Pragmatic Encroachment and Belief-Desire Psychology
Forthcoming in Analytic Philosophy
Co-authored with Jonathan Ichikawa and Katherine Rubin
We develop a novel challenge to pragmatic encroachment. The significance of belief-desire psychology requires treating... more We develop a novel challenge to pragmatic encroachment. The significance of belief-desire psychology requires treating questions about what to believe as importantly prior to questions about what to do; pragmatic encroachment undermines that priority, and therefore undermines the significance of belief-desire psychology. This, we argue, is a higher cost than has been recognized by epistemologists considering embracing pragmatic encroachment.
Download (.pdf) Some Recent Work In Experimental Epistemology
I survey some recent experimental work relevant to assessing contextualism in epistemology as well as Interest... more I survey some recent experimental work relevant to assessing contextualism in epistemology as well as Interest Relative Invariantism and contrastivism. I discuss some difficulties with drawing strong conclusions from these studies.