Physicalism

Physicalism and Moorean Supervenience

by Tom Polger

Draft.  Long-term project, recently presented in part at the Pacific APA and in full as the keynote to the York... more Draft.  Long-term project, recently presented in part at the Pacific APA and in full as the keynote to the York Graduate Philosophy Conference 2012.

Commentary on Frank Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics

by Katalin Balog

Reflexive monism

by Max Velmans

This is a summary of some of the main features of reflexive monism published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies in 2008. Some further implications of reflexive monism considered as an integrative philosophical system are summarised in "Reflexive Monism: psychophysical relations among mind, matter, and consciousness" due to be published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies in October 2012

Reflexive monism is, in essence, an ancient view of how consciousness relates to the material world that has, in... more Reflexive monism is, in essence, an ancient view of how consciousness relates to the material world that has, in recent decades, been resurrected in modern form. In this paper I discuss how some of its basic features differ from both dualism and variants of physicalist and functionalist reductionism, focusing on those aspects of the theory that challenge deeply rooted presuppositions in current Western thought. I pay particular attention to the ontological status and seeming “out-thereness” of the phenomenal world and to how the “phenomenal world” relates to the “physical world”, the “world itself”, and processing in the brain. In order to place the theory within the context of current thought and debate, I address questions that have been raised about reflexive monism in recent commentaries and also evaluate competing accounts of the same issues offered by “transparency theory” and by “biological naturalism”. I argue that, of the competing views on offer, reflexive monism most closely follows the contours of ordinary experience, the findings of science, and common sense.

I can't get no (epistemic) satisfaction: Why the hard problem of consciousness entails a hard problem of explanation

by Brian Earp

Earp, B. D. (2012). I can’t get no (epistemic) satisfaction: Why the hard problem of consciousness entails a hard problem of explanation. Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences, in press.

Daniel Dennett (1996) has disputed David Chalmers’ (1995) assertion that there is a “hard problem of consciousness”... more Daniel Dennett (1996) has disputed David Chalmers’ (1995) assertion that there is a “hard problem of consciousness” worth solving in the philosophy of mind. In this paper I defend Chalmers against Dennett on this point: I argue that there is a hard problem of consciousness, that it is distinct in kind from the so-called easy problems, and that it is vital for the sake of honest and productive research in the cognitive sciences to be clear about the difference. But I have my own rebuke for Chalmers on the point of explanation. Chalmers (1995, 1996) proposes to “solve” the hard problem of consciousness by positing qualia as fundamental features of the universe, alongside such ontological basics as mass and space-time. But this is an inadequate solution: to posit, I will urge, is not to explain. To bolster this view, I borrow from an account of explanation by which it must provide “epistemic satisfaction” to be considered successful (Rowlands, 2001; Campbell, 2009), and show that Chalmers’ proposal fails on this account. I conclude that research in the science of consciousness cannot move forward without greater conceptual clarity in the field.

Critique of an Argument for the Reality of Purpose

by Danny Frederick

Forthcoming, Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy

Schueler has argued, against the eliminativist, that human purposive action cannot be an illusion because the concept... more Schueler has argued, against the eliminativist, that human purposive action cannot be an illusion because the concept of purpose is not theoretical. He argues that the concept is known directly to be instantiated, through self-awareness; and that to maintain that the concept is theoretical involves an infinite regress. I show that Schueler’s argument fails because all our concepts are theoretical in the sense that we may be mistaken in applying them to our experience. As a consequence, it is conceivable that direct introspection of an event as a purposive action may be mistaken. I indicate ways in which the eliminativist may be able to explain why our perception and introspection is afflicted with systematic error.

Physicalism and sparse ontology

by Kelly Trogdon

In this paper I bring certain issues in sparse ontology to bear on the debate concerning non-reductive physicalism. In... more In this paper I bring certain issues in sparse ontology to bear on the debate concerning non-reductive physicalism. In the first part I consider whether Kim’s disjunctive property objection applies with equal force to non-reductive physicalism on the assumption that a version of priority monism instead of priority pluralism is true. I ultimately conclude that non-reductive physicalism still faces a comparable problem. In the second part, I argue, surprisingly enough, that what I call fine-grained reductionism, a particular version of which Kim proposes as an alternative to non-reductive physicalism, may work better in the monist framework than the pluralist one.

The modal status of materialism

by Kelly Trogdon

co-authored with Joseph Levine

Materialism, as traditionally conceived, has a contingent side and a necessary side. The necessity of materialism is... more Materialism, as traditionally conceived, has a contingent side and a necessary side. The necessity of materialism is reflected by the metaphysics of realization, while its contingency is a matter of accepting the possibility of Cartesian worlds, worlds in which our minds are roughly as Descartes describes them. In this paper we argue that the necessity and the contingency of materialism are in conflict. In particular, we claim that if mental properties are realized by physical properties in the actual world, Cartesian worlds are impossible.

