Philosophy of Cognitive Science

Generative Oscillation - A Cognitive Model for the Emergence of Language

by Thorold (Thor) May

Research Material for a discontinued PhD

DRAFT COPY ONLY

NOT READY FOR PRINT PUBLICATION

The GO model proposes a co-generative view of the emergence of language. Most conventional linguistics models conceive... more The GO model proposes a co-generative view of the emergence of language. Most conventional linguistics models conceive of language as a representational system of symbols which refer to events, either mental or external to the organism. This representational function is said to motivate the linguistic system and (depending upon the linguistic model) largely control its form. The GO (Generative Oscillation) model proposed here recognizes the representational role of language. However it notes that as the mental linguistic system itself becomes efficiently organized, it creates an internal logic and drive of its own. To some extent this internally motivated linguistic system is conceived to override the external motivation to represent another reality. Since the internal linguistic system is dynamic and generative, it may give rise to linguistic output which seems strange in an inter-human communicative context (or even within the reflective mind of the creator). Thus while the external communicative context can become a constraint on unmotivated non-representational "internal language", it might not eliminate it. The Generative Oscillation model proposes that actual language production is an oscillating compromise between the representational function of language and the mental "language bot" itself (i.e. an internal self-organizing system) which is generating language strings just because that is what language language bots do. As far as I know, the Generative Oscillation Model, or anything like it, had not been suggested before in linguistics at the time of writing. Some conventional linguists may find it a bit "off the wall".

Misyurov D.A. Dialectical formulas based on the binary notation as the development formulas // Credo New. 2012. №2

by Dmitry Misyurov

The article suggests dialectical formulas based on the binary notation as the development formulas: formula with... more The article suggests dialectical formulas based on the binary notation as the development formulas: formula with dominant and the non-dominant elements; universal formula; formula with symbolic weight of elements; tautological formula. For example, it suggests an opportunity to use the dialectical formulas for modeling and artificial intelligence creation, etc.

Alsmith & de Vignemont 2012 Embodying the mind and representing the body

by Adrian Alsmith

Co-authored with Frédérique de Vignemont. Intro to special issue of the Review of Philosophy & Psychology that we guest edited:
http://www.springerlink.com/content/1878-5158/3/1/

Does the existence of body representations undermine the explanatory role of the body? Or do certain types of... more Does the existence of body representations undermine the explanatory role of the body? Or do certain types of representation depend so closely upon the body that their involvement in a cognitive task implicates the body itself? In the introduction of this special issue we explore lines of tension and complement that might hold between the notions of embodiment and body representations, which remain too often neglected or obscure. To do so, we distinguish two conceptions of embodiment that either put weight on the explanatory role of the body itself or body representations. We further analyse how and to what extent body representations can be said to be embodied. Finally, we give an overview of the full volume articulated around foundational issues (How should we define the notion of embodiment? To what extent and in what sense is embodiment compatible with representationalism? To what extent and in what sense are sensorimotor approaches similar to behaviourism?) and their applications in several cognitive domains (perception, concepts, selfhood, social cognition).

Autonomy and Desire in Machines and Cognitive Agent Systems

by Kevin Magill

Co-authored with Yasemin J. Erden, published 'Online First' in 'Cognitive Computation', 2012, DOI DOI 10.1007/s12559-012-9140-9. Available through subscribing institutions. Drop me a line if you can't access.
Substantially revised from 2011 paper of same title.

The development of cognitive agent systems relies on theories of agency, within which the concept of desire is key.... more The development of cognitive agent systems relies on theories of agency, within which the concept of desire is key. Indeed, in the quest to develop increasingly autonomous cognitive agent systems, desire has had a significant role. We argue, however, that insufficient attention has been given to analysis and clarification of desire as a complex concept. Accordingly, in this paper, we will draw on some key philosophical accounts of the nature of desire, including what distinguishes it from other mental and motivational states, in order to identify some key characteristics of desire as a complex concept. We will then draw on these in order to investigate the role, definition and adequacy of concepts of desire within applied theoretical models of agency and agent systems.

