Philosophy of the Emotions

Naturaleza y elementos de una concepción cognitivo-práctica de las emociones

by Ana Marta González

Pensamiento, vol. 67,  nº 253, 2011.

Métaphysique des propriétés esthétiques

by Sébastien Réhault

“Figuring Joy: Gratitude as Medicine in 1 Thess 2:1-20,” Perspectives in Religious Studies (39.1 (2012): 15–23.

by Michael Whitenton

There has long existed a lacuna in rhetorical studies in Paul when one considers 1 Thessalonians; this gap is all the... more There has long existed a lacuna in rhetorical studies in Paul when one considers 1 Thessalonians; this gap is all the more pronounced when one enters the study of the emotions therein. Attempting to fill this lacuna, this article explores 1 Thess 2:1-20 from the perspective of psychagogy in the Greek tradition. Once viewed from this angle, Paul arises as a skilled rhetorician, both diagnosing a particular emotional need in his Macedonian audience, then meeting that need through figured speech. In this light, the specific function of the familial similes finds new significance vis-à-vis Paul’s pastoral care of the Macedonians.

Émotion(s) ? Une approche cognitiviste des théories de l'émotion et du sentiment

by Matthieu F. Girard

Emotionen nach Alfred Schütz

by Jan Strassheim

To appear in: Schnabel, Annette / Schützeichel, Rainer (eds.) 2012: Emotionen, Sozialstruktur und Moderne.

In German; supposed to come out in May.

I apply my particular reading of Schutz's theory to the problem of... more In German; supposed to come out in May.

I apply my particular reading of Schutz's theory to the problem of emotion, which Schutz himself only hinted at. How is it that emotions are rich and varied phenomena bound to unique embodied individuals - while at the same time emotions can be shared, understood, and even predicted (e.g. when we intentionally offend or amuse other people), and show a high degree of cultural and historical relativity?

Linquist & Bartol (forthcoming) 'Two Myths About Somatic Markers' British Journal for Philosophy of Science

by Jordan Bartol

Draft version.  Final version to appear in British Journal for Philosophy of Science.

Research on patients with damage to ventromedial frontal cortices suggests a key role for emotions in practical... more Research on patients with damage to ventromedial frontal cortices suggests a key role for emotions in practical decision making. This field of investigation is often associated with Antonio Damasio’s Somatic Marker Hypothesis–a putative account of the mechanism by which autonomic tags guide decision making in typical individuals. Here we discuss two ‘myths’ surrounding the direction and interpretation of this research. First, it is often assumed that there is a single somatic marker hypothesis. As others have noted, however, Damasio’s ‘hypothesis’ admits of multiple interpretations (Colombetti, [2008]; Dunn et al. [2006]). Our analysis builds upon this point by characterizing decision making as a multi-stage process and identifying the various potential roles for somatic markers. The second myth is that the available evidence suggests a role for somatic markers in the core stages of decision making, i.e. during the generation, deliberation or evaluation of candidate options. To the contrary, we suggest that somatic markers most likely have a peripheral role, in the recognition of decision points, or in the motivation of action. This conclusion is based on an examination of the past 25 years of research conducted by Damasio and colleagues, focusing in particular on some early experiments that have been largely neglected by the critical literature.

Don't Worry, Feel Guilty

by J. David Velleman

Published in Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions, Supplement to Philosophy (2003)

An analysis of guilt, including non-moral forms such as survivor guilt. An analysis of guilt, including non-moral forms such as survivor guilt.

The Genesis of Shame

by J. David Velleman

Published in The Philosophical Review (2001). Reprinted in Self to Self.

The moral emotion of shame The moral emotion of shame

Nicolai Hartmann’s Approach to Affectivity and its Relevance for the Current Debate Over Feelings

by Robert Zaborowski

in: The Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann, (eds.) R. Poli, C. Scognamiglio & F. Tremblay, W. de Gruyter, Berlin – Boston 2011, pp. 159–175

Max Scheler’s model of stratified affectivity and its relevance for research on emotions

by Robert Zaborowski

in: Appraisal 8, 3, 2011, pp. 24–34

The article examines some aspects of Scheler’s view on affectivity, especially his hierarchical approach which is... more The article examines some aspects of Scheler’s view on affectivity, especially his hierarchical approach which is useful in solving difficulties in analysis of affectivity and helps to avoid downwards as well as upwards reductionism in considering intricacy of emotions. After presenting how Scheler delineates the four levels of feelings, critical observations are made as to points which should be developed or refined so that Scheler’s model could more broadly contribute to current debate over emotions and advancement of the theory of affectivity.

