Sociality and Solitude
The nature of objective self-awareness — a person's awareness of being an inhabitant of the objective world — accounts... more The nature of objective self-awareness — a person's awareness of being an inhabitant of the objective world — accounts for many of the ways in which we value persons.
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Seen by: and 5 moreFoundations for Moral Relativism
I attempt to explain the normative force and moral content of what are nevertheless independent, mutually... more I attempt to explain the normative force and moral content of what are nevertheless independent, mutually incompatible, but equally valid moralities.
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Seen by: and 36 morePluralismo, relativismo e libertà
revised version published in "Discipline filosofiche", vol. XVII (2007), pp. 133-154
What's really wrong with (belief based) ethical relativism
by David Hunter
Draft paper - still likely to be revised further before submission
While typically given short shrift by philosophers various versions of what I will refer to as naïve moral relativism... more While typically given short shrift by philosophers various versions of what I will refer to as naïve moral relativism such as ethical subjectivism and cultural relativism are quite popular outside philosophical circles with both academics and non-academics. In this paper I will critique common philosophical objections to these positions and then develop a new objection, referred that in effect in some circumstances these positions must affirm that both A & ~A are simultaneously true. The basic form of my argument is that someone who believes that the truth of ethical claims is true only relative to the beliefs of an individual or group is committed to claiming that in some situations both A and ~A are true, since a specific individual or group could believe both A and ~A to be true, either through mistaken reasoning, a lack of knowledge or through an irresolvable attachment to contradictory intuitions. I will then see how this objection fares against more sophisticated versions of moral relativism such as that advanced by Gilbert Harman and conclude that this new objection shows us that versions of moral relativism that relate the truth of ethical claims to beliefs result in logical contradiction.
Life Absurd? Don't Be Ridiculous
Believing moral relativism does not make life absurd. Believing moral relativism does not make life absurd.
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More Seminal Ethics Implications
by Mark Singer
Tandem works include: "Seminal Ethics," "Kant Concept Art," "Addendum - More Seminal Ethics Implications" - also on this site.
These implications are: moral, epistemology, love, happiness, time and space, psychological, art, education, medical, economic, war, capital punishment, and abortion.
"Addendum - More Seminal Ethics Implications" includes additional categories.
Fear of Knowledge, Against Relativism and Constructivism – by Paul Artin Boghossian. Dialectica 63 (3):357-360.
My review of Boghossian's book, Fear of Knowledge, is generally sympathetic toward his rejection of epistemic... more My review of Boghossian's book, Fear of Knowledge, is generally sympathetic toward his rejection of epistemic relativism and turns toward an examination of "constructivist" themes in light of an anti-nominalist perspective. In general terms, this is a fine little book, tightly argued, and well worth considerable attention--especially from the friends of relativism and those supporting versions of constructivism. (Constructivism + radical nominalism = relativism.).
A Note on Assertion, Relativism and Future Contingents
(forthcoming in Logos & Episteme)
I argue that John MacFarlane's (2003) attempt to reconcile his proposed truth-relativist account of future contingents... more I argue that John MacFarlane's (2003) attempt to reconcile his proposed truth-relativist account of future contingents with a plausible account of assertion is self-defeating. Specifically, a paradoxical result of MacFarlane's view is that assertions of future contingents are impermissible for anyone who already accepts MacFarlane's own truth-relativist account of future contingents.
Knowing Future Contingents
Logos & Episteme (forthcoming)
This paper argues that we know the future by applying a
recent solution of the problem of future contingents to... more
This paper argues that we know the future by applying a
recent solution of the problem of future contingents to knowledge
attributions about the future. MacFarlane has put forward a version of assessment-context relativism that enables us to assign a truth value 'true' (or 'false') to future contingents such as There Will Be A Sea Battle Tomorrow. Here I argue that the same solution can be applied to knowledge attributions about the future by dismissing three disanalogies between the case of future contingents and the case of knowledge attributions about the future. Therefore none of the traditional conditions for knowledge can be utilized to deny that we know the future, as I argue in the last section.