Dragonfly: An Ecological Approach to Digital Architectural Design

by Michael J. Braund

Published in ACADIA 2011: Integration Through Computation, ed. by J.M. Taron, V. Parlac, B. Kolarevic and J.S. Johnson, pp.178-186. Stroughton, WI: The Printing House, 2011.

(Co-authored with Daniel Hambleton)

In his keynote address delivered to The American Society for Esthetics in 1976, James J. Gibson wrote, “Architecture... more In his keynote address delivered to The American Society for Esthetics in 1976, James J. Gibson wrote, “Architecture and design do not have a satisfactory theoretical basis.” He then asked, “Can an ecological approach to the psychology of perception and behavior provide it?” (1976, p. 413) We believe that it can, at least in part. In this paper, we expand upon Gibson’s insights into the nature of perceptual experience by applying the concept of “affordances” to the design of architectural objects in general, and to the domain of digital architectural design in particular. On our account, the affordance-concept supplies a useful theoretical basis for conceptualizing the relationship between environments and occupants with respect to the form and behavioral meaning of geometrically constructed layouts.

Donald Norman (1988) first introduced affordances to interaction design theorists, as a conceptual tool for predicting how agents will interact with a given product. The extensive body of literature that has since emerged, from human-computer-interaction studies (Ackerman, 1996; Conn, 1995; Moran, 1997; Norman, 1999) to architectural theory and practice (Koutamanis, 2006; Maier and Fadel, 2009), has followed Norman’s lead in defining affordances, somewhat amorphously, as whichever action-related properties of objects are sufficient to elicit the intended forms of behavioral interaction between the agent and object. However, while this is correct, it is only half the story. It leaves unexplained how human perceivers detect and “pair down” on the potentially vast range of possible affordances (at a given time), to select the ones that will be relevant to the coordination and guidance of the targeted actions. Call this the “selectivity problem,” a proper treatment of which is missing from the literature. This is no small matter. If the theory of affordances is to be useful to architects and designers, if it is to have explanatory and predictive power over how perceivers will interact with their surroundings, then some account of the cognitive procedure by which affordances are selected for the deployment of specific behaviors is necessary. Otherwise, it is unclear what the theory hopes to predict or explain.

To this end, we maintain that the couching of affordances in a framework of human intentionality is not only consistent with Gibson’s theoretical views (i.e., the action-oriented definition of the concept of affordances not only suggests an intentional perspective), indeed, such a perspective is necessary if we are to succeed in implementing the affordance-concept into an architectural design context in a way that addresses the selectivity problem. This is one of the goals of “Dragonfly,” a first attempt at implementing the affordance-based control of perceptually guided-action into a digital design simulation. Dragonfly enables human interaction with geometry by encoding the basic principles of ecological psychology (including a rudimentary form of intentionality) into an interactive CAD environment. New vistas for future research and interdisciplinary approaches to design are then discussed, with a special emphasis on their applicability to architecture.

Breathing new life into cognitive science

by Tom Froese

My Thesis Abstract: Extending Cognition in Epistemology: Towards an Individualistic Social Epistemology

by Spyridon Orestis Palermos

Carving the Mind at Its (Not Necessarily Modular) Joints

by Jack Lyons

I can't get no (epistemic) satisfaction: Why the hard problem of consciousness entails a hard problem of explanation

by Brian Earp

Earp, B. D. (2012). I can’t get no (epistemic) satisfaction: Why the hard problem of consciousness entails a hard problem of explanation. Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences, in press.

