Philosophy of Criminal Law

Criminals or Patients? Towards a Tragic Conception of Moral and Legal Responsibility

by Mark Coeckelbergh

Czy powinniśmy karać nienawiść? Uwagi o koncepcji przestępstw z nienawiści [Should we punish hate? Remarks about the concept of hate crimes]

by Michał Dudek

Published in: „Forum Prawnicze” ["Legal Forum"] 2012, no. 1 (9), pp. 33-47. ISSN 2081-688X

Czy każda kultura zasługuje na obronę? Kilka wątpliwości dotyczących cultural defence i prawa karnego w dobie multikulturalizmu [Does every culture deserves a defence? Few queries concerning cultural defence and criminal law in the age of multiculturalism]

by Michał Dudek

Published in: „Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej” ["Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy" Polish edition] 2011, no. 2 (3), pp. 47-60. ISSN 2082-3304

A Community Theory of Criminal Negligence

by Joshua Barton

Working Paper - First Draft Only

Recklessness in Scots Criminal Law: Subjective or Objective?

by Joshua Barton

Published in (2011) 2 Juridical Review 143-161.

Dialog und Kommentar zum Wesen des Strafrechts und seiner Verfassungsmässigkeit

by Paulo Ferreira da Cunha

ialettico. Appunti di Filosofia del Diritto (2001): electronic publication.

Le droit pénal n'est point, comme il le serait pour l'Ingénu, le bras armé (et, pour ainsi dire, magiquement,... more Le droit pénal n'est point, comme il le serait pour l'Ingénu, le bras armé (et, pour ainsi dire, magiquement, symboliquement infamant) d'un Etat moderne purifié et constitutionnalisé, civilisé et sécularisé (il n'est pas son "double" sacralisé, un droit de "superposition"), mais, en tout cas, imbu d'une consistance essentiellement publique, il semble avoir une dimension substantiellement constitutionnelle (au sens large que quelques historiens du droit, tels Otto Brunner, donnent à l'expression).

The Public Expression of Penitence

by Constantine Sandis

Forthcoming in Teorema, in a special section on Christopher Bennett's The Apology Ritual, edited by Edgar Maraguat.

Please do not quote from these pre-proofs.

This paper critically explores the expressivist understanding of punishment which lies at the heart of Christopher... more This paper critically explores the expressivist understanding of punishment which lies at the heart of Christopher Bennett’s book The Apology Ritual. There seems to be a tension in Bennett’s simultaneous treatment of offenders as people who are, on the one hand, being offered the opportunity to exercise their right to make amends and, on the other, being sentenced for the sake of an appropriate expression of their condemnation. I propose instead that state-inflicted punishment cannot easily
serve a purging function, that offenders do not need it to redeem themselves, and that it does not automatically bestow redemption on the unrepentant as a matter of course.
If, as Bennett seems to suggest, the ‘right to punishment’ is to include an ethical dimension, it cannot simply be a right to suffer for one’s deeds, for the ethically appropriate reaction to crime must also respect one’s right to be recognised as the criminal
that one is, and be given a chance to make public amends for it.

On Strict Liability Crimes: Preserving a Moral Framework for Criminal Intent in an Intent-Free Moral World

by Will Thomas

On the Purposes of Legality and its Applicability to International Law

by William Worster

Book Review: Kenneth S. Gallant, The Principle of Legality in International and Comparative Criminal Law (Cambridge:... more Book Review: Kenneth S. Gallant, The Principle of Legality in International and Comparative Criminal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 632 pp. £64.00 (Hardback) ISBN 978-0-52-188648-2

Devlet Sistemlerine Göre Savunma Hakkı ve Müdafi

by S.Sinan Kocaoglu

Savunma hakkının icrası ve müdafiin ceza muhakemesinin diğer süjeleri arasındaki konumu bir devletin rejiminin yapısı... more Savunma hakkının icrası ve müdafiin ceza muhakemesinin diğer süjeleri arasındaki konumu bir devletin rejiminin yapısı hakkındaki en önemli göstergelerden birisidir. Elinizdeki bu çalışma bahsi geçen iki konuyu liberal demokrat, otoriter, totaliter devlet yapılarının merceğinden incelemektedir.

Harmless Rapes? A False Problem for the Harm Principle

by alessandro spena

Published in Diritto & Questioni Pubbliche, n. 10, 2010, pp. 497-524

Sul fondamento della non punibilità nei casi di necessità giudiziaria (art. 384 cp)

by alessandro spena

Published in Rivista italiana di diritto e procedura penale, 2010(1), pp. 145-181

Libertà di espressione e reati di opinione

by alessandro spena

Published in Rivista italiana di diritto e procedura penale, 2007(2/3), pp. 689-738

The Irrevocability of Capital Punishment (Journal of Social Philosophy 42.3.)

by Benjamin Yost

Uncorrected Proofs

Do We Need a Philosphy of Law

by alireza azimi

« Allo scoppio del conflitto tra Filippo il Bello di Francia e Bonifacio VIII : l’affare Saisset (1301). Primi spunti per una rilettura », dans I poteri universali e la fondazione dello Studium Urbis. Il pontefice Bonifacio VIII dalla Unam sanctam allo schiaffo di Anagni, éd. Giovanni MINNUCCI, Rome : Monduzzi (Archivio per la storia del diritto medioevale e moderno, 1), 2008, p. 21-68

by Julien Théry

French version with additions forthcoming.

