la produzione teologica e la vocazione universale del papato: note critiche

by Paolo Broggio

in Teologia e teologi nella Roma dei papi (secoli XVI-XVII), a cura di P. BROGGIO, F. CANTÙ, «Roma moderna e contemporanea», XVIII, 2010, 1-2, pp. 7-23

The Nature of Transcendental Being and Its Contraction to Its Inferiors in the Thought of Mastri and Belluto

by Marco Forlivesi

published in M. Forlivesi (ed.), 'Rem in seipsa cernere. Saggi sul pensiero filosofico di Bartolomeo Mastri (1602-1673)', (Subsidia Mediaevalia Patavina, 8), Padova: Il Poligrafo, 2006, pp. 261-337.

This article is divided, de facto, into two sections. The first provides an examination of Mastri’s doctrine regarding... more This article is divided, de facto, into two sections. The first provides an examination of Mastri’s doctrine regarding the contraction of the transcendental being in the form of a confutation, on a historical level, of the criticisms formulated by Lukáš Novák (and John Punch). The second illustrates Mastri’s doctrine regarding the univocity of this being in the form of a presentation of the most delicate passages in Mastri’s argumentation. As regards Novák’s first criticism, we maintain that Mastri’s works are not lacking in pages which demonstrate the distinction between the nature of the extra-mental foundation of transcendentals and the nature of the extra-mental foundation of predicamentals. Predicamentals regard things not radically different from one another and such as can be made up of a potential principle and an active principle; to put it succinctly, they concern finite things, adequately conceived. Transcendentals, on the other hand, regard radically different things, of which at least one is infinite. This means that in the case of transcendentals we must admit that they are inadequate concepts, based “a parte rei” on a simple embryonic likeness, which is conceived in the form of a conceptual content common only through the work of the intellect. On the other hand, in the case of predicamentals we must admit that they are adequate concepts, based “a parte rei” on a distinction endowed with reality independently of the work of the mind. As regards Novák’s second criticism, we maintain first of all that it arises from a misunderstanding of Mastri’s doctrine regarding modal distinction. According to Mastri, the modal distinction that exists between something real (like a “formalitas” too) and its mode is a distinction which belongs to the family of real distinctions; however, the modal distinction that exists between an inadequate conceptual content (as are transcendentals) and its intrinsic mode is a distinction which belongs to the family of the distinctions of reason. Hence Mastri’s theory whereby the distinction between a being and its intrinsic modes is a virtual distinction (that is a distinction of reason “cum fundamento in re”) is coherent. In the second place, we observe that, according to Mastri, both the infinite being and the finite being are indivisible essences and that, consequently, both the concept of a being common to God and creatures and the concepts of infinity and finitude are inadequate conceptual contents. This means that the concepts of infinity and finitude explain (or rather do not explain) the essential difference between God and creatures to the same extent to which the concept of being explains (or rather does not explain) what they have in common. Nevertheless just as the latter is able to express to the human mind the embryonic likeness between God and creatures, so the former are able (to the extent to which they add a specification regarding the degrees of existence respectively of the infinite being and the finite being) to express the essential difference between God and creatures. More appropriately, we could say that the transcendental being, the mode of infinity, that of finitude, and the compositions of the former with the latter are the manifestations to the mind of the work with which the mind itself grasps the infinite being, the finite being and their relations of likeness and difference. Mastri’s tortuous argumentation derives from his effort to identify a subtle but difficult middle way between nominalism, Thomism, and the Scotism professed by most of Scotus’ followers, in a field already crowded with attempts at mediation. As regards the formation of the “ratio entis” and its contraction to its inferiors, Mastri’s doctrine can be thus summarized. The “ratio entis” is formed not by the grasping of a “formalitas” (against most Scotists), but rather by confusing abstraction; nevertheless such abstraction takes place not by reasoning reason (“ratio ratiocinans”) – against the “nominales” – , but rather by reasoned reason (“ratio ratiocinata”). Vice versa, the “ratio entis” is contracted not by explicitation (neither by reasoning reason – against the “nominales” –, nor by reasoned reason – against the Thomists, even the eclectic ones –), but rather by composition; nevertheless such contraction takes place not by real composition (against most Scotists), but rather by composition of reasoned reason. Mastri also looks for a middle way regarding the question of the univocal or analogous nature of being. Against those who deny that the transcendental being is unitary and univocal, he maintains the following theses: being is perfectly distinct from its inferiors; with respect to modes, ultimate differences, and transcendental “rationes” it is predicated not quidditatively, but rather identically; the inequality of being’s inferiors is not intrinsic to being. Against those who deny that the transcendental being is analogous, and maintain that it is a genus, he holds the following theses: with respect to non-ultimate differences, being is predicated quidditatively; the inequality of being’s inferiors is extrinsic to being, but the foundation of the former is intrinsic to the latter; the immediate inferiors of being are radically different. We examine these theories and their presuppositions; nevertheless, we confess our own difficulty in understanding some passages in Mastri’s argumentation.

