The Strategic Games that Donors and Bureaucrats Play: An Institutional Rational Choice Analysis. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (2009). 19:853–871
Araral, E. 2009. The Strategic Games that Donors andBureaucrats Play: An Institutional RationalChoice Analysis. JPART 19:853–871
Foreign aid plays an important role in developing countries, but little is empirically knownhow it affects incentives... more Foreign aid plays an important role in developing countries, but little is empirically knownhow it affects incentives of recipient bureaucracies. I provide a model and analytic casestudy to understand the strategic games that donors and bureaucrats play. My findings arebroadly consistent with the theoretical expectations of institutional rational choice:bureaucrats attempt to ensure bureaucratic survival, whereas donors ensure growth of loan portfolio. These findings, however, are not consistent with the Samaritan’s Dilemmaand the Patron’s Dilemma
Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U.S. House: A Replication Incorporating Recent Regression Discontinuity Design Methodology
2011, Unpublished Manuscript, Department of Economics, University of California, Irvine
This paper replicates Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004) using new advances in the regression discontinuity design... more This paper replicates Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004) using new advances in the regression discontinuity design literature. Specifically, this paper applies local linear regression techniques to estimate discontinuities based on optimal bandwidths described by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009). In addition, this paper modernizes the authors’ polynomial modeling techniques based on advice in Lee and Lemieux (2010). As an extension to the robustness checks run by the authors, this paper applies McCrary (2008)’s density test to investigate sorting around the treatment cutoff and investigates the sensitivity of estimates to the addition of covariates, polynomial order, and bandwidth selection. The conclusions of Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004) still hold up under this more rigorous scrutiny. They conclude that politicians do not moderate their policies in response to leftward or rightward shifts in the median voter. Thus, voters “elect” policies by selecting a politician, rather than being able to “affect” policies through the election process.
What Do Nationalists Maximise? A Public Choice Perspective on the (Non-) Europeanization of Private Law
by Jan Smits
Maastricht European Private Law Institute Working Paper 2012/9
This contribution explores the relationship between (private) law and nationalism from a public choice perspective.... more This contribution explores the relationship between (private) law and nationalism from a public choice perspective. Its main point is that the nationalist ideology in law is largely guided by the self-interest of citizens, legislatures, courts and academics. ‘Nationalists’ (those who favour the congruence of state and nation) maximise their chances in life by capitalising on homogeneity: by acting in accordance with the unified norms of the nation-state, they are able to put themselves in a better position. This framework is used to explain the importance of the nationalist view of law in the 19th century. In addition, it allows an analysis of both the question of how to organise private law today and the question of how to explain present resistance against Europeanization. At the normative level, the claim is made that citizens should be allowed to search for community elsewhere, e.g. by opting into European sets of norms (such as the proposed CESL). A possible explanation for resistance against Europeanization is found in the close relationship between engaging in things European and the economic or psychological advantages obtained from this. This is confirmed by a limited survey of the extent to which national academics are active in the debate on European private law, which can be explained by the different incentives universities provide academics with in obtaining tenure and prestige.
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Seen by:A Search-Theoretic Critique of Georgism
Co-authored with Bryan Caplan
This paper develops a critique of the single-tax proposal of Henry George. We present a simple search-theoretic model... more This paper develops a critique of the single-tax proposal of Henry George. We present a simple search-theoretic model for the discovery of natural resources and show that a tax on the unimproved value of land is distortionary. We then consider the time inconsistency and regime uncertainty problem created by even incremental Georgist policy. We discuss historical cases of land reform and the subsequent challenge to re-establish a credible commitment to property rights in land and natural resources.
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Seen by:Il merito alle urne. La ricerca di un sistema elettorale meritocratico e i suoi troppi inconvenienti
in 45 Biblioteca della Libertà Online (2010), Rivista quadrimestrale online del Centro Einaudi di Torino
Una impasse caratterizza le democrazie moderne: esse hanno come principio fondamentale l’uguaglianza politica,... more Una impasse caratterizza le democrazie moderne: esse hanno come principio fondamentale l’uguaglianza politica, tuttavia (a differenza delle democrazie antiche, che usavano il sorteggio) ricorrono al voto, una pratica che a ben vedere va in direzione opposta alla tutela dell’uguaglianza, determinando una scelta di alcuni e l’esclusione di altri. Per cercare di riconciliare questa contraddizione, le democrazie devono ricorrere a una considerevole quantità di regole. Fra esse, quelle volte alla trasformazione dei voti in seggi (i sistemi elettorali). Posto che le moderne democrazie non possono fare a meno di regole come i sistemi elettorali, esistono soluzioni preferibili a quelle attualmente adottate? Traendo spunto dagli studi di public choice e sul cosiddetto elitismo democratico, l’articolo considera in particolare le alternative che mirano a favorire la promozione del merito. Si analizzano così soluzioni estreme come la concessione del voto solo a chi lo abbia meritato o l’attribuzione di un voto plurimo in funzione del merito (proposta che risale a Mill), nonché alcune ipotesi più realistiche. Gli ostacoli e le obiezioni sono troppi, specialmente per le ipotesi più radicali, e appare più praticabile ridurre sensibilmente il potere di cui dispongono gli eletti, così che, «meritevoli» o no, essi non possano comunque incidere troppo sulla libertà individuale.