Daniel Dennett (1996) has disputed David Chalmers’ (1995) assertion that there is a “hard problem of consciousness”... more Daniel Dennett (1996) has disputed David Chalmers’ (1995) assertion that there is a “hard problem of consciousness” worth solving in the philosophy of mind. In this paper I defend Chalmers against Dennett on this point: I argue that there is a hard problem of consciousness, that it is distinct in kind from the so-called easy problems, and that it is vital for the sake of honest and productive research in the cognitive sciences to be clear about the difference. But I have my own rebuke for Chalmers on the point of explanation. Chalmers (1995, 1996) proposes to “solve” the hard problem of consciousness by positing qualia as fundamental features of the universe, alongside such ontological basics as mass and space-time. But this is an inadequate solution: to posit, I will urge, is not to explain. To bolster this view, I borrow from an account of explanation by which it must provide “epistemic satisfaction” to be considered successful (Rowlands, 2001; Campbell, 2009), and show that Chalmers’ proposal fails on this account. I conclude that research in the science of consciousness cannot move forward without greater conceptual clarity in the field.

L. Magnani (2012), Scientific Models Are Not Fictions. Model-Based Science as Epistemic Warfare

by Lorenzo Magnani

In L. Magnani and P. Li (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Western and Eastern Studies, Springer, Heidelberg/Berlin, 2012, pp. 1-38.

In the current epistemological debate scientific models are not only considered as useful devices for explaining facts... more In the current epistemological debate scientific models are not only considered as useful devices for explaining facts or discovering new entities, laws, and theories, but also rubricated under various new labels: from the classical ones, as abstract entities and idealizations, to the more recent, as fictions, surrogates, credible worlds, missing systems, make-believe, parables, functional, epistemic actions, revealing capacities. The paper discusses these approaches showing some of their epistemological inadequacies, also taking advantage of recent results in cognitive science. The main aim is to revise and criticize fictionalism, also reframing the received idea of abstractness and ideality of models with the help of recent results coming from the area of distributed cognition (common coding) and abductive cognition (manipulative). The article also illustrates how scientific modeling activity can be better described taking advantage of the concept of “epistemic warfare”, which sees scientific enterprise as a complicated struggle for rational knowledge in which it is crucial to distinguish epistemic (for example scientific models) from non epistemic (for example fictions, falsities, propaganda) weapons. Finally I will illustrate that it is misleading to analyze models in science by adopting a confounding mixture of static and dynamic aspects of the scientific enterprise. Scientific models in a static perspective (for example when inserted in a textbook) certainly appear fictional to the epistemologist, but their fictional character disappears in case a dynamic perspective is adopted. A reference to the originative role of thought experiment in Galileo’s discoveries and to usefulness of Feyerabend’s counterinduction in criticizing the role of resemblance in model-based cognition is also provided, to further corroborate the thesis indicated by the article title

Is Quinian Bootstrapping Cognitively Explicable?

by Matt Keeler

Susan Carey's The Origin of Concepts seeks to answer, in Nicholas Shea's words, "a conundrum that lies at the... more Susan Carey's The Origin of Concepts seeks to answer, in Nicholas Shea's words, "a conundrum that lies at the heart of cognitive science," which is the question of how we come to acquire the concepts that we possess. The difficulty of such an undertaking lies in the characterizing of a learning mechanism that is not susceptible to Fodor's paradox. Carey offers, to that end, what she calls Quinian bootstrapping, a cognitive process by which new representations are learned incommensurate with the old. In what follows, I will briefly detail the challenge posed by Fodor's paradox, followed by an exposition of the bootstrapping mechanism that Carey thinks successfully answers it. Afterward, I will argue that the inductive and abductive "leaping" involved in the acquisition process cannot be described in cognitive terms, effectively undermining the bootstrap's status as a concept learning device.

