Philosophy of Computer Science

Dragonfly: An Ecological Approach to Digital Architectural Design

by Michael J. Braund

Published in ACADIA 2011: Integration Through Computation, ed. by J.M. Taron, V. Parlac, B. Kolarevic and J.S. Johnson, pp.178-186. Stroughton, WI: The Printing House, 2011.

(Co-authored with Daniel Hambleton)

In his keynote address delivered to The American Society for Esthetics in 1976, James J. Gibson wrote, “Architecture... more In his keynote address delivered to The American Society for Esthetics in 1976, James J. Gibson wrote, “Architecture and design do not have a satisfactory theoretical basis.” He then asked, “Can an ecological approach to the psychology of perception and behavior provide it?” (1976, p. 413) We believe that it can, at least in part. In this paper, we expand upon Gibson’s insights into the nature of perceptual experience by applying the concept of “affordances” to the design of architectural objects in general, and to the domain of digital architectural design in particular. On our account, the affordance-concept supplies a useful theoretical basis for conceptualizing the relationship between environments and occupants with respect to the form and behavioral meaning of geometrically constructed layouts.

Donald Norman (1988) first introduced affordances to interaction design theorists, as a conceptual tool for predicting how agents will interact with a given product. The extensive body of literature that has since emerged, from human-computer-interaction studies (Ackerman, 1996; Conn, 1995; Moran, 1997; Norman, 1999) to architectural theory and practice (Koutamanis, 2006; Maier and Fadel, 2009), has followed Norman’s lead in defining affordances, somewhat amorphously, as whichever action-related properties of objects are sufficient to elicit the intended forms of behavioral interaction between the agent and object. However, while this is correct, it is only half the story. It leaves unexplained how human perceivers detect and “pair down” on the potentially vast range of possible affordances (at a given time), to select the ones that will be relevant to the coordination and guidance of the targeted actions. Call this the “selectivity problem,” a proper treatment of which is missing from the literature. This is no small matter. If the theory of affordances is to be useful to architects and designers, if it is to have explanatory and predictive power over how perceivers will interact with their surroundings, then some account of the cognitive procedure by which affordances are selected for the deployment of specific behaviors is necessary. Otherwise, it is unclear what the theory hopes to predict or explain.

To this end, we maintain that the couching of affordances in a framework of human intentionality is not only consistent with Gibson’s theoretical views (i.e., the action-oriented definition of the concept of affordances not only suggests an intentional perspective), indeed, such a perspective is necessary if we are to succeed in implementing the affordance-concept into an architectural design context in a way that addresses the selectivity problem. This is one of the goals of “Dragonfly,” a first attempt at implementing the affordance-based control of perceptually guided-action into a digital design simulation. Dragonfly enables human interaction with geometry by encoding the basic principles of ecological psychology (including a rudimentary form of intentionality) into an interactive CAD environment. New vistas for future research and interdisciplinary approaches to design are then discussed, with a special emphasis on their applicability to architecture.

Exploring Wolfram’s Notion of Computational Irreducibility with a Two-Dimensional Cellular Automaton

by Anthony Beavers

Co-authored with Drew Reisinger, Taylor Martin, Mason Blankenship, Christopher Harrison and Jesse Squires

The notion of computational irreducibility says that a problem is computationally irreducible when the only way to... more The notion of computational irreducibility says that a problem is computationally irreducible when the only way to solve it is to traverse a trajectory through a state space step by step using no shortcut. In this paper, we will explore this notion by addressing whether computational irreducibility is a consequence of how a particular problem is represented. To do so, we will examine two versions of a given game that are isomorphic representations of both the play space and the transition rules underlying the game. We will then develop a third isomorph of the play space with transition rules that seem to only be determined in a computationally irreducible manner. As a consequence, it would seem that representing the play space differently in the third isomorph introduces computational irreducibility into the game where it was previously lacking. If so, we will have shown that, in some cases at least, computational irreducibility depends on the representation of a given problem.

PHILOSOPHY OF COMPUTER SCIENCE

by Raymond Turner

The Philosophy of Computer Science is concerned with those philosophical issues that surround and underpin the... more The Philosophy of Computer Science is concerned with those philosophical issues that surround and underpin the academic discipline of computer science. In this paper we provide an introduction to some its philosophical concerns.

L. Magnani (2012), Scientific Models Are Not Fictions. Model-Based Science as Epistemic Warfare

by Lorenzo Magnani

In L. Magnani and P. Li (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Western and Eastern Studies, Springer, Heidelberg/Berlin, 2012, pp. 1-38.

