Philosophy of Punishment

'Sympathetic Exchange,' Adam Smith and Punishment

by Eric Miller

Ratio Juris, Vol. 9, No. 182, 1996

Adam Smith says relatively little about justice and punishment in the Theory of Moral Sentiments. What he does say... more Adam Smith says relatively little about justice and punishment in the Theory of Moral Sentiments. What he does say reveals that Smith viewed morality as dynamic, almost economic exchange.  Exposing the transactional nature of his theory of morality not only the operation of sympathy and moral judgment, but allows us to see a much closer link between the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations. Much remains to be said about this, as about his theory of justice. However, I do believe that to view Smith's moral theory from an "economic" perspective as a system of "sympathetic exchange" enables a more fruitful and cohesive account to be given of all aspects of his work, moral, economic and jurisprudential.

Hegel and the Unified Theory of Punishment

by Thom Brooks

Published in Thom Brooks (ed.), Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Oxford: Blackwell, 2012.

Keywords:

politics, and Hegel's theory;Hegel's unified theory of punishment;Philosophy of Right;The... more Keywords:

politics, and Hegel's theory;Hegel's unified theory of punishment;Philosophy of Right;The Science of Logic;“hybrid” theories of punishment;PR, and punishment;crime and its punishment;British idealists, defending Hegel's idea;societal, justifying legal punishment
Summary

This chapter contains sections titled:

Introduction

The Key Idea

Punishment in the Philosophy of Right

The Reception amongst British Idealists

The Prospects of a Unified Theory of Punishment

Notes

References

Social Control After Foucault

by Michalis Lianos

Neurosciences et droit pénal : le déterminisme peut-il sauver la conception utilitariste de la peine ?

by Florian Cova

Published in Klesis, issue 21, 2011, pp.33-77.

Greene et Cohen (2004) ont défendu la thèse selon laquelle le développement des neurosciences, en favorisant une... more Greene et Cohen (2004) ont défendu la thèse selon laquelle le développement des neurosciences, en favorisant une vision déterministe de l'action humaine, finira par bouleverser notre conception de la peine et favorisera une conception utilitariste de celle-ci. De façon similaire, Xavier Bébin (2006) a défendu que les découvertes des neurosciences devraient nous conduire à adopter une conception utilitariste de la peine. Dans ce papier, je discute et rejette ces deux arguments, en utilisant des outils tirés de la philosophie, de la philosophie expérimentale, et de la psychologie.

Sentencing as craftwork and the binary epistemologies of the discretionary decision process

by Cyrus Tata

Social & Legal Studies Vol 16: 425-447

Is Bradley a Retributivist?

by Thom Brooks

Perhaps the least controversial area of F.H. Bradley's writings relates to his views on punishment. Commentators... more Perhaps the least controversial area of F.H. Bradley's writings relates to his views on punishment. Commentators universally recognize Bradley's theory of punishment as a retributivist theory of punishment. This article challenges the received wisdom. I argue that Bradley does not endorse retributivism as commonly understood. Instead, he defends the view that punishment is non-retributivist and serves the end of societal maintenance. Moreover, Bradley defends this view consistently from Ethical Studies to later work on punishment. Instead of holding a theory of punishment largely unique amongst British Idealists of his time, Bradley's views on punishment are far more consistent than previously thought.

Retribution and Capital Punishment

by Thom Brooks

in Mark D. White (ed.), Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 232-45.

This chapter argues that contrary to popular wisdom (and clear pronouncements by classic retributivists such as Kant),... more This chapter argues that contrary to popular wisdom (and clear pronouncements by classic retributivists such as Kant), retributivists should oppose capital punishment for murderers. He concedes that murderers may deserve to be executed, and that this can be carried out fairly and humanely. Rather, his argument focuses on epistemic problems with ascertaining guilt, which have been made more prominent and visible by recent advances in forensic science (such as DNA testing). Even after guilt was found beyond a reasonable doubt during a fair trial, and confirmed in all subsequent appeals, these scientific advances have been able to clearly demonstrate the innocence of dozens of convicted murderers on death row. This chapter rejects several other arguments against capital punishment offered as retributivist before outlining and defending his own against actual and potential criticisms.

The Medieval Blood Sanction and the Divine Beneficence of Pain: 1100 - 1450

by Trisha Olson

As always, interested in comments and others' wisdom.

Sergi on Bennett Final Version

by Sergi Rosell

From Honor to Dignity And Back Again: On LaVaque-Manty's 'Dueling for Equality'

by Alexander Livingston

Political Theory v. 35 (2007). Coauthored with Leah Soroko

Don't Worry, Feel Guilty

by J. David Velleman

Published in Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions, Supplement to Philosophy (2003)

An analysis of guilt, including non-moral forms such as survivor guilt. An analysis of guilt, including non-moral forms such as survivor guilt.

