The Influence of Relational Experience and Contractual Governance on the Negotiation Strategy in Buyer-Supplier Disputes
Lumineau F. & Henderson J. 2012. “The Influence of Relational Experience and Contractual Governance on the Negotiation Strategy in Buyer-Supplier Disputes.” Journal of Operations Management, 30(5): 382-395.
This paper theoretically refines and empirically extends the debate on the type of interplay between relational... more This paper theoretically refines and empirically extends the debate on the type of interplay between relational experience and contractual governance in an under-researched area: supply chain disputes. We define relational experience as either cooperative or competitive; distinguish between control and coordination functions of contractual governance; and assess their interplay on the negotiation strategy used in disputes. Using a unique data set of buyer-supplier disputes, we find, in particular, that increasing contractual control governance weakens the positive effect of cooperative relational experience on cooperative negotiation strategy. However, increasing contractual control governance for a buyer-supplier dyad with competitive relational experience will increase cooperative negotiation strategy. Contractual coordination governance reinforces the positive effect of cooperative relational experience. Through this study, we reach a better understanding of how and when contractual and relational governance dimensions interact; rather than whether they act as substitutes or complements as has been studied in prior research. We discuss the implications of these findings for the field of supply chain management.
An Empirical Investigation of Interorganizational Opportunism and Contracting Mechanisms
Lumineau F. & Quélin B. V. 2012. “An Empirical Investigation of Interorganizational Opportunism and Contracting Mechanisms.” Strategic Organization, 10(1): 55-84.
This study investigates contracting mechanisms in situations of opportunistic disputes between organizations. We... more This study investigates contracting mechanisms in situations of opportunistic disputes between organizations. We specifically explore the relationships between the formal versus informal nature of opportunism and the formal versus informal nature of contractual governance. We use a unique data set of 102 buyer-supplier disputes to explore in depth different types of opportunism—that is, strong form versus weak form opportunism—and different types of contracting mechanisms—that is, the controlling and coordinating functions of formal contracts and the cooperative and competitive sides of relational contracts. Our detailed empirical analysis suggests distinct relationships between the different contracting mechanisms, the different types of opportunism, and the level of legal fees necessary to deal with the dispute. These findings enable us to derive implications for research on the role of contractual mechanisms in dealing with interorganizational opportunism.
Shadow of the Contract: How Contract Structure Shapes Interfirm Dispute Resolution
Lumineau F. & Malhotra D. 2011. “Shadow of the Contract: How Contract Structure Shapes Inter-Firm Dispute Resolution.” Strategic Management Journal, 32(5): 532-555.
This paper investigates how contract structure influences inter-firm dispute resolution processes and outcomes by... more This paper investigates how contract structure influences inter-firm dispute resolution processes and outcomes by examining a unique dataset consisting of over 150,000 pages of documents relating to 102 business disputes. We find that the level of contract detail affects the type of dispute resolution approach that is adopted when conflict arises, and that different approaches are associated with different costs for resolving the dispute. We also find that the effect of contract choice on dispute resolution approach is moderated by the degree of coordination required in the relationship, and that the effect of dispute approach on costs is moderated by the degree of power asymmetry between the parties. Thus, even after controlling for various attributes of the exchange relationship and the dispute, the choice of contracting structure has important strategic implications.
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