In the current epistemological debate scientific models are not only considered as useful devices for explaining facts... more In the current epistemological debate scientific models are not only considered as useful devices for explaining facts or discovering new entities, laws, and theories, but also rubricated under various new labels: from the classical ones, as abstract entities and idealizations, to the more recent, as fictions, surrogates, credible worlds, missing systems, make-believe, parables, functional, epistemic actions, revealing capacities. The paper discusses these approaches showing some of their epistemological inadequacies, also taking advantage of recent results in cognitive science. The main aim is to revise and criticize fictionalism, also reframing the received idea of abstractness and ideality of models with the help of recent results coming from the area of distributed cognition (common coding) and abductive cognition (manipulative). The article also illustrates how scientific modeling activity can be better described taking advantage of the concept of “epistemic warfare”, which sees scientific enterprise as a complicated struggle for rational knowledge in which it is crucial to distinguish epistemic (for example scientific models) from non epistemic (for example fictions, falsities, propaganda) weapons. Finally I will illustrate that it is misleading to analyze models in science by adopting a confounding mixture of static and dynamic aspects of the scientific enterprise. Scientific models in a static perspective (for example when inserted in a textbook) certainly appear fictional to the epistemologist, but their fictional character disappears in case a dynamic perspective is adopted. A reference to the originative role of thought experiment in Galileo’s discoveries and to usefulness of Feyerabend’s counterinduction in criticizing the role of resemblance in model-based cognition is also provided, to further corroborate the thesis indicated by the article title

Is Man Machine?

by Gestur Hilmarsson

Written for the seminar on philosophy of mathematics, taught by Prof. Erlendur Jónsson in the fall of 2011.

In this paper I discuss the problem of whether man and his cognitive functions can be reduced to the same work as... more In this paper I discuss the problem of whether man and his cognitive functions can be reduced to the same work as computer (i.e. Turing-machines), and whether computers could theoretically achieve human sentience. My discussion focuses mainly on Gödel's theorems and J.R. Lucas' argument in his 1959 Oxford lecture "Minds, Machines and Gödel".

Software is an abstract artifact

by Nurbay Irmak

MACHINES

by Raymond Turner

What is it for a physical machine or computation to be an implementation of an abstract one? In this paper we shall... more What is it for a physical machine or computation to be an implementation of an abstract one? In this paper we shall provide answers to this question that has its origins in the philosophy of science and theoretical computer science.

Studying Possibility of a Convergent Interpretation of Empirical Sciences on the Basis of the Concepts of Computation and Information

by Alireza Seghatoleslami

Extended Abstract of MA Thesis

Ontological Commitments of Computer Science

by Miguel Pagano

Alan Turing: Mathematical Mechanist

by Anthony Beavers

First Paragraph: I live just off of Bell Road outside of Newburgh, Indiana, a small town of 3,000 people. A mile down... more First Paragraph: I live just off of Bell Road outside of Newburgh, Indiana, a small town of 3,000 people. A mile down the street Bell Road intersects with Telephone Road not as a modern reminder of a technology belonging to bygone days, but as testimony that this technology, now more than a century and a quarter old, is still with us. In an age that prides itself on its digital devices and in which the computer now equals the telephone as a medium of communication, it is easy to forget the debt we owe to an era that industrialized the flow of information, that the light bulb, to pick a singular example, which is useful for upgrading visual information we might otherwise overlook, nonetheless remains the most prevalent of all modern day information technologies. Edison’s light bulb, of course, belongs to a different order of informational devices than the computer, but not so the telephone, not entirely anyway.

Three Paradigms of Computer Science

by Amnon Eden

Minds and Machines 17:2 (July 2007), pp. 135–167

We examine the philosophical disputes among computer scientists concerning methodological, ontological, and... more We examine the philosophical disputes among computer scientists concerning methodological, ontological, and epistemological questions: Is computer science a branch of mathematics, an engineering discipline, or a natural science? Should knowledge about the behaviour of programs proceed deductively or empirically? Are computer programs on a par with mathematical objects, with mere data, or with mental processes? We conclude that distinct positions taken in regard to these questions emanate from distinct sets of received beliefs or paradigms within the discipline:

    * The rationalist paradigm, which was common among theoretical computer scientists, defines computer science as a branch of mathematics, treats programs on a par with mathematical objects, and seeks certain, a priori knowledge about their “correctness” by means of deductive reasoning.

    * The technocratic paradigm, promulgated mainly by software engineers, defines computer science as an engineering discipline, treats programs as mere data, and seeks probable, a posteriori knowledge about their reliability empirically using testing suites.

