Reasons

Foundations for Moral Relativism

by J. David Velleman

I attempt to explain the normative force and moral content of what are nevertheless independent, mutually... more I attempt to explain the normative force and moral content of what are nevertheless independent, mutually incompatible, but equally valid moralities.

There Are No "Reasons for Acting"

by J. David Velleman

Parts of this paper were incorporated into "Time for Action"

The title says it all. The title says it all.

Razões para agir (ou como Lewis Carroll nos ajudou a entender também os raciocínios práticos)

by Marco Antonio Azevedo

RESUMO – Neste artigo, procuro extrair algumas conseqüências da lição de Lewis Carroll sobre a diferença entre... more RESUMO – Neste artigo, procuro extrair algumas conseqüências da lição de Lewis Carroll sobre a diferença entre premissas e regras de inferência no tocante aos raciocínios práticos. Meu ques- tionamento dirige-se à clássica suposição forma- lista contida na famosa “Lei de Hume”, a saber, a regra formulada, dentre outros, por Richard Hare, de que é logicamente impossível derivar-se uma conclusão moral prática apenas de premissas fatuais. Na primeira parte deste artigo, proponho que o leitor imagine-se numa situação hipotética, na qual adota uma postura evasiva mesmo diante de razões prima facie suficientes para tomar uma certa decisão. A situação apresentada é uma versão do “análogo prático”, engenhosamente construído por G. F. Schueler, ao clássico para- doxo de Lewis Carroll, contido em sua conhecida e genial estória da disputa entre Aquiles e a Tartaruga, publicada originalmente na revista Mind, em 1895. Na segunda parte, relembro e brevemente analiso a fábula carrolliniana, compa- rando-a com a versão prática de Schueler, discu- tindo suas analogias e dessemelhanças. Na terceira parte, mostro como as duas estórias são capazes de nos ajudar a desvendar alguns mal- entendidos sobre o raciocínio prático e sobre suas imbricações com a ética, em especial, com a conhecida tese de que de fatos não derivamos normas. Pretendo mostrar como essa famosa tese é vítima do mesmo vício formalista denunciado por Lewis Carroll, a saber, que é fruto de enten- dimentos equívocos acerca dos papéis que podem ser desempenhados por uma norma em um raciocínio prático, isto é, que, primariamente, normas, na condição de regras práticas, não figu- ram propriamente como premissas, e sim como regras especiais ou materiais de inferência. Se minha tese for verdadeira, então a alegação de que não podemos derivar “normas” de “fatos” resulta, na verdade, de um mal-entendido. Na última parte do artigo, destaco algumas outras confusões acerca do significado do termo ‘dever’ tal como esse termo é empregado usualmente em conclusões de raciocínios práticos. Numa refe- rência a Stanley Cavell, sustentarei que o termo ‘dever’ serve-nos, nessa condição, de modo de apresentação do conteúdo das premissas que temos ou das razões que oferecemos para agir de uma certa maneira. Sendo assim, o termo ‘dever’, que usamos para apresentar a conclusão de um raciocínio prático, não pode ser interpretado, de maneira simplista (tal como fazem os defensores de visões kantianas sobre a ética), como tendo o mesmo sentido que o termo ‘obrigação’, cujo significado é mais estrito.

Is Perception a Source of Reasons?

by Santiago Echeverri

forthcoming in 'Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy'

It is widely assumed that perception is a source of reasons (SR). There is a weak sense in which this claim is... more It is widely assumed that perception is a source of reasons (SR). There is a weak sense in which this claim is trivially true: even if one characterizes perception in purely causal terms, perceptual beliefs originate from the mind's interaction with the world. When philosophers argue for (SR), however, they have a stronger view in mind: they claim that perception provides pre- or non-doxastic reasons for belief. In this paper I examine some ways of developing this view and criticize them. I exploit these results to formulate a series of constraints that a satisfactory account of the epistemic role of perception should fulfill. I also make a positive suggestion: coherentists are right when they claim that only beliefs can be reasons for other beliefs. Nevertheless, I depart from traditional coherentism, for I do not buy its conception of perception as bare sensation, nor explicate the justificatory status of beliefs in terms of coherence. My point is rather that, when one invokes experience to justify a belief, the justifying state must have structural features of beliefs.

