The structure of idealization in biological theories: the case of the Wright-Fisher model. Journal for the General Philosophy of Science (2012)
Co-authored with Xavier de Donato. Published at the Journal for General Philosophy of Science 2012.
In this paper we present a new framework of idealization in biology. We characterize idealizations as a network of... more In this paper we present a new framework of idealization in biology. We characterize idealizations as a network of counterfactual and hypothetical conditionals that can exhibit different “degrees of contingency”. We use this idea to say that, in departing more or less from the actual world, idealizations can serve numerous epistemic, methodological or heuristic purposes within scientific research. We defend that, in part, this structure explains why idealizations, despite being deformations of reality, are so successful in scientific practice. For illustrative purposes, we provide an example from population genetics, the Wright-Fisher Model.
Classificatory Theory in Data-Intensive Science: The Case of Open Biomedical Ontologies
Forthcoming in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
Knowledge-making practices in biology are being strongly affected by the availability of data on an unprecedented... more Knowledge-making practices in biology are being strongly affected by the availability of data on an unprecedented scale, the insistence on systemic approaches and growing reliance on bioinformatics and digital infrastructures. What role does theory play within data-intensive science, and what does that tell us about scientific theories in general? To answer these questions, I focus on the Open Biomedical Ontologies, digital classification tools that have become crucial to sharing results across research contexts in the biological and biomedical sciences, and argue that they constitute an example of classificatory theory. This form of theorising emerges from classification practices in conjunction with experimental know-how and expresses the knowledge underpinning the analysis and interpretation of data disseminated online.
A epistemologia de Taketani-Osada
Trzesniak, Piotr (2009): A epistemologia de Taketani-Osada, in: Oliveira, V. F.; Cavenagui, V.; Másculo, F. S. (org): Tópicos emergentes e desafios metodológicos em engenharia de produção: casos, experiências e proposições (p 199-204). Rio deJaneiro/RJ: Editora da Associação Brasileira de Engenharia de Produção (ISBN 978-85-88478-38-1).
Observam-se atualmente muitas áreas do conhecimento que apresentam uma dimensão aplicada (profissional) consolidada e... more
Observam-se atualmente muitas áreas do conhecimento que apresentam uma dimensão aplicada (profissional) consolidada e muito bem sucedida, enquanto sua retaguarda teórica encontra-se em estágios variados de construção. Torna-se pertinente indagar se um olhar para o desenvolvimento dos ramos mais maduro do conhecimento científico, como física, química, biologia e até matemática, poderia contribuir para acelerar esse processo de formalização.
A resposta é mais não do que sim, caso o olhar se volte apenas para métodos e técnicas, mas pode ser mais sim do que não se a mirada for para a epistemologia de Taketani-Osada, desenvolvida Japão nos anos trinta e quarenta do século passado. Taketani propõe um modelo que vai desde o início de uma área de conhecimento (para o que coloca como requisito imprescindível a existência de experiências aplicadas bem-sucedidas) até a sua estruturação formal em teorias, concluindo com um estágio de revolução, como as descreve Kuhn. Seguir tal modelo implica melhorar significativamente a quantidade de resultados científicos relevantes em comparação com os esforços de pesquisa despendidos para alcançá-los.
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Seen by:On a Contrastive Criterion of Testability II: The Material Inadequacy of Contrastive Testability
Draft
Elliott Sober has suggested his contrastive criterion of testability as an improvement over previous criteria of... more Elliott Sober has suggested his contrastive criterion of testability as an improvement over previous criteria of empirical significance like falsifiability and the standard Bayesian criterion of empirical significance. I argue that the criterion fails to meet four of the conditions of adequacy for a criterion of empirical significance that follow from Sober’s position or are presumed in his arguments. I suggest to define empirical significance as empirical non-equivalence to a tautology, because this definition does meet the conditions of adequacy. Specifically, it is equivalent to the standard Bayesian criterion of empirical significance whenever all probabilities are defined and contains falsifiability as a special case. This latter feature is important because those conditions of adequacy that apply to criteria of deductive empirical significance single out falsifiability.