(2011) "Beyond Physicalism and Dualism? Putnam’s Pragmatic Pluralism and the Philosophy of Mind" European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 3(1)

by David Ludwig

Questioning the causal inheritance principle

by Ivar Hannikainen

In Defense of the Standard View

by Jeff Poland

Protosociologie, October 2000; co-authored with Barbara Von Eckardt

Chomsky's Challenge to Physicalism

by Jeff Poland

In Chomsky and His Critics (L. Antony and N. Hornstein eds.), Basil Blackwell 2003

Materialism

by Jeff Poland

Unpublished Manuscript, August 2008

Pluralistic Physicalism and the Causal Exclusion Argument

by Markus Eronen

To be published in the European Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2012.

There is a growing consensus among philosophers of science that scientific endeavors of understanding the human mind... more There is a growing consensus among philosophers of science that scientific endeavors of understanding the human mind or the brain exhibit explanatory pluralism. Relatedly, several philosophers have in recent years defended an interventionist approach to causation that leads to a kind of causal pluralism. In this talk, I explore the consequences of these recent developments in philosophy of science for some of the central debates in philosophy of mind. First, I argue that if we adopt explanatory pluralism and the interventionist approach to causation, our understanding of physicalism has to change, and this leads to what I call pluralistic physicalism. Secondly, I show that this pluralistic physicalism is not endangered by the causal exclusion argument.

Review of. The Character of Consciousness. David Chalmers. OUP. 2010.

by Daniel D. Hutto

2012. Philosophy. 87: 02, pp. 298-306.

Copyright held by Cambridge University Press, lhttp://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayIssue?jid=PHI&tab=currentissue

Natural Unity and Human Exceptionalism

by Manuel Cabrera

This is an uncorrected proof of a version of this paper which is set to appear in an issue "Midwest Studies in Philosophy" in honor of the late Paul Hoffman later this year.

Naturalism's appeal stems from a commitment to natural integration: understanding natural diversity in terms of... more Naturalism's appeal stems from a commitment to natural integration: understanding natural diversity in terms of natural unity.  But what's required for natural integration – specifically, of human mind and agency?  Physicalists think the cost of natural integration is impoverishing the language of nature – the concepts used for natural integration.  This is the entry point for human exceptionalism: the worry that the repertoire of physical concepts is too impoverished to account for human mind and/or agency.  I argue physicalism is mistaken by sketching a Spinoza-inspired view – pluralistic monism (PM).  On PM,
any truth concerning natural beings (a) pertains to their nature, and (b) concerns Nature as such. Thus, the language of nature is ordinary language, and the expressive resources available for naturally integrating human life include any we need to express any truth about it.  Nevertheless, PM embraces natural unity – albeit in a different form than in physicalism.

The anti-zombie argument

by Keith Frankish

Published in *Philosophical Quarterly*, 57 (229), 650-666, 2007. Definitive version available at: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/117997329/issue?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0

The zombie argument has come to occupy a central role in the case for a non-physicalist view of consciousness. This... more The zombie argument has come to occupy a central role in the case for a non-physicalist view of consciousness. This paper seeks to turn the tables on defenders of the argument ('zombists') by showing that a parallel argument can be run for physicalism. The argument invokes what I call anti-zombies – purely physical creatures that are nonetheless conscious. I show that, using the same resources as those employed by zombists, it is possible to construct an argument from the conceivability of anti-zombies to the truth of physicalism. l go on to defend the claim that anti-zombies are conceivable and to argue that the anti-zombie argument can be defeated only at the cost of rendering the zombie argument itself redundant. The moral of the paper is that dualists should not be zombists.

A defence of the explanatory argument for physicalism

by Jared Bates

Published in 2009.
Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):315-324.

One argument for reductive physicalism, the explanatory argument, rests on its ability to explain the vast and growing... more One argument for reductive physicalism, the explanatory argument, rests on its ability to explain the vast and growing body of acknowledged psychophysical correlations. Jaegwon Kim has recently levelled four objections against the explanatory argument. I assess all of Kim's objections, showing that none is successful. The result is a defence of the explanatory argument for physicalism.

Book Review of "Panpsychism in the West" by David Skrbina (Dutch)

by Titus Rivas

Published in Terugkeer, 18(1), pp. 24-25, 2007

Filosofische kritiek op de computer als model voor de verhouding tussen lichaam en geest

by Titus Rivas

Based on an article published in Terugkeer, 15, Winter 2004, Nr. 4, pp. 22-25, entitled "Filosofische kritiek op het computermodel voor de geest".

De overbodige activiteiten van de 'skeptici' (The Superfluous Activities of the "Skeptics")

by Titus Rivas

Published in Paraview, Summer 2007.