In Defense of the Wide-Scope Instrumental Principle

by Simon Rippon

Published in the Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, 2011. Open access.

I make the observation that English sentences such as “You have reason to take the bus or to take the train” do not... more I make the observation that English sentences such as “You have reason to take the bus or to take the train” do not have the logical form that they superficially appear to have. I find in these sentences a conjunctive use of “or,” as found in sentences like “You can have milk or lemon in your tea,” which gives you a permission to have milk, and a permission to have lemon, though no permission to have both. I argue that a confusion of genuine disjunctions with sentences of the above form has motivated the mistaken acceptance by some philosophers of principles like the one I call “Liberal Transmission.” This is the principle that if you have a reason to do something, then you have a reason to do it in each of the possible ways in which it can be done (though not more than one of them). I argue that Liberal Transmission and its close relatives are false. Wide-scope reasons are defined as reasons that have a conditional or other logical connective within the scope of the reason operator. For example, a wide-scope instrumental reason might be: reason(if you have an end, take the means). By refuting Liberal Transmission, I show that you could have wide-scope instrumental reasons like this while nevertheless lacking any narrow-scope reason to take the means, or narrow-scope reason to not have the end. This enables me to respond to two major objections to the wide-scope approach to the instrumental principle that have been developed by Joseph Raz and by Niko Kolodny.

Weight for Stephen Finlay

by Daan Evers

forthcoming in Philosophical Studies

According to Stephen Finlay, ‘A ought to X’ means that X-ing is more conducive to contextually salient ends than... more According to Stephen Finlay, ‘A ought to X’ means that X-ing is more conducive to contextually salient ends than relevant alternatives. This in turn is analysed in terms of probability. I show why this theory of ‘ought’ is hard to square with a theory of a reason’s weight which could explain why ‘A ought to X’ logically entails that the balance of reasons favours that A X-es. I develop two theories of weight to illustrate my point. I first look at the prospects of a theory of weight based on expected utility theory. I then suggest a simpler theory. Although neither allows that ‘A ought to X’ logically entails that the balance of reasons favours that A X-es, this price may be accepted. For there remains a strong pragmatic relation between these claims.

The Moorean argument against the Epistemic Error Theory

by Richard Rowland

It is plausible that the Moral Error Theory entails the Epistemic Error Theory.  In this paper I present a new... more It is plausible that the Moral Error Theory entails the Epistemic Error Theory.  In this paper I present a new Moorean argument against the Epistemic Error Theory.  I demonstrate that defenders of the Epistemic Error Theory cannot respond to this Moorean argument against the Epistemic Error Theory in the same ways that they have responded to similar Moorean arguments against the Moral Error Theory.  I then argue that defenders of both the Moral Error Theory and the Epistemic Error Theory must either accept the epistemic principle on which the Moorean argument against the Epistemic Error Theory depends or give up on some of their arguments against Non-Cognitivism and all of their arguments against Finlay’s End-Relational Meta-Ethical Theory.  If defenders of the moral and epistemic error theories give up on all their arguments against Finlay’s End-Relational Theory, then there have not shown that the Moral Error Theory is a better theory, or is more likely to be true, than Finlay’s End-Relational Theory.

