Philosophy of Mind

Attention and Perception: Looking without Paint

by Alessandra Tanesini

This is a Mumford Style Handout not for citation without permission. Any comments welcome

An argument against Block's Mental Paint deploying the pre-motor theory of attention An argument against Block's Mental Paint deploying the pre-motor theory of attention

The Psychology and Neuroscience of Desire and Action

by Patrick Butlin

May 2012 version

A detailed summary of recent scientific research on desire and action selection, aimed at philosophers. A detailed summary of recent scientific research on desire and action selection, aimed at philosophers.

Dôgen no “shinshin ichinyo” — chôetsuronteki tachiba kara no ichi kôsatsu.

by Raji C. Steineck

Published in: Ningen sonzai ron 9 (2003). Kyoto: Kyôto daigaku daigakuin ningen
/kankyô gaku kenkyûka sôgô ningen gakubu “Ningen sonzai ron” kankôkai, pp. 73-88.

The Relation between Language and Thought according to Hegel

by Hector Ferreiro

Slightly re-elaborated english version of the article “La relación entre lenguaje y pensamiento en el Sistema hegeliano”, published in Oliva Mendoza, Carlos (ed.), Hegel: Ciencia, Experiencia y Fenomenología, Ediciones de la Facultad deFilosofía y Letras de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México, 2010, 21-33. (I read this paper at the "Workshop Kant-Fichte-Hegel", Department of Philosophy and Moral Science, Ghent University, Belgium, June 24, 2011)

La relación entre lenguaje y pensamiento en el Sistema hegeliano

by Hector Ferreiro

En: Oliva Mendoza, Carlos (ed.), Hegel: Ciencia, Experiencia y Fenomenología, Ediciones de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México, 2010, 21-33.

THE SELF

by stanley wilkin

This work and others can be found on: www.greenwich-academy-books.com

The nature of the integrated Self. The nature of the integrated Self.

“Hume’s Empiricist Inner Epistemology: A Reassessment of The Copy Principle”

by Angela Coventry

(co-authored with Tom Seppalainen) in The Continuum Companion to Hume, edited by A. Bailey and D. O’Brien, Continuum Books, 2012

“Review of The Early Modern Subject by Udo Thiel"

by Angela Coventry

Mind, forthcoming

“Locke on Consciousness”

by Angela Coventry

(co-authored with Uriah Kriegel), History of Philosophy Quarterly, 2008 (25: 3), 221-242

William James Writ Large

by Jon Schull

Misyurov D.A. Dialectical formulas based on the binary notation as the development formulas // Credo New. 2012. №2

by Dmitry Misyurov

The article suggests dialectical formulas based on the binary notation as the development formulas: formula with... more The article suggests dialectical formulas based on the binary notation as the development formulas: formula with dominant and the non-dominant elements; universal formula; formula with symbolic weight of elements; tautological formula. For example, it suggests an opportunity to use the dialectical formulas for modeling and artificial intelligence creation, etc.

"Having Difficulty with Identity", Teoria. Revista filosofia (translated also in Italian)

by Colin SCHMIDT

SCHMIDT C.T.A. (2007), « Qualche problema con la nozione di identità », Teoria. Revista filosofia, vol. XXVII/2207/2,... more SCHMIDT C.T.A. (2007), « Qualche problema con la nozione di identità », Teoria. Revista filosofia, vol. XXVII/2207/2, Edizioni ETS, Pisa.

Müssen wir erkennen, was wir denken? – Die semiotische Seele bei Ockham

by Martin Lenz

Forthcoming in: Abschied vom Seelischen? Ed. by Hans-Ulrich Rüegger, Zürich: vdf Hochschulverlag 2012

Diachronic and Synchronic Unity

by Oliver Rashbrook

Published in 'Philosophical Studies'

There are two different varieties of question concerning the unity of consciousness: questions about unity at a time,... more There are two different varieties of question concerning the unity of consciousness: questions about unity at a time, and unity over time. A recent trend in the debate about unity has been to attempt to provide a ‘generalized’ account that purports to solve both problems in the same way. This attempt can be seen in the accounts of Barry Dainton and Michael Tye. In this paper, I argue that there are crucial differences between unity over time and unity at a time that make it impossible to provide a generalized account of unity. The source of these crucial differences is the phenomenon of the ‘continuity of consciousness’. I argue that accounts of unity over time have to provide an account of this continuity, and that there is no phenomenon analogous to continuity in the case of unity at a time. Attention to the continuity of consciousness reveals crucial structural differences between the two varieties of unity. These structural differences make it impossible to provide a generalized account of unity. I show that the problems faced by Dainton’s and Tye’s accounts in the light of the structural differences make their accounts of unity appear far less appealing than they might initially have looked. I conclude by noting that, in the light of the important differences between the two varieties of unity, it is a mistake to attempt to model accounts of unity over time on accounts of unity at a time.