The two faces of revenge: moral responsibility and the culture of honor

by Tamler Sommers

Confinement and the Emergence of Subjectivity: Inhumane Humanity in Foucault's 'Surveiller et punir'

by Kenneth D. Koffer

Presented at Graduate Colloquium: The Purpose of Punishment.  Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, December 2010.

A New Subject of Experimentation (A condensed version of my Master's Thesis)

by Cheryl Abbate

A condensed version of my Master's Thesis: Research on Criminals: an alternative to animal testing

Book Review Offending Women: Power, Punishment, and the Regulation of Desire, by Lynne A Haney.

by Aylwyn Walsh

In Prison Service Journal, Fall 2011.

Rewards, Punishment, and Cooperation: A Meta-analysis

by Daniel Balliet

Balliet, D., & Mulder, L. B., & Van Lange, P.A.M. (2011). Reward, punishment, and cooperation: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 137, 594-615.

How effective are rewards (for cooperation) and punishment (for noncooperation) as tools to promote cooperation in... more How effective are rewards (for cooperation) and punishment (for noncooperation) as tools to promote cooperation in social dilemmas, or situations when immediate self-interest and longer-term collective interest conflict? And what variables can promote the impact of these incentives? Although such questions have been examined, social and behavioral scientists provide different answers. To date, there is no theoretical and/or quantitative review of rewards and punishments as incentives of cooperation in social dilemmas. Using a novel interdependence-theoretic framework, we propose that rewards and punishment should both promote cooperation, and identify two variables – cost of incentives and source of incentives – that are predicted to magnify the effectiveness of these incentives in promoting cooperation. A meta-analysis involving 187 effect sizes, revealed that rewards and punishments exhibit a statistically equivalent positive effect on cooperation (d = .51 and .70, respectively). The effectiveness of incentives was stronger when the incentives were costly, compared to free, to administer. Centralization of incentives did not moderate the effect size. Punishments were also more effective during iterated dilemmas when participants continued to interact in the same group, compared to both iterated dilemmas with re-assignment to a new group after each trial and one-shot dilemmas. We also examine several other potential moderators of the effect size, such as iterations, partner matching, group size, country, and participant payment. We discuss broad conclusions, implications for theory, and suggest directions for future research on rewards and punishment in social dilemmas.

Research on prisoners: An alternative to animal testing

by Cheryl Abbate

Shame on Me, Shame on You? Nussbaum on Shame Punishment

by Thom Brooks

Journal of Applied Philosophy 25(4) (2008): 322-34

Shame punishments have become an increasingly popular alternative to traditional punishments, often taking the form of... more Shame punishments have become an increasingly popular alternative to traditional punishments, often taking the form of convicted criminals holding signs or sweeping streets with a toothbrush. In her Hiding from Humanity, Martha Nussbaum argues against the use of shame punishments because they contribute to an offender's loss of dignity. However, these concerns are shared already by the courts which also have concerns about the possibility that shaming might damage an offender's dignity. This situation has not led the courts to reject all uses of shaming, but only to accept shaming within certain safeguards. Thus, despite Nussbaum's important reservations against shame punishments, it may still be possible for her to accept shaming within specific parameters such as those set out by the courts that protect the dignity of an offender. As a result, she need not be opposed to the use of legitimate shame punishment.

Kantian Punishment and Retributivism: A Reply to Clark

by Thom Brooks

Ratio 18(2) (2005): 237-45

This reply argues that Kant does not defend -- contra Michael Clark - a deterrent theory of punishment. I argue that... more This reply argues that Kant does not defend -- contra Michael Clark - a deterrent theory of punishment. I argue that Kant defends retributivist punishment, but differently than others have previously understood.

T. H. Green's Theory of Punishment

by Thom Brooks

History of Political Thought 24(4) (2003): 685-701

Green agrees with Kant on the abstract character of moral law as categorical imperatives and that intentional... more Green agrees with Kant on the abstract character of moral law as categorical imperatives and that intentional dispositions are central to a moral justification of punishment. The central problem with Kant's account is that we are unable to know these dispositions beyond a reasonable estimate. Green offers a practical alternative, positing moral law as an ideal to be achieved, but not immediately enforceable through positive law. Moral and positive law are bridged by Green's theory of the common good through the dialectic of morality. Thus, Green appears to offer an alternative that remains committed to Kantian morality whilst taking proper stock of our cognitive limitations. Unfortunately, Green fails to unravel fully Kant's dichotomy of moral and positive law that mirrors Green's solution, although Green offers a number of improvements, such as the importance of the community in establishing rights and linking the severity of punishment to the extent that a criminal act threatens the continued maintenance of a system of rights.

This piece is reprinted in John Morrow (ed.), T. H. Green. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007.