Explaining Reasons: Where Does the Buck Stop?

by Ulrike Heuer

The Reasons That Matter for Public Justification and Gaus's Argument for Classical LIberalism

by Richard Rowland

Draft only.  Please do not cite.  Please do email me: r.a.rowland@pgr.reading.ac.uk

Gerald Gaus has recently argued that the normative reasons that are relevant to the public justification of laws and... more Gerald Gaus has recently argued that the normative reasons that are relevant to the public justification of laws and moral/political principles are reasons that satisfy a strong internalist constraint.  Gaus also argues that the redistributive and social justice promoting laws and moral/political principles of liberal egalitarianism are not publicly justified, but the laws and moral/political principles of classical liberalism are publicly justified.  I argue that Gaus does not establish that only reasons that satisfy a strong internalist constraint rather than a weaker constraint are reasons that are relevant to the public justification of laws and moral/political principles, and that there are reasons to favour a weaker constraint on the reasons that matter for public justification rather than Gaus’s strong internalist constraint.  I then demonstrate that if the reasons that matter for the public justification of laws and moral/political principles are reasons that satisfy a weaker constraint rather than reasons that satisfy Gaus’s strong internalist constraint, Gaus’s claim that the laws and principles of liberal egalitarianism are not publicly justified but the laws and principles of classical liberalism are publicly justified is undermined.

Why Pass Every Buck? On Skorupski's Buck-Passing Account of Normativity

by Richard Rowland

Final Draft.  Published in Ratio 24, 3 (2011): pp. 340-348.

A Critical Discussion of John Skorupski's, The Domain of Reasons A Critical Discussion of John Skorupski's, The Domain of Reasons

Reasons: Right and Wrong

by Sean Aas

Early draft, comments welcome. Sugarsync link always goes to the latest draft.

A demon threatens catastrophic destruction if you don’t value his toenail clippings. That doesn’t make them valuable.... more A demon threatens catastrophic destruction if you don’t value his toenail clippings. That doesn’t make them valuable. Your friend’s depressed and could really use a win. Letting him win is still not good sportsmanship. These sorts of problems arise in any activity where it makes sense to talk about there being a right way and a wrong way to engage in the activity. In all such cases there’s a question about whether reasons which go to making something the thing we ought to do go to within practice go to making it the right way to engage in that practice. But there’s also a converse questions: do considerations which bear on what counts as the right way to engage in a practice always bear on whether one ought to perform the moves of that practice? Here I show that they do not, and sketch an account of the relevant evaluative concepts which makes sense of this.

Instrumental Rationality

by Markos Valaris

Forthcoming in 'European Journal of Philosophy'

Does rationality require us to take the means to our ends?  Intuitively, it seems clear that it does.  And... more Does rationality require us to take the means to our ends?  Intuitively, it seems clear that it does.  And yet it has proven difficult to explain why this should be so: after all, if one is pursuing an end that one has decisive reason not to pursue, the balance of reasons will presumably speak against one’s taking the means necessary to bring that end about.  In this paper I propose a novel account of the instrumental requirement which addresses this problem.  On the view I develop, the instrumental requirement is normative not because agents have reasons to comply with it, but because it is a normative standard intrinsic to intentional action — i.e., it is a standard that partly spells out what it is to exercise one’s agency well.

Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason

by Jonathan Way

Forthcoming in Ethics.

This paper defends fitting-attitudes accounts of value against the wrong kind of reason problem. I argue for the... more This paper defends fitting-attitudes accounts of value against the wrong kind of reason problem. I argue for the skeptical view that putative reasons of the wrong kind are reasons to want and bring about certain attitudes but not reasons for those attitudes. The argument turns on the transmission of reasons: the familiar fact that there is often reason for one action or attitude because there is reason for another. I argue that putative reasons of the wrong kind transmit in a different way to the right kind of reasons, and that this fact is best explained by the skeptical view.

