Philosophy of Psychoanalysis

Freud and free-will: Fact, fantasy, and philosophy

by Simon Boag

Boag, S. (2011). Freud and free-will: Fact, fantasy, and philosophy [Review of the book Freud, the reluctant philosopher]. PsycCRITIQUES-Contemporary Psychology: APA Review of Books, 56 (6).

Repression, suppression, and conscious awareness

by Simon Boag

Boag, S. (2010). Repression, suppression, & conscious awareness. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 27 (2), 164-181.

Both ‘repression' and ‘suppression' are said to involve removing mental content from awareness. However, repression is... more Both ‘repression' and ‘suppression' are said to involve removing mental content from awareness. However, repression is generally said to be unconscious whereas suppression is said to be conscious. The meanings of the terms ‘unconscious' and ‘conscious', though, are open to a variety of interpretations and so the validity of this distinction is uncertain . This paper discusses the relationship between repression and suppression and whether conscious awareness distinguishes these processes. Consciousness and unconscious are discussed in terms of a relational account of cognition where ‘knowing' is understood as a relation between a cognising subject and a cognised object term. On this view, problems arise from confusing consciousness and unconsciousness with properties or qualities of mental processes. Examined in this light, the present analysis reveals that repression can become conscious and that suppression can occur unconsciously. The role of ‘resistance' and the recognition of a series of defenses are discussed.

Is language necessary for consciousness? An assessment of Freud's ‘word/thing' presentation distinction

by Simon Boag

Boag, S. (2008). Is language necessary for consciousness? An assessment of Freud's ‘word/thing' presentation distinction. In S. Boag (Ed.), Personality Down Under: Perspectives from Australia (pp. 81-89). New York: Nova.

The belief that language is a necessary condition for consciousness is common within psychoanalytic literature. This,... more The belief that language is a necessary condition for consciousness is common within psychoanalytic literature. This, in turn, has led to accounts of ‘passive primal repression', where pre-verbal mental content cannot become conscious at a later time. This paper discusses consciousness and unconsciousness as certain relations rather than as qualities of mental processes. On this view, to be conscious of mental content requires taking it as the object of a second mental act. The view that language is a necessary condition for consciousness is rejected on the basis that applying language to mental content requires knowing the mental content first (i.e., being conscious of it). Implications for primal repression theory, and the manner in which language may facilitate becoming conscious awareness, are discussed.

Freudian Repression, the Common View, and Pathological Science

by Simon Boag

Boag, S. (2006). Freudian repression, the common view, and pathological science. Review of General Psychology, 10 (1), 74-86.

A sustained misconceptualisation of a theory leading to invalid applications and inferences indicates a failure in the... more A sustained misconceptualisation of a theory leading to invalid applications and inferences indicates a failure in the scientific process. This has repeatedly occurred with Freud’s theory of repression, a cornerstone of psychoanalytic theory. This paper traces the development of Freud’s theory of repression and compares this with the ‘common view’ found in mainstream psychology: the motivated forgetting of trauma. A fixation with Freud’s original, and superseded theory (1893-1897) ignores the theoretical developments that constitute mature psychoanalysis (1900-1940), and has impacted upon attempts to test Freudian theory and the current ‘recovered memory’ debate. Although certain accidental factors contribute to this misunderstanding, the sustained failure to comprehend Freudian repression reveals a scientific pathology. Implications for psychology as a whole are discussed.

Can repression become a conscious process?

by Simon Boag

Boag, S. (2006). Can repression become a conscious process? Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 29 (5), 513-4.

A major weakness in Erdelyi's account concerns the claim that repression can become conscious. A relational account of... more A major weakness in Erdelyi's account concerns the claim that repression can become conscious. A relational account of cognition demonstrates that if repression is successful, then the repressive act cannot become known. Additionally, “resistance” further distinguishes “repression” from “suppression.” Rather than blurring the distinction between these processes, it is possible to recognise a series of defences. Suggestions are provided for alternative research avenues.

Real Processes' and the Explanatory Status of Repression and Inhibition

by Simon Boag

Boag, S. (2007). 'Real processes' & the explanatory status of repression & inhibition. Philosophical Psychology, 20 (3), 375-392.

The recent interest in neuroscientific psychodynamic research (‘Neuro-psychoanalysis’) has meant that empirical... more The recent interest in neuroscientific psychodynamic research (‘Neuro-psychoanalysis’) has meant that empirical findings are emerging which allow greater public scrutiny of psychodynamic concepts. However, Macmillan (1991) claims that the psychoanalytic cornerstone, ‘repression’, is a circular explanatory term and incapable of referring to a ‘real process’. This paper discusses Macmillan’s criticism and finds that repression is a coherent explanatory term and is not precluded from referring to real processes. Specifically, ‘neural inhibition’, triggered by social factors, can account for Freudian repression, without succumbing to circular explanation. Recent developments in neuroscience suggest that a plausible mechanism of inhibition exists, providing testable avenues for the ‘cornerstone’ of psychoanalysis. Evidence of the role of the frontal lobes, a brain area that appears to mediate the influence of social factors upon impulse control, demonstrates that repression is plausible within a dynamic neural framework.

