Practical Reasoning

Foundations for Moral Relativism

by J. David Velleman

I attempt to explain the normative force and moral content of what are nevertheless independent, mutually... more I attempt to explain the normative force and moral content of what are nevertheless independent, mutually incompatible, but equally valid moralities.

There Are No "Reasons for Acting"

by J. David Velleman

Parts of this paper were incorporated into "Time for Action"

The title says it all. The title says it all.

Judicial Preference

by Eric Miller

Houston Law Review, Vol. 44, 2008

In this paper I claim that, where the judge possesses strong discretion, she has both a legal power and the legal... more In this paper I claim that, where the judge possesses strong discretion, she has both a legal power and the legal right to decide whichever way she wishes. Neither law nor morality provides a decisive ground for decision and all that is left is her taste or inclination.

Perhaps because it looks like a naked exercise of power, the judge's predilections are not a terribly popular basis for judicial decision. Preference is often characterized as non-rational: as having no basis in reason because not based upon some unique reason requiring a particular decision. Reason-based decision, by contrast, is represented as demonstrating that some decisive reason overrides competing ones to settle the outcome of a legal dispute, independent of the judge's will. Absent such a reason, judicial decision consists an arbitrary exercise of the power authoritatively to resolve cases.

I claim that the judge's personal preference or predilection operates as a legitimate basis for judicial decision in cases presenting strong discretion. Strong discretion exists wherever legal rules conflict, and there is no decisive reason determining the outcome. In such circumstances, each of the conflicting rules is undefeated and there is no incorrect thing to do. The judge has both a legal power and a legal right to decide whichever way she wishes.

I contrast my strong discretion thesis with the claim that the judge has only "weak" discretion to resolve the case because extra-legal reasons bind the judge. In particular, I demonstrate that Ronald Dworkin and Joseph Raz, who are often thought to entertain diametrically opposed theories of law, both endorse weak discretion in adjudication and do so for similar, though mistaken, reasons.

Whatever the merits of the weak discretion thesis generally, I argue that strong discretion and preference-based decision is an inevitable and useful feature of complex legal systems. It encourages judges to experiment with different outcomes in circumstances in which they have only a limited ability to foresee the consequences, and no way to determine which among the possible consequences is best.

World that Matters: Reply to Poul Houe

by Narve Strand

"In the Shadow of Kierkegaard", Roman Kralik & Abrahim H. Kahn (eds.), University of Toronto/Central European Research Institiute of Søren Kierkegaard, 2011

Praxis and Phronesis in Aristotle and Kierkegaard Praxis and Phronesis in Aristotle and Kierkegaard

How Desires Might Matter: The Veto Power of Desire

by Kate Manne

Draft paper, revised version of a thesis chapter.

Is Reasons Internalism Counter-Intuitive?

by Kate Manne

Draft paper; comments sought.

Aging and Wisdom: Culture Matters

by Igor Grossmann

Co-authored with Karasawa, M., Izumi, S., Na, J., Varnum, M. E. W., Kitayama, S., & Nisbett, R. E., published in 'Psychological Science', in press

Research indicates that cultures differ in the ways they approach social conflicts, with Japanese being more motivated... more Research indicates that cultures differ in the ways they approach social conflicts, with Japanese being more motivated to maintain interpersonal harmony and avoid conflicts than Americans. Such cultural differences have developmental consequences for reasoning about social conflict. We interviewed random samples of Americans from the Midwest in the U.S. and Japanese from the larger Tokyo area about the future developments of intergroup and interpersonal conflicts. Responses showed increased wisdom (e.g. recognition of multiple perspectives, compromise, and the limits of knowledge) with increasing age among Americans, but older age was not associated with wiser responses among Japanese. Younger and middle-aged Japanese showed greater use of wise reasoning strategies than younger and middle-aged Americans. This cultural difference was weaker for older participants for interpersonal conflicts and was actually reversed for intergroup conflicts. Implications of this research for the study of aging, cultural psychology, and wisdom are discussed.

Book Review: Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith, eds., Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz :Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz

by Constantine Sandis

Kant's Practical Metaphysics of Freedom

by Maxwell Murphey

Williams' Internalism Reconsidered

by Nicholas Smyth

Draft only! Comments welcome.

