Philosophy of Agency

Agency, Necessity, and Normativity

by Antti Kauppinen

This is a draft of a paper that was originally to be a blog post, but grew too long. Comments would be very welcome.

According to constitutivists like Korsgaard and Velleman, moral requirements can be (roughly speaking) derived from... more According to constitutivists like Korsgaard and Velleman, moral requirements can be (roughly speaking) derived from what is constitutive of agency, so we have internal reason to act morally simply in virtue of being agents. This is challenged by David Enoch, who argues that even if agency is inescapable and has a constitutive aim, it doesn't follow we have reason to care about or act on it. I argue that while Enoch's criticisms hit the mark, it may be possible to formulate a requirement of rationality that allows a kind of successful bootstrapping from agency to reasons even though we have no reason to be agents.

New frontiers in the neuroscience of the sense of agency

by Nicole David

Narratives of identity, home, and return of Kosovarian refugees: Steps toward a postmodern sense of agency

by Marco Gemignani

Distributed language: implications for volition

by Stephen J. Cowley

The attached paper is a draft for a Russian volume that explored new perspectives on language. It was translated and appeared in Russian as:
С. Дж. Коули. Понятие распределенности языка и его значение для волеизъявления // А.В.Кравченко (ред.). Наука о языке в изменяющейся парадигме знания (Studia linguistica cognitiva 2). Иркутск: БГУЭП, 2009. С. 192-227.

It can be cited as:
Cowley, S. J. (2009). Distributed language: implications for volition. (In Russian). In A, Kravchenko (ed.) New Perspectives on Language and Cognition, pp. 192-227, Irkutsk: Baikal University Press.

Most post-Cartesian views trace human agency to the organism and are thus obliged to either leave aside questions of... more Most post-Cartesian views trace human agency to the organism and are thus obliged to either leave aside questions of volition or, worse, seek explanations in the individual brain. By contrast, when language is recognised as distributed, human cognition is seen to arise as we adapt to life in a collective world. Since language is embodied AND non-local, learning emerges under dual or multiple control –babies learn to talk by participating in “distributed cognitive systems.” In relation to human volition, this opens a gap between tracing actions and feelings to a single brain and privileging the person ‘level’. Although behaviour emerges as people deal with circumstances together, language gives some control over what is not said or done. By focusing on the possible (and what we imagine), we can use the real duration associated with verbal and other thoughts. In short, it is because language is embodied and conventional that we can modulate action/perception: this enables individual organisms to act as living subjects who exert a degree of control over what they – and others – say and do.

Anarchsim Strikes Back

by Christian Garland

Unedited version of shortened review of Franks, B. (2006) Rebel Alliances: The Means and Ends of Contemporary British Anarchisms (Edinburgh: AK Press) published in Radical Philosophy 172 http://www.radicalphilosophy.com/reviews/142-reviews

A Dual-power situation? Communization and the Materiality of Anti-power

by Christian Garland

Text of talk given at 'Taking Control' Conference, 12 March 2011
SOAS, University of London
http://takingcontrol2011.wordpress.com/

'Autonomism'

by Christian Garland

‘Autonomism’ pps. 322-325 International Encyclopaedia of Revolution and Protest: 1500-the present ed. Ness, I. (Oxford & New York: Blackwell Publishing) http://www.revolutionprotestencyclopedia.com/public/

The (Anti-) Politics of Autonomy: Between Marxism and Anarchism

by Christian Garland

Paper given at Is Black and Red Dead? Conference Centre for the Study of Social and Global and Justice (CSSGJ) University of Nottingham, 7-8 September, 2009. Version published in Theory in Action - Journal of the Transformative Studies Institute(TSI) Vol.3 No.4 pps.8-16 http://www.transformativestudies.org/wpcontent/uploads/10.3798tia.1937-0237.10030.pdf

Logics of Resistance: Autonomous Social Movements in Theory and Practise

by Christian Garland

Review essay of De Angelis, M. (2007) The Beginning of History (London: Pluto Press) and Katsiaficas, G. (2007) The Subversion of Politics: European Autonomous Social Movements and the Decolonization of Everyday Life (Edinburgh & Oakland: AK Press) in Studies in Social and Political Thought Issue 14 September 2007 pps.81-87