Spunti per una rilettura del caso Saisset, con il quale si aprí il "grand différend" tra Filippo il Bello e... more Spunti per una rilettura del caso Saisset, con il quale si aprí il "grand différend" tra Filippo il Bello e Bonifacio VIII nel 1301, cioè un momento chiave per lo sviluppo della Chiesa gallicana. L'analisi dei testi scritti nell'entourage regio (specie dal Nogaret) all'occasione del caso mette in luce gli inizi di un fenomeno di "pontificalizzazione" della monarchia capetingia, il quale si sarebbe accentuato negli anni 1302-1314 con le accuse rivolte a Bonifacio VIII e con il processo ai templari.

Atrocitas/enormitas. Pour une histoire de la catégorie de "crime énorme" du Moyen Âge à l'époque moderne

by Julien Théry

Publié dans Clio@Themis. Revue en ligne d'histoire du droit, 4, mars 2011.

In the language of most superior jurisdictions in the end of the Middle Ages, the concept of enormitas included the... more In the language of most superior jurisdictions in the end of the Middle Ages, the concept of enormitas included the most serious breaches of the legitimate order. It is suggested here that this concept was created during the 12th century in the practice of papal government and ecclesiastical reform. First, around 1130-1150, an « enormity » refered to a simple canonical irregularity without indicating any level of seriousness. From 1150-1160 on, the meaning changed. « Enormity » started to denote a blend of breach of rules or law, sin or stain and potentially radical subversion of the christian order. Although it remained typical of the ecclesiastical sphere, this new concept quickly spread broadly in the secular world, with a sense that was very similar to that of roman « atrocity » but had specific features. The enormitas of the 13th and 14th centuries was structurally unstable and protean. The perimeter of its field as a legal definition was variable, just as were its procedural implications. In many cases, the concept tended to embrace the whole criminal sphere (or « grand criminel », as it was called in France). Its use developed in concomitance with the rise of inquisitorial or « extraordinary » procedures, which were defined by an unprecedented expansion of the arbitrium judicis and therefore by situations of more or less generalized exceptionality with regard to traditional rules. While contributing to delimit the criminal sphere, enormitas thus created a continuum between the restricted field of crime of lese-majesty and that of ordinary crimes.


Dans le langage de la plupart des juridictions supérieures d’Occident à la fin du Moyen Âge, la catégorie de l’enormitas recouvrait les plus graves atteintes à l’ordre légitime. On montre ici que cette catégorie a été élaborée au XIIe siècle dans la pratique du gouvernement pontifical et de la réforme ecclésiastique. En premier lieu, dans les années 1130-1150, une « énormité » désigna une simple irrégularité canonique, sans référence à un quelconque degré de gravité. À partir des années 1150-1160, le contenu de la notion évolua. Elle commença à qualifier – et qualifia dès lors jusqu’à la fin du Moyen Âge et bien au-delà – un mixte d’infraction aux règles ou à la loi, de péché ou souillure et de subversion potentiellement radicale de l’ordre chrétien. Même si elle resta typique de la sphère ecclésiastique, cette nouvelle catégorie connut rapidement une vaste diffusion au sein du monde séculier, dans des acceptions qui présentaient de fortes similitudes avec la notion romaine d’atrocitas, mais aussi des caractéristiques spécifiques. L’enormitas des XIIIe-XIVe siècles était une notion structurellement instable, protéiforme. Le périmètre de son champ d’application comme qualification juridique, tout comme ses implications procédurales, demeuraient variables. Dans de nombreux contextes, la catégorie tendait à embrasser l’ensemble de la sphère criminelle (ou du « grand criminel »). Son usage se développa en concomitance avec l’apparition de procédures inquisitoires ou « extraordinaires » caractérisées par une dilatation sans précédent de l’arbitrium judicis et donc par des situations d’exceptionnalité plus ou moins généralisée eu égard aux règles de droit traditionnelles. Tout en contribuant à délimiter le champ du pénal, l’enormitas ménageait donc un continuum entre la sphère restreinte des crimes de lèse-majesté et celle des crimes ordinaires.

Carattere, merito e responsabilità (Character, Desert, and Responsibility, in Italian)

by Filippo Santoni de Sio

in 'Rivista di Filosofia', 2/2007, pp. 193-214.

Many moral and legal theorists have recently endorsed a Humean view of responsibility, according to which attributions... more Many moral and legal theorists have recently endorsed a Humean view of responsibility, according to which attributions of responsibility depends on character assessment. In the first part of this paper, the major contemporary developments of this view are presented, and some historical and theoretical reasons of its appeal are briefly discussed. In the second and third part, character-based theories of responsibility are shown to be untenable on both theoretical and ethical grounds. They seem to reflect a too simple view of the conceptual connection between character, personal and moral identity, and action. Moreover, they lead to very counterintuitive results in concrete cases such as those of an intentional wrong action “out of character”. In the final part, some additional reasons against character-based theories of responsibility deriving from some general reflections on the nature of responsibility are given.