Scientific Reasoning

Sobre pluralidad de modelos (On the plurality of models)

by Nicolas Saavedra Garreton

Publicado en PRAXIS. Revista de Psicología Año 13 Nº 19 (75-96), I Sem. 2011

En este trabajo se aborda la pluralidad de modelos en la construcción de teorías científicas, asumiendo dicha... more En este trabajo se aborda la pluralidad de modelos en la construcción de teorías científicas, asumiendo dicha pluralidad como una condición para la teorización fructífera. El tratamiento de este tópico es llevado a cabo tomando como base las propuestas de Max Black sobre modelos científicos, presentadas en su artículo Models and Archetypes. En esta referencia, Black caracteriza tres clases de modelo: analógico,
matemático y teórico. Algunas de las distinciones introducidas por Black son aplicadas al contraste de nociones pertenecientes a dos teorías de corriente principal en el ámbito
de la lingüística contemporánea: la lingüística generativa y la lingüística cognitiva. A partir de este contraste, se busca relativizar tanto el compromiso –aparentemente constitutivo– de estas teorías con el uso de ciertos tipos de modelo, como la resistencia de éstas al uso de modelos distintos. Esta relativización es introducida en función de las ventajas descriptivas y explicativas que un uso plural de modelos podría acarrear para las teorías en contraste.


This paper tackles the plurality of scientific models in constructing scientific theories, assuming this plurality as a condition for fruitful theorizing. The treatment
of this topic is carried out taking as a base Max Black’s proposals on scientific models, as presented in his article Models and Archetypes. In this reference, Black characterizes
three classes of models: analogical ones, mathematical ones and theoretical ones. Some distinctions introduced by Black are applied to the contrast between notions pertaining
to two mainstream theories in contemporary linguistics: generative linguistics and cognitive linguistics. From this contrast, the aim is to relativize both the – apparently
constitutive – commitment of these theories with the use of certain kinds of models, and the rejection of models of a different kind. This relativization is introduced according to the descriptive and explicative advantages that a plural use of models may
entail for the contrasting theories.

Exploring Research Data Interactively. Theme One : A Program of Inquiry

by Jon Awbrey

Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (August 1990), “Exploring Research Data Interactively. Theme One : A Program of Inquiry”, Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Conference on Applications of Artificial Intelligence and CD-ROM in Education and Training, Society for Applied Learning Technology, Washington, DC, pp. 9–15.

If computer programs were smarter, they would, like people, recognize sequences of events, form models of their... more If computer programs were smarter, they would, like people, recognize sequences of events, form models of their environment, and formulate rules based on experience.  This paper describes the development of a program designed to address the difficult computational problems involved in integrating the inductive and deductive reasoning necessary to perform such tasks.  “Theme One” is a prototype program composed of “Index”, a learning algorithm for sequential data, and “Study”, an algorithm for building logical models.  The project goal is an interactive research tool that assists students and investigators in the exploration of qualitative data using artificial intelligence.

Advocacy as a Scientific Strategy: The Mitroff Myth

by J Armstrong

A committee created a fictitious author, Ian Mitroff, who published a paper that violated scientific guidelines. The... more A committee created a fictitious author, Ian Mitroff, who published a paper that violated scientific guidelines. The Mitroff paper recommended an advocacy strategy for scientific research; it said that scientists should vigorously defend their initial hypothesis. I use the advocacy strategy to scientifically prove that Mitroff does not exist.

Does Science Provide Us with the Methodological Key to Wisdom?

by Nicholas Maxwell

Science provides us with the methodological key to wisdom.  This idea goes back to the 18th century French... more Science provides us with the methodological key to wisdom.  This idea goes back to the 18th century French Enlightenment.  Unfortunately, in developing the idea, the philosophes of the Enlightenment made three fundamental blunders: they failed to characterize the progress-achieving methods of science properly, they failed to generalize these methods properly, and they failed to develop social inquiry as social methodology having, as its basic task, to get progress-achieving methods, generalized from science, into social life so that humanity might make progress towards an enlightened world.  Instead, the philosophes developed social inquiry as social science.  This botched version of the Enlightenment idea was further developed throughout the 19th century, and built into academia in the early 20th century with the creation of university departments of social science.  As a result, academia today seeks knowledge but does not devote reason to the task of helping humanity make progress towards a better, wiser world.  Our current and impending global crises are the outcome.  We urgently need to bring about a revolution in universities throughout the world so that the blunders of the Enlightenment are corrected, and universities take up their proper task of helping humanity make progress towards a wiser world.

The Function of Scientific Metaphors: An Example of the Creative Power of Metaphors in Biological Theories

by Alfonso Arroyo-Santos

Penultimate draft of the paper I co-wrote with Xavier de Donato on metaphors in science and art for the book Paths of creation. Creativity in Science and art,  edited by Marcos and Castros.
Guess I shoudl say something like, "please buy our book" or something but in the mean time here's a draft for discussion.