Spinoza on Intentionality

by Martin Lenz

Draft; forthcoming in: Intentionality, ed. by Alessandro Salice with an introduction by John Searle, München: Philosophia-Verlag (Basic Philosophical Concepts) 2012

Although we commonly take our thoughts to be about external things that exist independently of ourselves, Spinoza’s... more Although we commonly take our thoughts to be about external things that exist independently of ourselves, Spinoza’s notion of intentionality suggests that our ideas are primarily about our own bodies. What are we to make of this somewhat revisionary tenet? Do our thoughts never reach out to the things themselves? This paper attempts to reconstruct Spinoza’s notion of intentionality in two steps. Firstly, I will place his position in the larger context of his metaphysical tenets and discuss how his theory of ideas provides an explanation of inten-tional content. Secondly, I will address the question of how Spinoza accounts for what we customarily take to be thoughts about external things as such. I shall argue that, for Spinoza, intentional content always involves propositional attitudes which are ultimately governed by our striving for self-preservation (conatus). In accentuating the links between his theory of propositional attitudes and his conatus principle, I hope to show how he challenges the traditional view of intentionality as grasping objects in a mind-independent world in favour of the thesis that we represent things as they are beneficial to us.

Sind nur sprachfähige Wesen rational? - Über die Grenzen des "Raums der Gründe"

by Martin Lenz

Forthcoming in: Crossing Borders: Proceedings of the 9th Congress of the Austrian Society of Philosophy 2012

Quidquid Movetur, Ab Alio Movetur: On the Insufficiency of Strawson's “Basic Argument” to Invalidate the Thomistic Recognition of Moral Responsibility

by Thomas Sundaram

Written for a class offered in Fall 2010 by Fr. Anselm Ramelow at the Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology, "Do We Have Free Will?"

Galen Strawson has offered, with his modification of the Basic Argument, an intriguing argument with a deceptively... more Galen Strawson has offered, with his modification of the Basic Argument, an intriguing argument with a deceptively simple appearance for the refutation of moral responsibility and ultimately free will. It seems to stand up to a great deal of criticism. Nevertheless, it seems also to presume a great deal with regard to the metaphysical origin of morality, particularly in the notion of the moral agent and in his notion of "desert." I investigate the terms and notion of causality used in his argument and attempt to demonstrate that it does not apply to an Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysical and ethical frame.

Animalism, Dicephalus, and Borderline Cases

by Stephan Blatti

Philosophical Psychology 20 (2007): 595–608.

The rare condition known as dicephalus occurs when (prior to implantation) a zygote fails to divide completely,... more The rare condition known as dicephalus occurs when (prior to implantation) a zygote fails to divide completely, resulting in twins who are conjoined below the neck. Human dicephalic twins look like a two-headed person, with each brain supporting a distinct mental life. Jeff McMahan has recently argued that, because they instance two of us but only one animal, dicephalic twins provide a counterexample to the animalist's claim that each of us is identical with a human animal. To the contrary, I argue that in cases of dicephalus it is obvious neither that there is one animal nor that there are two of us. Consequently, the animalist criterion does not straightforwardly apply to cases of dicephalus. I defend an account of dicephalus that is both sensitive to the complexity of twinning phenomena and not inconsistent with animalism. In my view, dicephalic twins are a borderline case of the concept *human animal*. I conclude with some speculative remarks concerning the normative import (if any) of my claim that dicephalic twins are a borderline case.

Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy (review)

by Stephan Blatti

Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (2009): 463–64.

This is a review of Sara Heinämaa, Vili Lähteenmäki, Pauliina Remes (ed.), Consciousness: From Perception to... more This is a review of Sara Heinämaa, Vili Lähteenmäki, Pauliina Remes (ed.), Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy (Dordrecht: Springer 2007).

Animalism

by Stephan Blatti

Continuum Encyclopedia of British Philosophy, ed. A. C. Grayling, A. Pyle and N. Goulder (Continuum, 2006), vol. 1: 108–09.

This entry sketches the theory of personal identity that has come to be known as animalism. Animalism’s hallmark claim... more This entry sketches the theory of personal identity that has come to be known as animalism. Animalism’s hallmark claim is that each of us is identical with a human animal. Moreover, animalists typically claim that we could not exist except as animals, and that the (biological) conditions of our persistence derive from our status as animals. Prominent advocates of this view include Michael Ayers, Eric Olson, Paul Snowdon, Peter van Inwagen, and David Wiggins.