Public Economics

Employment protection and unemployment benefits: On technology adoption and job creation in a matching model

by Odd Rune Straume

NIPE Working Paper 03/2012. (With Kjell Erik Lommerud and Steinar Vagstad)

We analyse the effects of different labour market policies -- employment protection, unemployment benefits and payroll... more We analyse the effects of different labour market policies -- employment protection, unemployment benefits and payroll taxes -- on job creation and technology choices in a model where firms are randomly matched with workers of different productivity and wages are determined by ex-post bargaining. In this setting, unemployment benefits are unambiguously detrimental to both job creation and technology adoption while the effects of employment protection are mixed, as higher firing costs stifle job creation but stimulate technology investments. This suggests that a `flexicurity' policy, with low employment protection and high unemployment benefits, might have the adverse effect of slowing down technological progress and job growth. Indeed, our analysis of the optimal policy solution suggests that flexicurity is often not optimal, and may be optimal only in conjunction with payroll subsidies.

Occupazione, disoccupazione e ambiente

by marcucci edoardo

A Literature Review of Empirical Studies of Philanthropy: Eight Mechanisms That Drive Charitable Giving

by Rene Bekkers

Co-authored with Pamala Wiepking.

The authors present an overview of the academic literature on charitable giving based on a literature review of more... more The authors present an overview of the academic literature on charitable giving based on a literature review of more than 500 articles. They structure their review around the central question of why people donate money to charitable organizations.
They identify eight mechanisms as the most important forces that drive charitable giving: (a) awareness of need; (b) solicitation; (c) costs and benefits; (d) altruism; (e) reputation; (f) psychological benefits; (g) values; (h) efficacy. These mechanisms can provide a basic theoretical framework for future research explaining charitable giving.

Public Goods Provision and Sanctioning in Privileged Groups

by Ernesto Reuben

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2009, 53: 72-93. (Ernesto Reuben and Arno Riedl)

In public-good provision, privileged groups enjoy the advantage that some of their members find it optimal to supply a... more In public-good provision, privileged groups enjoy the advantage that some of their members find it optimal to supply a positive amount of the public good. However, the inherent asymmetric nature of these groups may make the enforcement of cooperative behavior through informal sanctioning harder to accomplish. In this article, the authors experimentally investigate public-good provision in normal and privileged groups with and without decentralized punishment. The authors find that compared to normal groups, privileged groups are relatively ineffective in using costly sanctions to increase everyone's contributions. Punishment is less targeted toward strong free riders, and they exhibit a weaker increase in contributions after being punished. Thus, the authors show that privileged groups are not as privileged as they initially seem.

Everyone is a Winner: Promoting Cooperation through All-Can-Win Intergroup Competition

by Ernesto Reuben

European Journal of Political Economy, 2010, 26: 25-35. (Ernesto Reuben and Jean-Robert Tyran)

We test if cooperation is promoted by rank-order competition between groups in which all groups can be ranked first,... more We test if cooperation is promoted by rank-order competition between groups in which all groups can be ranked first, i.e. when everyone can be a winner. This type of rank-order competition has the advantage that it can eliminate the negative externality a group's performance imposes on other groups. However, it has the disadvantage that incentives to outperform others are absent, and therefore it does not eliminate equilibria where all groups cooperate at an equal but low level. We find that all-can-win competition produces a universal increase in cooperation and benefits a majority of individuals if the incentive to compete is sharp.

An Empirical Investigation of an Indicator of Economic Efficiency in the Public Transportation Industry During 1994

by Texas State PA Applied Research Projects

Latsha, Rob, "An Empirical Investigation of an Indicator of Economic Efficiency in the Public Transportation Industry During 1994" (1998). Applied Research Projects, Texas State University-San Marcos. Paper 186.
http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/186

Assessing Economic Development Incentives: Central Texas City: Managers Perspectives

by Texas State PA Applied Research Projects

Lester, Nina, "Assessing Economic Development Incentives: Central Texas City: Managers Perspectives" (2005). Applied Research Projects, Texas State University-San Marcos. Paper 6.
http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/6

Purpose: This study is an assessment of economic development incentives. Economic development is a staple in the... more Purpose: This study is an assessment of economic development incentives. Economic development is a staple in the growth of municipalities, and the use of incentives continues to grow in popularity. Existing literature on economic development and incentives often cites that the downfall of the literature is its failure to judge a program’s ability to effectively meet their goals. As such, the purpose of this research is threefold: (1) literature identifies the four major goals of economic development (attract target industry, employment opportunities, increase tax revenue, and increase economic activity) and the four most commonly used incentives (tax abatement, tax increment financing, industrial development revenue bonds, and loan guarantees), (2) a connection is drawn between the goals of economic development and how they act as adequate criteria to assess the success of an incentive, (3) the perspectives of Central Texas City Managers assist in assessing the success of incentives in achieving the goals of economic development through this connection.

Methods: To satisfy the research purposes, a survey instrument was developed from the conceptual framework (descriptive categories). These surveys were administered to Texas City Managers in Texas City Management Association (TCMA) Regions seven and eight. Descriptive statistics were used to analyze the results.

Findings: The data provides evidence that all incentives are considered to be successful in meeting the goals of economic development. Some incentives, however, were identified to be more successful or favored for particular goals. Based on the results of the survey, it is concluded that Tax Abatement can be accurately ranked as the most successful incentive in meeting all four economic development goals.

Cutting Back by Charging More: What Public Administrators Should Know About the Demand for their Products

by Patricia Shields

Presented at the Annual Conference of the American Society for Public Administration. 1984

This paper translates the law of demand and concepts like elasticity into straightforward examples that would be useful for beginners and local officials dealing with pricing decisions.