La distinction entre concept formel et concept objectif: Suárez, Pasqualigo, Mastri

by Marco Forlivesi

trad. par O. Boulnois, published in 'Les Études philosophiques', 2002/1, pp. 3-30.

La distinzione tra concetto formale e concetto oggettivo nel pensiero di Bartolomeo Mastri

by Marco Forlivesi

updated and unpublished Italian version of the article 'La distinction entre concept formel et concept objectif: Suárez, Pasqualigo, Mastri'.

Aristotelismo e aristotelismi tra Rinascimento ed Età moderna

by Marco Forlivesi

published in 'Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica', 96 (2004), pp. 175-194.

Gli scotisti secenteschi di fronte al dibattito tra bañeziani e molinisti: un'introduzione e una nota

by Marco Forlivesi

published in St. Perfetti (ed.), 'Conoscenza e contingenza nella tradizione aristotelica medievale', (Philosophica, 44), Pisa: ETS, 2008, pp. 239-281.

Francisco Suárez and the "rationes studiorum" of the Society of Jesus

by Marco Forlivesi

published in in M. Sgarbi (ed.), 'Francisco Suárez and His Legacy. The Impact of Suárezian Metaphysics and Epistemology on Modern Philosophy', Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 2010, pp. 77-90.

C'è una filosofia nell'opera di Francisco Suárez? Il caso della dottrina sul 'verbum mentis' tra 'auctoritates' e argomenti di ragione

by Marco Forlivesi

published in 'Rinascimento', 48 (2008), pp. 397-450.

"Ut illi non repugnet esse in materia". La dottrina di Zaccaria Pasqualigo (1600-1664) sulla natura della metafisica e del suo oggetto

by Marco Forlivesi

published in 'Veritas', 54/3 (2009), pp. 156-172.

Zaccaria Pasqualigo developed his doctrine concerning the nature of metaphysics and of its object in the Twenties of... more Zaccaria Pasqualigo developed his doctrine concerning the nature of metaphysics and of its object in the Twenties of the 17th century. It belongs to the group of reactions, in the Catholic milieu, to the theses propounded by Francisco Suárez on this topic. Pasqualigo develops a metaphysics whose formal object is not the transcendental being, but the being considered as the way of being of the 'quidditas rei omnino abstrahens a materia'. However, the ‘prescinding from matter’ that is proper of this being is not understood by Pasqualigo as an indifference to what is material and to what is spiritual. On the contrary, according to this author the being that metaphysics deals with is intrinsically material. Therefore, metaphysics deals with material being considered apart from matter purely by means of an operation of the mind. As a result, according to Pasqualigo metaphysics is a science superior to physics, but it is not a science superior to rational theology; actually, Pasqualigo’s metaphysics is almost completely separated from whatever kind of theology.

Impure Ontology. The Nature of Metaphysics and Its Object in Francisco Suárez's Texts

by Marco Forlivesi

published in 'Quaestio', 5 (2005), pp. 559-586.

The neo-Thomist and the Heideggerian interpretations of Suárez’s thesis on the object and nature of metaphysics are... more The neo-Thomist and the Heideggerian interpretations of Suárez’s thesis on the object and nature of metaphysics are still effective obstacles to the comprehension of the course of philosophical thought between Middle Ages and Modern Age. Unlike what was maintained by thinkers as Gilson and Heidegger, Suárez expounded clearly and firmly a concept of metaphysics according to which this discipline is indissolubly constituted both by the enquiry into transcendental being and the enquiry into spiritual being. Moreover, he neither conceived of the object of this science as a mere conceptual content, nor treated it as fully equivalent with the transcendental being. This inhibits us from understanding Suarezian metaphysics as ontology – let alone as pure ontology – and prevents us from considering Suárez as the precursor of the ontologies which were developed in Protestant regions during the 17th century.

Review of P. DI VONA, L'ontologia dimenticata. Dall'ontologia spagnola alla Critica della ragion pura

by Michele Paolini Paoletti

in Recensioni filosofiche, 56, gennaio 2011

Ius est idem quod dominium

by Joerg Alejandro Tellkamp