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Seen by:Protest Behavior in European Societies. The Role of Individual Incentives and the Political Context
Paper presented at the 7th Dutch-Belgian Political Science Conference (Politicologenetmaal), Berg en Dal, 29-30 May 2008
Co-authored with Hanna Bäck
Empirical research has provided different explanations for political protest. Yet, from a cost-benefit perspective the... more Empirical research has provided different explanations for political protest. Yet, from a cost-benefit perspective the motivation for protest behavior still remains unclear. Why do people engage in protest activities, even though participation is costly and collective outcomes are available to everybody? This paper aims to provide an explanation for this paradox by analyzing which individual-level incentives foster protest participation, and by considering the specific political context in which protest activities take place. We rely mainly upon the European Social Survey (ESS) data from 2002–2003, which covers a large number of countries, and includes important items for measuring political protest. The findings suggest that both individual-level incentives and contextual features are crucial to take into account when explaining protest activity. More specifically, we find that collective and selective incentives motivate protest in most European countries, and that protest levels are higher in systems with proportional representation, in less fractionalized systems and in more polarized systems. Looking at interactions between contextual and individual-level factors, we find that people are less likely to be driven to protest by collective incentives in countries where left parties are in the cabinet.
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Seen by:Rationality and Identity: A critique of Alessandro Pizzorno
Co-authored with Andrés de Francisco; published in the European Journal of Sociology, 2002
In this article we analyze Pizzorno’s attempt to develop a theory of identity capable of explaining individuals’... more In this article we analyze Pizzorno’s attempt to develop a theory of identity capable of explaining individuals’ participation in collective action, and his belief that this theory can, at the same time, be presented as an alternative to rational choice theory. In our opinion he has failed in this attempt. We have tried to show that his theory has only the flimsiest of foundations (the notion that individuals are ‘strings of selves’ constitutes little more than a happy turn of phrase) and raises more questions than it resolves.
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Seen by:Rational choice, social identity and beliefs about oneself
Co-authored with Andrés de Francisco; published in "Philosophy of the Social Sciences", 2009.
Keywords: beliefs; externalism; identity; internalism; rational choice theory;
rationality
Social identity poses one of the most important challenges to rational choice theory, but rational choice theorists do... more Social identity poses one of the most important challenges to rational choice theory, but rational choice theorists do not hold a common position regarding identity. On one hand, externalist rational choice ignores the concept of identity or reduces it to revealed preferences. On the other hand, internalist rational choice considers identity as a key concept in explaining social action because it permits expressive motivations to be included in the models. This article rejects externalist reductionism and proposes a redefinition of social identity as a net of beliefs about oneself, beliefs that are indexical, robust, and socially shaped.
The Political Prisoner's Dilemma: Evidence from the Great Terror in the Soviet Union
Ukrainian Quarterly, 62, 2, 2006, pp. 154-180
The prisoner’ dilemma model applied to the Great Terror in the Soviet Union implies that political prisoners had an... more The prisoner’ dilemma model applied to the Great Terror in the Soviet Union implies that political prisoners had an incentive to confess and implicate other prisoners. Since the other prisoners had similar incentives, they also confessed. As a result, all of the prisoners ended up worse off than if they all refused to confess. The analysis of Krawtchouk’s case and related cases, such as the Union of Liberation of Ukraine (SVU), the Jet Propulsion Institute, and UFTI cases, finds weak support for the prisoner’s dilemma model. Among 177 cases of individuals arrested on political charges in these cases, 13 percent gave voluntarily confessions and implicated other prisoners. The absolute majority of the prisoners who provided voluntary confessions and implicated others were Communist party members or secret informers of the NKVD. When this factor is held constant, the rates of voluntary confessions among Ukrainians, Jews and Russians do not differ significantly. The absolute majority of the political prisoners, 70 percent, did not confess voluntarily. Their interrogators had to resort to other methods in the form of physical and psychological torture, such as sleep deprivation, to extract confessions. Most of the political prisoners confessed as a result of the torture by the Soviet secret police. This result does not prove the effectiveness of torture, because these individuals admitted crimes they never committed.
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Seen by:CONSEQUENTIAL AND DECISION VALUE AND THE IRRELEVANCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES IN CHOICE PROBLEMS
In this paper I propose a distinction between consequential and decision value in the
rational assessment of... more
In this paper I propose a distinction between consequential and decision value in the
rational assessment of choice. By making this distinction I provide an alternative
taxonomy for dealing with rational choice problems. I introduce the notion of decision
value, and show that it can explain a wider spectrum of choice problems than can be
explained using consequential value alone. Perhaps more importantly, I show that
decision value can make sense of choice problems that are considered irrational when
assessed only by their consequential value. In doing so, I show that the
consequentialist standard of rational choice, which I take to be the consensual means
of addressing choice problems, is too strong, as are the internal consistency standards
of rationality that are closely related to it. The paper has two aims: to introduce the
notion of decision value into the taxonomy by which choice problems are evaluated.
And to demonstrate the implications that the notion of decision value has for the
accepted normative standards of rational choice. In perusing the latter aim, I will
address the internal consistency conditions of rational choice as they are expressed in
the principle of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). Using the notion of
decision value, I propose a model of choice behavior which demonstrates that because
the IIA only considers consequential (or "internal") value, and not decision value, it is
too strong as a standard for rational choice.
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Rational decisions: The adaptive nature of context-dependent choice
Rosati, A.G. & Stevens, J.R. (2009) In: Rational Animals, Irrational humans (S. Watanabe, A. Young, L. Huber, A. Blaisdell & Y. Yamazaki, eds.).
Although classical economic theory hinges on the assumption that rational actors should seek to maximize gains,... more Although classical economic theory hinges on the assumption that rational actors should seek to maximize gains, psychologists and behavioral economists have recently collected a wealth of evidence challenging this premise. In violation of the principles of rational choice, context appears to dramatically influence human decision making. Like humans, numerous nonhuman animals, ranging from honeybees to primates, are sensitive to context, suggesting deep evolutionary roots for seemingly irrational decision-making. Many psychologists have suggested that such choices may stem from cognitive biases that result in errors. We contend, however, that labeling context-dependent choices as errors obscures the real issue. Natural selection does not create organisms that adhere to economic theory—it creates decision makers that maximize fitness. We review evidence that many species show context-dependence when making decisions and then present a framework for analyzing the adaptive consequences of these choices. We argue for an approach weaving psychological perspectives into an evolutionary framework to elucidate the nature of decision making.
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