“Freudian dream theory, dream bizarreness, & the disguise-censor controversy”: Response to Commentaries.

by Simon Boag

Boag, S. (2006). “Freudian dream theory, dream bizarreness, & the disguise-censor controversy”: Response to Commentaries. Neuro-psychoanalysis, 8 (1), 59-68.

Response to commentaries by Mark Blechner, Rosalind Cartwright, Claudio Colace, Calude Gottesman, Brain Johnson, Nigel... more Response to commentaries by Mark Blechner, Rosalind Cartwright, Claudio Colace, Calude Gottesman, Brain Johnson, Nigel Mackay, Doris McIlwain, Agnes Petocz, and Calvin Kai-Ching Yu.

Realism, Self-Deception and the Logical Paradox of Repression

by Simon Boag

Boag, S. (2007). Realism, self-deception, & the logical paradox of repression. Theory & Psychology, 17 (3), 421-447.

Historically, repression has been considered a cornerstone of psychoanalytic theory. However, explaining how the ego... more Historically, repression has been considered a cornerstone of psychoanalytic theory. However, explaining how the ego maintains repression without knowing the repressed appears to create a logical paradox of knowing in order not to know. Maze and Henry’s realist analysis of the problem provides an important new direction for framing possible solutions. However, their proposed explanation in terms of ‘affective blocking’ is found to be limited with respect to explaining important features of repression, such as the clinical phenomenon of resistance. Alternatively, the present thesis proposes that a solution can be provided in terms of strong partitioning and neural inhibition. The resolution of the paradox hinges upon the recognition that repression inhibits knowledge of knowing the repressed. Implications of this position for understanding self-deception are discussed.

“Freudian dream theory, dream bizarreness, & the disguise-censor controversy”: Response to Commentaries.

by Simon Boag

Boag, S. (2006). “Freudian dream theory, dream bizarreness, & the disguise-censor controversy”: Response to Commentaries. Neuro-psychoanalysis, 8 (1), 59-68.

Response to commentaries by Mark Blechner, Rosalind Cartwright, Claudio Colace, Calude Gottesman, Brain Johnson, Nigel... more Response to commentaries by Mark Blechner, Rosalind Cartwright, Claudio Colace, Calude Gottesman, Brain Johnson, Nigel Mackay, Doris McIlwain, Agnes Petocz, and Calvin Kai-Ching Yu.

Freudian Dream Theory, Dream Bizarreness, and the Disguise-Censor Controversy

by Simon Boag

Boag, S. (2006). Freudian dream theory, dream bizarreness, & the disguise-censor controversy. Neuro-psychoanalysis, 8 (1), 5-16.

One particular area of contention in discussions of Freudian dream theory and its relation to the neuroscientific... more One particular area of contention in discussions of Freudian dream theory and its relation to the neuroscientific evidence is the notion of ‘disguise-censorship’ and its relation to dream bizarreness. The discussion to date, however, has neglected the conceptual basis of repression and disguise-censorship and this paper aims to clarify the role of repression in dreaming and its contribution to dream bizarreness. An analysis of disguise-censorship and repression reveals two competing accounts in Freud’s theory. Freud’s account of the ‘dream-censor’, acting as an agency intentionally disguising cognitive content, is found to be problematic. However, Freud’s alternative account of repression, in terms of cognitive inhibition instigated by motivational conflict, is developed and discussed in relation to neural inhibition. On this view, dream bizarreness arises, in part, through inter-drive competition preventing direct expression of wishes and the subsequent formation of substitute aims. Resolution of certain contradictions and inconsistencies between the neurological evidence and Freudian dream theory are discussed.

Le sujet comme structure du court-circuit. A partir d'une conception psychanalytique du sujet: Platon, Fichte, Lacan.

by Charlotte Morel

Published in Brazilian version:
Dois Pontos, vol. 5, N°1, abril de 2008- "Estructura, sistema, subjectividade" - Universidade Federal do Paraná, Curitiba, Brasil.

Review of Linda W. Brakel: Unconscious Knowing and Other Essays in Psycho-Philosophical Analysis

by Brian Garvey

Metascience (published online 9 March, 2012)

The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com.
http://www.springerlink.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1007/s11016-012-9663-4

Masochism and the Modern Ethical Ideal: Between Literary and Scientific Visibility

by f. scott scribner

Published in the Journal of Literature and Psychology

(Un)touched by Words: Psychoanalytic writing on Music and Musical aspect of Psychoanalysis

by Odelia Hitron

Published in Ma’arag: The Israel Annual of Psychoanalysis, 2011, Volume 2 (pp. 55-82). © 2011 Magnes Press/The Sigmund Freud Center, The Hebrew University

(UN)TOUCHED BY WORDS:PSYCHOANALYTIC WRITINGS ON MUSIC AND MUSICAL ASPECTS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS


ODELIA... more (UN)TOUCHED BY WORDS:PSYCHOANALYTIC WRITINGS ON MUSIC AND MUSICAL ASPECTS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS


ODELIA HITRON

This essay reviews the development and changes in psychoanalysis’ theoretical account of music, in an attempt to better understand the nature of the relations between the two as art, science and technique. I attempt to recount the slow process by which music has been transformed from being perceived as an "opponent" of psychoanalysis, to being seen as it’s complementary.
In my review, I show how the early Freudian perspective conspicuously failed to refer to music – that is, to take it up as a subject of study – since the type and quality of the psychic excitements that are generated by music could not be accounted for in classical psychoanalysis’ content-oriented and symbol-seeking investigations. This conceptual discrepancy necessarily led to a conflict, one which manifested as disinterest and/or ignorance.
With the establishment of ego psychology this began to change, as its expanded theoretization of the mechanisms of sublimation was better able to formulate a number of important concepts in respect to the various functions of music. This approach pointed out formal similarities between the psychical structure of primary and secondary processes, and the respective musical structure of a primary rhythmical layer and a secondary melodic layer, which, in turn, made it possible to speak about the unique character of the therapist’s listening faculty, which makes him or her attuned to each of these layers.
Soon after, object relations theories, and especially Donald W. Winnicott’s theory concerning the relations between creativity, being and formlessness, provided a the framework for further and firmer theoretization of the role of music within these processes. In my view, this aspect of Winnicott’s work constitutes the point of transition leading to what was later to develop into recognition of the musical dimension inherent to the field of psychoanalysis. This recognition of the musical components of therapy gives us the opportunity to examine not just their form, but also their content and meaning. It is only by establishing the relations between them, and by viewing them as irrevocably mixed, that we understand them both properly. Only in that manner can the “music” of psychoanalytic therapy be “touched” by words.
_______________
© 2011 Magnes Press/The Sigmund Freud Center, The Hebrew University
Ma’arag: The Israel Annual of Psychoanalysis, 2011, Volume 2 (pp. 55-82).

Freud and judaism

by David Meghnagi

The Particular Stream-of-Consciousness in Alfred Döblin's "Berlin, Alexanderplatz"

by Abraham Friedman

Nietzsche contra Freud on Bad Conscience

by Donovan Miyasaki

2010, Nietzsche-Studien 39, 434-54.

While much has been made of the similarities between the work of Nietzsche and Freud, insufficient attention has been... more While much has been made of the similarities between the work of Nietzsche and Freud, insufficient attention has been paid to their differences. Even where they have been noted, the degree of these differences, which sometimes approaches direct opposition, has often been underestimated. In the following essay, I will suggest that on the topic of conscience Nietzsche and Freud have radically opposed views, with profoundly different moral consequences. Despite superficial similarities, Nietzsche’s conception of conscience is opposed to that of Freud in almost every conceivable way. For Freud, conscience is primarily associated with bad will, repression, subordination to social prohibition, and the feeling of guilt. For Nietzsche, conscience is primarily related to affirmation, memory, individual sovereignty, and the feelings of pride and power. To be sure, Freudian “bad conscience” has its parallel in Nietzsche’s philosophy—but only as a modality of conscience, not as its foundation. Freudian conscience is, on the contrary, an essentially bad conscience.

The Affect of Creative Art

by Ayla Michelle Demir

Epistemophilia: Rethinking Feminist Pedagogy

by Peta Cox

Feminist understandings of epistemophilia (the drive for knowledge) have typically focussed on epistemophilia’s... more
Feminist understandings of epistemophilia (the drive for knowledge) have typically focussed on epistemophilia’s destructive aspects with little consideration for the multitude of possible creative and productive expressions of the drive (see Grosz 1990; Rudberg 1996; Townley 2006). In contrast, the reading of epistemophilia developed in this article is one of a precarious subject whose psychic investment in knowing is both multiple and conflictual. Knowing is not innocent here; it is never a “pure” nurturance or an untainted lust to learn. Neither though, can it be reduced to the libidinal or the masterful. As such, imagining a feminist pedagogy with the understanding of epistemophilia developed in this article constitutes a productive rethinking of what feminist pedagogy could be.

Archäologie des Nicht-Gesagten: Eine psychoanalytisch inspirierte Sozialforschung

by Torsten Heinemann

In: Freie Assoziation. 2011. 14(1): 67-80.

The concept of the working alliance is not only crucial for the psychoanalytic practice, but can be utilised for... more The concept of the working alliance is not only crucial for the psychoanalytic practice, but can be utilised for generating new knowledge in empirical social research. Empirical research, inspired by the concepts of psychoanalysis, allows to discerning, unravelling, and revealing the tacit knowledge and implicit norms, every social phenomenon is based on. This leads to a deeper understanding and allows to gain new insights that otherwise would not be accessible to the researcher. The paper starts with an introduction to a reflexive social research. Subsequently, the concepts of the working alliance as well as transference and countertransference and their productive use in the empirical social research are laid out. The paper concluded with some methodological considerations that may well be helpful for the analysis of working alliances and an archaeology of the unspoken.