On a Contrastive Criterion of Testability I: Defining Contrastive Testability
Draft
Elliott Sober has suggested his contrastive criterion of testability as an improvement over previous criteria of... more Elliott Sober has suggested his contrastive criterion of testability as an improvement over previous criteria of empirical significance like falsifiability or a suggestion within Bayesianism. I argue that Sober’s criterion entails that if one group of people is justified in believing a claim, every group is, and that it tacitly relies on an inconsistent interpretation of probabilistic inequalities. Furthermore, the criterion’s restrictions on the use of auxiliary assumptions are in part redundant and in part unjustified. Most importantly, they are so weak that almost all theories can be contrastively tested. On the basis of these results, I suggest a modification of Sober’s criterion that avoids these problems without abandoning Sober’s core idea.
Criteria of Empirical Significance: a Success Story
An earlier version of this article received the Sir Karl Popper Essay Prize 2009 of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science.
The sheer multitude of criteria of empirical significance has been taken as evidence that the pre-analytic notion... more The sheer multitude of criteria of empirical significance has been taken as evidence that the pre-analytic notion being explicated is too vague to be useful. I show instead that a significant number of these criteria—by Ayer, Popper, Przełęcki, Suppes, and David Lewis, among others—not only form a coherent whole, but also connect directly to the theory of definition, the notion of empirical content as explicated by Ramsey sentences, and the theory of measurement; two criteria by Carnap and Sober are trivial, but can be saved and connected to the other criteria by slight modifications. A corollary is that the ordinary language defense of Lewis, the conceptual arguments by Ayer and Popper, the theoretical considerations by Przełęcki, and the practical considerations by Suppes all apply to the same criterion or closely related criteria. Furthermore, the equivalence of some criteria allows for their individual justifications to be taken cumulatively and, together with the entailment relations between nonequivalent criteria, suggest criteria for general auxiliary assumptions, comparative criteria, and more liberal conceptions of observation.
Conventional and Objective Invariance: Debs and Redhead on Symmetry
Co-authored with Stephan Hartmann. Published in 2010 in /Metascience/, vol. 19, pp. 3–27, without its title and abstract as part of the symposium "A new perspective on objectivity and conventionalism".
This review is a critical discussion of three main claims in Debs and Redhead's thought-provoking book Objectivity,... more This review is a critical discussion of three main claims in Debs and Redhead's thought-provoking book Objectivity, Invariance, and Convention. These claims are: (i) Social acts impinge upon formal aspects of scientific representation; (ii) symmetries introduce the need for conventional choice; (iii) perspectival symmetry is a necessary and sufficient condition for objectivity, while symmetry simpliciter fails to be necessary.
What's Right With a Syntactic Approach to Theories and Models?
Presented at the EPSA09: 2nd Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association
I argue that, contrary to common opinion, (i) unintended models do not pose a significant problem for syntactic... more I argue that, contrary to common opinion, (i) unintended models do not pose a significant problem for syntactic approaches to scientific theories, (ii) in syntactic approaches, scientific theories can be as well connected to the world as in semantic ones, and (iii) some syntactic approaches are at least as language independent as semantic ones. Based on these results, I argue that syntactic and semantic approaches fare equally well when it comes to (iv) capturing the theory-observation relation, (v) ease of application, and (vi) accommodating the use of models in the sciences.
On a Straw Man in the Philosophy of Science - A Defense of the Received View
Published in /HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science/ 2(1), pp. 77-120. Spring 2012.
I defend the Received View on scientific theories as developed by Carnap, Hempel, and Feigl against a number of... more I defend the Received View on scientific theories as developed by Carnap, Hempel, and Feigl against a number of criticisms based on misconceptions. First, I dispute the claim that the Received View demands axiomatizations in first order logic, and the further claim that these axiomatizations must include axioms for the mathematics used in the scientific theories. Next, I contend that models are important according to the Received View. Finally, I argue against the claim that the Received View is intended to make the concept of a theory more precise. Rather, it is meant as a generalizable framework for explicating specific theories.