Value and Reasons to Favour

by Jonathan Way

Forthcoming in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 8, OUP 2013. *Not a final draft*

Explaining the Instrumental Principle

by Jonathan Way

Forthcoming in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

The Wide-Scope view of instrumental reason holds that you should not intend an end without also intending what you... more The Wide-Scope view of instrumental reason holds that you should not intend an end without also intending what you believe to be the necessary means. This, the Wide-Scoper claims, provides the best account of why failing to intend the believed means to your end is a rational failing. But Wide-Scopers have struggled to meet a simple Explanatory Challenge: why shouldn’t you intend an end without intending the necessary means? What reason is there not to do so? In the first half of this paper, I argue that the Wide-Scope view struggles to meet the Explanatory Challenge because it takes the principles of instrumental reason to have unlimited application – to apply to all agents, in all circumstances. I then go on to offer an new account of these principles. The new account is very much in the spirit of the Wide-Scope view, and shares its central advantages, but lacks its unlimited application. This view should, therefore, find the Explanatory Challenge more tractable. In the second half of the paper, I argue that this prediction is confirmed. If the requirements of instrumental reason apply only when a means is, or is believed to be, necessary for your end, then plausible independent claims about reasons, rationality, and intentions, explain why failing to intend the necessary means to your ends is a rational failing.

Defending the Wide-Scope Approach to Instrumental Reason

by Jonathan Way

Published in Philosophical Studies, 147 (2), January 2010: 213-33

The Wide-Scope approach to instrumental reason holds that the requirement to intend the necessary means to your ends... more The Wide-Scope approach to instrumental reason holds that the requirement to intend the necessary means to your ends should be understood as a requirement to either intend the means or else not intend the end. In this paper I explain and defend a neglected version of this approach. I argue that three serious objections to the Wide-Scope approach turn on a certain assumption about the nature of the reasons that ground the Wide-Scope requirement. The version of the Wide-Scope approach defended here allows us to reject this assumption, and so defuse the objections.

The Normativity of Rationality

by Jonathan Way

Published in Philosophy Compass 5 (12), December 2010: 1057-1068.

This article is an introduction to the recent debate about whether rationality is normative – that is, very roughly,... more This article is an introduction to the recent debate about whether rationality is normative – that is, very roughly, about whether we should have attitudes which fit together in a coherent way. I begin by explaining an initial problem – the “detaching problem” – that arises on the assumption that we should have coherent attitudes. I then explain the prominent “wide-scope” solution to this problem, and some of the central objections to it. I end by considering the options that arise if we reject the wide-scope solution.

Two Accounts of the Normativity of Rationality

by Jonathan Way

Published in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, December 2009.

Recent views of reasons and rationality make it plausible that it can sometimes be rational to do what you have no... more Recent views of reasons and rationality make it plausible that it can sometimes be rational to do what you have no reason to do. A number of writers have concluded that if this is so, rationality is not normative. But this is a mistake. Even if we assume a tight connection between reasons and normativity, the normativity of rationality does not require that there is always reason to be rational. The first half of this paper illustrates this point with reference to the subjective reasons account of rationality. The second half suggest that this point may have been missed because of certain similarities between the subjective reasons account and the importantly different transparency account. On the transparency account, rationality seems not to be normative. I think it is often assumed that what goes for the transparency account goes for the subjective reasons account as well. But I argue that this is a mistake. A corollary is that the subjective reasons account has an important advantage over the transparency account, given how plausible it is that rationality is normative.

A Millian Objection to Reasons as Evidence

by Guy Fletcher

Very short. Draft only. Comments very welcome!

ABSTRACT: Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star have recently proposed the following theory of reasons:

Reasons... more ABSTRACT: Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star have recently proposed the following theory of reasons:

Reasons as Evidence: Necessarily, a fact F is a reason for an agent A to Φ iff F is evidence that A ought to Φ (where Φ is either a belief or an action).

In this paper I present an objection, inspired by Mill's proof of the principle of utility, to the right-to-left reading of the biconditional. My claim is that the fact that you can perform some action can be evidence that you ought to do it without, itself, being a reason to do it. If this is true then Reasons as Evidence is false.

Expertise, Deference, and Giving Reasons

by Adam Perry

Forthcoming in 'Public Law'. Co-authored with Farrah Ahmed.