Feeling–Thought Linkage and its Forms in the Ancient and Modern Times

by Robert Zaborowski

in: Greek philosophy and the issues of our age, t. 1, (eds.) K. Boudouris & M. Adam, Ionia Publications, Athens 2009, pp. 230–240

Clément d’Alexandrie et Origène sur les émotions (avec une considération de l’apport des Stoïciens, d’Aristote et de Platon)

by Robert Zaborowski

in: Eos 94, 2007, pp. 251–276

Do Unconscious Emotions Involve Unconscious Feelings

by Michael Lacewing

Philosophical Psychology  Vol. 20, No. 1, February 2007, pp. 81–104

The very idea of unconscious emotion has been thought puzzling. But in recent debate about emotions, comparatively... more The very idea of unconscious emotion has been thought puzzling. But in recent debate about emotions, comparatively little attention has been given explicitly to the question. I survey a number of recent attempts by philosophers to resolve the puzzle and provide some preliminary remarks about their viability. I identify and discuss three families of responses: unconscious emotions involve conscious feelings, nconscious emotions involve no feelings at all, and unconscious emotions involve unconscious feelings. The discussion is exploratory rather than decisive for three reasons. First, the aim is to provide a framework for the debate, and identify a number of key issues for further research. Second, a number of the positions depend for their plausibility upon theoretical commitments that can be made clear, but cannot be evaluated in detail, in a survey article. Third, I believe no fully satisfactory, comprehensive solution has yet been developed.

Emotion-Philosophy-Science

by Phil Hutchinson

Facing Atrocity: Shame and Its Absence

by Phil Hutchinson

Abstract
In this paper I focus on four varieties of shame absence. My hope is that reflection on these varieties... more Abstract
In this paper I focus on four varieties of shame absence. My hope is that reflection on these varieties of shame-absence will go some way to giving us a more complete picture of the role that shame plays in our moral character and in discussions of atrocity. I note that the shame that emerges from an exposure to atrocity can be in part what leads us to identify the event as atrocious.
I progress to argue that when shame is absent, this absence can serve to blind us to the atrocity that is before us and that is ours to work to prevent. Feeling shame is part of seeing the atrocity for what it is in an appropriate emotionally-engaged manner. It is thus a vital part of being human, and its absence in certain cases is an all-too-human failure of humanity.

"Emotions, Attachment and the Human Good. "Upheavals of Thought" by Martha Nussbaum" (Book essay)

by Lene Auestad

Dictum no. 2 2005.

Learning of pains; Wittgenstein's own Cartesian Mistake at Investigations 246

by David Robjant

forthcoming in the 2012 Wittgenstein Studien (Jahrbuch)

I refute the support offered for the remark at Philosophical Investigations 246: “It can’t be said of me at all... more I refute the support offered for the remark at Philosophical Investigations 246: “It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain.” I identify two kinds of support for this claim, the one arguing that I cannot learn of my own pains and the second arguing that I cannot be persuaded by evidence that I am in pain. Against the first sort of support I offer various cases in which I learn of a pain. I argue that one learns about the world and about ones body simultaneously, and that this includes learning of sensations. Against the second sort of support I develop the case in which I am persuaded by compelling evidence that I am, contrary to what I imagined, still in an emotional pain about N. I argue that in this case I make a mistake about my pain. P.M.S. Hacker claims that a mix of sensation and emotion such as might be found in my second case would make it irrelevant as a criticism of Wittgenstein. I argue that the reverse holds. That ‘sensation’ is quite separate from ‘emotion’ is a Cartesian Mistake which is, I argue, implicit in Wittgenstein’s discussion of ‘I know I am in pain’.

«Επιθυμία, έρωτας, συναισθήματα: μια φιλοσοφική ανάγνωση του Κίτρινου Φακέλου του Μ. Καραγάτση»

by Eleni Leontsini

υπό έκδοση στο διεθνές νεοελληνικό φιλολογικό περιοδικό ΙΤΑΛΟΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ, Rivista di cultura greco-moderna (που εκδίδεται από το Πανεπιστήμιο L’ Orientale, Έδρα Νεοελληνικής Γλώσσας και Φιλολογίας, Νάπολη, Ιταλία), Napoli 2010.

Sociology of the Heart

by Frederic Vandenberghe

Homeric Thumos: The Early History of Gender, Emotion, and Politics

by Barbara Koziak

Journal of Politics

Although most political theories imply some view of the role of emotion in political life, some are hostile to... more Although most political theories imply some view of the role of emotion in political life, some are hostile to emotion; and no general treatment of the emotional has yet been written in normative political theory. The theoretical study of political emotion should begin with the history of ancient Greek thumos as understood by Homer, who wrote free of the philosophical elevation of reason. Recent theorists have understood thumos as the angry and manly defense of one's own honor, family, and country. In Homer's Iliad, thumos motivates both men and women, participates in deliberation, and suggests not one disposition or emotion, but many emotions. The typical readings of ancient thumos neglect these elements in Homer, and fail to investigate the relationship between political regime and emotion. Employing recent studies of emotion, I articulate the mutual effect of political organization, morality, and emotional character focusing particularly on the story of Achilles.