This paper translates most demand concepts into straightforward examples that would be useful in explaining the... more This paper translates most demand concepts into straightforward examples that would be useful in explaining the concepts to beginners.

Cepiku D., Corvo, L., Bonomi Savignon A. (2011), "Pianificazione, programmazione e controllo nei Ministeri italiani”. Rivista Italiana di Ragioneria e di Economia Aziendale, marzo - aprile.

by Denita Cepiku

Determinants of Corruption: the Role of Press Freedom

by Cristina Casanova

The Progressivity Of Health Care Services In Ghana

by Alistair Munro

co-authored with Mawuli Gaddah

This paper examines the incidence of public health subsidies in Ghana using the Ghana Living Standards Survey. Using a... more This paper examines the incidence of public health subsidies in Ghana using the Ghana Living Standards Survey. Using a combination of (uniform) benefit incidence analysis and a discrete choice model, our results give a clear evidence of progressivity with consistent ordering: postnatal and prenatal services are the most progressive, followed by clinic visits, and then hospital visits. Children health care services are more progressive than adults'. Own price and income elasticities are higher for public health care than private health care and for adults than children. Poorer households are substantially more price responsive than wealthy ones, implying that fee increases for public health care will impact negatively on equity in health care. Simulations based on an estimated nested logit model show the importance of opportunity costs in healthcare decisions and suggest that reforms that focus only on out-pocket expenses will have a limited ability to extend public healthcare to all potential users.

The Rich or the Poor: Who Gains from Public Education Spending in Ghana?

by Alistair Munro

co-authored with Mawuli Gaddah

This paper examines the incidence of public education subsidies in Ghana. Since the late 1990s, Ghana’s government has... more This paper examines the incidence of public education subsidies in Ghana. Since the late 1990s, Ghana’s government has increasingly recognised human capital as a cornerstone to alleviating poverty and income inequality, causing dramatic increases of government expenditures to the education sector. At the same time user fees have been introduced in higher education while basic education is being made progressively free. The question then is, whether these spending increases have been effective in reaching the poor and to what extent? What factors influence the poor’s participation in the public school system? We attempt to address these issues, employing the standard benefit incidence methods and the willingness-to-pay method using a nested multinomial logit model. The results give a clear evidence of progressivity with consistent ordering: pre- schooling and primary schooling are the most progressive, followed by secondary, and then tertiary. The poorest quintile gains 14.8% of total education benefts in 2005 compared to the richest quintile benefit of 26.3%. Own price and income elasticities are higher for private schools than public schools and for secondary than basic schools.

O ESTADO "HOOD-ROBIN": ao invés de combater a desigualdade, o gasto público no Brasil trata de aprofundá-la

by Silverio Zebral

Infrastructure in South Africa: Who is to finance and who is to pay?

by Johan Fourie

A note on infrastructure quality in South Africa

by Johan Fourie

Economic Infrastructure: a Review of Definitions, Theory and Empirics

by Johan Fourie

The progressivity of government taxes and benefits in Ireland

by Niall O'Higgins

Public Spending and Credit Creation as the Drivers of Aggregate Profit

by Arturo Hermann

Previous versions of the work have been presented to AFIT 2011 Conference, AHE 2011 Conference and ICAPE 2011 Conference

Keywords: Institutionalism, Keynesian Macroeconomics, Psychoanalysis, Participation, Social Value, Policy Coordination

In this work we try to address a number of aspects of the present economic and social crises from the standpoint of... more In this work we try to address a number of aspects of the present economic and social crises from the standpoint of heterodox economics. This field of research rests on interdisciplinarity and pluralism and include Marxist, Institutional, Keynesian, Austrian, Sustainable Development and Feminist economics.
We employ this approach for the analysis of the role of public intervention — in particular, public spending and credit creation — in the formation of the aggregate profit of private sector.
We try to highlight that this intervention constitutes a central feature for the development of capitalistic institutions. Contrary to what maintained by “market fundamentalism” doctrine, our analysis - by drawing on Institutional and Keynesian economics and on the available data - points out that public intervention, in its various forms, become more and more relevant for ensuring the development of the system. The main conclusion of the work is that the attempts to reduce public spending at any cost are unlikely to really solve the economic and social problems of today. What is highly needed for that purpose is a better use of public spending, less focused on the agenda of the various interest groups and more on the real needs of economy and society.

Good jobs, bad jobs, and redistribution

by Odd Rune Straume

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 106, 703-720, 2004. (With Kjell Erik Lommerud and Bjørn Sandvik)

We analyse the question of optimal taxation in a dual economy, when the policy‐maker is concerned about the... more We analyse the question of optimal taxation in a dual economy, when the policy‐maker is concerned about the distribution of labour income. Income inequality is caused by the presence of sunk capital investments, which creates a "good jobs" sector due to the capture of quasi‐rents by trade unions. With strong unions and high planner preference for income equality, the optimal policy is a combination of investment subsidies and progressive income taxation. If unions are weaker, the policy‐maker may instead choose to tax investment.

Company taxation and merger incentives in international oligopoly: on international policy coordination with strategic trade

by Odd Rune Straume

Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 10, 161-186, 2010. (With Kjell Erik Lommerud and Trond E. Olsen)

We analyse how national taxation of firms is likely to affect merger incentives in international markets. In... more We analyse how national taxation of firms is likely to affect merger incentives in international markets. In particular, we ask whether non-coordinated trade policies stimulate cross-border mergers that are overall inefficient, and if this then is an argument for international coordination of such policies? We address this issue in a setting where policy makers use two-part tariffs to tax exporting firms. The analysis reveals that while non-coordinated policies may induce cross-border mergers by allowing the firms in question to play national policy makers out against each other, this can nevertheless be overall welfare enhancing compared to market outcomes under coordinated policy making.