    * The scientific paradigm, prevalent in the branches of artificial intelligence, defines computer science as a natural (empirical) science, takes programs to be entities on a par with mental processes, and seeks a priori and a posteriori knowledge about them by combining formal deduction and scientific experimentation.

We demonstrate evidence corroborating the tenets of the scientific paradigm, in particular the inherently unpredictable (even chaotic) nature of a large class of computer programs. We conclude with a discussion in the influence that the technocratic paradigm has been having over computer science.

Key terms: philosophy of computer science, ontology and epistemology of computer programs, scientific paradigms

PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES AS MATHEMATICAL THEORIES

by Raymond Turner

Author(s): Ray Turner (University of Essex, United Kingdom)
Pages: 66-82 pp.
Source Title: Thinking Machines and the Philosophy of Computer Science: Concepts and Principles
Source Author(s)/Editor(s): Jordi Vallverdú (Ed.) (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain)
Copyright: 2010

That computer science is somehow a mathematical activity was a view held by many of the pioneers of the subject,... more That computer science is somehow a mathematical activity was a view held by many of the pioneers of the subject, especially those who were concerned with its foundations. At face value it might mean that the actual activity of programming is a mathematical one. Indeed, at least in some form, this has been held. But here we explore a different gloss on it. We explore the claim that programming languages are (semantically) mathematical theories. This will force us to discuss the normative nature of semantics, the nature of mathematical theories, the role of theoretical computer science and the relationship between semantic theory and language design.

THE MEANING OF PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES

by Raymond Turner

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
NEWSLETTER ON PHILOSOPHY AND COMPUTERS. VOL 9,1. FEATURED ARTICLE.

Abstract
A folklore view has it that programming languages get their semantic interpretations layer by layer,... more Abstract
A folklore view has it that programming languages get their semantic interpretations layer by layer, one language getting its interpretation in the next, until the bedrock of physical reality (physical machines) provides the final and actual mechanism of semantic interpretation. We argue, based upon the normative requirements of any semantic account, that this is a false picture. We further argue that, in any adequate semantic theory of a programming language, the denotations of its constructs must be taken to be mathematical objects.

UNDERSTANDING PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES

by Raymond Turner

Minds and Machines
Volume 17, Number 2, 203-216, DOI: 10.1007/s11023-007-9062-6

Abstract
We document the influence on programming language semantics of the Platonism/formalism divide in the... more Abstract
We document the influence on programming language semantics of the Platonism/formalism divide in the philosophy of mathematics.

PHILOSOPHY OF COMPUTER SCIENCE

by Raymond Turner

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The Philosophy of Computer Science (PCS) is concerned with philosophical issues that arise from reflection upon the... more The Philosophy of Computer Science (PCS) is concerned with philosophical issues that arise from reflection upon the nature and practice of the academic discipline of computer science. But what is the latter? It is certainly not just programming. After all, many people who write programs are not computer scientists. For example, physicists, accountants and chemists do. Indeed, computer science would be better described as being concerned with the meta-activity that is associated with programming. More generally, and more precisely, it is occupied with the design, development and investigation of the concepts and methodologies that facilitate and aid the specification, development, implementation and analysis of computational systems. Examples of this activity might include the design and analysis of programming, specification and architectural description languages; the construction and optimisation of compilers, interpreters, theorem provers and type inference systems; the invention of logical frameworks and the design of embedded systems, and much more. Many of the central philosophical questions of computer science surround and underpin these activities, and many of them centre upon the logical, ontological and epistemological issues that concern it. However, in the end, computer science is what computer scientists do, and no exact formulaic definition can act as more than a guide to the discussion that follows. Indeed, the hope is that PCS will eventually contribute to a deeper understanding of the nature of computer science.

SPECIFICATION

by Raymond Turner

Minds and Machines
DOI: 10.1007/s11023-011-9239-x

The specification and implementation of computational artefacts occurs throughout the discipline of computer science.... more The specification and implementation of computational artefacts occurs throughout the discipline of computer science. Consequently, unpacking its nature should constitute one of the core areas of the philosophy of computer science. This paper presents a conceptual analysis of the central role of specification in the discipline.

FOUNDATIONS OF SPECIFICATION

by Raymond Turner

J Logic Computation (October 2005) 15 (5): 623-662.
doi: 10.1093/logcom/exi052

We develop and explore a Core Specification Theory (CST) as a basis for the meta-mathematical investigation of... more We develop and explore a Core Specification Theory (CST) as a basis for the meta-mathematical investigation of specification and specification languages.

Philosophical Ideas on the Simulation of Social Behaviour

by Carlos Gershenson