In-Against-and-Beyond: Negativity, Autonomy, and Class Struggle

by Christian Garland

Review essay of Negativity and Revolution: Adorno and Political Activism eds. Holloway, J. Matamoros, F. & Tischler, S. (2009) (London: Pluto Press) in Logos: A Journal of Modern Society and Culture Vol. 8, Issue 2

Negating that which Negates us: Marcuse, Critical Theory and the New Politics of Refusal

by Christian Garland

‘Negating that which Negates us: Marcuse, Critical Theory and the New Politics of Refusal’ (under review) in Radical Philosophy Review. Version of paper presented as part of Panel 24: ‘Looting, Refusing, Negating, Embodying’, 'Critical Refusals’ Fourth Biennal Conference of the International Herbert Marcuse Society, University of Pennsylvania, 27-29 October 2011

Review of Holloway, J. (2010) Crack Capitalism (London: Pluto)

by Christian Garland

Review of Holloway, J. (2010) Crack Capitalism (London: Pluto) for Marx and Philosophy Review of Books

In seinem Anderen bei sich selbst zu sein: Toward a Recuperation of Hegel's Metaphysics of Agency

by Ayon Maharaj

Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 11.1 (Fall 2006), 225-255.

This essay argues for a distinctly post-Kantian understanding of Hegel's definition of freedom as "being at home... more This essay argues for a distinctly post-Kantian understanding of Hegel's definition of freedom as "being at home with oneself in one's other." I first briefly isolate the inadequacies of some dominant interpretations of Hegelian freedom and proceed to develop a more adequate theoretical frame by turning to Theodor Adorno. Then I interpret Hegel's notion of the freedom of the will in the Philosophy of Right in terms of his speculative metaphysics. Finally, I briefly examine Hegel's treatment of agency in the Phenomenology of Spirit in order to establish important continuities between the early and late Hegel.

Autonomy and Desire in Machines and Cognitive Agent Systems

by Kevin Magill

Co-authored with Yasemin J. Erden, published 'Online First' in 'Cognitive Computation', 2012, DOI DOI 10.1007/s12559-012-9140-9. Available through subscribing institutions. Drop me a line if you can't access.
Substantially revised from 2011 paper of same title.

The development of cognitive agent systems relies on theories of agency, within which the concept of desire is key.... more The development of cognitive agent systems relies on theories of agency, within which the concept of desire is key. Indeed, in the quest to develop increasingly autonomous cognitive agent systems, desire has had a significant role. We argue, however, that insufficient attention has been given to analysis and clarification of desire as a complex concept. Accordingly, in this paper, we will draw on some key philosophical accounts of the nature of desire, including what distinguishes it from other mental and motivational states, in order to identify some key characteristics of desire as a complex concept. We will then draw on these in order to investigate the role, definition and adequacy of concepts of desire within applied theoretical models of agency and agent systems.

Distributed Language: cognition beyond the brain

by Stephen J. Cowley

This short paper was a presentation at the Annual International Forum in the Humanities Conference on Interdisciplinarity in Cognitive Science Research, State University for the Humanities, Moscow (March 2012).

As Cognitive Science develops a view of agency, we are learning much about human cognition. First, as living things,... more As Cognitive Science develops a view of agency, we are learning much about human cognition. First, as living things, we depend on active embodiment. Since, this is incompatible with reduction to information processing, we are bound to ask what cognition is –and what it is to be a person. On a ‘4E’ view, agency is embodied, embedded, enacted and extended. This applies, moreover, to living beings as diverse as earthworms, beavers, wolves and humans. To understand human agency, I therefore argue for a more radical view. Pursuing this, it is stressed that, while situated, language is also non-local: our voices always echo those of others. While grounded in first-order activity, language also enacts second-order practices. It is its symbiotic nature that makes homo sapiens ecologically special. Once acknowledged, this opens up a distributed perspective on language and cognition. By means of clarification, I offer thick description of a interactional moment where language links the brain with the world beyond the body. At this instant, the words actually spoken are background: the verbal aspect of speech acts as a Zeitgeber for bodily coupling that directly realizes human values. Finally, I place the distributed view of linguistic cognition against themes in Russian psycholinguistic tradition.