In this paper, I offer some clarificatory remarks on Bernard Williams' brand of reasons-internalism, which I believe... more In this paper, I offer some clarificatory remarks on Bernard Williams' brand of reasons-internalism, which I believe is often misunderstood in crucial ways.

ANU-Digital Collections: Conventions and Cooperative Virtues: Some Observations on Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Explanations of Social

by Bruno Verbeek

Instrumental Rationality and Moral Philosophy: an essay on the virtues of cooperation

by Bruno Verbeek

Rational self-commitment

by Bruno Verbeek

Rational Choice Virtues

by Bruno Verbeek

A Limited Vindication of Voluntarism in Practical Reason

by Bruno Verbeek

Manuscript. Please do not quote without permission!

Voluntarism is the view that obligations ultimately derive from an act of the will. Thus, theological voluntarism... more Voluntarism is the view that obligations ultimately derive from an act of the will. Thus, theological voluntarism about morality holds that all moral duties derive from the will of God. Similarly, democratic voluntarism holds that legal duties derive from the will of the legislator (e.g., parliament). Traditionally, voluntarism, of any sort has been dismissed by a widely diverging range of authors. Voluntarism, so these critics claim, is susceptible to all kinds of criticisms, ranging from the well-known Euthyphro dilemma, the so-called regress argument (Korsgaard) and the bootstrapping objection (Bratman, Broome). There are few positions in ethical theory that have been as thoroughly dismissed as voluntarism.
In the face of all these criticisms, voluntarist intuitions lead a remarkably tenacious existence, resurfacing again and again in various areas of practical philosophy. One of the more recent re-appearances of voluntarism is in the area of reasons for action. Thus, Korsgaard (1996) has argued that a person’s reasons for action are the result of her endorsing a particular consideration. David Gauthier in various publications has argued that a rational deliberator should treat her prior commitment to a choice procedure as rationalizing the choices selected by that procedure. Similarly, Michael Bratman , in spite of many claims to the contrary, has argued that by settling on intentions or long-term policies, one takes certain considerations as reasons for action. And there are many more. All these views, although very different, share a voluntarist intuition, namely that (some) reasons for action are the result of an act of the will.
In this paper I defend a moderate version of voluntarism about reasons for action against the main criticisms of voluntarism and in doing so, explain why philosophers, in spite of their official rejection of voluntarism are attracted to voluntarist intuitions.

Authority and Reason-Giving

by David Enoch

Reason-Giving and the Law

by David Enoch

Giving Practical Reasons

by David Enoch

In Defense of the Wide-Scope Instrumental Principle

by Simon Rippon

Published in the Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, 2011. Open access.

I make the observation that English sentences such as “You have reason to take the bus or to take the train” do not... more I make the observation that English sentences such as “You have reason to take the bus or to take the train” do not have the logical form that they superficially appear to have. I find in these sentences a conjunctive use of “or,” as found in sentences like “You can have milk or lemon in your tea,” which gives you a permission to have milk, and a permission to have lemon, though no permission to have both. I argue that a confusion of genuine disjunctions with sentences of the above form has motivated the mistaken acceptance by some philosophers of principles like the one I call “Liberal Transmission.” This is the principle that if you have a reason to do something, then you have a reason to do it in each of the possible ways in which it can be done (though not more than one of them). I argue that Liberal Transmission and its close relatives are false. Wide-scope reasons are defined as reasons that have a conditional or other logical connective within the scope of the reason operator. For example, a wide-scope instrumental reason might be: reason(if you have an end, take the means). By refuting Liberal Transmission, I show that you could have wide-scope instrumental reasons like this while nevertheless lacking any narrow-scope reason to take the means, or narrow-scope reason to not have the end. This enables me to respond to two major objections to the wide-scope approach to the instrumental principle that have been developed by Joseph Raz and by Niko Kolodny.

Weakness of will as intention-violation

by Dylan Dodd

European Journal of Philosophy
17/1:45-59 [2009]
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00283.x

I propose a way of improving Richard Holton's analysis of weakness of will. I also propose a way of improving Michael... more I propose a way of improving Richard Holton's analysis of weakness of will. I also propose a way of improving Michael Bratman's analysis of intentions.