In Defence of Aristotelian Metaphysics

by Tuomas Tahko

Forthcoming in my Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics (Cambridge University Press, 2011)

The so called 'Aristotelian' conception of metaphysics is often ridiculed because it takes certain notions as... more The so called 'Aristotelian' conception of metaphysics is often ridiculed because it takes certain notions as fundamental, or appears to require some sort of mysterious rational insight to establish epistemic access to metaphysical truths. In this paper I examine the methodology of this conception of metaphysics, contrast it with the predominant Quinean conception of metaphysics and ontological commitment, and make some suggestions regarding the methodology of Aristotelian metaphysics. Specifically, I argue that the Quinean idea of viewing all ontological questions as existence questions is flawed, and that the proper understanding of (many) ontological questions views them as questions concerning the natures or essences of the entities under investigation. Another way to put this might be to say that Aristotelian metaphysics is interested in explaining entities in virtue of others rather than reducing entities to other entities. I also examine the relationship between metaphysics and natural science and argue that Aristotelian metaphysics is in fact continous, or parallel, to natural science.

Olga Pombo & Alexander Gerner (Eds.). Abduction and the Process of Scientific Discovery. Lisbon: Publidisa, 2007

by Alexander Gerner

(2009) Regulation, necessity, and the misinterpretation of knockouts

by Jamie Davies

Davies JA (2009) BioEssays 31: 826-830

Much contemporary biology consists of identifying the molecular components that associate to perform biological... more Much contemporary biology consists of identifying the molecular components that associate to perform biological functions, then discovering how these functions are controlled. The concept of control is key to biological understanding, at least of the physiological kind; identifying regulators of processes underpins ideas of causality and allows complicated, multicomponent systems to be summarized in relatively simple diagrams and models. Unfortunately, as this article demonstrates by drawing on published articles, there is a growing tendency for authors to claim that a molecule is a 'regulator' of something on evidence that cannot support the conclusion. In particular, gene knockout experiments, which can demonstrate only that a molecule is necessary for a process, are all too frequently being misinterpreted as revealing regulation. This logical error threatens to blur the important distinction between regulation and mere necessity and therefore to weaken one of our strongest tools for comprehending how organisms work.

A Priori and A Posteriori: A Bootstrapping Relationship

by Tuomas Tahko

Metaphysica, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2011

The distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge has been the subject of an enormous amount of discussion,... more The distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge has been the subject of an enormous amount of discussion, but the literature is biased against recognizing the intimate relationship between these forms of knowledge. For instance, it seems to be almost impossible to find a sample of pure a priori or a posteriori knowledge. In this paper, it will be suggested that distinguishing between a priori and a posteriori is more problematic than is often suggested, and that a priori and a posteriori resources are in fact used in parallel. We will define this relationship between a priori and a posteriori knowledge as the bootstrapping relationship. As we will see, this relationship gives us reasons to seek for an altogether novel definition of a priori and a posteriori knowledge. Specifically, we will have to analyse the relationship between a priori knowledge and a priori reasoning, and it will be
suggested that the latter serves as a more promising starting point for the analysis of aprioricity. We will also analyse a number of examples from the natural sciences and consider the role of a priori reasoning in these examples. The focus of this paper is the analysis of the concepts of a priori and a posteriori knowledge rather than the epistemic domain of a posteriori and a priori justification.

Metaphors as surrogate variables. The case of adaptive radiation

by Alfonso Arroyo-Santos

Co-authored with Mark E. Olson. Draft only. Hopefully, it it be published in no time ;)
Any comments are very welcomed!

We develop a new metaphor account where metaphors become surrogate variables for different but related phenomena. As... more We develop a new metaphor account where metaphors become surrogate variables for different but related phenomena. As we will argue, subrogation is the result of the interplay between the things inspired by the metaphor and the empirical dynamics that result from such inspiration. In particular, we focus on adaptive radiation, a major concept of evolutionary biology. Our study suggests that there is no distinct phenomenon, process, or pattern in nature than can be identified as adaptive radiation. What we have instead is a grouping variable that has surrogated different evolutionary phenomena into one expansive label. We believe this analysis of metaphors helps better understand the value of metaphors for science not only as providers of epistemic and cognitive virtues but most importantly, as a crucial research tool that can both help and divert scientific experimentation.

Thinking in continua: beyond the “adaptive radiation” metaphor

by Alfonso Arroyo-Santos

co-authored with Mark E. Olson, published in BioEssays
Volume 31, Issue 12, pages 1337–1346, December 2009

“Adaptive radiation” is an evocative metaphor for explosive evolutionary divergence, which for over 100 years has... more “Adaptive radiation” is an evocative metaphor for explosive evolutionary divergence, which for over 100 years has given a powerful heuristic to countless scientists working on all types of organisms at all phylogenetic levels. However, success has come at the price of making “adaptive radiation” so vague that it can no longer reflect the detailed results yielded by powerful new phylogeny-based techniques that quantify continuous adaptive radiation variables such as speciation rate, phylogenetic tree shape, and morphological diversity. Attempts to shoehorn the results of these techniques into categorical “adaptive radiation: yes/no” schemes lead to reification, in which arbitrary quantitative thresholds are regarded as real. Our account of the life cycle of metaphors in science suggests that it is time to exchange the spent metaphor for new concepts that better represent the full range of diversity, disparity, and speciation rate across all of life.