Relativism and Self-Refutation in the Theaetetus
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy XXXVII (Winter 2009)
Plato argues, at Theaetetus 170e-171c, that Protagoras’ relativism is self-refuting. This argument, known as the... more Plato argues, at Theaetetus 170e-171c, that Protagoras’ relativism is self-refuting. This argument, known as the ‘exquisite argument’, and its merits have been the subject of much controversy over the past few decades. Burnyeat (1976) has argued in defense of Plato’s argument, but his reconstruction of the argument has been criticized as question-begging. After offering an interpretation of Protagoras’ relativism, I argue that the exquisite argument is successful, for reasons that Burnyeat hints at but fails to develop sufficiently. I consider Protagorean relativism under both of the two possible readings with respect to its scope: global relativism, according to which all truths are only relatively true, and qualified relativism, according to which the relativistic thesis itself is excepted. Taking into consideration some contemporary work on relativism and self-refutation, I show that Plato’s argument succeeds on both of these readings. Given that Protagoras could avoid self-contradiction simply by denying that an enduring subject exists, I argue that the exquisite argument is best understood as confronting Protagoras with a dilemma between self-contradiction and self-defeat of various sorts, all of which lead to the same result, that Protagoras violates the requirements of rational discourse in such a way that he becomes an absurd figure who has nothing to say to us.
Epistemic Contextualism, Epistemic Relativism and Disagreement
Forthcoming in a special issue of 'Philosophical Writings'.
Relativist Apologetics: The Future of Creationism
by Taner Edis
Pre-publication draft
Reports of the National Center for Science Education, 17:1 17 (1997)
I diritti umani tra universalismo e relativismo
by Andrea Rigon
published in 'Jura Gentium - Journal of Philosophy of International Law and Global Politics'. II (2006), 1
Meaning and Context
by Erich Rast
Baptista, Luca / Rast, Erich (eds): Meaning and Context. Peter Lang 2010.
Contents: Luca Baptista/Erich Rast: Introduction - Manuel García-Carpintero: Norms of Presupposition - Emma Borg:... more Contents: Luca Baptista/Erich Rast: Introduction - Manuel García-Carpintero: Norms of Presupposition - Emma Borg: Minimalism and the Content of the Lexicon - Anne Bezuidenhout: Contextualism and Information Structure: Towards a Science of Pragmatics - Augustín Vicente/Fernando Martínez-Manrique: Lexical Concepts: From Contextualism to Concept Decompositionalism - Isidora Stojanovic: Referring with Proper Names: Towards a Pragmatic Account - Kepa Korta/John Perry: Intentions to Refer - Brian Ball: What Is Semantic Content? - Sandy Berkovski: Some Remarks on Mthat - Teresa Marques: Truth and the Ambiguity of Negation - Ana Falcato: The Contextualist Fight Against Minimalism - Salvatore Pistoia-Reda: Some Notes on Game Theory and the Pragmatics of Alternatives - Andrei Moldovan: Can Uses of Language in Thought Provide Linguistic Evidence?
Reference and Indexicality: PhD Thesis
by Erich Rast
If you're looking for similar content but with many corrections and less linguistic oddities, please order the book in the Logos series "Logische Philosophie" which was revised and edited heavily.
I lay out a modal description theory of reference, show how to reply to the Kripkean challenge (insofar as the... more
I lay out a modal description theory of reference, show how to reply to the Kripkean challenge (insofar as the arguments of Millians are comprehensible), and lay out why in my opinion Millians and descriptivists talk at cross purpose. In a nutshell, a descriptivist theory of reference is feasible but not necessary for modeling semantic reference.
The second part develops a descriptive theory of indexical reference and discusses essential indexicality.
Just FYI: In contrast to what is suggested in chapter 8 of the thesis I've recently (2011) changed my mind about de se attitudes and do now believe like most others that they need to be modeled as being truth-conditionally relevant rather than explaining them away as pragmatic phenomena. I've changed my mind mainly due to Stalnaker's recent work on the analogies between the Knowledge Argument and de se puzzles, especially Lewis' two gods. -- a paper is in preparation.
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Seen by:Plausibility Revision in Higher-order Logic with an Application in Two-Dimensional Semantics
by Erich Rast
published in Arrazola, Xabier and Ponte, María (eds.): LogKCA-10 - Proceedings of the Second ILCLI International Workshop on Logic and Philosophy of Knowledge, Communication and Action. San Sebastian/Donostia: University of the Basque Country Press/ILCLI 2010, pp. 387-403.
The printed version unfortunately contains some nasty and embarrasing errors, most of them caused by hitting the Emacs key for "downcase region" just before the final deadline. :O
In this article, a qualitative notion of subjective plausibility and its revision based on a preorder relation are... more
In this article, a qualitative notion of subjective plausibility and its revision based on a preorder relation are implemented in higher-order logic. This notion of plausibility is used for modeling pragmatic aspects of communication on top of traditional two-dimensional semantic representations.
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Seen by:Introduction to Meaning and Context (together with Luca Baptista)
by Erich Rast
the introduction to the Peter Lang volume we edited, co-authored with Luca Baptista.
in Baptista/Rast (eds.): Meaning and Context. Peter Lang. Bern New York 2010, pp. 1-17.
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