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Entry in:
K. Dowding, Encyclopdia of Power, London, Sage, 2011
Note de lecture sur Sylvain Broccolichi, Choukri Ben Ayed et Danière Trancard (coords), Ecole : les pièges de la concurrence. Comprendre le déclin de l’école française, La Découverte, Paris (2010). 312 pp.
2010, Inédit. Version (très) longue d'une note parue dans une revue de sociologie.
La présentation de ce livre, résolument accrocheuse (un titre en rouge et blanc sur couverture noire brillante et sans... more
La présentation de ce livre, résolument accrocheuse (un titre en rouge et blanc sur couverture noire brillante et sans illustration, des titres de chapitres qui laissent penser que le lecteur doit être convaincu avant d’avoir commencé la lecture) peut
irriter. La quatrième de couverture questionne et répond sans nuance : « Est-il vrai qu’en intensifiant la concurrence entre établissements, on crée une émulation qui favorise l’élévation des performances des élèves ? La réponse est non (…). »
D’emblée donc, la cause est entendue : les six auteurs de cet ouvrage entendent nous convaincre que la suppression de la carte scolaire qui, en théorie, permet aux familles de choisir leur école, est une mauvaise chose.
Ces effets de présentation, cependant, ne doivent pas masquer le sérieux de l’ouvrage, version actualisée d’un rapport de recherche pluridisciplinaire (sociologie, histoire, géographie). D’ailleurs, la forme très didactique de l’ouvrage a l’avantage de la clarté: des résumés au début de chaque partie et de chaque chapitre ainsi que l’usage des questions rhétoriques rendent la problématique toujours très explicite et autorisent une lecture superficielle. Et pour ceux qui la suivront en détails, la démonstration est implacable.
Proceduralisation, choice, and parental reflections on decisions to accept newborn bloodspot screening
Forthcoming in Journal of Medical Ethics: doi:10.1136/medethics-2011-100040
Newborn screening is the program through which newborn babies are screened for a variety of conditions shortly after... more Newborn screening is the program through which newborn babies are screened for a variety of conditions shortly after birth. Programs such as this are individually oriented but resemble traditional public health programs because (a) they are targeted at large groups of the population and (b) they are offered as preventive interventions to a population considered healthy. As such an ethical tension exists between the goals of promoting high uptake of supposedly ‘effective’ population oriented programs and the goal of promoting genuinely informed decision-making. There is, however, a lack of understanding with regard to how parents experience the tension between promoting uptake and facilitating informed choice. In this paper I address this issue and present data to show how aspects of the timing, presentation of information and procedural routinisation of newborn screening serves to impact on the decisions made by parents.
Anarchy, Preferences, and Robust Political Economy
by Brad Taylor
Co-authored with Eric Crampton
We consider the relative robustness of libertarian anarchy and liberal democracy to meddlesome... more We consider the relative robustness of libertarian anarchy and liberal democracy to meddlesome preferences.Specifically, we examine how the liberty of those wishing to engage in externally harmless activities is affected by people who wish to prevent them from doing so. We show that intense, concentrated meddlesome preferences are more likely to produce illiberal law in anarchy; while weak, dispersed meddlesome preferences are more likely to do so in democracy. Using insights from the economics of religion, we argue that anarchy is more likely than democracy to produce small groups with intense meddlesome preferences. Absent government provision of public goods, voluntary groups will emerge to fill the gap. Strict religious groups – ‘sects’ – are more able to overcome collective action problems and will therefore be more prevalent in an anarchic society.These sects are apt to instil intense meddlesome preferences in their members and have the ability to enforce them: anarchy produces the situation to which it is most fragile. Our argument highlights the importance of ideology in comparative institutional analysis, and reveals unresolved questions in the conventional understanding of institutional robustness.
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