Abstract Argumentation and Explanation Applied to Scientific Debates

by Dunja Šešelja

Co-authored with Christian Straßer; published in Synthese

Abstract argumentation has been shown to be a powerful tool within many fields such as artificial intelligence, logic... more Abstract argumentation has been shown to be a powerful tool within many fields such as artificial intelligence, logic and legal reasoning. In this paper we enhance Dung’s well-known abstract argumentation framework with explanatory capabilities. We show that an explanatory argumentation framework (EAF) obtained in this way is a useful tool for the modeling of scientific debates. On the one hand, EAFs allow for the representation of explanatory and justificatory arguments constituting rivaling
scientific views. On the other hand, different procedures for selecting arguments, corresponding to different methodological and epistemic requirements of theory evaluation, can be formulated in view of our framework.

Accounting for Natural Phenomena: Explanatory Modes Used by Children

by Vasilia Christidou

Published in the 'International Journal of Learning', 2005/2006.

A framework for classifying children's explanations about dissolution, floating, magnetic forces, plant nutrition and... more A framework for classifying children's explanations about dissolution, floating, magnetic forces, plant nutrition and the water cycle is presented. Explanations are classified as naturalistic, non-naturalisic, or synthetic.

Preschool Children's Explanations of Plant Growth and Rain Formation: A Comparative Analysis

by Vasilia Christidou

Christidou, V., & Hatzinikita V. (2006). Preschool children’s explanations of plant growth and rain formation: A comparative analysis. Research in Science Education, 36, 187-210.

This paper explores the different types and characteristics of preschool children's explanations of plant growth and... more This paper explores the different types and characteristics of preschool children's explanations of plant growth and rain formation. The children's explanations were categorized as naturalistic, non-naturalistic, or synthetic, i.e., explanations containing both naturalistic and non-naturalistic parts. In regards to plant growth the children tended to rely on synthetic or on naturalistic explanations. In the case of rain formation the children most frequently used non-naturalistic explanations, which were mainly teleological or metaphysical.

Pre-energy reasoning in preschool children

by Vasilia Christidou

Co-authored with D. Koliopoulos,  I. Simidala, and M. Koutsiouba. Published in the 'Review of Science, Mathematics and ICT Education', 2009.

The research presented in this paper explores the degree to which preschool children have the ability to use mental... more The research presented in this paper explores the degree to which preschool children have the ability to use mental representations which constitute precursor energy models.

Can science tell us what's objectively true?

by Brian Earp

Earp, B. D. (2011). Can science tell us what’s objectively true? The New Collection, Vol. 6., No. 1, 1-9. Featured article in the graduate journal of New College, Oxford.

Can science tell us what’s objectively true? Or is it merely a clever way to cure doubt – to give us something to... more Can science tell us what’s objectively true? Or is it merely a clever way to cure doubt – to give us something to believe in, whether it’s true or not? In this essay, I look at the pragmatist account of science expounded by Charles Sanders Peirce in his 1877 essay, ‘The Fixation of Belief’. Against Peirce, I argue that science does not come naturally to our species, nor does the doubting open-mindedness upon which its practice relies. To the extent that science is successful in ‘curing’ doubt, it’s because it tracks the real state of the world; and I argue that Peirce himself – his pragmatist narrative notwithstanding – is implicitly committed to this view as well.

Book Review: "Beyond the Hoax: Science, Philosophy and Culture" by Alan Sokal

by Joseph Rhodes

published in "Science, Technology & Human Values," 2010

Replication in the deception and convergence of opinions problem

by André Martins

Deception and Convergence of Opinions

by André Martins

The Mediating Effect of Task Presentation on Collaboration and Children's Acquisition of Scientific Reasoning

by Dorothy Faulkner

Faulkner, Dorothy; Joiner, Richard; Littleton, Karen; Miell, Dorothy and Thompson, Linda (2000). The mediating effect of task presentation on collaboration and children's acquisition of scientific reasoning. European Journal of Psychology of Education, 15(4), pp. 417–430.

There has been considerable research concerning peer interaction and the acquisition of children's scientific... more There has been considerable research concerning peer interaction and the acquisition of children's scientific reasoning. This study investigated differences in collaborative activity between pairs of children working around a computer with pairs of children working with physical apparatus and related any differences to the development of children's scientific reasoning. Children aged between 9 and 10 years old (48 boys and 48 girls) were placed into either same ability or mixed ability pairs according to their individual, pre-test performance on a scientific reasoning task. These pairs then worked on either a computer version or a physical version of Inhelder and Piaget's (1958) chemical combination task. Type of presentation was found to mediate the nature and type of collaborative activity. The mixed-ability pairs working around the computer talked proportionally more about the task and management of the task; had proportionally more transactive discussions and used the record more productively than children working with the physical apparatus. Type of presentation was also found to mediated children's learning. Children in same ability pairs who worked with the physical apparatus improved significantly more than same ability pairs who worked around the computer. These findings were partially predicted from a socio-cultural theory and show the importance of tools for mediating collaborative activity and collaborative learning.