Forgetting Curves Emerge from Dynamics of Integrated Memory (2011)

by Eva Čadež

Émotion(s) ? Une approche cognitiviste des théories de l'émotion et du sentiment

by Matthieu F. Girard

From a self that controls to self-control: paradigm shifts in early Buddhism and in cognitive science

by Asaf Federman

A Metacognitive Model of the Sense of Agency over Thoughts

by Glenn Carruthers

in press, in Cognitive Neuropsychiatry

Introduction: The sense of agency over thoughts is the experience of oneself qua agent of mental action. Those... more Introduction: The sense of agency over thoughts is the experience of oneself qua agent of mental action. Those suffering certain psychotic symptoms are thought to have a deficient sense of agency. Here I seek to explain this sense of agency in terms of metacognition.
Method: I start with the proposal that the sense of agency is elicited by metacognitive monitoring representations that are used in the intentional inhibition of thoughts. I apply this model to verbal hallucinations and the like and examine the plausibility of this model explaining deficits associated with these symptoms.
Results: By tying the sense of agency to metacognitive inhibition I propose that the loss of a sense of agency in certain psychotic symptoms is accompanied by a particular deficit in the patient’s ability to control their own thinking. This is consistent with the experiences of those at high risk of developing hallucinations, who report more intrusive thoughts than controls. The model I present is able to explain why those at risk of developing verbal hallucinations and those suffering from verbal hallucinations have deficits in the intentional inhibition of thought. I defend this account from a possible objection by distinguishing the form of the intentional inhibition deficit displayed by those suffering verbal hallucination from that displayed by those suffering from orbital-frontal cortex lesions and post-traumatic stress disorder.
Conclusion: A plausible hypothesis is that the sense of agency over thoughts is elicited by the metacognitive monitoring representation used to intentionally inhibit thoughts. The deficit in the sense of agency over thoughts associated with certain psychotic symptoms could be explained by a failure to properly metacognitively monitor certain thought processes.

Toward a Cognitive Model of the Sense of Embodiment in a (Rubber) Hand

by Glenn Carruthers

in press in the Journal of Consciousness Studies

The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is the experience of an artificial body part as being a real body part and the... more The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is the experience of an artificial body part as being a real body part and the experience of touch coming from that artificial body part. An explanation of this illusion would take significant steps towards explaining the experience of embodiment in one’s own body. I present a new cognitive model to explain the RHI. I argue that the sense of embodiment arises when an on-line representation of the candidate body part is represented as matching an off-line prototype representation of what one’s body is usually like. The cause of the sense of embodiment in the model body part only partially overlaps with the causes of proprioceptive drift, which commonly accompanies the RHI, and so is compatible with observed dissociations between the illusion and proprioceptive drift. The distinguishing features of this model are the off-line body representation, and the process of matching an on-line model to an off-line model, both of which are to be understood in terms of a conceptual space.

Key Words: Rubber Hand Illusion; RHI; Sense of Embodiment; Self Consciousness; Body Experience

THEORY OF MIND, MIND-BODY DUALISM, AND THEIR (MIS)APPLICATION IN THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

by K. Mitch Hodge

This Paper was Submitted to Cognitive Science on 04 March 2012 in slightly revised form.
THIS IS A MANUSCRIPT IN PRODUCTION: PLEASE DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE THIS MANUSCRIPT WITHOUT THE AUTHOR’S PERMISSION.

Abstract: The cognitive science of religion has contributed greatly to our understanding the cognitive processes... more Abstract: The cognitive science of religion has contributed greatly to our understanding the cognitive processes involved in religious beliefs and practices. The author warns, however, that current research trends and theories in the cognitive science of religion threatens the relevancy of this project. By misapplying the psychological and philosophical theories of mind and mind-body dualism to supernatural agents, these cognitive theories are positing supernatural agents that are not representative of anthropologically documented instances. The author traces the historical patterns and logical errors that have contributed to this trend, and then demonstrates how these patterns and logical errors are present in the literature. Finally, the author suggests why cognitive scientists of religion have fallen prey to these errors and ways to rectify them.

Is computation based on interpretation?

by Marcin Miłkowski

Semiotica, 2012, vol. 188, no. 1, 219-228

Perception, Action and Consciousness - Sensorimotor Dynamics and Two Visual Systems - Reviewed by Mirko Farina

by Mirko Farina

forthcoming in The Journal of Mind and Behavior (JMB)

Language and Emotional Knowledge: A Case Study on Ability and Disability in Williams Syndrome

by Christine James

Published in Biosemiotics, August 2009.