Refuting a Frankfurtian Objection to Frankfurt-Type Counterexamples

by Ezio Di Nucci

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2010, 13 (2): 207-213

In this paper I refute an apparently obvious objection to Frankfurttype counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate... more In this paper I refute an apparently obvious objection to Frankfurttype counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities according to which if in the counterfactual scenario the agent does not act, then the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. And because what happens in
the counterfactual scenario cannot count as the relevant agent’s actions given the sort of external control that agent is under, then we can ground responsibility on that agent having been able to avoid acting. I illustrate how this objection to Frankfurt’s famous counterexample is motivated by Frankfurt’s own ‘guidance’ view of agency. My argument consists in showing
that even if we concede that the agent does not act in the counterfactual scenario, that does not show that the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario. This depends on the crucial distinction between ‘not φ-ing’ and ‘avoiding φ-ing’.

Simply, false

by Ezio Di Nucci

Analysis 2009, 69 (1): 69-78

According to the Simple View (SV) of intentional action famously refuted by Bratman (1984 & 1987), ’-ing is... more According to the Simple View (SV) of intentional action famously refuted by Bratman (1984 & 1987), ’-ing is intentional only if the agent intended to ’. In this paper I show that none of five different objections to Bratman’s counter-example – McCann’s (1991), Garcia’s (1990), Sverdlik’s (1996),
Stout’s (2005), and Adams’s (1986) – works. Therefore Bratman’s contention that SV is false still stands...

Rational Constraints and the Simple View

by Ezio Di Nucci

Analysis 2010, 70 (3): 481-86

According to the Simple View of intentional action, I have intentionally switched on the light only if I intended to... more According to the Simple View of intentional action, I have intentionally switched on the light only if I intended to switch on the light. The idea that intending to ’ is necessary for intentionally ’-ing has been challenged by Bratman (1984, 1987) with a counter-example in which a videogame player is trying to hit either of two targets while knowing that she cannot
hit both targets. When a target is hit, the game finishes. And if both targets are about to be hit simultaneously, the game shuts down. The player knows that she cannot hit both targets, but still she concludes that, given her skills, the best strategy is to have a go at each target at the same time. Suppose she
hits target 1. It seems obvious that she has hit target 1 intentionally. But, Bratman argues, she could not have intended to hit target 1. Since the scenario is perfectly symmetrical, had the player intended to hit target 1, she would have also had to intend to hit target 2. But the player knows that she cannot hit both targets.

Agency, Performance and Recitation as Textual Tradition in Mesopotamia. An Akkadian Text of the Late Babylonian Period to Make a Woman Conceive (in preparation).

by M. Erica Couto-Ferreira

In Magali de Haro Sanchez (ed), Écrire la magie dans l’Antiquité – Scrivere la magia nell’antichità. Proceedings of the International Workshop (Liège, October 13-15, 2011). Liège: Presses universitaires de Liège (PULG – Sciences Humaines).

Beyond Dualism: A Plea for an Extended Taxonomy of Agency Impairment in Addiction

by Anke Snoek

Anke Snoek, Jeanette Kennett & Craig Fry (2012): Beyond Dualism: A Plea for an Extended Taxonomy of Agency Impairment in Addiction, AJOB Neuroscience, 3:2, 56-57

Pickard (2012) claims that the neurobiological or disease model of addiction hinders the recovery of people because it... more Pickard (2012) claims that the neurobiological or disease model of addiction hinders the recovery of people because it undermines their feeling of self-efficacy and agency. Substance
users are “not aided by being treated as victims of a neurobiological disease, as opposed to agents of their own recovery” (40). Although Pickard acknowledges that claims of powerlessness or loss of agency can have a functional role in the self-narratives of substance users in excusing them from blame, she primarily focuses on the negative effects of the disease model on the recovery of substance users. Preliminary evidence from in-depth interviews with heroin-dependent participants in our current cohort study on addiction and moral identity supports Pickard’s claims in part: Substance users describe grades of control, psychological distress, and loss of options, and an ambivalent attitude toward their belief in elf-efficacy. However the interviews also provide points of critique.